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OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351) *in Peter Rodman* 06 JUN 2002

SUBJECT: Deputies Meeting on North Korea and Colombia, 4 June 2002 (U)

(U) USD(P) Feith and I attended a Deputies Committee meeting on 4 June.

North Korea

(S) Deputies considered how to choose between -- or how to blend -- two distinct approaches to North Korea:

-- the "roadmap" approach, with a message to be conveyed to North Korea by State Department envoy Jack Pritchard, seeking movement on the familiar agenda (missile and nuclear restraints, the conventional military threat); and

-- a "bolder" approach, suggested by the President, raising directly with Kim Jong-Il (if possible) the fact that his regime faces a fundamental choice between reform (which we will assist) or demise (which we will also seek to assist). This message could be conveyed by a higher-level envoy (e.g., Steve Hadley or Rich Armitage).

- The problem, in a nutshell, is that State prefers the "roadmap" and is wary of the second option. DoD has doubts about both.
- USDP expressed uneasiness about a high-level envoy carrying a "bolder" message: This could be seen by Kim Jong-Il as a threatening message. Had we thought this through? He also argued that Kim Jong-Il was unlikely to be receptive to such a message; but the approach could be useful if the audience we were trying to reach was the North Korean people and elite.

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(S) After discussion, Hadley asked that the paper be recast along the following lines:

-- The U.S. should start off with the "bolder" approach, appropriately refined so as to avoid a provocative effect. If this failed, we could either (1) let it sit for a while, (2) use the conventional "roadmap" as a safety net, or (3) apply a "negative roadmap" of penalties.

(S) Hadley also asked for further study of sequencing and the level of the contacts: SecState Powell could signal the North Koreans that a new initiative was coming at the ASEAN Regional Forum on 31 July.

- Hadley also asked for a strategy paper on the flow of refugees and asylum seekers from North Korea. This would be a possible element of U.S. strategy as well as a problem to manage.

(S) State's envoy Pritchard is scheduled to contact the North Koreans in New York with a place-holding reply to their overture of 27 April. Principals will meet on the issue before he goes, and his talking points will be circulated.

Colombia

(S) Deputies agreed that Colombia's choice of a new President should reinforce the course on which U.S. policy was already embarked. Much of our (and Congress's) inhibition had been rooted in concern that the Colombians, under Pastrana were not doing enough. Uribe promises to furnish the political will.

- Deputies agreed that Uribe also had to show he had a strategy.

(S) Deputies agreed (at JCS suggestion) to move quickly to nullify the Clinton-era PDD-73 that confines U.S. policy to counternarcotics. A document would be prepared shortly to do this (while preserving any legal authorities that the Office of Drug Control Policy might need to retain). In the meantime, a new NSPD would be drafted in the interagency process.

COORDINATION TAB A

Prepared by: ASD/ISA Rodman, 695-4351

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