

SECRET

NPEC CIA/SI/HTA-SIM-1-57

No. Pages: 16  
Copy No: 29

25X1A  
26X1

23

22-08-57

22-08-57

# SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

## GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE FROM THE KLYUCHI/KAMCHATKA COVERAGE

22 AUGUST 1957



JOB NO. 78T04753

BOX NO. 1

FOLDER NO. 23

TOTAL DOCS HEREIN 1

CIA/SI/HTA-SIM-1-57

REV DATE	3 JUN	BY	EL09599
ORIG COMP		TYPE	11
ORIG CLASS	I	REV CLASS	S
JUST	22	PAGES	19
		NEXT REV	2012
		AUTH:	HR 70-2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET [redacted]  
Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP78T04753A000100230001-7

25X1A



SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

"GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE FROM  
THE KLYUCHI/KAMCHATKA [redacted]

25X1D

22 August 1957

OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP78T04753A000100230001-7

TOP SECRET [redacted]

25X1

CONTENTS

I PURPOSE

II CONCLUSIONS

III DISCUSSIONS

A. Guided Missile Intelligence Interest in the Klyuchi Area

B. Potential Guided Missile Information

of Klyuchi Area

1. Klyuchi As An Impact Area
2. Klyuchi As A Launching Point
3. Impact Area vs Launching Point

C. Data Acquired of Klyuchi Area

D. Guided Missile Knowledge

1. Klyuchi As A Launching Point
2. Klyuchi As An Impact Area
3. Impact Area vs Launching Point

E. The Unanswered Guided Missile Intelligence Questions

PLATES

Plate # 1 - Probable New Ballistic Missile Test Range

Plate # 2 - Kamchatka Peninsula

Plate # 3 - Aircraft Activity and Radar Locations In The Klyuchi Area

~~TOP SECRET~~

PREFACE

25X1D This Scientific Intelligence Memorandum provides a summary of the guided  
 25X1D missile intelligence [redacted] of the Klyuchi/Kamchatka  
 25X1D area [redacted] A brief treatment of the reasons for guided missile  
 25X1D intelligence interest in the Klyuchi area is included as well as a discussion  
 25X1D of type of information which it was hoped would be acquired [redacted]

25X1D [redacted]  
 25X1D Detailed [redacted] data is continuing at  
 25X1D HT AUTOMAT; it is unlikely however, that future [redacted] analysis will  
 25X1D reveal any new information of sufficient guided missile importance to alter  
 the conclusions reached herein.


The precise role of the Klyuchi area in the Soviet guided missile program  
 continues to be the subject of further studies in OSI/CIA.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1A

25X1



GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE FROM  
THE KLYUCHI/KAMCHATKA COVERAGE

PROBLEM

To assess the guided missile intelligence




of the Klyuchi/Kamchatka area.




CONCLUSIONS

1. [Redacted] not reveal any specific indications of  
guided missile activity.

2. The probability that the Klyuchi area is the terminus rather than  
the launch point for a new guided missile test range between Novokazalinsk/  
Dzhusaly and Klyuchi areas is strengthened by the complete lack of evidence  
of the extensive facilities associated with rangehead type activities.



3. Within



the best known opportunity for acquiring data which should answer

critical questions on the status of the Soviet ICBM program [Redacted] of the  
probable new rangehead in the Novokazalinsk/Dzhusaly area.

TOP SECRET




25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

DISCUSSION

A. Guided Missile Intelligence Interest in the Klyuchi Area

1. By its geographic location alone, the Kamchatka Peninsula area, including its bordering bodies of water, has long been a suspect location for the terminus of a new long distance ballistic missile flight test range. Impact points here would provide the longest great circle distance between known and suspect launching points in western USSR. Flight test ranges of 3000 to 4500 nautical miles could be achieved.




25X1B

\*The Novokazalinsk/Dzhusaly area also includes the Kzyl Orda area.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

25X1B



25X1B

3. The evidence indicates Soviet preparations for testing either a ICBM or earth satellite vehicle (ESV). It is doubtful [redacted] alone could provide an answer to the key question of whether the Klyuchi area was intended to be the terminal impact area for an ICBM or the location of instrumentation sites for the ESV or both. However, the critical question to be answered is whether the Klyuchi area contains only instrumentations sites or evidence that a launching site is being constructed there. Because of the overriding intelligence importance of the ICBM the remainder of this paper will consider only that aspect with emphasis on the status and timing of the program.

25X1D

4. There was some question as to which area is to be the launching point and which area is to be the impact area for the ICBM test range. The available evidence strongly indicated that the Novokazalinsk/Dzhusaly area would contain the launching point with the range terminus in the Klyuchi area. However, the relatively large amounts (about 21,000 tons [redacted] of cargo off-loaded at Ust Kamchatsk and destined for the Special Construction Unit at Klyuchi could have indicated the start of construction of a launching area-possibly to serve a dual role, first as a launcher for test range and later as an operational launching site for ICBMs.

TOP SECRET


25X1A

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP78T04753A000100230001-7

PLATE I

25X1

TOP SECRET



25X1

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET



25X1D

25X1D

B. Potential Guided Missile Information Available




of Klyuchi Area




1. Klyuchi As An Impact Area. Instrumentation sites for acquiring missile telemetry and trajectory data would probably be located along the

25X1D

terminal trajectory path.



25X1D



25X1D




Klyuchi area it might be possible

to determine an instrumentation site pattern from which the intended impact area could be deduced.

2. Administrative and logistic support for the instrumentation sites in an impact area would probably be centralized on one location - possibly Klyuchi. Approximately 200-400 personnel would be needed to operate the equipment and provide "housekeeping" functions. A rapid and dependable communication system is needed to connect this location with its instrumentation sites. In addition, an equivalent system is required to connect the central location with the rangehead control station. A modest transportation terminus and some warehouse-type storage facilities should be present.

3. Klyuchi As A Launching Point. The guided missile test rangehead area would contain many distinguishable features, the "readiness" of which should provide a direct indication of the timing of the missile program to be flight-tested thereat. There would be launching facilities consisting of concrete pads, servicing towers, control bunkers, fuel storage areas, electronic instrumentation sites, and special missile handling and fueling equipment.

TOP SECRET



~~TOP SECRET~~

A fairly large industrial complex should be located nearby to provide support type operations such as missile assembly, missile check-out, liquid oxygen production, and general industrial maintenance activities. A range control center and communication network would also be located near the launching area. The whole rangehead area should be interconnected by a first-class road network with large radius turns for missile handling equipment.

4. Impact Area vs Launching Point. The type, quantity, dispersion and distinguishability of missile facilities located in a rangehead area compared with those in an impact area definitely indicate that by far the greatest opportunity for acquiring information on the status of the Soviet ICBM program

25X1D

[Redacted]

25X1D

C. Data Acquired [Redacted] <sup>1/</sup> of Klyuchi Area.

25X1D

1. [Redacted]

25X1D

[Redacted] was acquired on the primary target - the town of Klyuchi and the surrounding terrain. [Redacted]

25X1D

[Redacted]

25X1D


<sup>1/</sup> HPA-B43-57, dated 23 June 1957, (Top Secret [Redacted])

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

25X1



~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

2. Two military type installations are located in the town of Klyuchi; one has been completed for sometime, and the other is currently under construction. The installation under construction consists of seven large two story buildings of barracks or warehouse type ranging in size from 30' x 90' to 60' x 130', and several other smaller buildings in varying stages of construction. On the western outskirts of Klyuchi there were seven HOUND helicopters parked in a small clearing. No large airstrips were detected near the town of Klyuchi; a large area (approximately 1,000' x 11,000') is being cleared just north of the town of Kozyrevsk which looks like the early stages of airfield construction.

3. [REDACTED] considerable logging activity in the area.

Villages of the Kamchatka River Valley are connected by a narrow swath (approximately 20' wide) cut through the vegetation which is typical of communication or power line clearings. The transportation in the area is restricted to narrow trails except in the immediate vicinity of villages and logging camps. There is considerable river traffic consisting of barges and small craft. Nearly all activities, (towns, logging camps, trails, communication or power lines and river docks) are located on the southern side of the Kamchatka river indicating little activity to the immediate north.

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET

D. Guided Missile Knowledge

1. Klyuchi As A Launching Point.

no evidence of guided missile rangehead type activities. In fact there was a complete lack of any evidence indicating that such activity was intended for the area or could be supported by the logistic capabilities evident in and around Klyuchi. Although it is recognized that a rangehead could be located in an area this is considered highly unlikely for the following reasons:

a. Klyuchi has been the focal point indicating that the guided missile activity involved probably has its headquarters in Klyuchi;

b. Rangehead activities would require considerable logistic support during both the construction and operational phases. There is no indication of such logistic activity in the Klyuchi area.

c. The very rugged terrain and extremely poor weather conditions make this whole area of Kamchatka generally unfavorable for rangehead activities.

2. definitely weakens, but does not positively exclude, the possibility of a guided missile rangehead being located in the Klyuchi area.

3. Klyuchi As An Impact Area. did not provide any direct indications of the guided missile test range instrumentation sites normally associated with an impact area. Such sites would probably be dispersed along the terminal trajectory path and located on fairly elevated plateaus to

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

provide line-of-sight tracking on the incoming missile all the way to its impact point. Water impact is likely; therefore, some small "shacks" along the coastline with cables leading out into water to sonic detection systems would also be expected. Considering the probable locations of instrumentation sites [Redacted] the absence of any direct indications of such sites [Redacted] is not surprising.

25X1D

25X1D

25X1D

4. A heliport with seven HOUND helicopters [Redacted] on the western edge of Klyuchi. Although these helicopters could be utilized for many purposes, there is the distinct possibility that they service guided missile instrumentation sites dispersed along the terminal trajectory path. [Redacted]

25X1D

25X1D

[Large Redacted Area]

TOP SECRET

[Redacted]

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP78T04753A000100230001-7

25X1D

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP78T04753A000100230001-7

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

30001-7

[Redacted]

5. The military installation currently under construction could be a focal point for the impact area and as such could provide ample housing, warehouse and general logistic support facilities for the outlying instrumentation and communication sites. The 21,000 tons of cargo destined for Special Construction Unit at Klyuchi [Redacted] could well be going into this new installation.

25X1D

6. Impact Area vs Launching Point. The complete lack of any indications of guided missile rangehead type activities in or around Klyuchi definitely weakens this possibility. These negative results when considered in the light of other associations with the guided missile program strengthen the probability that the Klyuchi area will be the terminus for the new test range. The comparative likelihood of detecting indicators of the two activities also becomes a factor favoring the "impact area" explanation.

25X1D

[Redacted]

25X1D

E. The Unanswered Guided Missile Intelligence Questions.

1. This study further supports the belief that the Klyuchi area is probably the terminus for a new guided missile test range and as such undoubtedly would contain instrumentation sites. The types, quantities and locations of these sites are not known. [Redacted] the whole area would probably reveal possible locations of instrumentation sites from which a reasonable estimate of the intended impact point could be deduced. [Redacted]

25X1D

25X1D

25X1D

[Redacted]

TOP SECRET

[Redacted]



TOP SECRET

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1D

[Redacted]

2. The probability that the launching point for a new long range ballistic missile test facility is located in the Novokazalinsk/Dzhusaly area is strengthened by the negative results of the Klyuchi

[Redacted]

25X1D

[Redacted]

25X1D

TOP SECRET

[Redacted]

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP78T04753A000100230001-7

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP78T04753A000100230001-7

**SECRET**

**NATIONAL  
SECURITY  
ARCHIVE**

This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, [nsarchiv@gwu.edu](mailto:nsarchiv@gwu.edu)