



[REDACTED]

● ROUTINE

STATE/INR NMCC/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA TREAS SDO CES

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NSC/S FBI NIO

[REDACTED]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

DIST 25 October 1974

[REDACTED]

1.5 (c)

1.

2.

COMMENT: ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1974 GENERAL CARLOS PRATS, FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE CHILEAN ARMY, WAS ASSASSINATED BY UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS IN BUENOS AIRES, WHERE PRATS HAD BEEN IN EXILE SINCE THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SALVADOR ALLENDE ON 11 SEPTEMBER 1973.) ACCORDING TO-

[REDACTED] OFFICIAL ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT CIRCLES CONSIDER THE ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL CARLOS PRATS TO BE THE WORK OF CHILEANS. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THIS OPINION WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE BOMB USED IN THE ASSASSINATION WAS CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN THOSE ORDINARILY USED IN ARGENTINA AND

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SECRET

(dissem controls)

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~~SECRET~~

(classification)

[REDACTED]
(dissem controls)

ON THE FACT THAT THE ASSASSINATION ~~WAS NOT CARRIED OUT IN THE MANNER~~
IN WHICH SUCH TERRORIST ACTS ARE USUALLY EXECUTED BY ARGENTINE
GROUPS. IN ADDITION, NO GROUP HAS TAKEN CREDIT FOR THE ASSASSINATION,
WHICH IS UNLIKE ARGENTINE EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS, AND PRATS HAD
NO IMPORTANCE ON THE ARGENTINE POLITICAL SCENE. [REDACTED] COMPLAINT :
[REDACTED] THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS AMONG OFFICIAL ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT CIRCLES REGARDING WHETHER THE ASSASSINATION WAS THE WORK
OF A CHILEAN LEFT-WING OR RIGHT-WING GROUP.)

3. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1.5 (c)

4. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE HAD SEEN
GENERAL PRATS IN LATE SEPTEMBER AND THAT PRATS HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE
HAD RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM A CHILEAN ATTEMPTING TO ASSUME AN
ARGENTINE ACCENT. THE CALLER WARNED PRATS THAT A TEAM WAS PREPARING
TO ASSASSINATE HIM, THE CALLER ADDING THAT HE OPPOSED THE ASSASSINA-
TION. ACCORDING TO PRATS, THE CALLER SUGGESTED THAT PRATS HOLD A
PRESS CONFERENCE TO ANNOUNCE THIS THREAT, EXPLAINING THAT THE ANNOUNCE-
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MENT WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE TEAM TO CANCEL THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. 5
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THE CALLER ALSO SUGGESTED THAT PRATS SHOULD CARRY OUT HIS PLANNED TRIP 3
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TO BRAZIL. PRATS TOLD [REDACTED] THAT HE HAD NOT CONTEMPLATED SUCH 1

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

A TRIP BUT THAT HE HAD USED ALLEGED TRAVEL TO BRAZIL AS A PRETEXT WITH CHILEAN CONSUL GENERAL ALVARO D R O G U E T T TO OBTAIN A PASSPORT.

1.5 (c)

5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INSISTS THAT PRATS WAS NOT POLITICALLY ACTIVE IN BUENOS AIRES. HOWEVER, PRATS HAD NEARLY COMPLETED HIS MEMOIRS WHICH STRONGLY CONDEMNED MANY NON-POPULAR UNITY POLITICIANS AND MILITARY OFFICERS. AFTER PRATS' ASSASSINATION, HIS DAUGHTER TOOK THE MANUSCRIPT OF THE MEMOIRS BACK TO SANTIAGO.

1.5 (c)

6. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

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