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COMMANDS, THE MILITARY SERVICES, NSA, AND DIA. EVERY REASONABLE
EFFORT IS MADE TO ENSURE THAT INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES REPRESENT THE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY VIEW.

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SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST {MID} 150-4A
SECTION 1 OF 3
/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY
SUBJ: (U) THE UNITED NATIONS' CHALLENGES IN INDONESIA'S EAST TIMOR
DOI: 3 AUG 99 {AS OF 1000 EST}
TEXT: 1. (U) BECAUSE DIA'S FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS USE A
STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLASSIFICATION MARKING SYSTEM
THAT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH TODAY'S MESSAGE-HANDLING SYSTEM, THIS
MESSAGE SHOWS THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION ABOVE IN A DIFFERENT FORM
THAN THAT USED THROUGHOUT THE BODY OF THE MESSAGE. IN TERMS OF THE
STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MARKING SYSTEM, THE OVERALL
CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS SECRET//X1.
2. ~~(S)~~ DESPITE PERSISTENT UNREST AND HOSTILITY BY PRO-INDONESIAN
MILITIAS, THE UN MISSION IN EAST TIMOR STILL IS PREPARING FOR A
UN-RUN REFERENDUM ON THE PROVINCE'S FUTURE. INDONESIA HAS STEPPED UP
SECURITY MEASURES, ALTHOUGH SHORT OF NEUTRALIZING THE VIOLENCE-PRONE
MILITIAS. JAKARTA'S DESIRE TO AVOID FURTHER HARM TO ITS INTERNATIONAL
STANDING SUGGESTS IT WILL ACCOMMODATE UN DEMANDS, BUT INDONESIAN
DIFFERENCES WITH THE UNITED NATIONS POINT TO LINGERING FRICTION.
3. ~~(S)~~ UN PREPARATIONS. DESPITE SEVERAL DELAYS, THE UN MISSION IS
MAKING PROGRESS IN PREPARATIONS FOR A POPULAR VOTE ENABLING EAST
TIMORESE TO CHOOSE BROAD AUTONOMY WITHIN THE INDONESIAN STATE OR

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SEPARATION UNDER TRANSITIONAL UN OVERSIGHT. RECENT SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS HAVE PERMITTED THE MISSION TO REGISTER MOST OF THE OVER 400,000 ELIGIBLE VOTERS, ALTHOUGH NOT WITHOUT MORE VIOLENCE FROM BOTH SIDES, PARTICULARLY INTIMIDATING ACTIONS BY THE PRO-INDONESIAN MILITIAS. ALSO OF CONCERN ARE A STILL-LARGE NUMBER OF VOTERS DISPLACED BY EARLIER MILITIA VIOLENCE. BECAUSE OF THIS SITUATION, THE UNITED NATIONS LAST WEEK AGAIN DELAYED THE VOTE UNTIL 30 AUGUST.

4. ~~(S)~~ SINCE ITS ARRIVAL, THE UN MISSION HAS CONFRONTED PERSISTENT INDONESIAN BREACHES OF THE 5 MAY UN ACCORD GOVERNING THE VOTE, INCLUDING CAMPAIGN AND FUNDING VIOLATIONS. THE PROAUTONOMY CAMPAIGN BEGAN WELL BEFORE THE UN SIGNING, VARYING FROM VIOLENT INTIMIDATION BY THE MILITIAS AND LOCAL OFFICIALS TO MORE RECENT GOVERNMENT RICE HANDOUTS TO GARNER SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS, INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES RESENT UN COMPLAINTS AND BELIEVE THE MISSION IS SUPPORTING THE PROINDEPENDENCE CAUSE. HOPEFUL OF VICTORY AND FEARFUL OF LOSING MOMENTUM, JAKARTA OPPOSES FURTHER UN DELAYS AND HAS SOUGHT TO DEFLECT BLAME FROM THE MILITIAS TO PROVOCATIONS BY THE OTHER SIDE.

5. ~~(S)~~ CHANGED SECURITY DIRECTIVES. FACING RISING FOREIGN CRITICISM, ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO HAS TAKEN MORE CONCERTED ACTION IN RECENT WEEKS TO AVOID FURTHER EMBARRASSING INCIDENTS. FOLLOWING GEN WIRANTO'S VISIT IN MID-JULY, JAKARTA BEGAN TO REPLACE LOCAL COMMANDERS CLOSE TO THE MILITIAS AND REPORTEDLY DIRECTED OFFICERS TO RESPOND TO UN NEEDS. THE RECENTLY AUGMENTED POLICE FORCE IS NOW MOVING INTO TROUBLED AREAS, ALTHOUGH SHORTCOMINGS AND LACK OF WILLPOWER IN CONFRONTING MILITARY-BACKED MILITIAS STILL UNDERMINE POLICE EFFECTIVENESS.

6. ~~(S)~~ DESPITE THESE STEPPED-UP MEASURES, THE MILITIAS' IMPORTANCE TO THE PROAUTONOMY CAMPAIGN STILL MILITATES AGAINST MORE FORCEFUL MEASURES AGAINST THEM. ALTHOUGH NOW PRECLUDED FROM CAMPAIGNING, ARMY OFFICIALS REMAIN HEAVILY INVOLVED IN INFLUENCING THE VOTE BY TRYING TO UNIFY THE PROINTEGRATIONISTS AND MOBILIZING VOTER TURNOUT FOR AUTONOMY. NOTORIOUS MILITIA GROUPS CONTINUE TO OPERATE ABOVE THE LAW, DESPITE THE ARMED FORCES' ABILITY TO NEUTRALIZE THEM QUICKLY IF THEY CHOOSE.

7. ~~(S)~~ CHALLENGES AHEAD. THE UNITED NATIONS IS CALLING FOR FURTHER SPECIFIC MEASURES TO HALT MILITIA INTIMIDATION, SEVER MILITARY-TO-MILITIA TIES, AND OVERCOME THE REFUGEE PROBLEM BEFORE CERTIFYING THAT "FREE AND FAIR" CONDITIONS EXIST FOR BALLOTING. IT ALSO HAS URGED JAKARTA TO ESTABLISH SAFEGUARDS TO ALLOW INDEPENDENCE GROUPS TO CAMPAIGN AND TO AGREE ON CANTONMENT AREAS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, MILITIA, AND REBEL ELEMENTS BEFORE THE VOTE. MILITIA COERCION

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