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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

FOIA review completed on 12 January 2017. Portions of this document no longer meet the classification standards of E.O. 13526, Section 1.4. As such, I am downgrading specific portion-marked paragraphs as "UNCLASSIFIED."

Partial classification downgrade executed by:

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**CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 (U)
GLOBAL DETERRENCE AND STRIKE (U)**

1 FEBRUARY 2008

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HEADQUARTERS, US STRATEGIC COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NE 68113-6500
1 FEB 2008

SUBJECT: CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 (U)

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1. (U) CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 fulfills a requirement established in Appendix B to Enclosure D, CJCSI 3110.01E, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 05, and is effective for planning purposes only until Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approval and plan implementation, scheduled for 1 February 2008.
- (U) 2. ~~(S)~~ Upon SecDef approval and plan implementation, CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 supersedes USCINCSSTRAT OPLAN 8044-98 dated 25 January 2001, CDRUSSTRATCOM Global Strike Interim Capability OPORD dated 08 September 2004, and CDRUSSTRATCOM Strategic Deterrence Interim Capability OPORD dated 10 May 2005, in their entireties. Strategic forces will continue to be capable of providing a credible response to any attack at any time. The nuclear attack structure and all developed Global Strike Support Documents in existence on 1 February 2008 will remain in effect.
3. (U) CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 was coordinated with USTRANSCOM, USJFCOM, USSOCOM, USPACOM, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, the Joint Staff, the Services, and supporting component and task force commanders during preparation.
4. (U) The supporting plans listed in Base Plan, paragraph 3b (Tasks) must be prepared and forwarded to this headquarters for review within 60 days of SecDef approval of CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


MARK H. OWEN
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, Plans and Policy

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CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 (U)

(U) SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS AND RECORD OF CHANGES

- (U) 1. ~~(S)~~ The long title of this plan is CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08, Global Deterrence and Strike. The short title is CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08.
2. (U) This document is classified **SECRET** to protect information revealing operation plans of the US military. Information in OPLAN 8010 must be disseminated only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of the plan, including those required to develop supporting plans.
3. (U) This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, title 18 of the United States Code, sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of information contained herein, in any manner, to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
4. (U) Reproduction of this document, in whole or in part without permission of this headquarters, is prohibited, except as required for the preparation of supporting plans.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

<u>CHANGE NUMBER</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>EFFECTIVE DATE</u>
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USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 (U) Executive Summary (U)

1. (U) Situation

a. ~~(S)~~ **General.** Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) OPLAN 8010 responds to Contingency Planning Guidance FY 05 and CJCSI 3110.01E and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 06 (JSCP FY 06) tasking that directs development of a Global Deterrence and Strike Plan. The purpose of OPLAN 8010 is to provide national leadership with a (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC typical Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) developed plan. The basic annexes will describe how USSTRATCOM's capabilities will be used to address each adversary. Not all described activities will be appropriate in all circumstances, but CDRUSSTRATCOM will choose each as required to achieve the objectives and effects for (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC. In addition, for this plan to be successful, planning coordination must occur between each affected Geographic Combatant Command during the (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC. Also, a close working relationship with the interagency is critical for execution of (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

Finally, the development and implementation of strategic themes and messages that support the identified actions in (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC is essential for the identified deterrent action to be effective.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(U) (1) ~~(S)~~ **Political-Military Environment.** Threats to the United States and its vital interests are diverse and cannot be fully predicted. Numerous nations and non-state actors are aggressively pursuing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

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and associated delivery systems as a means to advance their interests through intimidation and coercion. Within this dynamic and uncertain security environment, OPLAN 8010 supports the National Defense Strategy's ways of assuring allies and friends, dissuading potential adversaries, deterring aggression, and defeating adversaries.

(2) ~~(S)~~ **Global Deterrence.** The current political/military context and our National Security Strategy dictate the need for a new US deterrence strategy that

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

Modern challenges require a new concept of "waging" deterrence, paired with revised joint force capabilities that provide a wider range of military deterrent options. Effective deterrence is adversary dependent; each adversary has a unique decision calculus that guides behaviors and actions.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

These strategies and actions span daily operations as well as all phases of conflict. Our awareness and understanding of the current global security environment; our need to assure allies and friends; and the requirement to deter, and possibly defeat, our adversaries all dictate the status and operational readiness

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

CDRUSSTRATCOM will adjust the posture of those forces to reflect changing security conditions. The USSTRATCOM

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

Effective deterrence operations convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten US vital interests by decisively influencing their decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly demonstrating the will and means to deny benefits and/or impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome. Because of the uncertain future security environment, new threats to US vital interests may emerge; OPLAN 8010 deterrence strategy and planning are sufficiently robust and flexible to accommodate these changes when they occur.

(3) ~~(S)~~ **Global Strike (GS) Execution.** Per the DO JOC, GS is the capability to plan rapidly and deliver limited-duration and extended-range attacks to achieve precision effects against highly valued adversary assets in support of national or theater commander objectives.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

Combatant commanders will normally conduct GS (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC The supported and supporting command relationships associated with GS are delineated in paragraph 5 (Command and Control) and Annex J (Command Relationships). Combatant commanders may use in-theater capabilities and global capabilities individually or in concert with each other, but the defining characteristic of GS will be its unique blend of military capabilities without resort to large numbers of general purpose forces traditionally associated with major combat operations.

(U) b. ~~(S)~~ Area of Concern. CDRUSSTRATCOM has no geographic area of responsibility (AOR) for normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command associated with area responsibility. CDRUSSTRATCOM will be the supported commander for OPLAN 8010 courses of action (COAs) development in full partnership with the affected GCC. The CDRUSSTRATCOM's area of interest (AOI) for military operations is global, particularly involving operations that transcend GCC boundaries. CDRUSSTRATCOM must be prepared to support operations as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) as well as to support combatant commander requests for OPLAN 8010 planning, option execution, or operational support. OPLAN 8010 forces will operate on a global basis as necessary to satisfy national or theater objectives.

c. ~~(S)~~ OPLAN 8010 is global in scope. (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC to threaten US freedom of action, vital interests, and military capabilities located in different geographic AORs and across multiple domains. CDRUSSTRATCOM's global responsibilities coupled with the GCCs' adversary focus demands a unique, adversary-specific plan construct for Global Deterrence and Strike efforts.

(1). (U) Adversary-Specific Campaign Planning.

(a) ~~(S)~~ Comprehensive and tailored adversary-specific campaign planning and intelligence for this OPLAN are (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC

(U) (b) ~~(S)~~ Plan objectives encompass a comprehensive range of effects-based options that are tailored to specific scenarios. Each appendix contains enemy courses of action, and desired regional end-states and strategic objectives originating from USG policy and reflect combatant command collaboration. These appendices translate strategic objectives into desired effects tailored to potential political/military contexts. They also translate effects into a spectrum of options that work in concert with an integrated communication campaign to shape

adversary perceptions, intentions, and actions across all campaign phases as well as influence other regional and global actors.

(c) ~~(S)~~ Depending on the level of planning, each option contains

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC

(U) (d) ~~(S)~~ Adversary appendices are designed for use by all commands and agencies.

d. (U) Friendly Forces

(1) (U) Center of Gravity. The nation's ability to deter aggression or coercion rests on both the perception and reality of its capabilities and political will. The perception of the nation's capability and will is crucial for influencing adversary decision making as it affects that adversary's calculation of costs and benefits, and the consequences of restraint, while the reality of that adversary's capability and will determines the likelihood of successfully defeating its offensive capability. Due to the inseparable nature of national capability and will in deterrence, they represent a single center of gravity, supported by the following critical capabilities: global situational awareness; command and control; forward presence; security cooperation and military integration and interoperability; force projection; active and passive defenses; and strategic communication. US critical vulnerabilities are based on adversary capabilities and therefore will vary from adversary to adversary.

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC

(2) (U) Strength and composition. CDRUSSTRATCOM has Combatant Command (Command Authority) (COCOM) for forces delineated in Forces for Unified Commands (FY 06) and Global Force Management Guidance (FY 05). CDRUSSTRATCOM will plan with all forces reasonably deemed essential to meet objectives.

e. (U) Legal considerations. Legal review is required in the development of strike options and prior to option execution to ensure compliance with the US Constitution, applicable US statutes, international treaty/agreement obligations to which the US is a party, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), customary international law, rules of engagement (ROE), and national policies. The use of any weapon, kinetic or non-kinetic, must satisfy the key principles of LOAC: military necessity, avoidance of unnecessary suffering, proportionality, and

discrimination or distinction. All of these factors must be taken into account during COA development and execution.

f. (U) Risk /Mitigation.

(U) (1) ~~(S)~~ Risk. Deterrence fails. Mitigation. Develop readily executable or adaptively planned response options to de-escalate, defend against, or defeat hostile adversary actions.

(2) (U) Risk. Unintended second and third order effects on assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence efforts focused on other actors. Mitigation. Cross-indexing proposed deterrence actions and activities across the decision calculus of other adversaries and allies to detect and address potential second and third order effects. Develop MOE/MOP to determine deterrence cause and effect on adversary/actor behavior and perception shift.

(3) (U) Risk. Adversaries misperceive messages. Mitigation. Constantly assessed, culturally appropriate communication strategy tightly integrated through the interagency process.

(4) (U) Military/Operational Risk. Due to the adversary and scenario-specific nature of military/operational risk, these factors are detailed in each

~~(S)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

2. ~~(S)~~ Mission. CDRUSSTRATCOM

~~(S)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

~~(S)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

~~(S)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC drawn from the full spectrum of military power and synchronized with other elements of national power, in order to assure friends and allies, dissuade undesirable military competition, deter aggression (particularly aggression employing WMD), defend US vital interests and, upon order, swiftly defeat adversaries and terminate conflict on terms favorable to the United States.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Overall Plan Objectives.

(U) (1) ~~(S)~~ Deter attacks against US vital interests. This plan focuses on deterring a discrete set of adversaries from attacking US vital interests and, in a broader context, preventing all WMD attacks on US vital interests. The following objectives support this objective: denying benefits, imposing costs, and encouraging adversary restraint. Strategically communicated effects complement and reinforce deterrence actions. In the development of these effects, the actions

must seek to align the adversary's perception with US objectives. Collaboration within the US Government and coalition partners is essential. For the message to be credible, the words and actions must be integrated and consistent.

(2) ~~(S)~~ Defeat attacks against US vital interests. This objective focuses on defeating attacks, particularly WMD attacks, by a discrete set of adversaries possessing the capability and intent to threaten US vital interests or those potential adversaries with capabilities so great that regardless of their intent, planning must account for them. This objective also includes [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4 (a) USSC

time-sensitive scenarios. Defeat includes both offensive and defensive operations.

b. ~~(S)~~ Concept of Operations. This OPLAN employs the JP 5-0 six-phase model as a planning framework. As the strategic context requires, USSTRATCOM will modify the phasing model and objectives to reflect the supported commander's concept of operations. For each phase of the campaign, the following paragraphs describe general activities that relate to each phase and assign specific tasks to USSTRATCOM. The description of the phases and the associated activities are general in nature and may or may not apply to all adversaries. OPLAN 8010 and its supporting annexes describe the conceptual framework, processes, and procedures necessary to effect global deterrence and strike operations in support of national objectives—in other words, the "how" of global deterrence and strike.

[REDACTED] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4 (a) USSC

[REDACTED] provide a range of diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL) actions focused upon creating effects in the operational environment to support adversary-specific objectives. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

[REDACTED] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4 (a) USSC [REDACTED] Particularly during Phase 0 and 1 operations, USSTRATCOM continually evaluates and assesses the strategic environment. As circumstances require, planners group activities into COAs for CDRUSSTRATCOM's decision. These COAs are composed of the strategic context-appropriate activities [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

[REDACTED] and span all elements of national power (DIMEFIL). For those aspects of the approved COA that fall within USSTRATCOM's purview, CDRUSSTRATCOM issues orders to the appropriate subordinates; for those activities that fall to interagency partners, he engages the SecDef and/or the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), to carry them forward to the applicable policymaking forum. Should the prospect for armed conflict increase (Phases 2 and 3), [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC

[REDACTED] With the transition to Phases 4 and 5, USSTRATCOM reconstitutes and continues to

assure the nation's friends and allies and dissuades and deters other actors and adversaries. The common end state for all threats is a Phase 0 environment where US vital interests are neither attacked nor subject to the threat of aggression/coercion. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] For planning purposes, the phasing construct allows for the systematic arrangement of activities and tasks in a logical and anticipated sequence. Some activities from a specified phase may continue into subsequent phases.

(1) ~~(S)~~ Phase 0 (Shape). CDRUSSTRATCOM's goal is to keep all activity in Phase 0. Day-to-day operations and [REDACTED] Assure, Dissuade, and Deter activities and actions, using predominantly diplomatic, informational, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement resources, with the goal to convince the adversary to adopt or maintain a non-threatening posture toward US vital interests. Day-to-day operations also include the identification of new/emergent threats, monitoring and tracking existing threats, ongoing cyberspace operations, Information Operations (IO), SC, and the routine employment of forces for planned deployments, training, and exercises. The transition point to Phase 1 is when a specific crisis arises.

(2) ~~(S)~~ Phase 1 (Deter). The situation has now moved outside of normal day-to-day operations with the emergence of a crisis. Emphasis remains on Assure, Dissuade, and Deter activities and actions, with new actions building on those initiated during Phase 0 with a higher level of intensity and exercising a higher level of military activity, but generally short of using force. CDRUSSTRATCOM, in conjunction with the applicable geographic commander, recommends [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The transition points for this phase are either the crisis is resolved and the end state is achieved, thus allowing a return to Phase 0 (de-escalatory), or the current level of activity is ineffective in achieving end state and there is an increase resource allocation and employment of forces, thus moving into Phase 2 (escalatory).

(U) (3) ~~(S)~~ Phase 2 (Seize the Initiative). As the situation enters Phase 2, the emphasis of deterrent operations moves from diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts to military engagement. USSTRATCOM leads a collaborative

effort with the joint force component commands, the service components, the combatant commanders, and the Joint Staff in order to develop and/or refine options that rapidly deliver the desired kinetic and non-kinetic effects. The Commander's Estimate is based on collaborative activity to facilitate active participation of the affected combatant commanders. As tensions mount, CDRUSSTRATCOM offers the President and SecDef a range of options designed to meet designated objectives and tailored to the current world situation. The transition points for this phase are either the crisis is resolved and the adversary de-escalates, thus allowing a return to Phase 0 or Phase 1 (de-escalatory), or the current level of activity is ineffective in achieving end state and the global security environment warrants decisive operations, thus moving into Phase 3 (escalatory).

(4) ~~(S)~~ Phase 3 (Dominate). During Phase 3, although military conflict has begun, activities continue to deter the adversary from increasing the scope or intensity of conflict and to accept conflict termination on conditions favorable to the US. However, USG will signal its preparation

[Redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC
The President directs options [Redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC
[Redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

[Redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC The President, or SecDef when delegated by the President [Redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

[Redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

[Redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC Likewise, continued assessment of adversary capabilities and intent may result in new or continued employment of deterrent options. The transition to Phase 4 occurs when the current level of Dominate Phase activity is excessive for achieving the end state; the adversary capitulates or as otherwise directed by President or SecDef.

(5) ~~(S)~~ Phase 4 (Stabilize). Phase 4 contains multiple lines of activity, centered around the [Redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC This phase begins after forces have been employed in Phase 3; however, the beginning of this phase does not dictate that Phase 3 activity has ceased. Forces can be recovering and regenerating while other forces are in the Dominate Phase. In general, the objectives of regenerate, reconstitute, and consequence management are in a post-attack and post-employment environment. However, this phase can end with the recovery of employed forces while not necessitating the achievement of the recovery, reconstitution, and consequence management objectives. Employment of capabilities during this phase shapes the information environment to support deterrence. Operations ensure combat forces are available to provide a credible response to any adversary contemplating, or executing, an attack on US territory,

forces, allies, or coalition partners. The transition to Phase 5 occurs when civil authority attains necessary capability to assume responsibility.

(U) (6) ~~(S)~~ Phase 5 (Enable Civil Authority). During this phase, USSTRATCOM will continue to recover and reconstitute its forces. In addition, USSTRATCOM will provide support to the affected GCC, as required, for consequence management activities. As in Phase 4, conduct of operations will set the conditions that ensure combat forces are available to provide a credible response to any adversary contemplating, or executing, an attack on US territory, forces, allies, or coalition partners. The end state to this phase is that the global security environment is stable and balanced; US vital interests are neither attacked nor threatened by attack; and US support of civil authority in adversary state is minimized.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics.

a. (U) Security, logistics, personnel and administrative support will be furnished by supporting commands in accordance with service directives, command arrangements agreements (CAA), memoranda of understanding (MOU), Task Force (TF) operating instructions, and the logistics concept for support operations outlined in CDRUSSTRATCOM plans and directives.

b. (U) GCC and USSTRATCOM components will coordinate with and support lateral and subordinate unit commanders in maintaining a daily capability to support the OPLAN 8010 execution.

(U) c. ~~(S)~~ USSTRATCOM will perform a logistics supportability assessment and logistics risk assessment to identify any potential logistics shortfalls prior to OPLAN 8010 execution.

5. (U) Command and Control.

a. (U) Command Relationships. The affected GCC, other combatant commanders, agencies, and USSTRATCOM components will participate in collaborative planning in order to provide appropriate close, timely coordination during option development. The GCC will normally execute subsequent GS operations as the supported commander in their AOR. The President or SecDef will designate supported and supporting relationships for execution upon option selection. See Annex J (Command Relationships) for the organizational structure expected to exist during execution.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC will examine command relationships by scenario through collaboration.

b. ~~(S)~~ Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems.

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC



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USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 (U)
CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE (U)

(U) REFERENCE: (U) US Strategic Command Strategic Target Planning
Security Classification Guide, 1 Oct 2006 (S)

(U) ~~(S)~~ This classification guidance provides users with general categories of subjects and levels of protection. The level of protection listed, represents the highest probable level of protection required by these subjects. If a document derived from this plan contains particular portions that are unclassified when standing alone, but classified information will be revealed when they are combined or associated, those portions shall be marked as unclassified and the page shall be marked with the highest classification of any information on or revealed by the page. An explanation will be added to the page or document identifying the combination or association of information that necessitated the higher classification.

<u>(U) SUBJECT REQUIRING PROTECTION</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>
(U) Operation code word.	S
(U) Concept of nuclear operations, including order of battle execution, circumstances, operating locations, resources required, tactical maneuvers, deployments, actions, and objectives.	S
(U) Classification guide.	S
(U) Participating nuclear units, including types, vulnerabilities, locations, quantities, readiness status, deployments, redeployments, and details of movement of US and friendly forces.	S
(U) DEFCON status and meaning.	U
(U) DEFCON changes.	S
(U) Location, itineraries, and travel mode of key US and friendly military and civilian leaders.	S

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<u>(U) SUBJECT REQUIRING PROTECTION</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>
(U) Limitations and vulnerabilities of US forces.	S
(U) Characteristics and capabilities of US weapons and related sustainability.	S/FRD
(U) US vulnerabilities and limitations.	S
(U) Status and details of US alliances, including status of forces, deployment right, privileges, airfield use, and port availability.	S
(U) Estimates of operational effectiveness; including intelligence, counterintelligence, rescue, and reconnaissance.	S
(U) Communications effectiveness, sustainability, and limitations.	S
(U) Planning assumptions.	S
(U) Target area weather information.	S
(U) OPLAN 8010 Change effective date.	U
(U) OPLAN 8010 Change effective date and effective time. (Note 1)	U/C
(U) Employment parameters that could be used to bound capabilities or limitations of the OPLAN 8010 planning process.	C
(U) General descriptions or specific parameters used in planning nuclear sorties, (i.e., airspeeds, altitudes, distances, generation times). (Note 2)	S
(U) Any planning guidance used to limit OPLAN 8010 nuclear aircraft route of flight either directly or through relationships with other aircraft.	S
(U) Any tactic or procedure (either defensive or offensive) which reveals an exploitable OPLAN 8010 aircraft/missile/weapon limitation or capability.	S

<u>(U) SUBJECT REQUIRING PROTECTION</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>
(U) Bombers, tankers, and reconnaissance assigned dispersal/Forward Located Aircraft Generation bases.	S
(U) Identity of bases capable of being assigned as Directed Planning Option (DPO) bomber post-strike recovery. (Note 3)	U/S
(U) The country where DPO post-strike recovery bases are located. (Note 4)	S
(S) Actual (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC (Notes 5, 6, 7)	TSRD/ RD
(S) Planned (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC (Note 8)	S/TS
(U) Actual displayed routings or flight plans for individual tanker aircraft or all tanker aircraft assigned to one unit supporting nuclear sorties.	S
(U) Actual displayed routings or flight plans for two or more tanker units supporting nuclear sorties.	TS
(U) Listings of all OPLAN 8010 committed nuclear bombers with mated tankers.	S
(U) Listings of all committed tankers and mated nuclear bombers with rendezvous information (e.g., times, track, offload, etc.)	TS
(U) Listing of individual nuclear aircraft cells (bombers and mated tankers) or those nuclear cells assigned to a single unit, with rendezvous information (e.g., times, track, offload, etc.).	S
(U) Listing of total number of tankers and nuclear bombers committed to OPLAN 8010.	S
(U) Listing of tanker degrades per OPLAN 8010.	S
(U) E-6B peacetime operation areas (OPAREAs).	U

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<u>(U) SUBJECT REQUIRING PROTECTION</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>
(U) [redacted] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4 (a) USSC	S
(U) [redacted] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4 (a) USSC	TS
(U) The country in which a TERCOM map is located. (Note 9)	S
(U) Flexible targeting capability of strategic nuclear forces	S
(U) That OPLAN 8010 consists of various attack options. (Note 10)	U/S/TS
(S) [redacted] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC (Note 11)	U/S/TS
(U) DPO. (Note 12)	U/S/TS
(S) Specific [redacted] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC [redacted] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC (Note 13)	S/TS
(S) [redacted] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC OPLAN 8010 force coordination. (Note 14)	S/TS
(U) Existence of a Secure Reserve Force (SRF). (Note 15)	U
(U) Targeting techniques. (Note 16)	S
(U) Termination methodology and techniques. (Note 17)	U/S/TS
(U) [redacted] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4 (a) USSC [redacted] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4 (a) USSC	TS
(U) Information revealing operational plans and capabilities of reconnaissance forces. (Note 18)	S
(U) A reference to a particular reconnaissance unit's objectives and dispersal or deployment location. (Note 19)	S
(U) Reconnaissance objectives associated with any attack option.	TS
(U) Reconnaissance sorties associated with any attack option.	TS
(U) OPLAN 8010 Reconnaissance Plan priority. (Note 20)	S/TS

<u>(U) SUBJECT REQUIRING PROTECTION</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>
(U) Classification of ballistic missile employment parameters that could be used to bound capabilities or limitations should be marked in accordance with the specific weapon system security classification guide. (Note 21)	S/TS
(U) Fact that USSTRATCOM or an alternate site is currently conducting adaptive nuclear planning. (Note 22)	U/S
(U) Fact that adaptive nuclear planning has occurred in the past or will occur in the future. (Note 23)	U/S
(U) Individual component nuclear planning timeline (i.e., time to accomplish weapon application).	C
(U) That (b)(1) Sec. 1.4 (a) USSC in support of OPLAN 8010.	U
(U) Location of CONUS survivable Alternate Recovery Bases (ARBs).	TS
(U) The number of OPLAN 8010 nuclear committed sorties/units. (Note 24)	S/TS

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(U) Notes

1. (U) Effective date and time for Interim Changes other than start of OPLAN 8010 are UNCLASSIFIED.
2. (U) Common known procedures or general guidelines that do not reveal exploitable data are UNCLASSIFIED. Nuclear weapons employment data is SECRET RD/FRD, as applicable.
3. (U) The concept of bomber post-strike is UNCLASSIFIED. Identity of bases actually assigned as DPO bomber recovery bases is TOP SECRET until declaration of A-hour. Identity of an OPLAN 8010 post-strike recovery base assigned to a specific OPLAN 8010 nuclear sortie is SECRET. Knowledge of the nuclear Post-strike Recovery Base Plan is limited to Armed Forces personnel, civilian employees, and contractors employed by the Department of Defense (DOD) in support of military programs. The concept of Recovery and Regeneration is UNCLASSIFIED.
4. (U) Knowledge of the nuclear Post-strike Recovery Base Plan is limited to Armed Forces personnel, civilian employees, and contractors employed by the DOD in support of military programs.
5. (U) Upgrade to RD/FRD with weapons data.

6. (S) [redacted] is TS/NC2-ESI. An actual

[redacted]

7. (S) Complete data of a [redacted] and is TS information. Refer to protection of the OPLAN 8010 directives for specific category.

8. (S) [redacted] are classified TOP SECRET. [redacted]

[redacted] are classified TOP SECRET. [redacted]

[redacted] are SECRET. [redacted]

[redacted]

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(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC [redacted] and is TOP SECRET.
(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC [redacted] is TS/.

9. (U) (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC [redacted]

10. (U) The fact that OPLAN 8010 consists of various nuclear attack options is UNCLASSIFIED. The number of nuclear attack options is SECRET. The details of nuclear attack options are TOP SECRET.

11. ~~(S)~~ The term (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC [redacted] is FOUO, by itself. That OPLAN 8010 consists of (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC [redacted] is SECRET. Specific nuclear option objectives are TOP SECRET.

12. (U) The term "Directed Planning Option" (DPO) is FOUO, by itself. The total number of DPOs is SECRET. The definition/purpose is TOP SECRET.

13. ~~(S)~~ Details associated with (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC [redacted] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC [redacted] are classified TOP SECRET.

14. (U) Specific nuclear attack option structure, methodology and targets are classified TOP SECRET.

15. (U) The purpose of the Secure Reserve Force (SRF) is SECRET. The exact composition of the SRF which identifies specific numbers is TOP SECRET.

16. (U) Specific nuclear targeting techniques are classified TOP SECRET.

17. ~~(S)~~ That the cessation of an OPLAN 8010 (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC [redacted] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC [redacted] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC [redacted] is SECRET. Specific termination instructions are classified TOP SECRET.

18. (U) Disseminate only to those agencies whose official reconnaissance force duties specifically require knowledge.

19. (U/~~FOUO~~) Locations may be listed as destination on unclassified DD175/1801 as long as no reference is made to the (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC [redacted] (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a) USSC [redacted] objectives.

20. (U) TOP SECRET with description.

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21. (U) See specific weapon systems security classification guide for proper classification.
22. (U) The conduct of a nuclear adaptive planning exercise is UNCLASSIFIED. Any association with the date, sortie, target, etc. is SECRET.
23. (U) Any association with the date, sortie, target, etc. is SECRET.
24. (U) Nuclear forces committed for each individual leg of an OPLAN 8010 nuclear sortie is SECRET. If combined with other force commitment data, such as patrol areas or commit times, the numbers are TOP SECRET. When force commitment data for all three legs is combined, the information is TS.