

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



COMMUNICATIONS,  
COMMAND. CONTROL,  
AND INTELLIGENCE

14 JUN 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: False Missile Alerts (U) - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U) This memorandum is the third periodic report on the actions being taken to correct the false missile warning problem which occurred on (b)(1)

Operational/Procedural Actions (U)

(S) The (b)(1) implemented as a result of the (b)(1) incidents were clarified by a message on June 12 from the Director, Operations, OJCS, to his counterparts at CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC and CINCNOB, and to the NEACP. The same procedures were the subject of a June 13 conference call initiated by LtGen Shutler, Director, Operations, OJCS to the Command Directors at LANTCOM, PACOM, EUCCOM, SAC, ADCOM and ANMCC with NEACP represented in the NMCC where the conference was convened. I was invited to be present in the NMCC during this conference. The purpose of the conference call was to insure understanding of the procedures to be followed by all commands in the event of (b)(1) it was made clear that:

(b)(1)

Technical/Equipment Actions (U)

(U) On June 11 and 12 Dr. Van Trees and the Task Force headed by Bob Evans met at NORAD and conducted a thorough review of the NORAD computer system and the recent false alert incidents. Bob Evans is writing a report which he will circulate to other Task Force members for approval and provide to me shortly. In addition, he provided some preliminary comments. The principal points are:

Classified by ASD(C31)  
Review on 14 June 2000  
Extended by ASD(C31)  
Reasons: 5 and 6

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The Task Force agrees there is high probability that the suspect integrated circuit is the source of the (b)(1) problems. They can find no other reasonable failure mechanism; however, with present data, they cannot be absolutely certain the suspect integrated circuit is the failure mechanism. After studying the probable failure, the Task Force will recommend specific short-term (30-100 day) actions which, after detailed analysis, should permit use of the (b)(1) with reasonably high confidence.

The Task Force has also found that the basic (b)(1) They will make additional recommendations to improve the (b)(1)

Even with the fixes NORAD plans and those the Task Force will recommend, they feel it is (b)(1) using (b)(1), thus continuing to require careful procedures and human oversight.

(U) The Task Force will meet again in Washington, D.C. on 23 and 24 June.

(U) In parallel with the Task Force activities I am implementing several actions:

NORAD should put a (b)(1) to detect and notify the operator whenever (b)(1) is being sent. It appears that this could be tested and implemented in the system in 3 to 4 weeks.

On an accelerated basis, methods should be analyzed for improving the (b)(1) used in the NORAD-to-user communications system. I have organized a small team of experts in this area working under a member of my staff. They will begin work at NORAD on Monday, June 16. My early estimate is that it will take 2 to 3 months to implement improved techniques.

In order to get completely adequate (b)(1) it will probably be necessary to modify some of the (b)(1) procedures. This will require coordination with the users and, perhaps, some modification of their equipment.

My tentative recommendation is to leave the system on the (b)(1) until we have proceeded through at least steps 1 and 2. Before making this decision the JCS should make a detailed assessment of any operational disadvantages that are incurred by using the (b)(1). I have asked the JCS to provide this assessment by June 18. I should point out that the (b)(1)

(b)(1)

*Gerry*  
Gerald P. Dineen

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, C<sup>3</sup>S, OJCS

SUBJECT:

( ) It appears that it may be advisable to continue operation on the (b)(1) for a period of 3-6 weeks until improvement in the (b)(1) (b)(1) can be instituted. I would like to have an assessment of the operational impact of operating on the (b)(1) instead of the (b)(1). Specifically, I would like a detailed breakdown of the functions that can be performed (b)(1) and the resulting displays and a list of the (b)(1) that are normally provided in the (b)(1) that will not be available using the (b)(1). Based on this, I would like a summary of how this (b)(1) (b)(1) affects CINCNORAD's capability to accomplish his mission. I would appreciate receiving this assessment by June 18th.

16

Gerald P. Dinneen



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