

~~TOP SECRET~~

#4

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January 13, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: Dr. Brzezinski
SUBJECT: General Huyser's Report

I include an interesting cable from Huyser.

I believe he is following his instructions correctly though I feel uneasy about his list of desirable governments, (marked in red). I do not believe we can afford to go down the slippery slope of one civilian government followed by another somewhat more to the left. The armed forces will be demoralized and we will have no more leverage.

If Bakhtiar fails, we must make a decisive choice and (Huyser's) "C" will have to be implemented with U.S. backing. I believe that is consistent with your original directive and, with your permission, I would like to communicate that corrective to General Huyser. It is important that he and his Iranian colleagues not entertain any illusions of what may have to be done in the event Bakhtiar falters.

Precisely because no one wants a military coup, it is important for the Iranian military to support Bakhtiar fully, and not become entangled in a disintegrative political game.

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DECLASSIFIED

Per: Rac Project

ESDN; NLC-25-41-3-2-4

BY: ABP NARA DATE 10/14/14
for location nlc-SAFE 59C-12-50-5
(i.e. nlc-33-2-14)

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ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

[REDACTED]

EYES ONLY

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3.5(c)

TO: [REDACTED] SECDEF WASHDC
[REDACTED] CJCS WASHDC

EM
~~TOP SECRET~~ CITE [REDACTED]

EYES ONLY FOR SECDEF BROWN AND CJCS GEN JONES FROM GEN HUYSER

- (C) THIS IS SUPPLEMENTAL TO OUR PHONECON 12 JAN 79. TWO EAONS FOR THIS MSG - FIRST TO CLARIFY SOME POINTS AND SECOND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION GAINED DURING THE NIGHT AND THIS MORNING.
- (TS) I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR MY POSITION AS IT RELATES TO KHOMEINI. THE SERIOUSNESS OF GETTING SOME COOPERATION OF ANY TYPE FROM KHOMEINI IS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY OF ALL TASKS BY THE IRANIAN MILITARY LEADERS. THEY ARE OF AN OPINION THERE CANNOT BE PROGRESS MADE BY THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THIS INGREDIENT. I SHARE THESE VIEWS AS IT PERTAINS TO BEING OF HIGHEST PRIORITY. THEY ARE ALSO OF A UNANIMOUS OPINION TO HAVE KHOMEINI COME BACK INTO COUNTRY WOULD BE DISASTROUS. I'M INCLINED TO AGREE, HOW NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONDUCTED WITH KHOMEINI

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(1) 3.5(c)
Authority MR-LP-JC-2015-005
NARA [B] Date 5/4/2015

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OUT OF MY EXPERTISE AND ABOVE MY PAY GRADE, BUT I DO CONSIDER THEM URGENT.

3. (TS) IN MY CONVERSATION WITH SEC BROWN THE NIGHT OF 11 JAN 79 THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME DOUBT IN YOUR MIND AS TO MY UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. POLICY AND MY INSTRUCTIONS. I BELIEVE I THOROUGHLY UNDERSTAND AND I AM FOLLOWING THEM TO THE LETTER. FOLLOWING IS ABBREVIATED OUTLINE.

A - VITAL TO U.S. AND IRANIAN PEOPLE TO HAVE STRONG AND STABLE GOVERNMENT FRIENDLY TO U.S. B - THE IRANIAN MILITARY THUS FAR HAS DEEPLY IMPRESSED OUR PRESIDENT. C - WE BELIEVE BEST INTERESTS OF ALL CAN BE BEST REALIZED BY A STRONG AND STABLE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. D - A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE FULL SUPPORT OF MILITARY. E - THIS SUPPORT CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF MILITARY LEADERS STICK TO THEIR JOBS. THE MILITARY SERVICES MUST REMAIN INTACT AND WORK AS ONE TEAM. F - WE WILL FROM THE PRESIDENT DOWN REMAIN STRONGLY BEHIND THEM. THE ONLY

AMPLIFICATION I HAVE GIVEN BUT WHICH I CONSIDER INSIDE THE GUIDANCE FOLLOW: A - ALL PLANS SHOULD BE BASED ON MINIMUM BLOODSHED. B - I HAVE IMPLIED TO THEM THAT THEY MUST FIRST EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO INSURE SUCCESS OF THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT IF THEY ARE TO REALIZE FULL U.S. SUPPORT IN OTHER ALTERNATIVES. I AM USING THIS TO BACK THEM AWAY FROM ONLY CONSIDERING A MILITARY COUP. I HAVE TOLD THEM THAT I CONSIDER A MILITARY COUP AS AN ABSOLUTELY LAST RESORT. I HAVE EXPLAINED TO THEM THERE ARE DEGREES BEFORE THAT ACTION. SO THEY COULD UNDERSTAND I HAVE MADE IT A THREE STEP APPROACH FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE. FIRST STEP - BAKHTIAR MAY SUCCEED UNDER SOMEWHAT NORMAL GOVERNING PROCEDURES. SECOND STEP - IF THAT FAILS BAKHTIAR COULD USE MILITARY IN VARYING DEGREES. HE COULD HAVE TOUGH MARTIAL LAW OR HE COULD ORDER MILITARY TAKE OVER OF FACILITIES SUCH AS POWER, OIL, ETC. THIRD STEP - ONLY IF EVERYTHING FAILS CONSIDER MILITARY TAKE OVER.

4. (TS) I'M NOT THE EXPERT IN THIS FIELD BUT SO YOU WILL KNOW HOW MY MIND IS FUNCTIONING, HERE ARE MY THOUGHTS ON THE TYPES OF GOVERNMENT DESIRED. LIST FROM BEST UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO WORST.

A - SUCCESSFUL BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. B - BAKHTIAR OPERATES WITH SOME SUCCESS FOR A PERIOD OF TIME (MONTHS) BUT FAILS. ANOTHER CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT APPOINTED (SHAH IS OUT OF COUNTRY) THAT IS MORE ACCEPTABLE TO KHOMEINI AND THE RELIGIOUS FACTION. THIS ALTERNATIVE COULD REPEAT ITSELF UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. C - A MILITARY COUP. D - A KHOMEINI GOVERNMENT - ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. E - A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT.

5. (TS) AS YOU KNOW I MET WITH GEN TOUFANIAN UNTIL LATE LAST NIGHT. I MET WITH GEN RABII THIS MORNING. BOTH HAVE PRESSED ME HARD THAT THE MOMENT THE SHAH LEAVES THERE SHOULD BE A MILITARY TAKE OVER. THEY STATE THE REASON BEING

THE UNCERTAINTY OF WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE MILITARY FORCES ON THE SHAH'S DEPARTURE. THEY DON'T THINK BAKHTIAR WILL SUCCEED AND THEN THEY WON'T HAVE THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO TAKE OVER. I BELIEVE EACH HAS HIS REASONS. THIS IS MY OPINION OF WHY THEY ARE PUSHING. GEN TOUFANIAN IS TORN BETWEEN PERSONAL THOUGHTS AND DEDICATION TO HIS COUNTRY -- HE IS ON THE LIST THE GOVERNMENT HAS FOR THOSE TO BE PUT ON TRIAL FOR CORRUPTION AND IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT HIS FUTURE. HE ALSO SAID HE HAS INFORMATION IN HIS HEAD THAT IF EXTRACTED WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO THE WEST. HE IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT FUTURE OF IRAN. GEN RABII IS EXTREMELY DEDICATED TO THE SHAH. THEREFORE THE CLOSER WE GET TO THE SHAH'S DEPARTURE THE MORE UNCERTAIN HE GETS AND PREDICTS DRASTIC LOSS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL WHEN THE SHAH DEPARTS. GEN TOUFANIAN HAS ALSO PRESSED ME HARD TO AGREE TO HIS DEPARTURE PRIOR TO THE SHAH DEPARTING. I HAVE TOLD HIM IT IS HIS DECISION BUT THAT I DO NOT CONSIDER HIS DEPARTURE AS BEING IN THE BEST INTEREST OF HIS COUNTRY.

6. (TS) I'LL DO MY BEST TO KEEP THEM STABLE, IN COUNTRY, GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO BAKHTIAR, AND NOT JUMP INTO A MILITARY COUP, AS THE SHAH'S DEPARTURE GETS CLOSER AND WHEN HE DEPARTS THEY MAY QUIT LISTENING. I HOPE THIS DOESN'T HAPPEN.

7. (TS) THERE ARE STILL DEMONSTRATIONS BUT THEY ARE NOT VIOLENT, NOT DESTRUCTIVE. I KNOW FOR A FACT THE INSTRUCTIONS THEY GET IN THE MOSQUE IS TO DEMONSTRATE BUT BE ORDERLY AND NOT DESTRUCTIVE. THERE IS A LARGE ANNUAL DEMONSTRATION SCHEDULED ON 19 JAN 79. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THEY WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE IT PEACEFUL.

8. (TS) WILL CALL AGAIN TONIGHT WITH AN UPDATE. BEST WISHES,
DUTCH,
#0824

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