



(U//~~FOUO~~) USCYBERCOM 120-Day Assessment of Operation GLOWING SYMPHONY: Executive Summary

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) This document represents the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) assessment of Operation GLOWING SYMPHONY (OGS) after 120 days from initiation of the operation. It is a subsequent update to the 30-day assessment that was released on 15 Dec 16. Where numbers are reported, the number from the 30-day assessment is shown afterward in brackets ([]).

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) OGS is a USCYBERCOM operation targeting the Islamic State in Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) Through OGS, USCYBERCOM sought to contest ISIS' ability to execute its media and [REDACTED] contest the enemy in the information domain, and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) USCYBERCOM designed OGS to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Key to this operation was close coordination between Joint Task Force (JTF) ARES, USCYBERCOM, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the NSA, and [REDACTED] to maintain pressure on ISIS and to address attempts by ISIS media to reconstitute.

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] USCYBERCOM initiated OGS. Based upon the experiences and lessons learned [REDACTED] USCYBERCOM notified the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy (OSD(P)), and the Interagency [REDACTED] of its intent to [REDACTED]. USCYBERCOM requested [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Since the start of the operation, Coalition forces have [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Additionally, operations led to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) USCYBERCOM assesses that OGS successfully contested ISIS in the information domain [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. The operation contested ISIS' ability to execute

Classified By: [REDACTED] (b) (3) 10 U.S.C. § 130b
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its media [REDACTED] operations by imposing time and resource costs [REDACTED] and disrupting ISIS media [REDACTED].

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Reflections also indicate that OGS disruptions [REDACTED] impacts against media distribution and dissemination. ISIS continues to [REDACTED].

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED].

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) During [REDACTED] USCYBERCOM has continued to leverage the deconfliction process directed within [REDACTED]. Cyber Mission Forces utilize [REDACTED] while the USCYBERCOM Joint Operations Center facilitates operational deconfliction with Interagency partners. To date, these processes have worked well [REDACTED].

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Absent of significant policy changes from OSD, USCYBERCOM is limited in its ability to challenge ISIS [REDACTED]. As a result, USCYBERCOM has [REDACTED] to achieve our objectives. The updated version of [REDACTED] seeks to provide [REDACTED].

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) The scale and complexity of OGS has allowed us to learn a number of lessons that will benefit the community as we move forward. This report summarizes two new lessons learned since the 30-day assessment, strategic communication and [REDACTED] and provides additional recommendations with respect to targeting and [REDACTED] data exploitation. The entire compiled set of lessons learned encompassing both assessments can be found in the updated Appendix C.

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) USCYBERCOM has [REDACTED]. Through OGS, we have seen ISIS continue to [REDACTED].

counter ISIS' radicalization efforts through cyberspace. [REDACTED] permits continued integration with USCENCOM, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, and [REDACTED] during USCENCOM's [REDACTED] while also allowing us to socialize the CONOP with our partners.



~~(U//FOUO)~~ **USCYBERCOM 120-Day Assessment of Operation GLOWING SYMPHONY**

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ This document represents the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) assessment of Operation GLOWING SYMPHONY (OGS) after 120 days from initiation of the operation. It is a subsequent update to the 30-day assessment that was released on 15 Dec 16. Where numbers are reported, the number from the 30-day assessment is shown afterward in brackets ([]). This assessment is divided into four main sections. The *Operational Overview* section describes the planning and execution of the operation, including an assessment of task accomplishment. The *Operational Effectiveness* section summarizes the USCYBERCOM assessment of the effects of OGS on ISIS, as well as the maturation of United States (US) Government (USG) approval processes for offensive cyberspace operations (OCO). The *Lessons Learned* section describes a selected subset of the lessons learned as a result of OGS. Finally, the *Way Ahead* section describes USCYBERCOM follow-on actions.

(U) OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW

~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)~~ OGS is a USCYBERCOM operation targeting the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].

~~(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ OGS focuses on [REDACTED] ISIS media and propaganda operations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].

~~(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ This section describes the planning and execution of OGS, with focus on the 90 days [REDACTED]. The planning portion explains the purpose, concept of the operation, and initial expectations. The second portion summarizes the execution of OGS, including Coalition and Interagency efforts.

(U) PLANNING

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) In accordance with COMUSCYBERCOM's intent, through Operation GLOWING SYMPHONY, USCYBERCOM sought to contest ISIS' ability to execute its media and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] contest the enemy in the information domain, and [REDACTED].

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The initial mission period for OGS covered a 30-day window beginning at [REDACTED] USCYBERCOM notified the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy (OSD(P)), and the Interagency of its intent to [REDACTED]. For a detailed overview of the concept of the operation for OGS, refer to the original 30-day assessment. In addition to the types of missions described in the 30-day assessment, subsequent OCO also included unique missions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Also, Joint Task Force (JTF) ARES has begun [REDACTED].

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) This assessment also includes cyber intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C-ISR) operations conducted against [REDACTED]. The purposes of such operations include [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. The team is also authorized to collect information related to ISIS media production, distribution and dissemination. For these operations, [REDACTED].

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) Initial expectations were that Coalition operations would significantly impact ISIS media distribution and dissemination [REDACTED] however, planners also recognized that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED].

(U) EXECUTION

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) OGS continues to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ISIS media. Through our coordination and planning with the FBI, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Furthermore, the FBI continues to address [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) At the request of US Central Command (USCENTCOM), JTF ARES is continuing to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Additionally, we continue to coordinate with USCENTCOM to [REDACTED] in support of ground operations [REDACTED].

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Under OGS, JTF ARES leveraged Interagency and Coalition partners to increase pressure on ISIS' ability to develop, distribute, and disseminate media [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) With respect to the Coalition's task performance, we continue to assess our task accomplishment in the execution of OGS as successful overall. USCYBERCOM, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in support of USCENTCOM operations. For further discussion of task accomplishment measures of performance (MOP) and the updated assessment for OGS, see Appendix A.

(U) OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) This section assesses the effectiveness of OGS in two parts tied to the original purpose of the operation. The first part describes the impacts of OGS on ISIS, as reported in

intelligence reflections and operational observations. The second part summarizes the maturation of the process for approving OCO.

(U//FOUO) IMPACT ON ISIS

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) USCYBERCOM assesses that OGS successfully contested ISIS in the information domain [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]

- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) OGS disrupted [REDACTED].^{1,2,3}
- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Through OGS coordination with the FBI, [REDACTED].
- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/LES) JTF ARES, in partnership with the FBI, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The FBI and USCYBERCOM assess that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) JTF ARES partnered with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] assesses that the operation was successful and led to a significant reduction in [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. As a result of [REDACTED] ongoing counter-media [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) USCYBERCOM assesses that OGS [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. OGS contested ISIS' ability to execute its media and [REDACTED] by imposing time and resource costs [REDACTED] and disrupting ISIS media [REDACTED].^{4,5,6,7}

- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) USCYBERCOM estimates that OGS-led disruptions of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to conduct its operations. [REDACTED] and better postured the Coalition to achieve decisive future effects.
- (TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) OGS disrupted ISIS media [REDACTED].
- (TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) OGS had significant impacts on [REDACTED] since the start of OGS.
- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) OGS likely disrupted [REDACTED]. According to recent signals intelligence (SIGINT) reporting, ISIS media [REDACTED].⁸
- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) OGS caused internal disruption of [REDACTED]. ISIS was forced to [REDACTED].⁹

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Reflections also indicated that OGS disruptions affected [REDACTED] media distribution and dissemination. ISIS continues to [REDACTED] distribute its propaganda, [REDACTED].^{10,11}

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]

- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]
- (TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]
- (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) OGS conducted more than [REDACTED] C-ISR missions to date [REDACTED].

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Finally, OGS enabled Combatant Command [REDACTED]

(b) (1) Sec. 1.4(a) (d) (g), 1.7(e)

(U) PROCESS MATURATION

~~(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ During [REDACTED] USCYBERCOM has continued to leverage the deconfliction process directed within [REDACTED]. Cyber Mission Forces utilize [REDACTED] while the USCYBERCOM Joint Operations Center facilitates operational deconfliction with Interagency partners. To date, these processes have worked well [REDACTED].

~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Absent of significant policy changes from OSD, USCYBERCOM is limited in its ability to challenge ISIS [REDACTED]. As a result, USCYBERCOM has [REDACTED] to achieve our objectives.

~~(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ As an example, [REDACTED] USCYBERCOM has been working options to [REDACTED]. Specifically, USCYBERCOM is working with the FBI in order to [REDACTED].

~~(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ During [REDACTED]. The updated version of [REDACTED] seeks to provide [REDACTED].

(U) LESSONS LEARNED

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Planning and executing OGS provided the opportunity to truly exercise the [REDACTED]. While the command learned many lessons throughout the process, a number of areas stand out. For this assessment update, there is no change to the following lessons learned from the 30-day assessment:

- (U) Authorities and Policies
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ [REDACTED]
- (U) Joint Interagency Coordination
- (U) Collection Management
- (U) [REDACTED]
- (U) Political Military Assessments

~~(U//FOUO)~~ There were two new observations with respect to strategic communications and [REDACTED] as well as additional recommendations for targeting and [REDACTED] data

(b) (1) Sec. 1.4 (a) (d) (g) , 1.7 (e)

(b) (5)

exploitation. The primary recommendations for those four observations are described below. Appendix C includes the more-detailed discussions and is a comprehensive appendix that replaces Appendix C from the original 30-day assessment.

(U//FOUO) **Strategic Communication.** To our communications planning, add consideration of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] will be kept informed during operations, to include [REDACTED] as well as written USCYBERCOM summaries/updates. This plan should also include [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] USCYBERCOM should engage the stakeholders of the Trilateral Memorandum of Agreement (Tri-Lat) (Appendix F), in order to establish governance underneath the Tri-Lat for [REDACTED] and develop [REDACTED] for execution under [REDACTED] should include language that explicitly states [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) **Targeting (Additional Recommendation).** Employ a wider range of joint doctrine and procedures (e.g., [REDACTED]) for cyberspace operations.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] **Data Exploitation (Additional Recommendations).** [REDACTED] [REDACTED] where possible. Leverage JTF ARES mission requirements to drive the development of an initial USCYBERCOM [REDACTED] capability as part of the [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

(U) WAY AHEAD

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) USCYBERCOM [REDACTED] allows our operators to continue to pursue ISIS in cyberspace in support of USCENTCOM's efforts to combat the "virtual caliphate," while USCYBERCOM develops and socializes follow-on Concepts of Operation (CONOPs) to counter ISIS media with the Interagency. Through OGS, we have seen ISIS continue to [REDACTED] [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] counter ISIS' radicalization efforts through cyberspace. It is useful to note that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] will continue to support OGS operations via [REDACTED] [REDACTED].


(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) USCYBERCOM will formally submit this CONOP to the Interagency for approval [REDACTED] will allow us to continue operations [REDACTED] [REDACTED] while also allowing us to socialize the CONOP with our partners. The new CONOP will require [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in the cyber domain. We will incorporate a recurring assessment into this CONOP which will allow the Interagency the opportunity to provide feedback and input to improve ongoing and future cyberspace operations against ISIS.

(U) APPENDICES

(U//~~FOUO~~) Appendices B, D, E, and F have not been changed from the 30-day assessment and are not being distributed with this update. Refer to the original assessment for those. Appendices A and C have been updated; completely replace the corresponding appendices from the 30-day assessment; and are being republished with this assessment update. Note that Appendix C is classified NOFORN, and will therefore be maintained as a separate document.

- A. (U//~~FOUO~~) Assessment of Task Accomplishment (Updated) [TS//SI//REL]
- B. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Joint Interagency Coordination Timeline (No Change) [TS//SI//REL/FISA]
- C. (U) Lessons Learned (Updated) [TS//SI//NF/FISA]
- D. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) United States Cyber Command Concept of Operations (CONOP) to disrupt ISIL [REDACTED] – Operation GLOWING SYMPHONY (No Change) [TS//SI//NF/FISA]
- E. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) SECDEF Approval for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (No Change) [TS//NF]
- F. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Trilateral Memorandum of Agreement among the DOD, DOJ and Intelligence Community Regarding Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) (No Change) [S//NF]





(U//FOUO) APPENDIX A. ASSESSMENT OF TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT (UPDATED)

(U//FOUO) This appendix describes our framework for assessing task accomplishment, which captures how well we executed Operation GLOWING SYMPHONY. This is an update to, and fully replaces, the same appendix to the 30-day assessment, with the only change being to the information shown graphically in Figure 1.




Figure 1. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) OGS Assessment of Task Accomplishment.

(U//FOUO) The framework is broken down by phase from the OGS Concept of the Operation (CONOP), with supporting measures of performance and indicators. Actual numerical data for each indicator are shown in blue. After each indicator description are the Coalition partners represented in the data. The stop light circle next to each indicator assesses that particular measure against the thresholds established in the CONOP. The gray circles represent indicators that are not important for assessing task accomplishment, but still contribute to the understanding of Coalition activities. Black outlined circles indicate those measures that only apply to the initial mission period and were not updated as the operation continued. The full legend is shown on the bottom left of the figure.

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) Overall, we assess the task execution of OGS as green, or successful. Only two evaluated indicators are amber; the remainder are green. The first indicator, [REDACTED] is amber because the teams were not able to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had no negative impact on the mission. The second amber indicator is for [REDACTED] which was the original intent of the CONOP. [REDACTED]. The threshold for green [REDACTED].

~~TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY//FISA//LES~~

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Note that some reporting shows different numbers for [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. The difference is that here, we do not count the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(b) (1) Sec. 1.4(a)(d)(g), 1.7(e)
(b) (5)

(U//FOUO) APPENDIX C. LESSONS LEARNED (UPDATED)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ This appendix describes the observations and recommendations associated with our primary lessons learned as a result of planning and executing Operation GLOWING SYMPHONY. This is an update to, and fully replaces, the same appendix to the 30-day assessment.

~~(S//REL)~~ AUTHORITIES AND POLICIES

~~(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **Observation.** Although the collateral effects estimate (CEE) for OGS was determined to be no CEE, the operation required [REDACTED] approval because [REDACTED] within the context of [REDACTED].

~~(TS//NF)~~ **Discussion.** [REDACTED] was the authority used during the conduct of OGS. [REDACTED] approved by the President of the United States (POTUS) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(TS//NF)~~ In the event of a non-concur from a voting member of the Interagency, [REDACTED]. USCYBERCOM exercised this exact process and the timeline in support of the OGS approval (see Appendix B). The non-concurs highlighted [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Recommendation.** Normalize [REDACTED] approval processes. Interagency policies and processes are not established to [REDACTED]. Joint Interagency Coordination process that is still in a transitional state.

~~(S//REL)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **Observation.** Prior to OCO actions [REDACTED]

(TS//NF) **Discussion.** [REDACTED] when operating under the authorities granted via [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//NF) Despite the plan and agreement of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. USCYBERCOM continues to analyze reporting to codify the degree to which the adversary exploited this opportunity.

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Should follow-on operations propose more invasive tactics and/or utilize more sophisticated capabilities, it would be ill-advised to risk critical infrastructure and/or capabilities unnecessarily.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Recommendation.** [REDACTED] remains an unresolved policy issue [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Observation.** [REDACTED] establish a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) that is focused on [REDACTED]. Specifically, the JIATF [REDACTED] as part of the operational review and approval process in support of [REDACTED]. However, [REDACTED] does not [REDACTED].

(TS//NF) **Discussion.** [REDACTED] requires targets be deconflicted in accordance with the Trilateral Memorandum of Agreement (Trilat MOA) [REDACTED]. Additionally, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a Strike Package is required that consists of an Intelligence/Technical Gain/Loss Assessment (IGL/TGL), Political Military Assessment, Legal Review, and CONOP. As implemented, each OCO mission requires these documents. In addition to deconfliction under the

Trilat MOA, [REDACTED] requires [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) The amount of informal meetings, briefings, and overall information sharing that occurred was extremely in-depth and time consuming for both USCYBERCOM and JTF ARES staffs. If this same level of detail is required for each proposed action during an OCO mission [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].
Further discussion of the Joint Interagency Coordination process and timeline can be found in Appendix B. Cyber operations against ISIL should be [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) As a result of the Interagency coordination, OGS was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to be deliberated under different policy decisions.
[REDACTED] as a follow-on Combatant Command (CCMD) action.

(U//FOUO) **Recommendation.** Normalize Interagency policies and processes to adjudicate Interagency non-concurs expeditiously in a manner that supports dynamic targeting within the cyber domain.

(U//FOUO) COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Observation.** Through extensive pre-operation coordination, all US intelligence agencies were highly attuned to the OGS plan and were postured to focus collection assets to gauge the impact of OGS on ISIL members. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Discussion.** USCYBERCOM J2 and JTF ARES developed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Multiple meetings in the pre-operational phase with IC/DoD/allied intelligence representatives ensured high awareness of OGS collection requirements. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Recommendation.** Incorporate positive lessons learned into standard practices, collection management tradecraft, and products for future operations. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. In addition,

codify collection timelines and deliverables to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) **Observation.** USCYBERCOM's [REDACTED] capabilities [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] contributed significantly to OGS planning and execution; however,
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) **Discussion.** DoD's Cyber Strategy emphasizes [REDACTED] in cyberspace operations;
however, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) **Recommendation.** USCYBERCOM's [REDACTED] in cyberspace element could provide
substantial support to operational planning, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] should also be requested and incorporated into the operation.

(U//FOUO) **TARGETING**

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Observation.** During target development, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

This made the target vetting process for OGS lengthy and difficult, as USCYBERCOM and JTF ARES
personnel had to frequently [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) **Discussion.** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. As such, it is recommended that it be vetted with the
CCMDs as well as IC partners [REDACTED]. The target
was sent out for vetting [REDACTED] IC partners, but [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] with CCMDs and IC
vetting agencies. Much of the difficulty revolved around [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Objectives for the mission were [REDACTED].

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) With regard to the additional information requirement to support target development and IC vetting, the inability of JTF ARES to [REDACTED] from teams under operational control (OPCON) of JTF ARES led to [REDACTED] IC vetting process for [REDACTED]. JTF ARES is [REDACTED] that relates to JTF ARES operational needs.

(U//FOUO) **Recommendation 1.** Adhering to established vetting standards should reduce the time and effort required advance the targeting process as all parties get to "vote"/comment at the same time. Targets should be developed to support established plans, containing MOPs and MOEs that are clearly linked to well-defined objectives. Establish measurable MOEs based on determination of what intelligence is known or likely to be known about adversary activities.

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Recommendation 2.** [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) **Recommendation 3.** Employ a wider range of joint doctrine and procedures (e.g. [REDACTED]) for cyberspace operations.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] DATA EXPLOITATION

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Observation.** OGS plans factored the possibility of adversary data recovery and acknowledged the need for exploiting that data, but did not [REDACTED]. Additionally JTF ARES did not anticipate [REDACTED] priorities were established for exploiting the data, but [REDACTED] policies are needed to clarify handling procedures for captured data.

(TS//NF) **Discussion.** JTF ARES established [REDACTED] priorities for exploiting captured data: [REDACTED] which JTF ARES accomplished by working through HQs USCYBERCOM J3 in accordance with USCYBERCOM OCO data policies. [REDACTED] JTF ARES worked through USCYBERCOM to identify sources for short-term support.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Recommendation 1.** Future plans should account for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. USCYBERCOM should formulate [REDACTED] policy and capability to support any USCYBERCOM JTF or JFHQ-C that covers all future operations.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Recommendation 2.** [REDACTED] where possible. The USCYBERCOM Capabilities Development Group (CDG) is pursuing [REDACTED]. CDG is developing USCYBERCOM data storage solutions [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is expected to be operational for [REDACTED]. USCYBERCOM J6 (in particular [REDACTED]) [REDACTED] should be consulted on [REDACTED]. In particular, [REDACTED].

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Recommendation 3.** Leverage JTF ARES mission requirements to drive the development of an initial USCYBERCOM [REDACTED] capability as part of the [REDACTED]. Development of an initial USCYBERCOM [REDACTED].

(U) POLITICAL MILITARY ASSESSMENTS

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Observation.** The current [REDACTED] timeline for conducting a Political Military Assessment (PMA) [REDACTED] against adversary infrastructure.

(S//NF) **Discussion.** [REDACTED] to produce PMAs for the target elements [REDACTED] with significant challenges in meeting the timeline, especially factoring the need for [REDACTED]. Other agencies, [REDACTED] were similarly stressed to meet the deadline. [REDACTED] to staff a required PMA and the IC is given another [REDACTED] to review.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Recommendation.** Given the likelihood that USCYBERCOM will be conducting more frequent and widely-scoped cyber operations throughout the global Internet infrastructure in the future, [REDACTED] would help expedite the request and approval process and provide planners with [REDACTED] factored up front into cyber CONOPs.

(U) STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

(U//FOUO) **Observation.** An expanded strategic communication plan is needed to provide [REDACTED] timely operational updates and synchronized messaging.

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NFORN//FIR~~

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Discussion.** A communication plan [REDACTED] was adequate during the planning phase but waned during execution. Once the operations commenced, further notifications or updates [REDACTED] shared and synchronized among agencies. Due to USCYBERCOM's [REDACTED] particularly when USCYBERCOM was [REDACTED].

(U) **Recommendation.** Add consideration of how [REDACTED] will be kept informed during operations, to include [REDACTED] as well as written USCYBERCOM summaries/updates. This plan should also include synchronized delivery of communications [REDACTED].

(U) [REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Observation.** Current deconfliction processes place unnecessary restrictions on a Combatant Command's (CCMD's) ability to coordinate Cyber Operations for CCMD [REDACTED]. If a target has been validated, vetted, and formally designated [REDACTED] by the CCMD, the CCMD should not be prevented from requesting USCYBERCOM support - specifically in situations where [REDACTED].


(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Discussion.** The Trilateral Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), dated May 2007, is the keystone policy document outlining offensive cyber operations deconfliction processes. The language in the MOA reflect the policies, authorities and capabilities that were in place when the MOA was written. [REDACTED].

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Recommendation 1.** Recommend the following verbiage [REDACTED].

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Cyber operations for [REDACTED] within a designated AO, and as defined in joint publication 3-60, [REDACTED]. USCYBERCOM will attempt to [REDACTED] to the fullest extent possible [REDACTED]. In the event of [REDACTED], USCYBERCOM will [REDACTED]. Examples include, but are not limited to, [REDACTED].

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Recommendation 2.** USCYBERCOM should engage the stakeholders of the Trilateral Memorandum of Agreement (Tri-Lat) (Appendix F), in order to establish governance underneath the Tri-Lat for [REDACTED] and develop a standard [REDACTED] for execution under [REDACTED].


- Task Accomplishment



- Operational Effectiveness



(b) (3) 10 U.S.C. § 130b

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
- OBJ: Disrupt and Counter ISIL's use of social media




- OBJ: Disrupt ISIL's sponsored media




- OBJ: Disrupt and Counter ISIL's use of social media




- OBJ: Disrupt ISIL's sponsored media



(b) (3) 10 U.S.C. § 130b

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