

***Global
Competition
and the
Deterioration
of U.S.-Soviet
Relations,
1977-1980***

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DOBRYNIN: I would like rather to expand a little bit more on what Karen asked before the conference. Before we going into all of these details about the very colorful discussion between Cy and Gromyko—and I think we should do it—the basic question really was, were we—I mean both of us: the Soviet Union and the United States—prepared to find accommodation, to find solutions to many of these conflicts, or we were not prepared to do so? Take the situation in Somalia and Ethiopia. In August and January 1978, we said to the Americans, “Let’s sit down together and find a way out of this conflict.” We were told, in effect, “No.” The Americans said that by joining us in such discussions, they would be legitimizing our presence in Africa. This was their answer to us. It was nothing new. It was the same situation in Kissinger’s time, which I know a little bit better than Carter’s. Kissinger was prepared to discuss the Middle East situation with us hundred times. But once we came to the concrete discussions, his purpose was very clear. It was especially clear in the war of 1973: he was against anything that would legitimize the Soviet presence in the Middle East. This was his credo. It was clear from the very beginning to the very end.

So, the United States seemed unwilling to seek solutions with us out of fear that this would legitimize our presence and our role. What we managed to do with Cy at the very beginning—preventing Ethiopia from crossing the Ogaden border—was a real achievement. We were also working together on Yemen. But these are the only two examples when we were really working together. On all of the other issues, we were on opposite sides. It seemed to us—maybe I am exaggerating a bit here—but it seemed to us that you were always thinking that the Third World was yours after the Second World War;

that it was the Western countries' domain. You felt that we had no business there. You did not say so directly, but that was the impression we had. So when we tried to find an accommodation—when we tried to work together—you always told us bluntly, or not so bluntly, "We really don't want to deal with you." When we wanted to find a collective way of preventing the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia from escalating, Zbig's reaction was very simple: "We don't want to legitimize the Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa." Only when the United States got into a very difficult situation in some area of Third World would you come to us and say, "Look here, let's do something, otherwise there will be a conflict." When the situation developed favorably, from your perspective, you never asked us to do anything. But when something went wrong, you would say, "Let's do something."

I am not criticizing you here; there are plenty of things about our own behavior to criticize, of course. I am merely stating my impression of your attitude. My personal opinion is that the Soviet-American relationship suffered greatly over the long run because of the Third World. The game was really not worthwhile. But we should address this particular issue when we discuss the question you just put on agenda, Mr. Chairman. It would be very interesting, at least for us Russian participants, to know how really you approached it. Did you really *want* to be more cooperative, to work together?

I could give another example. It is unfortunate that Zbig is not here; I can give you an interesting piece of information. During the Afghanistan conflict, you expressed an interest in guaranteeing together the safety of Pakistan and Iran, but with one condition: there would be no written agreement, because you didn't want to legitimize our role in the

Middle East. Again it was the same song. Always. So, I am saying this not by way of criticism, but simply by way of inviting American participants to clarify this issue, at least for me. How was it really at that time? Was true cooperation really in the mind of leading American officials? Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Anatoly. Marshall, and then Oleg.

MARSHALL SHULMAN: In answer to Anatoly's question, it seems to me it is useful to have in mind three considerations. The first was the time factor, because from the 1960s into the 1980s, the Soviets' logistical capability for reaching Africa and other Third World areas was growing. For example, at the time of the Congo crisis in 1960—the fight of Lumumba and Kasububu, and so on—the Soviet Union had an interest, but not the capability, of reaching the Congo and intervening in an effective way. By the 1970s—and, *a fortiori*, in the 1980s—the Soviet Union had begun to acquire that capability. This was a new factor.

The second consideration is how the United States would react to this. There were some who were beginning to explore the possibility of cooperative action. There were others who still held, essentially, the geopolitical view that we should not allow a Soviet encroachment. The relative weight of these two schools of thought shifted over time.

The third element goes back to Bob's original question about the conversation between President Carter and Foreign Minister Gromyko. Essentially, there were

power; and, some believed, beyond that, it was a struggle against the Soviet goal of destroying American influence around the world and undermining the United States. It is very hard to discuss these things given our personal relations, and given the evolution of the relations between our two countries, without going back and understanding how strongly held those views were. And I think what we are asking from you at this point is precisely what you introduced: a sense of what your strategy was—what you really thought you were trying to accomplish in getting involved—however you were involved—in Shaba 7 or Horn of Africa 3, etc. What were you doing?

DOBRYNIN: May I speak to that?

LEGVOLD: If it's very brief, Anatoly, because I think we will be back and forth on this all morning.

DOBRYNIN: Before I answer you, I have one very brief additional question, which I would like to throw to everyone for discussion. Don't you—all of you—think that during the Carter administration, all of these African things were blown out of all proportion? I feel, personally, that they were. I am not saying who was guilty, you or we. We were playing our own games. But I think to a certain extent, really, the situation in Africa was blown out of proportion in Soviet-American relations, and in world affairs generally.

Now, coming back to your question. Quite frankly, as far as I know—Oleg or

Karen may correct me—we did not have any African doctrine at that time. There was no doctrine in the Soviet Union. We had no plans. I do not recall any discussion about how to behave in Africa on a real big scale. The policy was like a mosaic: it developed in bits and pieces. Something would happen here, so we went there, because you were there, or vice versa. It was never the case that we were somewhere that you were not. There was always that kind of interaction. I do not say that it was clever game; but nevertheless, it was a game. We did not have a well-thought-out policy in Africa. We did not have an African doctrine at all. What we had were just ideological rules of thumb. We were going to support colonial people, people who were under colonialism. The only over-arching policy was this ideological rule of thumb. Karen knows it quite well, better than I do. These were the major considerations.

But I never heard strategic considerations. Many times I sat in on Politburo meetings where strategic matters were discussed, and I never heard anyone say anything about the strategic importance of Africa for the Soviet Union. You may believe it or not, but there was unanimity. I never heard from Gromyko, or from Andropov, anything about the strategic importance of Africa for the Soviet Union. I never heard anything about the importance of Africa as a place for us to cut off your oil supplies—that was a favorite theme of yours.

So, coming back to my point: unfortunately, as far as our side is concerned, it was not a very well-thought policy. We did not have any doctrine except an ideological doctrine. We were certainly not trying to build an empire in Africa. We had no guiding conception of our policy in Africa. We had a guiding conception of our policy in Europe,

rightly or wrongly; we had one in the disarmament negotiations—the SALT talks, and so on. But in Africa, we did not.

Before coming to this conference, I looked at the agenda and I saw the phrases “Shaba I” and “Shaba II.” I did not know what these meant. I was an ambassador for 25 years, and I did not know what we were talking about. I thought maybe I had missed something when I was ill, or in the hospital. [Laughter.] Really, I did not know. I had to go to the Foreign Ministry and look at all of my telegrams to try to find out what these meant. I did not find a single telegram referring to these things. There was not a single telegram from the Washington Embassy to Moscow about any Shaba incident. There was no record of anybody in your country referring to Shaba I or Shaba II. There were telegrams about Zbig’s trip to China, and about many other things. But there was nothing on Shaba I or Shaba II. And here is it on the agenda of our meeting.

At the last conference, I protested all the attention we were paying to the Horn of Africa. My view was that it was unimportant. Rightly or wrongly, nobody in Moscow or in the Washington embassy paid much attention to it. Maybe people in Karen’s department did. Maybe they talked about Shaba in the International Department. But it was not a significant political issue for us. I don’t believe there was really a competition for Africa. But there was clearly a growing misunderstanding. The Carter administration was most unfortunate: it began with a great hope for improved U.S.-Soviet relations, and finished with—you know—a fiasco. That’s all.

LEGVOLD: We’ve obviously got some very intelligent scholars around the table, because

DOBRYNIN: I will try to answer your question. At that particular moment, the Soviet government was quite prepared—together with the United States—to have a joint effort to stop the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia. There was no disagreement among the military people or the ideologists. Ponomarev said this; you can find it in your own papers. We were really interested in stopping the fighting. We were quite prepared to work together in Ethiopia and Somalia. If you look at the materials that you have here, you can see that in five or six meetings of Politburo, the one question that they discussed—for over six months—was how to stop the fighting. They were very seriously thinking about how to do it. At the very beginning we said that we did not like the fighting, because, after all they were allies, and it would have been better to keep them together. [Nikolai] Podgorny visited; then there Castro. There were many efforts to try to keep Barre and Mengistu together. We had some concern about Barre, but we were talking amongst ourselves about how to stop this. So in this particular case, the prospects for a cooperative solution were quite good. We definitely wanted to stop the fighting, and this could have been achieved if there had been an effort on your side. This may not have been true of all situations in the world; but on this particular issue—Somalia-Ethiopia—there was a very good possibility that we could both would work together. We were quite prepared to deal with you.

Why did we fail? It was a matter of perception: what you were thinking about us, and what we were thinking about you. Maybe Cy or somebody else would like to comment on the psychological state of mind of your president; we could discuss our top officials as well. From the very beginning—after Carter was elected, but before he

officially became president—we had the feeling that he worried that the Soviet Union would test his will, his strength, and his convictions. We thought he worried that we would try to find out whether he could be pushed around, and that we would try to show him that we really were a force worldwide. We got this impression from many sources: intelligence sources; people in the Embassy; even people in the White House, and people who were very close to the president. I could give their names, but I don't want to. This was the situation. There was a meeting of the Politburo, and Brezhnev said, "Look, here's someone who comes from a different background. The president is a little bit concerned, or a little bit uneasy, that we are going to test his will." Then Harriman came. He was a self-appointed ambassador, as I understand, because nobody sent him. But he went to Moscow before the president was officially inaugurated. And he, too, expressed this worry. So Brezhnev himself told him, "Please tell Mr. Carter that we are not going to test his will." It sounds ridiculous now, but Brezhnev explained to Harriman that he was not going to test the will of the president.

Let's go further. When the situation in Africa developed in 1977 and 1978, I suspect that the president made up his mind that we were testing his resolve. It seems to me that he was determined not to be pushed around in Africa. He was torn between his desire for cooperation and his fear of confrontation. He made many speeches in which he was torn between cooperation and confrontation. One was the speech in Annapolis. He was speaking about cooperation, then suddenly he faced us with the question: are you for cooperation or for confrontation? This showed that the president became more combative, little by little. Without saying who is right and who is wrong, I would suggest that he

became more and more combative.

Cy is right; when he went to Moscow in March, he brought with him a lot of suggestions. Aside from SALT, our feeling was that it was possible to do certain kinds of things. Someone mentioned the Indian Ocean; I forget who mentioned it. We were prepared to cooperate on the Indian Ocean. But what happened with Indian Ocean? You canceled the negotiations. Until the very last moment, we were eager to continue. I realize that this happened in connection with Afghanistan; but still, you canceled it.

[UNIDENTIFIED VOICE]: That was before Afghanistan.

DOBRYNIN: Before, that's right; even before Afghanistan. It is not a major point.

So we really were prepared to cooperate. And we had the impression that you were, too. At the outset, we had a good impression of the administration's willingness to cooperate. When I spoke with the president personally, or when he wrote letters, he would appeal for joint action to avoid confrontation, and to pursue a new era of cooperation. But then, little by little, you know, tension grew.

One reason for that, I think, was our mistake: there was no summit meeting until 1979. I think it was the biggest mistake that we made in our government, because we were just dragging our feet instead of sitting down and discussing all these issues frankly with Cy, with the president, and with Zbig. Several times during 1977 and 1978 I suggested to Moscow that we should sit down with the president and discuss these issues.

Unfortunately, on our side, it was Gromyko who prevailed. He convinced Brezhnev to bring pressure on the Americans to sign a SALT treaty. He felt that if we held off a summit, the Americans would try as soon as possible to prepare a treaty and to sign it. But ultimately, we spent three years on the treaty, and by that time Brezhnev was really in another world. The whole relationship could have been completely different. It was a mistake that we did not really try to explain ourselves to each other. It was both sides' fault; but I think it was much more our fault.

The last remark I would like to make is in the connection with Georgy's comment. He made an interesting remark. There is only one thing I disagree with him about. I do not think we reached the point in 1978 where we thought that we had reached a point of such military strength that, for us, the Third World was the most important area of concern. I never heard anyone in my country suggest that the Third World was the number one problem for Russia. Never.

TROYANOVSKY: Never. That is true.

DOBRYNIN: So, please don't be misled. Maybe he spoke with Andropov; he was not at that time the Secretary General, but he was a reasonable fellow. But the Third World was never the number one problem. The number one problem was the United States. I just wanted to make that clear.

U.S.-Soviet aspect of the Middle East question—in Zbig’s mind, at least—was settled.

LEGVOLD: I am going to turn to Anatoly next, but I am going to ask a question first:

Anatoly, in terms of what you have said a moment ago, and what has been the general position, was there a view at high levels in the Soviet Union—or among you professionals—that the October 1st joint statement had been a kind of deception? Did you feel that it was insincere on the part of the United States—apart from the Secretary’s role in it?

DOBRYNIN: If you look back at the previous two decades of Soviet-American relations, you must understand that our impression was that practically all American presidents did not want us to participate in any Middle East conferences or settlement. So it was a relief for us when, in the very beginning of the Carter administration, we discovered through Cy Vance that you were very actively beginning to explore the possibility of some joint effort to reach a settlement. In this connection, there were several meetings between you and Gromyko. I can quote the decision of our Politburo from our archives: they specifically instructed Gromyko at that time to do his best to come to an agreement with Cy Vance, to find common ground for a Middle East settlement, through joint or parallel actions. This was our basic policy.

There were many meetings, I think, before the 1st of October, and there was an unusually good development in our relations on the Middle East. The agreement on the

1st of October was received in Moscow, I should say, with true satisfaction, because it was very unusual to have an agreement on the Middle East. We thought it was a good achievement with the new administration. Then Sadat's visit happened. Within the government, there was a division of opinion. A majority, I would say, looked back on the long history of Soviet-American relations, when the Soviet Union was excluded. They thought that this was not a deception, exactly, but rather that the administration retreating under the pressure from Israel and pro-Israeli forces in Washington. For us it was a rather bad sign. If you retreat on this one, what should we expect on the SALT talks? What should we expect on other things?

LEGVOLD: Anatoly, what was the minority view?

DOBRYNIN: Well, a minority were uncertain about what kind of game it was. A majority thought that you were yielding under the pressure from Israel and from the lobbyists in Congress. After several weeks—after three or four weeks—the administration continued to tell us very frankly—and we accepted it—that they were in favor of this October 1 statement. But then you know what happened. Our intelligence sources gave us the impression that President Carter appealed to Sadat to break the deadlock, and then Sadat came with his initiative. This is the version of events we had in our minds.

LEGVOLD: So you thought that Sadat's visit was instigated by the Americans?

DOBRYNIN: In a way. Not 100%; no, because I remember when Cy mentioned to me about—if you permit me to tell the story—

VANCE: Yes, yes.

DOBRYNIN: He told me how he spoke with Sadat before the statement—that they had friendly talks. Cy painted a very interesting picture. He said he spoke with Sadat, and Sadat told him, “Look here, the people of Egypt are so tired, we can no longer live in a state of war with Israel. I have no choice but to find a way out of this impasse.” Do you remember? [Vance nods.] This was off the record. So, I will not say that it was instigated by the United States; but perhaps the United States gave him a small push to help him make a final decision. Maybe Cy would say that there was not even a small push. I accept that, if that is what he says. But this, of course, is one of the major things which make a very bad impression in the Kremlin.

I, for one—I do not know about my colleagues; I have not tried to speak with them on this—but I always thought that the idea of us not having any relations with Israel, and at the same time pretending to be a peacemaker, or a co-chairman of something, was nonsense. It was nonsense. How could you negotiate, or be in a position to do anything, if you do not want to discuss matters with Israel? Once, when Gromyko and Suslov were on vacation, we tried to persuade Brezhnev to have consular relations with Israel, or at least some informal representation. He gave an order to the Foreign Ministry to work on

this problem. But then Gromyko came back, and Suslov came back, and they said, "Now, come on; until there is movement on the side of Israel, there should be no movement from our side." This put us in an all-or-nothing situation. We could not expect under this difficult situation to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem. I am not an admirer of Henry Kissinger's Middle East policy, but to a certain extent, his step-by-step approach was the right one.

In any case, the course of events as it developed at that time had negative effects on our relationship. We really believed that you broke your promise—that you just went your own way without us. This is my reply to what you said.

LEGVOLD: Cy, I am going to turn to you, but I want to clarify one thing in particular, if I may.

VANCE: Yes, go ahead.

LEGVOLD: I heard you say initially that, after you heard of the Sadat initiative—which surprised you—you attempted to put the two together—that is, the Geneva initiative, and Sadat's initiative—but that at some point you could not do it any longer. If that is correct, was that in fact the decision of the administration, or was that your own initiative?

VANCE: It was a decision by the administration. The president knew about it fully, and

sound fellow; but in this case he got carried away. I do not agree with his statement.

LEGVOLD: On the broader point, though, there are two things. Mark quoted from Dr. Brzezinski's memoir, which suggests that, by November, he had decided that this was an opportunity to "squeeze the Soviets out." Was that the reason that there was such opposition to the Sadat initiative, and opposition to American policy? Did you believe that what Zbig is now saying was his view—that it was, in fact, the motivation of the U.S. government at that point?

DOBRYNIN: I will be rather blunt. We were under the impression that it was Cy's view—and the view of the State Department—to reach a certain kind of understanding, to find a way out for the Middle East. We knew—or at least we thought we knew—that there were some people opposing this view, saying that the Soviet Union should be squeezed out of the Middle East process. That we knew; we had a great deal of information on this. Not only from you, but from [Yitzhak] Rabin and others. Our experience with previous administrations showed this very clearly. So we were not very much surprised that suddenly something happened. There was a wild reaction in the United States, and Israel, and then there was a change in the balance of forces within your government. You know this better than I do; perhaps one of the other American participants could explain it to us. But in our view, there was a very delicate balance. Until October 1, the forces favoring cooperation were stronger; after this reaction—which was, in my view, rather unexpected,

even to Cy: maybe I am wrong; it is up to him to say—but after this big reaction in Israel, and all the negative press—all those kinds of things—the government begin to withdraw, little by little, and then more and more and more. Within a week or two, the president withdrew two or three sentences from this communiqué in oral conversation with the Israelis. Some of these were very important things, for example, touching on the Palestinian issue. He said to Dayan, “Okay, this particular sentence does not apply to you.” He made some concessions to them. The government began to retreat under the pressure. It was not that you wanted to deceive us; there was obviously good will present. We definitely counted on the good will of the president, and of Cy. But we felt that your government was retreating under the pressure.

So you retreated more and more and more. And then there was the Sadat trip; many angry statements from both sides; and other issues that began to cascade—going to China only two months before; the Shcharansky case, and other things. But as far as the Middle East itself is concerned, all of a sudden the joint process stopped. Through inertia, Cy and Gromyko continued to discuss a conference. But you know what happened afterwards.

LEGVOLD: Bob, Cy, and then I am coming back to Karen Brutents.

VANCE: In the aftermath of the joint statement and the hubbub that followed that for a bit of time, the president wrote a letter to Sadat, which is in the briefing book. Let me read

LEGVOLD: A question to our Russian guests—in fact, two questions: In your recollection, how early did you begin to think that the Carter administration was playing a China card against you? Did it happen before Brzezinski's trip to Beijing? Or was that the critical moment where you began to think that the administration was trying to use the China factor against you?

Second, once you began to focus on the American handling of the China issue, how serious was it for you? Was it simply an inconvenience? An annoyance? Or was it something that was seen as very serious, even strategically significant?

I have a third question: at those fall meetings in 1978 on SALT, some have argued, the Soviet Union for the first time established a linkage: they linked SALT momentarily to the normalization of relations with China, although they backed off in a few months. I do not know whether there is truth to that or not.

Does anyone want to comment on any of those questions? Anatoly?

DOBRYNIN: On the last one: I do not recall any connections in our mind between SALT and the China issue, as far as concluding the treaty was concerned. There were discussions—negotiations—and we did not try to link these two issues. You may have linked them, but we did not. So the answer is no.

As to how it influenced our relationship, I may put it this way: during November and December 1978, when there were very extensive, up-tempo negotiations between Cy and Gromyko to finish the SALT treaty, everybody was expecting that this was number one

priority for your administration, as it was for ours. We had an expectation that we would finish the treaty soon. Of course, we know that you had negotiations with the Chinese. This was not a secret. But in our mind, we still believed that SALT would be the number one issue for you, not the Chinese.

Cy just described how it happened really. It was on the 15th of December, if I remember. Zbig invited me—because you were at that time in Europe, or somewhere else—and, with great satisfaction, he announced your normalization of relations with China. He recalled that I became gray when I heard that. I do not know why I should become gray at this announcement; but he said, “Look here, now there is an agreement to normalize relations with China, and the Chinese Premier will come,” and on he went. Cy tried to reverse this sequences of priorities, as I understood it. But suddenly, as if something very urgent happened, China became your priority, not the SALT treaty.

The Politburo discussed this, and they were rather angry with this situation. When Cy returned for what were supposed to be the final discussions of SALT, he received additional instructions on SALT to take a stronger position on the encryption issue. Everything was already prepared; you were coming just to finish things off, and then suddenly, after this love affair with the Chinese, he received instructions to take a very tough position on encryption. So Gromyko was really angry. It was his expectation that we were going to sign within a few days, and that there would be a summit meeting in the spring. But then you raised another obstacle to the discussions.

Cy, you called Washington, and I understood it, you were told to hold firm. You called from our mission. As Zbig later explained—I do not know whether he was joking or

not—he was there with Brown, I guess, and somebody else, because the president was in Atlanta. He had a hemorrhoid attack, so, they did not want to bother him. And these three fellows decided to follow this tough line on encryption. Gromyko became very angry; he, in turn, decided to be tough, too, and for half a year the treaty was delayed after it was practically ready.

So the effect was psychological., We were not at that particular moment influenced by the implications of your having normal relations with China, but at this particular moment we were angry that you preferred China to Moscow. It was very clear.

There were other implications, of course. We were following your relations with China very closely. Cy will remember that several times we discussed arms delivery. While you continued your normalization of relations, we began to receive information that you arrived at some secret intelligence agreement with China to monitor our missiles. Then we received news that there was a discussion to sell China non-lethal military equipment, and then later some other military equipment. You were always consulting China. Zbig discussed our SALT talks with the Chinese ambassador, and discussed its implications—how America was going to get more out of the SALT talks than we would get, and it would benefit China, and so on. All this information, of course, made the geopolitical factor more and more important. We received information that the Chinese were really boasting to some of their friends in the Third World that they were going to encircle Russia now, with China, the United States, Japan, and I do not know who else. There would be an arc of crisis, to invoke Zbig's invention. They were going to encircle us. They said many of these grandiose things. But putting aside theses grandiose things, of

course, China was China. It was important. It was a big factor. We had major concerns.

BRUTENTS: We had less fear than irritation.

DOBRYNIN: Yes, at that moment it was more irritation than real fear. But still, of course, China is China. So this really created a situation which spoiled our negotiations in 1978. We went through with this meeting in Vienna, which was a good thing; but still, there were many other issues, and we regretted that this particular incident happened, and that everything got postponed. China at that time issue played a very bad role in our relationship.

LEGVOLD: The next person on the list is Georgy, and then Oleg. But in case it did not get on the record, Karen's side comment, I think, is important. He said normalization with China was more of an irritant than a source of real fear. Anatoly then repeated it. Georgy?

SHAKINAZAROV: I would like to add to what Anatoly Fedorovich has just said. We need to take into account the situation that developed at that time. After Mao Zedong died, some of the causes of the sharp confrontation between the Soviet Union and China were gradually weakening or disappearing. In particular, one can say that the competition for the leading role in the world communist movement had relaxed. The Chinese no longer demanded so strongly that Mao be recognized as the number one communist. And we

never done that before. This is what I wanted to add.

LEGVOLD: Anatoly?

DOBRYNIN: First, I would like to answer my friend Oleg. Phil asked you—and I will try to answer him on your behalf [laughter]—what Zbig did in Beijing. What he was up to, and with what result? I think the answer is very clear. There is a White House document signed by Carter on May 17 instructing Zbig Brzezinski on what to tell Chinese: “Your basic goal should be convey to the Chinese our determination to compete effectively with the Soviets, to deter the Soviet military challenge, and to protect our interests and those of our friends and allies. Equally important, you should probe the Chinese for their views, seeking to establish a shared perspective, and where desirable to develop political collaboration. You should emphasize reciprocity, and stress that the pursuit of our shared objectives required mutual efforts.” Further: “With the above as your point of departure, you should then share with the Chinese my personal view of the nature of Soviet threat. To state it most succinctly, my concern is the combination of increasing Soviet military power and political shortsightedness fed by big power ambitions might tempt the Soviet Union both to exploit local turbulence, especially in the Third World, and to intimidate our friends, in order to seek political advantage, and eventually even political preponderance. This is why I do take seriously Soviet action in Africa, and this is why I am concerned about the Soviet military buildup in Europe. I also see some Soviet designs

pointed toward the Indian Ocean through South Asia, and perhaps toward the encirclement of China.”

You can well imagine, given these instruction, what kind of picture Zbig presented to the Chinese. “. . . [A]nd perhaps toward the encirclement of China through Vietnam, and even perhaps, some day through Taiwan. The United States, however, is determined to respond.” It is rather clear what instructions Zbig had, and he used them fully.

TROYANOVSKY: He probably he wrote them for himself. [Laughter.]

DOBRYNIN: Yes, he may have prepared it for himself; but never signed them [Laughter.]

And there is another interesting point, as was mentioned in the letter from Brezhnev. Immediately after the visit of Deng Xiaoping to Washington, there was the invasion of Kampuchea. Was this a coincidence, or not?

LEGVOLD: You mean the invasion of Vietnam.

DOBRYNIN: Vietnam; excuse me. We wondered whether this was a simple coincidence, or whether this was something you had discussed. According to Henry Kissinger, Deng mentioned in Washington that he was going to teach the Vietnamese a lesson.

Now, about linkage and my letter—

GARRISON: Earlier you had said that the Soviet Union did not attempt to hold up the SALT process because of what we were doing on China, but—

DOBRYNIN: Well, I will repeat it. We did not want to link these two issues, because SALT was our number one priority, and if there was a possibility to have the SALT agreement, we would sign it immediately. More than that, if Cy had not received additional instructions from the White House, we would have signed a treaty and announced it. Gromyko had instruction from my government to make an announcement in Geneva by the end of the year, even though you had already announced that you were going to receive Deng Xiaoping. He was prepared a week later to sign SALT. We did not like what you were doing with China, but we were prepared to sign. We discussed with Cy his new instructions, and he tried to find a compromise. This is why he called Washington. There was a discussion about how to formulate this new demand on encryption. He tried to find a compromise; Gromyko tried also. But when Cy asked his government, the answer was no. And we were stuck for another six months. If it were not for that, there would have been an agreement then. I know, because these were Gromyko's instructions. What could we gain by postponing? Brezhnev was prepared to come in the spring, or even earlier. Everything was prepared.

LEGVOLD: Thank you very much, Anatoly. Arne is next with a question. We are beyond the hour that I promised you, so I think we want to become brief now, and then we will

night he was going to leave the next morning, I said to him, "What the devil are you doing?" He said, "It is all over." I said, "No it's not; these issues have not all been resolved."

DOBRYNIN: So *you* were the obstacle, then? [Laughter.]

GELB: No, no. To say that China was what held it up does not make sense on the face of it, Marshall, because encryption was our decision, not the Soviets' decision. They would have been willing to settle on what had been prearranged. I agree with Anatoly: China was not the reason for the failure.

And then I disagree with everybody. [Laughter.] Even if we had solved all five of those issues in Geneva in December, we had a list of almost 60 additional issues which we spent the next six months trying to clear up. And, in fact, even when we got on the plane to fly out to Vienna, we did not have a final text, because there were still two issues unresolved.

DOBRYNIN: You know as well as I do that once you have a basic decision announced in Washington and Moscow by two leaders, they will do whatever is necessary to clear up all remaining issues. But when they are angry, they might just wait another five or six months.

ODOM: Can I add something?

LEGVOLD: Very briefly, Bill. And then I will give you more time afterwards.

ODOM: Did we have at the last session a copy of the article from *Presidential Studies Quarterly* about the Annapolis speech?

LEGVOLD: Yes.

ODOM: I think that is terribly important, because it is a part of the very phenomenon Les is describing. You see what the president did in putting that speech together: that has often been cited as evidence of the Vance-Brzezinski split. The split was very clearly in the president's head on that.

GELB: Absolutely.

LEGVOLD: Now, before you, Mark, Anatoly Dobrynin.

DOBRYNIN: I would just like to make a few comments on Les's statement. I think what you said, Les, was very interesting, and from my point of view as Ambassador, it looked to me exactly the way you presented it—not in detail, of course, because I did not know

them. But I would like for you to understand what actually happened in the Kremlin at the very beginning of the Carter administration, because it is very illuminating for all further events. At the very beginning, Carter was a completely unknown figure to the Moscow leadership—and for me as Ambassador, too. When they asked me for an analysis of Carter, all I could do was give quotations from his speeches during the election campaign, which are misleading.

When I met first time Carter two or three months after he became president, I discussed SALT with him, because I already had some information that he had in mind drastic reductions, maybe up to 200 or 300 missiles. When we discussed this with him, I asked him, "Mr. President, I heard that you have a plan for really drastic reductions." He said, "Yes." I asked, "How much?" He said, "Three hundred; two hundred." Well, I said, "There is no practical way to do it, in my personal opinion, because, with great difficulty, we just successfully finished the Vladivostok agreement. It is better to finish what we have, and then go to these drastic reductions later." But he said, "I think it is not enough, we should go further." So, the first thing I sent to Moscow was the news that the Washington rumors of a plan to make drastic cuts were true; I heard it from the president. He did not make a proposal to me officially; but he confirmed the rumor which was going around Washington.

Then, of course, there were many cases of human rights, which were considered in Moscow not as individual cases—Ginzburg, Orlov, Shcharansky—but rather as a trend in American foreign policy. Rightly or wrongly, they believed that this was a new trend in American policy: for the first time, the United States proposed to interfere openly in the

domestic affairs of the Soviet Union. Never before had there been such intervention on a government level. This was a second big surprise, and it caused great resentment in Moscow.

So what happened? In my many years of being Ambassador, I had never known our Politburo to have a specific discussion in the initial weeks of a new administration on how to deal with it. But there was in this case. Usually we would wait two, three, or four months to see what happened, and what kinds of actions the new administration would take, and we would formulate our own position. But not in this case. Before you came to Moscow, Andropov and Ustinov wrote a very rough letter to the Politburo asking Brezhnev to put on the agenda as a special point our relationship with the new administration. It was very unusual. In their opinion, this administration came with a very drastic and unwise policy—I am using a mild word; they used much stronger words, such as a “subversive” policy to change everything in Soviet-American relations. The new administration proposed just to sweep away the gains we had made during the previous administration, and to begin with a completely clean slate. This was not acceptable to us. From the very beginning, the Politburo proposed to take a very firm position with the new president, to make him understand that this was not the way to treat the Soviet Union. Again, I repeat: never before had we had such a discussion about a new administration.

There was a discussion, and it was decided to send a letter from Brezhnev to Carter, explaining to Carter, in a more polite way than was said at the Politburo meeting, “Look here, let us be more reasonable. First, on SALT: this is a major issue, which is practically ready for signing. So, let us not try a new avenue now. We are prepared to look into it

further; but let us not do away with four or five years of difficult negotiations and begin toying with a new set of proposals which will take another five or seven years to negotiate." This was simply pragmatic. We already had a treaty in place.

In addition, at Vladivostok there was for the first time a real clash between Brezhnev and our military leadership. Grechko, our Minister of Defense, protested some concessions Brezhnev made. He said, "You are conceding too much to Americans. I, as a Minister, disagree with you, Mr. Secretary General." I was present at the three talks by telephone. Ultimately, Brezhnev, you know, was a rather cautious fellow. He always tried to rule by consensus within the Politburo. But here he was confronted with this situation when our Minister of Defense rather arrogantly said to him, "I am against, and many people in the Politburo agree with me." Brezhnev replied, "I think the deal we are making with the Americans in Vladivostok is a good one. If I will listen what you say, we will destroy this treaty, and for how many years will we have no treaty at all?" So, Grechko, after consulting, called him back and said, "No, no, Leonid Ilych; do not take it as an affront. If you feel this way, go ahead." But for Brezhnev, it was very difficult situation, because for the first time he was challenged openly. And then exactly within few months we had a new set of ideas from the United States—a new president with a completely new set of rules for the SALT talks. Brezhnev's reaction was very severe. "Oh my God," he said, "So I have to begin from the very beginning."

In any case, the new proposals were things in which Brezhnev himself was not convinced. Psychologically, it was very difficult to accept the idea of a reduction from several thousand missiles to two or three hundred missiles. You have to understand it. For

so many years we were discussing in terms of thousands, and then suddenly we were supposed to start talking about hundreds. It was very difficult psychologically to accept. So the impression this gave the Politburo was that President Carter was not serious—that this was just plain propaganda, to impress world opinion with the new president's new ideas. Either that, or he Carter did not know what he was talking about.

On the whole, this was a psychological issue. Our reaction to your delegation was strongly negative, because of the psychological effect of your new proposals. I spoke with Cy Vance—you probably see me in the State Department minutes. I told him very clearly two weeks before he went to Moscow, "Cy, what you are bringing, as I understand it, is a complete non-starter. There is no way." I do not know whether he thought that at that moment I was just trying to press him; but that was not the case. I really knew what the situation was. I tried to give him a warning. I tried to persuade him to have a second position. But he did not listen. When your delegation arrived in Moscow, the response was brutal on our part, because Brezhnev did not even want to listen. He was beside himself. Before you arrived, there was another meeting of the politburo. All those who were sitting around the table said, "Leonid Ilych, show the Americans how we are strong and they are not serious." So he did not want to discuss your proposals. Of course, you had the full right to expect some questions about your proposals, and my impression was that you were prepared to explain them.

GELB: Absolutely.

DOBRYNIN: But we were not prepared to discuss them seriously.

LEGVOLD: Anatoly, I am going to push you now to finish the point, because we need to move on.

DOBRYNIN: The point is very simple. SALT could have been terminated very quickly, in time for a summit at the beginning of 1977. Events would have been quite different in Soviet-American relations if we had concluded with Vladivostok, or something like it, at a summit meeting in 1977. But instead, we got stuck on Africa, and in the irritant of human rights. If you look at 1978, the main problem between us was African affairs and human rights.

At one meeting with Gromyko, Carter asked him about Shcharansky. He said, "What about Shcharansky? What are you doing with his case?" Gromyko looked at him and said, "Who is Shcharansky?" In the United States, everybody knew who Shcharansky was. Gromyko just said, "Who is that?" Carter was so surprised that he dropped the whole issue. Quite frankly, at that time I thought, "What a clever Minister we have." He avoided a long and delicate discussion just by saying, "I do not know who that is." It was very simple. [Laughter.] And Carter dropped it. There was no more discussion just then about Shcharansky.

Well; this is how the things occurred. From the beginning, the psychology was all wrong. This was the important point: the psychology of the new administration's

approach to the Soviet Union was much more important than the new proposals, the figures.

LEGVOLD: Anatoly, that is very helpful. What you and Les have done for us, I think, is extremely valuable. You have set the context for us. But I am now going to urge us to focus on the 1978 period to understand how that worked given everything everyone has said. Mark is next; then Bob Pastor; then Marshall; then Anatoly Gribkov afterwards. Mark?

GARRISON: Just two brief points. First, I would like to illustrate one of the problems with the Carter administration that we talked about at Musgrove: namely, the question of priorities. I looked again at Carter's memoirs for this period to see how he looked at all of these things. And of course he looked at the issues that we are discussing separately—in isolation, more or less, from each other. But in his diary on March 13, he wrote, "It is hard to concentrate on anything except Panama." And then, of course, he was dealing with two votes on the Panama treaty. He really was not focused on what we are focussing on here.

But what I really wanted to do was to follow up on Bob's discussion of public opinion in the United States. The question is to Anatoly. The public opinion polls described a conservative swing in the United States at that time. But in your letter to the Foreign Ministry—and I realize your Embassy officers wrote the letter; you only signed it

came about. I will let you speak first, if you are disciplined—if you consider the time limit.
[Laughter.]

DOBRYNIN: Five minutes. First of all, I am really surprised that the Chairman is treating this paper as so important. It had nothing, really, to do with big events. But here he is inviting a full discussion of it. I do not know even how you got this important document.
[Laughter.] Zubok, I would like to have a full explanation.

ZUBOK: Legally. [Laughter.]

DOBRYNIN: I am sure you got it legally; the question is *why* you got it.

LEGVOLD: The anti-Soviet conspiracy continues, Anatoly.

DOBRYNIN: This is my impression, too. [Long loud laughter and applause.] I do not see any necessary to discuss it, because it is not really worthwhile. First of all, what it was? It was, you know, customary. Gromyko ordered all embassies once per quarter to write about what was going on in their host countries.

TROYANOVSKY: Once every three months.

DOBRYNIN: Once every three months. For the active embassies—Tokyo, Paris, Washington—it was really an exercise in the futility, because there were daily telegrams. But once per quarter our counselors—or a group of counselors—would sit down and try to prepare a report. So I did not pay much attention to it, or to any others, and I am sure the Foreign Ministry did not, either. If you want to know the point of view of embassy on a given subject, I am prepared to give an answer. But this is not a helpful document. There is not a single document from the American side like this, although I am sure that your embassy wrote something similar. You do not discuss those; suddenly, we are to discuss this.

BRUTENTS: You should be proud of it.

DOBRYNIN: No, no, I am proud. [Laughter.] I am not proud that we are discussing my document. It is not mine, really, but the embassy's.

SHULMAN: Did you get a reaction to it?

DOBRYNIN: Not at all. Come on. Gromyko did not read it.

TROYANOVSKY: Why do you say Gromyko? *No one* read it. [Laughter.]

DOBRYNIN: Only our department. Only the department read it; nobody else. This is why I would like you to understand that it is not important. It had no influence. A telegram might have an influence on events, but not this.

GELB: If they did not pay attention to this kind of report, what reports did you make to which they did pay attention?

DOBRYNIN: Telegrams. Cables. They go to the members of the Politburo. But not this paper. This is a working paper for people in the American department.

LEGVOLD: Anatoly, in those terms then, were the cables that you were sending back at about this time different in any significant way from the judgments in this paper?

DOBRYNIN: They did not have this broad sweep; they were very concrete. They dealt specifically with SALT, or with human rights—with specific subjects—or they reported on what had happened that day: what happened at my meeting with the secretary or the president, and so on. None of this was in the working papers; all of this was in telegrams. Sometimes, when they asked, I gave a general analysis in telegrams. But you should not pay too much attention to this particular piece of paper. The telegrams I am prepared to defend, because I know that they were read by members of the Politburo. Maybe Kornienko read this; maybe not. This is how it was.

Second, someone mentioned public opinion polls in this connection with this paper. In your public opinion you could find many things. But they are beside the point. I had many conversations with your leading people, who spoke about the SALT talks, and about human rights, and so on—David Rockefeller, or [first name?] Austin; many close friends of the president. I spoke with dozens of them. If you look at my telegrams, you will see my reports of those conversations. Many of them disagreed with the president on human rights, as Oleg mentioned. They think that he overplayed the issue. Austin, for instance—

TROYANOVSKY: He was with Coca-Cola.

DOBRYNIN: Coca-Cola, yes; he was banker. He said, "I talked to the president. I told him that he was overplaying these things. He was just spoiling U.S.-Soviet relations, for nothing. But my impression is that he is enjoying himself. He is getting publicity as the champion of human rights." On human rights, David Rockefeller said, "I do not agree with this—with the way it is presented."

All of this leads me to ask a basic question to Marshall: Did President Carter understand the damage he was inflicting on Soviet-American relations by his public human rights campaign? Or did he believe that the Soviet Union will swallow it after all, because it was much more interested in SALT? Did he think he could pursue both goals at once? I tried to speak with him twice about this.

Soviet—who understands the United States better than anybody else. When Arkady Shevchenko defected to the United States, I, naturally, had a debriefing with him. The one really important question I asked him was, did he think the Politburo understood the United States? I was concerned whether we were talking past each other or not. And you know Shevchenko better than I. You know whether he is reliable or not. But he indicated that he did not think so; he did not think the reporting coming from you, and the reporting coming from elsewhere, enabled them to do this. We now have a good example here of your reporting, even though you want to distance yourself from it. We admire it. My question to you is: do you think the Politburo, reading your other telegrams, got the message that you have in here as to what the United States's motives were—what the forces were that drove the United States? Did you get this across to them in other ways, if they did not read this?

LEGVOLD: Anatoly; please.

DOBRYNIN: First a footnote about Shevchenko. I know him well, as does Oleg.

TROYANOVSKY: More than well. [Laughter.]

DOBRYNIN: He has no knowledge about what went on in the Politburo. None. It was natural for him to present himself as a man very close to the Politburo. He said that any

time he came to Moscow, he would go to Brezhnev and say, "Hello, Leonid Ilych," and so on. None of that was true.

TURNER: All of your defectors were like that.

DOBRYNIN: Yes. It is understandable. I agree with you. He was close friend of Gromyko's son. This made Gromyko available to him; he could go to his house. But you should know that Gromyko never discussed real politics in the presence of this fellow. Even with his ambassadors he was rather reserved. So, all he heard, he heard from Gromyko's son Anatoly. This is the first remark that I wanted to make.

Of course, when he came here, he read the telegrams at United Nations.

TROYANOVSKY: Not all.

DOBRYNIN: Not all. It was up to the permanent representative to determine what he would see. There was nothing in these telegrams about the opinion of the Politburo. They contained only directives: "You should vote this way, or that way," without elaboration. So, he had no knowledge of the actual thinking in Moscow. He had no access to the Politburo. Whatever he said or thought came from his own imagination. Nothing else. I do not know how much Anatoly Gromyko mentioned to him—not because he was a reserved person, but because he himself did not read telegrams. Of course, he may have

discussed some things with his father. I do not know.

Now, on the telegrams we sent. The main concern was the atmosphere which existed between the two governments. Take, for instance, May 1978. Of course, I felt disappointed that we lost SALT, and to a certain extent I was angry with the administration. I will be very frank with you. I am not trying to fault you here; I am just reporting how I felt. We felt that we were very close to signing the agreement in 1977. I took part in many of those discussions. Marshall knows, because I dealt with him for many years. I spent dozens and dozens of evenings with him and Vance on it. I felt attached to this agreement, professionally. I really wanted to have it. And then, suddenly, it was derailed, for various reasons. Human rights was one; Oleg explained it well. The problem was how you handled the issue. I was definitely against the public pressure which you tried to mount against us. Again, I am not arguing with you about the merits of the case; I am sure that everyone on the American side will defend it on its merits. That is not what I am speaking about here. I am merely saying that there are other means for communicating your concerns. Kissinger, for example, as you mentioned, was not the best champion of human rights; but even with him, by the end of this Nixon administration we reached an agreement to allow 50,000 people to emigrate, mostly of Jewish nationality. And we were prepared to permit more. There was no limit to it. But Jackson was pressing, pressing, and pressing. Carter asked me if we could invite Jackson to Moscow. I said, "I'll check it." I sent a telegram to Brezhnev, and the Politburo discussed it, and I received a telegram back saying, "Yes, if President Carter feels it would help his ideas about human rights, we will invite Jackson to Moscow." So I went to Jackson, and I invited him to come to discuss

everything. What was his answer? He said, "Okay, I am very glad; thank you very much." But a few days later, he said, "Okay, I will come; but I would like your Politburo to receive me, and at the same time I will have a public meeting with all dissidents in Moscow." Then I said to him, "Do you want to meet Brezhnev, or the dissidents? You have to make a choice." I said, "You could have a meeting with the dissidents, as Edward Kennedy had; or you can meet Brezhnev." But he wanted both. This was impossible. These are small things; but they put matters in perspective. These were unnecessary irritants. They were frustrating.

On African affairs: you probably noticed at the last meeting that I expressed irritation with your preoccupation with the Horn of Africa. Quite frankly, I felt the same way at the time. It was a small, tiny issue. I understand now that you attached importance to it. But I believed at the time—and I still believe—that this was not the main issue in our relations. It was maybe two or three levels below our main concerns: disarmament, European affairs, and so on. But you were always talking about Africa.

LEGVOLD: Could you draw it to a close, Anatoly?

DOBRYNIN: Yes. What is Somalia? You go there; you come back. Who remembers Ethiopia? These were really unimportant in our relations. But at that time it was a big issue. I felt inside that Africa should not be allowed to prevent the development of our relations. I spoke with many people in your foreign policy establishment, and many of

them also felt that the administration overplayed African affairs. There was disagreement within your own administration. In my telegrams, I reported all of these talks which I had with prominent Americans. I reported on these differences of opinion within the establishment. I did not report on press coverage of public opinion polls; I reported on the opinion of those whose opinion really mattered. And there were great differences among those people. So this was it.

LEGVOLD: The next person is Bob Pastor, then Les Gelb. Then we are letting go of this, and we are going to go onto the next session. Bob Pastor?

PASTOR: I would like to focus on one element of that letter, which I think is very important. It is on page 4, in which the Embassy is saying that “we need to continue to react strongly and negatively to anti-Soviet rhetoric and actions, but we also need to find ways to respond to positive steps, and to encourage and to reinforce positive steps.” And this is the question I would like to focus on for a moment.

Mr. Shakhnazarov made a wonderful presentation just a little while ago in saying that the early expectation of the Soviet leadership about dealing with the Democratic administration was that the Democratic administration would be more progressive—more open—and that this might be a very important opportunity. I think that was precisely the perspective that the Democratic administration brought to office: here might be a chance to connect. But we failed to do so, and one of the reasons for that was that neither side

President Carter to other Western leaders—things of that sort. In the list of reasons that the Russian side has given us for why an intervention was not seriously contemplated, there is no reference to the impact of any such intervention on the West, and particularly on the United States. Where on the scale of thinking did any possible strong U.S. or Western reaction fit in?

LEGVOLD: Does anyone of the Soviet side care to answer that question?

DOBRYNIN: It was one of the factors, but it was not really decisive. Of course we took it into consideration; but relations with the United States were so bad at that time that it was not decisive a factor. Karen quoted some of the documents thinking about some things that the West might do—not military things, but other things. So we took that into consideration. But in a very limited way.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Anatoly.

Tomorrow morning we will backpedal a little bit: we will be looking at the period between the Vienna summit in the summer of 1979 and the events leading up to the Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan. If you wish, we can also discuss the question of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, and its effect on U.S. policy. I want to thank all of you for the session this afternoon. I think it was very interesting. I want to thank General Gribkov and Georgy Shakhnazarov particularly, for their additional new information, and I would like

DOBRYNIN: I think Newsome was wrong. Of course it was a very sour moment in our relationship; but it did not have much influence on our decision about Afghanistan, quite frankly. There was a difference of opinion in Moscow about the significance of the Cuban brigade issue. Some people just thought that Senator Church simply wanted to be reelected, and that he created the issue for that purpose. Others thought it was a convenient tool for the opponents of SALT to prevent ratification. Still others thought it was one of the American attempts to adjust the 1962 understanding. Throughout the whole history of Soviet-American relations since 1962, there were several attempts by the American side to correct it—to try to prevent us from sending patrol boats, establishing a submarine base, sending nuclear rather than non-nuclear submarines to Cuban ports, deploying MiG-23 fighters, and so on. There was a whole series of these attempts, beginning in 1962. So many of our people considered this another attempt to redraft, in a way, this 1962 understanding, in order to get rid of all our personnel which had been there for 17 years.

At that very moment, I was in Moscow. Cy sent a personal telegram to Gromyko, asking him to send me back to Washington. I was on vacation, so Gromyko called me and said, "Well, I do not know why they need to consult you. I know you are on a vacation. But if the Secretary asks, then if you do not mind, please go." The first question Cy asked me when I met him was, "Anatoly, were those troops there during the Kennedy administration? During the Johnson administration? During the Nixon administration? During the Ford administration?" I said, "Yes. Exactly." Then he said, "Then what is this all about?" And I said, "I should ask *you* what it is all about." During four administrations

our personnel had been there. Nothing new had been introduced during the Carter administration. And he agreed with me. He said, "This is my understanding, too." And in his memoir, he simply summarized the whole episode as a "lapse of memory in American intelligence." That was his description, not mine. [McGeorge] Bundy had made a public statement during the Kennedy administration that there were some two or three thousand Russian troops there to train. It was nothing new.

We did not understand why it became an issue all of a sudden in 1979, quite frankly. In the government there were several hypotheses, as I have just enumerated. But it was not really a decisive factor in our decision making on Afghanistan. Of course it added a sour note to our relations, so to speak; but it did not affect our decision on Afghanistan. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: General Gribkov, and then Marshall.

GRIBKOV: I do not understand why the question of our motorized brigade came up 17 years after it had been stationed there. We had four motorized regiments there in 1962. We called them regiments, but they were essentially brigades. One of them we renamed a brigade, and then under an agreement with the Cuban leadership, we left it there. It consisted of about 2,500-3,000 people, at different points in time. And the American side knew about that brigade, because their intelligence—land, air, and satellite—constantly monitored Cuba. The Americans were informed about that brigade. But why the question

speaking. So, if your point is big—

ODOM: Very briefly, I just want to say that I think Stan Turner's explanation here is remarkably candid. I think he is taking more of a blame than he deserves. I think he was the victim of some interagency game plan, and that this thing could have been sorted out by the winter had people beyond his control been willing to cooperate.

LEGVOLD: Marshall, I know you wanted to pick up where Stan stopped. But I am going to hold you for a minute. Anatoly was next on the list.

Anatoly, the only thing I would say is that in the history of these two conferences your feeling about the "Goddamn Horn" has become well-known. I do not think that I am betraying your confidence if I say that when Cy Vance knew we were going to talk about the issue of the Soviet brigade, his basic attitude was: we screwed up, what is there to talk about?

DOBRYNIN: This was really what I was prepared to say. My impression—and our embassy's impression—was that this was not the creation of the administration, but that the administration simply handled a domestic political issue badly, leading to a needless mini-crisis. That was my impression. By the way, we tried to help you as you licked your wounds: we tried to help you by issuing that final communiqué covering the issue.

LEGVOLD: But, Anatoly, did senior officials in Moscow come to understand what you came to understand?

DOBRYNIN: They had my explanation; whether they accepted it or not, I do not know. But that was my explanation.

LEGVOLD: But did you have some sense of whether they accepted it or not?

DOBRYNIN: Yes, I think so; because ultimately we accepted a compromise which was really trying to help President Carter find a way out of this. He coordinated his statement with us through Cy. I met with Cy six or seven times just on that communiqué. It was not our communiqué; it was President Carter's statement to the American public. We agreed with it, and provided some help, but in an off-the-record kind of way.

In the middle of this crisis, Senator [Robert] Byrd, the Senate majority leader—whom I knew quite well—invited me to come to the Senate, to have an official talk. He said, "Please, Anatoly; you know things quite well. Tell your story about this from 1962." So, with all documents, I presented the case, and when I finished it, he said, "Well, I will have to check with our intelligence." And then later on, as Cy told me, he went to the president, and he said, "I heard the story from the Soviet Ambassador. I have checked with our intelligence, and I have come to the conclusion that you created the mess. The administration created the mess. And unless you finish it, Senate ratification of the SALT

treaty is dead in the water." This is in Cy's book.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Anatoly. Jim, do you have a brief reference to the documents?

HERSHBERG: Yes, directly on the point of whether the Soviet leadership and Brezhnev personally blamed Carter and the Carter administration for the Cuban brigade. There are a couple of relevant passages in the documents passed around the table this morning: in Brezhnev's response to Carter's hotline message of September 25—the response sent on September 27; and in Brezhnev's conversation with Erich Honecker in East Berlin on October 4. The phrase used in the hotline response is, "We are extremely surprised by the openly hostile campaign against the Soviet Union, which has been launched in the U.S.A. with the active participation of the administration, for which the United States has absolutely no reason and no legal basis." And then, a week later, in his meeting with Honecker, Brezhnev says, "It is our impression that until recently those who supported the ratification of this treaty, SALT II, had the upper hand. Now the situation has become more complicated. The historical clamor in the United States, in which the Carter administration directly participated, over the stationing of the Soviet brigade in Cuba has become a serious impediment. We, as well as the Cubans, have taken a firm position against the American blackmail."

So, it is clear—although there is some ambiguity as to whether they blamed Carter personally—that they certainly that elements within the administration were

DOBRYNIN: You mean on mine, or on Brezhnev's?

HERSHBERG: Both.

LEGVOLD: You probably had similar reactions.

DOBRYNIN: Well, first of all, I can say that I am sure that Brezhnev did not read it.

HERSHBERG: Not even in translation?

DOBRYNIN: He may have heard that there was a memoir; but I am sure he did not read it. So it had no devastating effects on our foreign policy, or on our government. There was no revolt; there were no changes in the policy. Of course, those who did not know Henry well might have had some revelations; if you know Henry as well as I do, you will know that there was nothing really surprising. [Laughter.] I can give you one example, not to go out of this room: When he wrote his memoirs, there were several sentences—or descriptions—which, to put it mildly, were more fantasy than reality, particularly dealing with his conversations with Brezhnev. Henry always had it that he was on top, and Brezhnev was lying down. [Laughter.] Sometimes I acted as an interpreter during those conversations. So I told Henry, "Look, come on; I was there. This is not exactly what happened." He replied, "Anatoly, who will know? Brezhnev is dead; Russian

Ambassadors do not write memoirs; and I do." [Laughter.] Well, this was a joke; but it was a typical joke of Henry's. So, I would not exaggerate the importance of his memoir.

Of course, his play around the Middle East was well-known to me at that time. I could tell you a dramatic story about his handling of the situation in 1973. You will remember that Henry went to Moscow, and discussed with Brezhnev and the Politburo how to prevent a further spread of the conflict. Everything went fine. He left, and then within the next few days, I heard in the press, or on the radio, that the United States had raised a military alert against the Soviet Union. Probably you know that at that time we had a direct telephone line; it is now an open secret. I had a telephone, and Henry had a telephone. Only he could pick up at his end, and only I could pick up in my embassy. So I immediately called Henry, and said, "Look here, you were in Moscow. Of course the situation is very dramatic, but there is nothing really in the situation between the Soviet Union and the United States threatening conflict. There is no military threat. What are you talking about? What kind of a military alert are you announcing?" And Henry said, "Anatoly, this is a domestic issue. Tomorrow it will end; but don't tell anyone." And that is the way he handled that situation.

Well, at that time it was helpful. That is not exactly the best way to conduct diplomacy—through a military alert of your armed forces. I should pay tribute to Brezhnev; he took it rather quietly. He did not believe the alert was serious. We knew that you had an alert, but we did not respond, because we could see no reason for it. Sometimes Henry played a rather dangerous game; it is in his character. There were many other instances. So his memoirs are revealing; but I would not exaggerate the importance

of his memoirs, or any one else's memoirs. Memoirs are memoirs.

TROYANOVSKY: What about your future memoirs?

DOBRYNIN: I do not exaggerate. [Laughter.]

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Anatoly.

DOBRYNIN: Just to finish, since all of my colleagues have expressed their attitude about the conference: it looks as though you are eager to continue the discussion, we are thankful for your efforts. The organizers did an incredible job. Bob, Jim, and Mark came to Moscow many times to prepare the groundwork and to gather materials; they are very good at finding materials in our archives—much better than we are ourselves. They have done a very good job. I think this conference was interesting for theoreticians—for those who are interested in ideology; for academics; and for practitioners. In the past we have looked too much at these issues from the point of view of history. That is good and useful; but it was good idea to have Tom [Pickering] here now. It gives the discussion a dimension of contemporary relevance. Unfortunately, Yuly Vorontsov could not make it this time—next time, I hope.

What we really have not done quite as well as we could do is come to grips with the lost opportunities. There were many lost opportunities during the Carter years, in

different fields. With skill and understanding, we could have done many things. We did some things, but we could have done much more. I am not as pessimistic as some of my colleagues. If Carter had not insisted on his drastic reductions proposal and had skillfully wrapped up Vladivostok, we could have moved on to accomplish many things. There is a practical lesson in this, and this conference has helped to make that clear to me.

I do not know how to publicize the work of this seminar series for practitioners—for the people in my Foreign Ministry and in your State Department. But that would be a very helpful thing to do. They should know more about it. Unfortunately, this seminar is not very well-known, except, of course, among a rather narrow group of people.

LEGVOLD: We are giving very careful thought to exactly the problem you are raising. I think it will be addressed.

DOBRYNIN: I think that it should be, because people are sitting here who know a lot, and who could give good advice. Students not only in universities, but also students in diplomacy, should have access to these proceedings. Now in Russia we have new diplomatic personnel. They should understand what was going on.

KOMOLOV: Exactly; I agree completely with Ambassador Dobrynin.

DOBRYNIN: They, in turn, will have their own opinions. We will learn something from

them, too, no doubt. So I think it would be helpful to make it a less academic process. But apart from that, my personal feeling is that this was a very good idea—this conference especially. I think the process should continue. I can speak for all of my colleagues and tell you that they would be pleased to accept any further invitations, first to Norway, and then maybe to some other exotic place afterwards. [Laughter.]

LEGVOLD: Okay, thank you.

DOBRYNIN: And I would like to thank Bill and Mark and everyone else for the wonderful job they have done, and for all the assistance they have given to our people, including me.

TROYANOVSKY: And the young ladies.

DOBRYNIN: Yes, especially. We applaud you. [Applause.] And many thanks for the Horn!

LEGVOLD: I do not think I would have ever believed that you would say that. [Laughter.]

DOBRYNIN: It is the influence of the seminar.

BRENNER: On behalf of the scholars we, of course, thank you. I just want to thank the

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