

Reference

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13 October 1961

CUBAN COVERT PROGRAM REPORT

1. Intelligence, Counter-intelligence.

Has become progressively more hazardous because of internal controls. The Agency, however, maintains contact with 26 agents through secret writing plus one W/T operator. The present geographic overconcentration of these agents in the Havana area should be improved in the next 30 to 60 days by introduction of legal travellers with some training plus a number of planned black entries of fully trained agents. The major operational problems at the moment are identifying further infiltration points and increasing W/T communications. Four or five W/T operators are almost ready for operational use while eight to ten previously trained agents may agree to being infiltrated. Additional operators are beginning the full ninety day course.

In counter-intelligence a number of low-level active penetrations of Cuban governmental organizations exist while a 30-man experienced, entirely Cuban, element continues to work with us out of Miami as it has for some time. Further internal penetrations are being sought.

2. Political Action.

All the known Cuban exile groups have been worked with from the point of view of operational planning and support. Most had unrealistic plans, but are now being more practical. About seven of these groups show promise as instruments for establishing internal assets. Selection, training, and planning are going on, and actual infiltration operations plus possible sabotage should begin in the next 30 to 60 days.

The external groups are far from organized or coordinated. The internal opposition has made some efforts at consolidation and organization but with only moderate success so far.

3. Propaganda.

Speaking tours by teacher, student, labor, jurist and women's groups, support of publications and distribution of pamphlets continues. Radion Swan, 60 Latin American stations and three stations in Florida broadcast anti-Castro programs. A broadcasting ship is ready.

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

By [Signature] NARA, Date 5/30/98

JFKL: JFKP: NSF: M+M, 6. 319,
f: "SpGp (CI) 4/6/62-6/7/62."

In addition, [REDACTED] selected Cuban students are being placed in a number of Latin American universities for agitation and propaganda purposes.

4. Paramilitary.

Almost all of the Cuban exile groups are providing individuals for training as paramilitary agents or activists. In addition, a 35-man commando element is in being, ready for use. Boats are adequate for foreseeable maritime requirements. Air operations are not presently planned.

Despite infiltration difficulties, minor sabotage is planned. (Some sabotage is now occurring in Cuba without Agency support.) Criteria for minor sabotage operations will include a favorable chance of avoiding prior detection, capability of appearing to be organized from inside, and avoidance of major disruption.

Any major sabotage operations will be subject to approval by the Special Group.

The position of Dr. Miro Cardona presents something of a problem. His organization - the Cuban Revolutionary Council - and portions of the Frente now allied with the CRC, are being subsidized as about \$90,000 per month. Miro expects this to continue at least until 29 June 1962.

Some, but very little, operational benefit is realized. Miro has used the funds to support individuals of his choosing and has not devoted attention to strengthening internal Cuban opposition. Other exile leaders interpret this support as evidence of U.S. selection of Miro as leader of a post-Castro government.

Since this situation is inconsistent with present U.S. policy, possible solutions are being sought under the leadership of the State Department.

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

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JFKL: JFKP: NSF: M+M, b. 319, F: "SpUp (CI) 7162-11/63."

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JFKL:JFKP:NSF:M+M, b. 3A, f: "Special Group (CI) 1/61-6/62."

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