


SECRET

3-6 (8A) 10

25 June 1963



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

1. In accordance with the request of the Attorney General, two Agency officers met the evening of 24 June 1963 with the following members of the Cuban Brigade: Roberto PEREZ San Roman, Eneido OLIVA Gonzalez, Ramon FERRER Mena and Enrique RUIZ-WILLIAMS. RUIZ-WILLIAMS was present at the beginning and at the end of the 5-1/2 hour session. One of the two Agency officers was "Bob" who is well known to the men, having met with them many times in the past. The other officer, using the name Alfred Rodemeyer, did not meet with RUIZ-WILLIAMS, and was there basically to brief the men on conditions in Cuba at present.

2. The three Brigade members, less RUIZ-WILLIAMS, basically had the following points to make:

a. They were concerned about not only their own personal future but also that of the rank and file of the Brigade. They wanted to know precisely in what way their present training in the U. S. Armed Forces would be useful in obtaining the liberation of Cuba. As part of this concern they wanted to know what the Agency was doing and how they and the Brigade fit into Agency activities. They are most concerned with the types of training they should undergo following the present training course, which ends in August, in order to best qualify themselves for participation in anti-Castro activities.

b. They still believe that the best way to liberate Cuba is by a massive U. S. military intervention. They are basically disheartened in that they do not foresee such an invasion and believe that the situation as regards liberation is comparable to that of 1959 or 1960.

c. They do not believe that unconventional warfare in itself, including commando type raids, can liberate Cuba, without the use of U. S. forces in the final stages.

QVA

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GROUP 1  
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NLK-16-120  
By *MM* NARA, Date 8/16

d. PEREZ San Roman, in his concern about the post-Castro period, does not favor the use of such elements as Manolo RAY or Huber MATOS in any post-Castro government. OLIVA tended to agree with PEREZ concerning the use of any non-Communist Left groups or individuals.

3. The two Agency officers, in addition to providing a current brief on the situation in Cuba today, as had been suggested by the Attorney General, explained the necessity for building a resistance movement inside, keeping the flame of resistance alive, and pointed out that one of the best means currently available seemed to be to split the regime through the use of members of the 26th of July Movement who were and are anti-Communist and who now believe that the revolution has been betrayed. The numerous complications and problems, both political and military, were explained in relation to the thesis of the Brigade members concerning U. S. military intervention. While the Brigade members seemed to appreciate the problems concerning this point, they still believed this was the only sure way to achieve the liberation of Cuba. No commitment was made concerning the individual futures of the men concerned or of the rank and file of the Brigade. It was pointed out that the training that they were receiving at present and any additional training they might undertake would always stand them in good stead if any of the men were selected for participation in any type of activity aimed at liberating Cuba or in any post-Castro Cuba in which they might be involved.

4. The men volunteered their opinion that the single most important policy change made since April 1961 was the determination on the part of the Agency, as outlined to them, to sponsor well-conceived operations run by Cubans.

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