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By AB NARA Date 1/10



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January 5, 1973

Honorable Ronald I. Spiers
Director, Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs (7315)
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

1/5/73

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action*

Dear Ron:

The purpose of this letter is to address the substantive aspects of next steps in the matter of ADM cooperation with certain NATO Allies.

*Atomic Demolition
Inventions*

First, in order to put the problem in proper context it is useful to recall the basic policy decisions:

A) In summer/fall 1970 the White House acting on an inter-agency agreed recommendation approved in principle ADM programs of cooperation with NATO Allies including Italy, Greece and Turkey. In implementing this decision it was decided that we would first approach the Germans with regard to possible programs involving German forces and, subsequently, forces of other allies stationed in the FRG. No steps were to be taken with respect to the southern flanks until the German situation clarified.


B) The State Department supported the recommendation that resulted in the above mentioned White House approval based on the policy principle which, I think, you and I discussed several times that within the limits of undiluted and exclusive presidential release authority, US custody of nuclear weapons, and limitations on access to technology, our NATO Allies should be accorded equal treatment to US forces when it comes to theater nuclear weapons. I strongly hope that PM has not deviated from that principle.

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*(signed)
W. J. Lehmann
Political
Officer*

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second, to recent developments:

A) It is now clear that the FRG does not want ADM program of cooperation. Presumably the FRG attitude applies also to other non-US forces on German territory. To put it in another way around they prefer to leave matters as they are, i.e., any ADM support necessary in an emergency is to be provided entirely by US teams. The reelection of the SPD/FDP government just about assures that the Germans will not change their minds.

B) SACEUR continues to support ADMs for the southern region. This is a long standing position.


C) Although there has been some discussion of ADMs between some senior US military officers on one hand, and Greek and Turkish officers on the other, this has been in general terms and not in terms of a US offer of a program of cooperation. Therefore such discussion is not inappropriate. It is as appropriate as ADM play which normally takes place in certain NATO exercises such as Deep Furrow.

D) As far as Turkey is concerned the Turkish position has not yet changed. This was recently made clear at SHAPE. However, the Turks have also stated their interest in a thorough review of their position, and in order to accomplish this have stated a need for technological information through NATO channels.

E) The Turkish interest in reviewing their ADM position is fundamentally a part of the overall Turkish reassessment of their future defense requirements which has been under way for some months and which among other things has resulted in such major decisions as the F-4 buy, the proposed development of a Turkish aircraft industry and the most recently announced decision to buy \$95 million worth of field army air defense hardware from the Swiss. Assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Turkish desire to reassess their ADM position is not something that is just artificially stimulated from without.

Third, with the German position now very clear we face the question of where to go next. This is all the more necessary because the Turks have opened the question through CINCSOUTH and to SACEUR.

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I believe we should now carry out the decision which I stress again, the President has already approved in principle over two years ago. We should offer programs of cooperation to all three southern allies, Italy, Greece and Turkey, not as something that we are urging them to do but rather as something we are prepared to undertake with them if they desire, and, I might add, if someone else but the US pays such costs as may be involved in additional storage sites (if needed), helipads, etc ...

I want to stress the fact that we should offer programs of cooperation but not press them on anybody. Therefore, the assertion which has been made in the case of Italy that we will be placing another burden on our relationship already loaded down with other military plans (e.g. La Maddalena) is not relevant. If the Italians or anyone else prefer to leave matters as they are then we should not fight the problem. However, they should be given the opportunity to make their own decision in face of a US offer to provide ADM cooperation on the same basis as other NATO nuclear weapons programs.

It is obviously unthinkable that we offer an ADM program of cooperation to Turkey but not to Greece. This fact raises the problem of possible congressional difficulties because of distaste for the Greek regime based on the mistaken belief that until 1967 the history of Greece since Pericles has been one of uninterrupted democracy.

Without wishing to gainsay the problem of dealing with these difficulties I would like to note that a) the situation was the same, and in some respect worse, at the time we formulated our original position in 1970, b) we managed to overcome more serious difficulties on other questions such as resumption of military grant aid deliveries to Greece and c) an ADM program of cooperation would be only a very modest addition to our existing nuclear weapons cooperation programs with Greece. In fact, since grant aid to Greece will probably be either severely reduced or eliminated entirely in FY 74, we need something that indicates our continuing interest in cooperation with the Greeks in southern region defense.

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
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In summary, I strongly hope that we will proceed on the basis which has already been approved by the White House and not be deflected by either the numerous theological arguments which have surrounded both sides of the ADM issue for many years nor by narrow bureaucratic concerns.

With best regards.

Sincerely,



W. J. LEHMANN
Political Adviser

cc: Emb. Athens (Mr. Brandin)
Rome (Mr. Devine)
Ankara (Mr. Boehm)

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