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| DOCUMENT PROCESSING RECORD | CONTROL NUMBER 764 |
| | DATE RECEIVED 17 Mar 80 |
| RETURN TO: OFFICE, CHAIRMAN, JCS-ROOM 2E865, THE PENTAGON | DATE OF DOCUMENT 17 Mar 80 |
| DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION DJSM-564-80 | |
| SUBJECT Reply to USCINCEUR (U) | |

THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE. CIRCULATION OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO INDIVIDUALS INDICATED BELOW. THE DOCUMENT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE FOR RECORD PRIOR TO DISPATCH TO ANOTHER OFFICE, OR OTHER DISPOSITION.
 THIS FORM WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.

| TO | NAME | INITIAL | REMARKS |
|----|---|---------|---|
| | CHAIRMAN, JCS | 00 | <p style="text-align: center;">19 March 1980</p> <p>1. ACTION - RELEASE MESSAGE.</p> <p>2. USCINCEUR has asked for the following specific information and authority regarding the 9 Nov 79 event at NORAD:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - summary of event; - any changes in procedures; - lessons learned; and - release of appropriate version of event to NATO. <p>3. This is a "mare's nest." Next under I have rewritten the preferred staff option--enclosure (2)--to achieve a small degree of conciseness and clarity. I have added USDELMC Brussels (General Knowlton) and USNMR SHAPE (General Rogers' office) as info addrees so that the information can be shared at appropriate levels in NATO. Contrary to staff advice. I have not included CINCAD, CINCSAC and CINCPAC.</p> <p>3. I have re-cleared the draft with the originator.</p> <p>4. Recommendation: Release message next under.</p> |
| 6 | EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT | 02 | |
| 5 | DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT | 03 | |
| 4 | THE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN | 01 | |
| 3 | EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT | 01A | |
| 7 | ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT | 04 | |
| | DEPUTY ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT | 04A | |
| | CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP AIR FORCE MEMBER | 01B | |
| 1 | CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP NAVY MEMBER | 01C | |
| 2 | CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP ARMY MEMBER | 01E | |
| | LEGAL ADVISOR AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT | 01F | |
| | SPECIAL ASSISTANT | 01G | |
| | SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS | 01H | |
| | ARMY AIDE | 05 | |
| | MARINE AIDE | 05A | |
| | PROTOCOL | 06 | |

Declassified by the Joint Staff IAW JSI 5227.01

Date: 1/1/81

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4

NW40299
 By: PDMs Date: 3/1/15

V.R.
 FLINN
 Men Jones, Second CSEA is (Geny Flynn's)
 reverts. WJ/John

SECRET

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

764

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|------------------------|---|---|-----------------------------------|
| CJCS | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE 17 MAR 1980 | |
| THRU: DJS | <i>Hanson - I agree on Options 2 + 4.</i> | DJSM NO. 564-80 | ODJS SUSPENSE DATE |
| | | DJSM DATE 17 MAR 1980 | |
| SUBJECT: | THOR HANSON VICE ADMIRAL, USN DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF | ACTION | |
| Reply to USCINCEUR (U) | | APPROVAL X | SIGNATURE INFORMATION OTHER |

REMARKS

- (U) Enclosures 1, 2, and 3 are presented as options for response to a USCINCEUR/ECJ3* request for information concerning the 9 Nov 79 false missile raid incident.
- (S) Four options are proposed:
 - (S) Option 1: Forward message at Enclosure 1. This message details NATO releasable information at SECRET level.
 - (S) Option 2: Forward message at Enclosure 2. This message contains same information as Option 1 but tasks General Knowlton (US Rep Mil Comm, NATO) to brief NATO military. No written material provided.
 - (S) Option 3: Forward message at Enclosure 3. This message summarizes information in Option 1 and states CJCS will brief NATO in more detail at earliest opportunity.
 - (U) Option 4: Forward message at Enclosure 1 to CINCAD, CINCPAC, and CINCSAC.
- (C) This information has been coordinated with C3S, J3 (EUR Div), J-5, and OASD(PA).
- (U) C3S and J-3 recommend Option 2 and Option 4.
- (U) Request CJCS approval of Option 1 ____, 2 ____, 3 ____, or 4 ____ for release by J-3.

*USCINCEUR 042025Z Feb 80

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|--|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------|--------|---------|-----------|
| ACTION OFFICER R. J. SALEWSKI LTCOL, USAF SWS, C3S Ext 70168 | COORDINATION/APPROVAL | | | | | |
| | OFFICE | NAME | EXTENSION | OFFICE | NAME | EXTENSION |
| | C3S | <i>H. Robinson</i> | | J-3 | Shutler | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
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| DATE OF PREPARATION | | | | | | |

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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3//
USDELMC BRUSSELS BE

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SUBJ: PROCEDURES FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF TESTING {U}

- REFS: A. JCS 151435Z JAN 80
- B. USCINCEUR/ECJ3 042025Z FEB 80
- C. HQ NORAD/DO 061735Z DEC 79

1. {C} REF B REQUESTED A SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL INCIDENT DISCUSSED IN REF A. REF C CONTAINS ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON 9 NOV 79 INCIDENT.
2. {C} ANY PROCEDURAL REVISIONS AFFECTING USCINCEUR STEMMING FROM 9 NOV 79 INCIDENT WILL BE DIRECTED BY REVISION OF APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES. SUCH CHANGES WOULD NOT NECESSARILY REFER TO 9 NOV.
3. {U} THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS RELEASABLE TO NATO AT THE SECRET LEVEL:

A. {U} BACKGROUND OF INCIDENT:

{1} {S} EARLY ON 9 NOVEMBER 1979, THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND {NORAD} HEADQUARTERS WAS CONDUCTING AN INTERNAL

CJCS DJS SJCS J3 J3:NMCC CES

C.H. BOYD, MAJ, USAF
EA DIV, 45130,



02
EXERCISE. FOR A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT PURPOSE, TECHNICIANS WERE PREPARING TO CONDUCT ADDITIONAL TESTS LATER THAT DAY. AS PART OF THIS PREPARATION, A TEST COMPUTER, NORMALLY USED TO SIMULATE INPUTS FROM EARLY WARNING SENSORS, WAS BEING READIED FOR CONNECTION WITH AN INCOMING SENSOR COMMUNICATION LINE.

{2} ~~{8}~~ AFTER TECHNICIANS WERE UNABLE TO PROPERLY ESTABLISH A CONNECTION, THEY CHANGED DATA DISKS TO ONE WHICH HAD BEEN USED SUCCESSFULLY IN THE PAST. AT THE TIME THEY DID NOT INTEND TO FEED SIMULATED SENSOR DATA INTO THE MAIN COMPUTER AND, IN FACT, THOUGHT THAT THE TEST COMPUTER WAS NOT CONNECTED TO THE SENSOR COMMUNICATION LINE.

{3} ~~{5}~~ HOWEVER, UNKNOWN TO THE TECHNICIANS, TWO MINUTES OF EARLY WARNING DATA FROM THE DISK WENT INTO THE MAIN NORAD COMPUTER TAGGED AS REAL DATA. THE QUOTE REAL DATA UNQUOTE FORMAT HAS BEEN USED IN THE PAST TO PROVE THAT THE SYSTEM WILL OVERRIDE TESTS IN PROGRESS IN THE EVENT MISSILE LAUNCH INFORMATION IS COMING IN FROM THE SENSORS. NORMAL PROCESSING OF THIS INPUT DATA BY THE MAIN NORAD COMPUTER RESULTED IN NORADS MISSILE WARNING DISPLAY SYSTEM {MWDS} HIGH SPEED DATA AND TELETYPE USERS RECEIVING INDICATIONS OF AN ATTACK

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ON THE UNITED STATES BY SOME 1,400 SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILES.

B. (U) ACTIONS TAKEN ON 9 NOVEMBER 1979:

(L) ~~(S)~~ A CONFERENCE WAS INITIATED TO DISCUSS THE APPARENT ATTACK WARNING. ABOUT ONE MINUTE AFTER THE FIRST WARNING, EVEN BEFORE THE CONFERENCE WAS COMPLETELY ESTABLISHED, OFFICERS IN THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER BEGAN TO DETECT ANOMALIES IN THE WARNING INFORMATION.

(A) ~~(S)~~ THE WARNING INFORMATION GENERATED BY THE COMPUTER AT NORAD SIMULATED DETECTION OF A SOVIET MISSILE ATTACK BY WARNING SENSORS THAT NOT ONLY FEED DATA TO NORAD BUT ALSO ARE DIRECTLY CONNECTED TO THE NMCC, ANMCC, AND SAC CP. THE DIRECT DATA LINE FROM THESE SENSORS TO THE NMCC, ANMCC, AND SAC CP SHOWED NO LAUNCH REPORTS BEING TRANSMITTED. FURTHERMORE, OPERATORS AT THESE SENSORS REPORTED THAT NO LAUNCH REPORTS HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED AND THAT THEIR SYSTEMS WERE OPERATING PROPERLY.

(B) ~~(S)~~ NORMALLY LAUNCH DETECTIONS FROM THESE SENSORS WOULD BE CONFIRMED BY DETECTIONS MADE BY OTHER SENSORS HAVING COVERAGE OF POTENTIAL ICBM AND SLBM THREAT TRAJECTORIES. ON 9 NOVEMBER THERE WAS NO CONFIRMATION OF AN ATTACK BY OTHER U.S.

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~~SECRET~~

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EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS.

{C} ~~{S}~~ FINALLY, THE TEST DATA INTRODUCED OTHER INACCURACIES INTO THE SYSTEM. AMONG THESE IS A TIME OF DAY INDICATION SEVERAL HOURS DIFFERENT FROM REAL TIME.

{2} ~~{S}~~ APPROXIMATELY SIX MINUTES AFTER THE FIRST WARNING, THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS {NMCC} DETERMINED CONCLUSIVELY THAT NO THREAT EXISTED.

C. {U} LESSONS LEARNED:

{1} ~~{S}~~ VOICE COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES MUST BE CAREFULLY WORDED TO AVOID POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING. NORAD DIRECTED ITS AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS TO PREPARE TO LAUNCH; HOWEVER, AT A FEW BASES THE INSTRUCTION RELAYED TO THE AIRCRAFT WAS LAUNCH, CAUSING A NUMBER OF INTERCEPTORS TO ACTUALLY LAUNCH.

{2} ~~{S}~~ USE OF AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS CIRCUITS CAN CARRY THE EFFECTS OF TESTING TO LOCATIONS FAR REMOVED FROM THE TEST SITE. CONTROL PROCEDURES SHOULD INSURE THAT ALL INVOLVED AGENCIES ARE NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE OF TESTING ACTIVITIES. IN AN ON LINE INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM, PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO NOTIFYING INDIVIDUALS AT FACILITIES

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UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM FROM THE TEST LOCATION.

{3} ~~{8}~~ VOICE COMMUNICATIONS CONNECTIVITY TO SENIOR DECISIONMAKERS, E.G., COMMANDERS IN CHIEF, SHOULD BE VERIFIED PERIODICALLY TO INSURE TIMELY RESPONSE DURING CRISIS.

4. {S} GENERAL KNOWLTON IS AUTHORIZED AT HIS DISCRETION TO BRIEF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 3 TO PRINCIPALS OF NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE ONLY ON A CLOSE HOLD BASIS AS SOON AS PRACTICAL. THIS MUST BE A BRIEFING ONLY AND WILL NOT INCLUDE ANY WRITTEN STATEMENTS.

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JCS WASHINGTON DC//J3//

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3//

SECRET

SUBJ: PROCEDURES FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF TESTING (U)

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C. HQ NORAD/DO 061735Z DEC 79

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C.H. BOYD, MAJ, USAF
EA DIV, 45110, 20 FEB 80

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
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
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
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JCS WASHINGTON DC//J3//
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S E C R E T

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JCS WASHINGTON DC//J3//
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USDELMC BRUSSELS BE

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02

REAL DATA RESULTING IN INDICATIONS OF AN ATTACK IN THE UNITED STATES BY SOME 1400 SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILES.

B. ~~(S)~~ EARLY IN THE EVENT, NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER PERSONNEL DETECTED ANOMALIES IN THE WARNING INFORMATION AND A CONFERENCE WAS INITIATED TO DISCUSS THE APPARENT ATTACK WARNING. THERE WAS NO CONFIRMATION OF AN ATTACK BY OTHER US WARNING SYSTEMS. APPROXIMATELY SIX MINUTES AFTER FIRST WARNING, THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (NMCC) DETERMINED CONCLUSIVELY THAT NO THREAT EXISTED.

C. ~~(S)~~ MODIFICATIONS TO SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES ARE PRESENTLY BEING STAFFED AND IMPLEMENTED TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE OF SIMILAR INCIDENTS.

4. ~~(S)~~ AUTHORIZE RELEASE PARA 3 TO NATO. THE CHAIRMAN WILL BRIEF AND EXPAND ON THIS INCIDENT TO NATO AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

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