

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF *Copy 1-2*

SUBJECT: Program I Memorandum for the President (U)

1. In my conversation on Friday afternoon with the Secretary of Defense, we discussed the problem of determining the required levels of the strategic nuclear delivery forces and the need for a clear understanding of the meaning and intent of the proposed Memorandum to the President.

2. During the discussion, the Secretary stated that what he had wanted is this: Without regard to prior programs, we should rebuild the strategic force requirement following a block or category approach. The first block would be that force essential to deterrence -- sufficient visible deliverable strength to destroy the Soviet Union as a viable society. For the purpose of this exercise, we should assume that about a 30% loss of population and 50% loss of industrial capability would accomplish this result. The possession of such a force should assure against a deliberate resort to general war and leave us exposed only to the danger of miscalculation.

3. As a second block, we should look at forces which would serve to limit damage to the United States. In this category, we could consider weapons which might be employed in a first strike against military targets, as well as those available for strikes at military targets under conditions of retaliation.

4. For the third block, we should examine those forces which might be required as a full first strike if it can be shown that this capability is both worthwhile and possible of attainment.

5. Having established this procedure, we should then test the effectiveness of alternative forces in meeting the requirements of the three categories. Among these forces considered, one would be the 1200 Minuteman force, another the 1400 Minuteman force. Each force would be tested under the so-called worst possible situation and under the median condition, using both the current SIOP targeting procedures and that implicit in the proposed Memorandum to the President. The testing (or excursions) would endeavor to answer the following questions:

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- a. What conditions are created in the US and USSR by the several exchanges?
 - b. What force structure applied by which target procedure results in the most favorable post-strike situation for the US?
 - c. For purposes of limiting damage to the US, what provision is it reasonable to make in force planning for weapons for use in a first strike or for the retaliatory attack of enemy weapons withheld from a hostile first strike?
 - d. At what point, if ever, will expenditures for ABM and civil defense be more effective in limiting damage than will expenditures for more offensive weapons?
 - e. Under the conditions of the various excursions, what damage to the US was attributable to USSR submarine-launched missiles?
 - f. In arriving at force requirements, what provision has been made for striking targets outside the USSR? Specifically, how are the requirements of the NATO target system met?
 - g. What is the conclusion as to the feasibility of a full first strike capability and what are the reasons therefor?
6. The over-all intent of this study is to determine whether it remains feasible and desirable in the 1969 time frame to maintain a concurrent capability to strike a military and an urban/industrial target system or whether the growing Soviet missile force consisting of hardened land-based missiles and of submarine-launched missiles has not in effect priced counter force targeting out of the range of practical feasibility. If the answer to the latter is affirmative, it becomes a question of determining what forces beyond those for "full deterrence" should be maintained for the off-chance of wishing to strike the enemy first or for attacking residual forces (of uncertain location and identification) following a first strike by the enemy.

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for MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
 Chairman
 Joint Chiefs of Staff

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