

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

July 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: British Guiana Meeting - July 27, 1964

PARTICIPANTS: William Tyler; Harold Shullaw; William Cobb; Richard Helms; [redacted] McGeorge Bundy; Peter Jessup; Gordon Chase

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(b)(1)


1. The meeting was called to discuss the attached cable from Georgetown. The cable reported Consul General Carlson's apprehension about telling Cheddi Jagan we are not ready to receive an envoy.
2. The group agreed that a visit to the U. S. by a Jagan emissary would be a bad thing. At worst, such a visit would be interpreted to mean that the U. S. supports Cheddi Jagan; at best it would be interpreted as a sign that we can live with him. The visit would hurt the opposition parties in BG and would not help us domestically.
3. The group then discussed whether it would be advisable to send a lower-level official down to BG to talk to Cheddi Jagan as well as to the two opposition leaders. The advantages of this would be that we would appear reasonable ("willing to listen"), and that it might allow us to stall for time and reduce the rate of violence in the months between now and the BG elections. The main disadvantage is that any talks with Jagan will probably be misinterpreted by the uncommitted voters in BG -- which number about 10%; such talks might indicate ~~that~~ to these voters that "perhaps the U. S. does not think Cheddi is so bad."
4. The group agreed that Jagan's request to send an envoy to the U. S. should be turned down and that we should not offer to send someone down to BG. However, we should use more gentle wording than the flat assertion now under consideration -- i. e. "This proposal has been informally discussed with the Americans and they see no useful purpose for it. Therefore, it would be better if the proposal were dropped." Instead, a more flexible position should be adopted which offers a quid pro quo -- i. e. when the violence stops, we will reconsider the proposal. The group decided that a cable should be drafted in this sense and sent to London, with an information copy to Georgetown (copy attached).

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 04-219

Rv. icw NARA, Date 2-4-05


Gordon Chase

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TELEGRAM TO AMEMBASSY LONDON, RPTD INFO AMCONSUL GEORGETOWN

Request Embassy ask Colonial Office to modify instructions to Governor regarding possible Jagan emissary as follows:

"This proposal has been informally discussed with the Americans who see no useful purpose in it at this time. The Americans are obviously influenced in this point of view by continuing pattern of violence in British Guiana and widespread belief in British Guiana, as elsewhere, that PPP as governing party bears heavy responsibility this state of affairs. Their subsequent attitude toward question of emissary naturally would be influenced by course of events in British Guiana".

You may advise Colonial Office foregoing represents no change our position as outlined recent London talks but is designed solely avoid possible security repercussions forecast Carlson message repeated to you.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-328
By cb, NARA Date 6-7-96

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DATE: 24 JULY 64

RECD: JULY 24 2300Z, 64

PRIORITY

IN 35522

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(FROM CARLSON TO SHULLAW)

GOVERNOR INVITED ME OVER LATE AFTERNOON JULY 23 TO STATE HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS INFORM JAGAN ALONG FOLLOWING LINES RE PROPOCAL SEND ENVOY TO WASHINGTON: "THIS PROPOSAL HAS BEEN INFORMALLY DISCUSSED WITH THE AMERICANS AND THEY SEE NO USEFUL PURPOSE IN IT. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE PROPOSAL WERE DROPPED." I ASKED GOVERNOR TO DELAY ACTION UNTIL WASHINGTON COULD BE INFORMED AND HE READILY AGREED HOLD OFF "FOR DAY OR TWO." HE MENTIONED THAT JAGAN HAS REPEATEDLY BEEN ASKING ABOUT THIS MATTER. GOVERNOR ADDED THAT HIS RELATIONS WITH JAGAN RECENTLY DETERIORATING FAST, APPARENTLY FOR NO PARTICULAR REASON OTHER THAN PREMIER'S GROWING SENSE OF FRUSTRATION AND DESPERATION. JAGAN HAS ALSO BEEN PUTTING REPEATED AND UNUSUALLY HEAVY PRESSURE ON GOVERNOR TO USE EMERGENCY POWERS FORCE POLL OF UNIONS IN SUGAR INDUSTRY LEAVING TIMING OF POLL-TAKING ENTIRELY TO GOVERNOR. THERE IS LITTLE OR NO PROSPECT GOVERNOR ACCEEDING.

COMMENT: BELIEVE DEPT SHOULD TAKE FULLY INTO ACCOUNT POTENTIAL EFFECT ON JAGAN REGIME OF BEING INFORMED ACCORDING GOVERNOR'S INSTRUCTIONS. THERE HAS BEEN NOTICEABLE LACK OF CRITICISM,

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-217
By MS, NARA, Date 2-4-05

~~SECRET~~

MUCH LESS ANY ATTACK, ON U.S. BY REGIME SINCE JAGAN'S PEACE FEELER. EVEN MIRROR REPEAT MIRROR SEEMS TO HAVE DROPPED U.S. FROM ITS LIST OF PRIMARY TARGETS AND FOUND LITTLE OR NO OCCASION TAKE USUAL JIBES AT US. IT HAS BEEN NOTED THAT JAGAN REGIME HAS CAREFULLY AVOIDED TAKING ADVANTAGE SEVERAL OPENINGS. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN JAGAN'S PRESS OFFICER COMPLAINED VOICE OF AMERICA CARRIED BIASED ACCOUNT RE SINKING OF LAUNCH AND USIS OFFICER SUBSEQUENTLY STATED VOA CARRIED REUTERS ACCOUNTS, MIRROR REPEAT MIRROR DENOUNCED REUTERS AND BBC FOR CARRYING BUT OMITTED ANY MENTION VOA (WHICH INCIDENTALLY JAGAN HABITUALLY LISTENS TO). LIKEWISE JAGAN REGIME HAS FAILED TAKE UP ALLEGATIONS OF BRITISH LABOR MP EDWARDS [REDACTED]

ABOVE TACTIC WILL MOST LIKELY CHANGE COMPLETELY ONCE JAGAN'S LAST FAINT HOPE OF PEACE WITH U.S. IS DASHED BY GOVERNOR'S MESSAGE TO EFFECT THAT U.S. WILL NOT EVEN LISTEN. THEN U.S. WILL BECOME PRINCIPAL VILLAIN (JAGAN STILL TELLS VISITORS U.S. IS KEY TO HIS TROUBLES AND DID SO LAST WEEK TO VISITING FRENCH CONSUL GENERAL FROM PEURTO RICO). IT SHOULD BE EXPECTED THAT JAGAN LIKELY MAKE VIOLENT DENUNCIATION OF US AND PROBABLY OF CONGEN [REDACTED] AND DEMANDS FOR REMOVAL OR CONCEIVABLY CLOSING OF POST. THIS ATTACK WILL BE TAKEN UP BY PARTY APPARATUS. CLAIMS MAY BE ADVANCED THAT US AGENTS PLOTTED AND DIRECTED DESECRATION OF PPP SHRINE BY BOMBING FREEDOM HOUSE AND THAT U.S. HAS ALIGNED ITSELF WITH AFRICANS WHO ARE KILLING INDIANS. THERE IS LIKELY ENSUE INSPIRED OR PERHAPS DIRECTED HARRASSMENT AND PHYSICAL ATTACK ON U.S. PERSONNEL,

~~SECRET~~

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HOUSES, AND OFFICES, PROBABLY BOMBS AND ARSON.

QUESTION THEREFORE ARISES WHETHER ANY CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO KEEPING JAGAN SLIGHTLY ON HOOK BY FOR EXAMPLE (A) FINDING PRETEXT DELAY ANY MEETING UNTIL LATE AUGUST; (B) THEN SUGGESTING THAT TO AVOID PUBLICITY HIGH-RANKING OFFICIAL WHO IS ON WAY ELSEWHERE WILL STOP BY GEORGETOWN SOMETIME IN SEPTEMBER (AND TALK WITH ALL THREE LEADERS), AND (C) FOR SUCH OFFICIAL TO TELL JAGAN WE WILL THINK ABOUT HIS PROPOSITIONS IF VIOLENCE SUBSIDES SIGNIFICANTLY BUT IN ABSENCE SUCH DEVELOPMENT THERE SEEMS LITTLE POINT AT THIS LATE DATE TO CONSIDER ACCEPTANCE ASSURANCES WHICH MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE OF IMPLEMENTATION IF REGIME CAN EXERCISE NO DISCERNIBLE MODERATING INFLUENCE OVER INDIAN COMMUNITY TO IMPROVE SECURITY.

THIS TYPE OF TACTIC, HOWEVER, WHICH WOULD BE DESIGNED ONLY BUY TIME, HAS SERIOUS DISADVANTAGES, E.G., RISK OF CREATING CONFUSION AND DOUBTS AMONG OPPOSITION AND PUBLIC UNLESS MOST CAREFULLY HANDLED.

THEREFORE, IF DEPT SHOULD DECIDE ACCEDE TO GOVERNOR'S PENDING MOVE CONGEN WILL BATTEN DOWN HATCHES AND HOPE FOR THE BEST.

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LBJL, NSF: Intel Files, Box 5, Folder, "British Guiana Special File"

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