

## Cable

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 SUBJ: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH NATO SYG MANFRED  
 WOERNER, MARCH 3. 1993

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 SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH NATO SYG MANFRED  
 WOERNER, MARCH 3. 1993

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. IN HIS MARCH 3 MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY, WOERNER PROPOSED THAT A NATO SUMMIT BE HELD IN THE FALL OF 1993 TO DETERMINE THE COURSE OF NATO'S DEVELOPMENT. ALSO DISCUSSED WAS HOW THE U.S. SHOULD BRIEF THE ALLIES ON THE APRIL CLINTON-YELTSIN SUMMIT. WOERNER DISCUSSED THE INTEREST OF NACC STATES, PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, IN CLOSER ASSOCIATION WITH NATO BECAUSE OF ANXIETY OVER POTENTIAL INSTABILITY AT HOME AND IN THE REGION. HE APPEALED FOR FUNDING TO PURSUE NATO OUTREACH ACTIVITIES TO THE EAST AND URGED THE U.S. TO RENEW ITS SUPPORT FOR THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM. IN A DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, WOERNER WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE EC, WEU AND NATO, BUT WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CSCE. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING HIS MARCH 1-3 VISIT TO WASHINGTON, NATO SYG MANFRED WOERNER CALLED ON THE SECRETARY AT 9:30 AM MARCH

3. SEVERAL ISSUES. INCLUDING EX-YUGOSLAVIA, HAD BEEN COVERED AT AN EARLIER WOERNER/CHRISTOPHER MEETING HELD IN BRUSSELS PRIOR TO THE FEBRUARY 26 NAC. ALSO ATTENDING THE MARCH 3 MEETING WERE EUR A/S NILES, U/S-DESIGNATE TARNOFF, U/S-DESIGNATE DAVIS, A/S-DESIGNATE OXMAN, AND AN EUR/RPM NOTETAKER.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CALL FOR A NATO SUMMIT  
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4. AFTER A SHORT PHOTO OPPORTUNITY, WOERNER LED OFF THE DISCUSSION, NOTING THAT HE HAD PROPOSED TO THE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR LAKE, IN HIS MEETING WITH THEM THE PREVIOUS DAY, THE IDEA OF NATO SUMMIT. HE ASKED FOR EARLY WARNING OF USG PLANNING FOR A SUMMIT SO THAT NATO COULD BE PREPARED. HE PREFERRED THAT A SUMMIT NOT BE MERE "WINDOW DRESSING" BUT, LIKE PREVIOUS NATO SUMMITS, SHOULD DETERMINE THE COURSE OF NATO'S DEVELOPMENT.

5. THE SECRETARY ASKED ABOUT THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF A NATO SUMMIT. WOERNER RESPONDED WITH THREE POINTS. FIRST, A SUMMIT WOULD ALLOW NATO TO DEFINE CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY ITS NEW ROLES AND PROPOSE CONCRETE INITIATIVES. THE PUBLIC CONTINUES TO ASK ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF NATO IN POST-COLD-WAR EUROPE AND DOES NOT FULLY RECOGNIZE THE CHANGES NATO HAS ALREADY MADE. A SUMMIT WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PUBLICIZE THIS ONGOING TRANSFORMATION AND NATO'S OUTREACH TO THE EAST.

6. SECOND, A SUMMIT WOULD GIVE THE U.S. A FORUM IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT COULD, IN ONE EVENT, MEET ALL 15 ALLIANCE LEADERS AND GIVE THEM A CLEAR VIEW OF HIS ADMINISTRATION'S AGENDA. THIS VISIBLE EXERCISE OF U.S. LEADERSHIP COULD TAKE PLACE EITHER IN THE U.S. OR IN EUROPE. WOERNER RECALLED THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD USED HIS FIRST SUMMIT TO ESTABLISH HIS LEADERSHIP IN NATO SOON AFTER TAKING OFFICE (MAY 1989).

7. THIRD A SUMMIT COULD FURTHER DEFINE NATO'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE EVOLVING EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY (ESDI). MODALITIES OF THIS RELATIONSHIP STILL NEED TO BE WORKED OUT, AND THE FALL OF 1993 WOULD THEREFORE BE THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY FOR A WELL-PREPARED NATO SUMMIT. INTER ALIA, A NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IN PLACE.

8. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY FROM THE SECRETARY, WOERNER NOTED THAT NATO HAD HELD THREE SUMMITS SINCE 1989: BRUSSELS IN MAY 1989, LONDON IN JULY 1990, AND ROME IN

NOVEMBER 1991. HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY THAT A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF LEAD-TIME WOULD BE DESIRABLE BUT MAINTAINED THAT AS SOON AS THE U.S. DECIDES TO CALL FOR A NATO SUMMIT, THE ALLIES WILL QUICKLY AGREE TO ATTEND.

NATO'S OUTREACH TO THE EAST  
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9. THE SECRETARY ASKED WOERNER HOW TO INTEGRATE FORMER WARSAW PACT STATES INTO THE NATO ORBIT AND INCREASE COOPERATION ACTIVITIES. WOERNER RESPONDED THAT OUTREACH AND COOPERATION WILL REMAIN DIFFICULT AS LONG AS THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA IS UNSTABLE AND UNPREDICTABLE. THERE IS GROWING PRESSURE FROM CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN (CEE) STATES TO MOVE CLOSER TO NATO. HOWEVER, AN INCREASE IN NATO TIES WITH CEE STATES CAN BE

SEEN IN MOSCOW AS THREATENING AND AFFECT RUSSIAN INTERNAL POLITICS.

10. WOERNER POINTED TO A RELATED QUESTION - THE EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE EC AND POSSIBLY THE WEU OF TRADITIONAL EUROPEAN NEUTRALS (E.G. SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, AND AUSTRIA) -- WHICH LEADS TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A STATE CAN JOIN THE EC/WEU WITHOUT JOINING NATO. WOERNER SAID THE ALLIES HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE ISSUE, BUT HE URGED THE U.S. TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF EC EXPANSION UPON NATO. WE HAVE SOME TIME SINCE THE FIRST ADMISSION OF THESE STATES TO THE EC IS NOT SCHEDULED BEFORE 1995/96, AND TO THE WEU BEFORE 1996/97.

11. WOERNER ARGUED THAT NACC STATES ARE INCREASINGLY INTERESTED IN MOVING CLOSER TO NATO BECAUSE OF ANXIETY ABOUT RUSSIAN INSTABILITY AND FEARS OF THEIR OWN DOMESTIC INSTABILITY. BY AND LARGE, MOST DO NOT FEEL MILITARILY THREATENED BY RUSSIA (EXCEPT UKRAINE AND THE BALTIC STATES) BUT ALL FEAR THAT CONSERVATIVE FORCES IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES COULD OBTAIN RUSSIAN SUPPORT AND DESTABILIZE THEIR FLEDGLING DEMOCRACIES. THE NACC STATES BELIEVE THEY LIVE IN A "SECURITY VACUUM," AND THAT NATO MEMBERSHIP CAN HELP STAVE OFF THE RETURN OF AUTHORITARIAN FORCES.

12. THE SYG SAID THE NACC STATES UNDERSTAND THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF NATO MEMBERSHIP IN THE SHORT TERM. HOWEVER, WOERNER URGED THE SECRETARY TO START CONSIDERING POSSIBLE TIMEFRAMES, CANDIDATES AND CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION. IN THE MEANTIME, WOERNER BELIEVED NATO MUST ADD TO THE SECURITY OF NACC STATES. SHORT OF EXTENDING FORMAL SECURITY GUARANTEES.

13. WOERNER POINTED TO ANOTHER PROBLEM: THE CEE STATES SUPPORT DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN GROUPS OF NACC MEMBERS. CEE STATES LIKE HUNGARY AND POLAND, WHERE STABLE DEMOCRACIES ARE BEING BUILT, OBJECT TO EQUAL TREATMENT WITH RUSSIA. WOERNER SAID HE CONTINUES TO ASSURE THE CEE STATES THAT NATO, IN FACT, DIFFERENTIATES BETWEEN NACC STATES AND COOPERATES WITH CEE STATES IN WAYS IT COULD NOT WITH RUSSIA. IN WOERNER'S VIEW, THE TRICK IS TO CONTINUE CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE CEE STATES WITHOUT ANGERING RUSSIA. (COMMENT: WOERNER DID NOT RAISE THE OTHER PERSPECTIVE ON "NACC DIFFERENTIATION" -- THE DEGREE TO WHICH NATO MAY WANT TO DEVELOP A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH RUSSIA. END COMMENT)

MORE FUNDING NEEDED FOR NATO OUTREACH TO THE EAST

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14. THE SYG COMPLAINED THAT ONE OBSTACLE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE NACC WAS FINANCIAL. THE WEST SENDS BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AID TO THE EAST, BUT HE COULD NOT GET EVEN 2-3 MILLION DOLLARS FOR EFFECTIVE OUTREACH. WOERNER STRESSED THAT NATO COULD DO A LOT WITH JUST A LITTLE; HE HAD CUT PERSONNEL IN ORDER TO FUND OUTREACH ACTIVITIES. HE URGED THE U.S. AND THE OTHER ALLIES TO PROVIDE FUNDS FOR THE TRAVEL AND PER DIEM OF NACC PARTNER STATE REPRESENTATIVES WHO VISITED BRUSSELS TO PARTICIPATE IN

OUTREACH ACTIVITIES. WITH FUNDING, WOERNER COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, INVITE UZBEK DELEGATIONS TO ATTEND NATO SEMINARS, FOLLOW UP ON RUSSIAN REQUESTS TO INVITE CORPS COMMANDERS TO VISIT NATO HQ, AND OPEN NATO SCHOOLS TO THE POLES.

15. WOERNER SAID MORE SECURITY DISCUSSIONS WITH NACC PARTNER STATES WERE NEEDED AS WELL AS CRISIS MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE CSCE. (HE OFFERED HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT NATO WAS A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION AND COULD NOT ACT MILITARILY ON A GLOBAL BASIS.) THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THE NACC COULD BE STRENGTHENED THROUGH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, CONFERENCES, JOINT MANEUVERS, AND CRISIS PREVENTION ACTIVITIES.

16. THE SYG OPINED THAT CEE STATES HAD MORE TRUST IN NATO THAN IN CSCE, SINCE NATO WAS AN ORGANIZATION WITH POWER. WOERNER SAID THAT IN VIENNA, CSCE AMBASSADORS COMPLAINED THAT EASTERN STATES WERE MORE INTERESTED IN CLOSE TIES WITH NATO. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE ATTRACTION WAS BASED IN AN EASTERN VIEW THAT NATO WAS THE POWER INSTRUMENT OF THE U.S. IN EUROPE. FOR NACC PARTNERS, CLOSER TIES TO NATO MEAN CLOSER TIES TO THE U.S.

17. THERE ARE LIMITS TO NACC OPERATIONS, WOERNER NOTED. THERE WOULD BE NO NATO CONSENSUS TO SEND NATO TROOPS TO ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN, OR GEORGIA. HE SAID SHEVARDNADZE HAD INVITED HIM TO VISIT GEORGIA AS A SIGNAL THAT NATO IS INTERESTED; WOERNER ACCEPTED BUT CONTINUES TO POSTPONE HIS TRIP OUT OF CONCERN FOR RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES.

#### THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS

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18. THE SECRETARY ASKED WOERNER TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH TO MANY AMERICANS ARE AN ALPHABET SOUP WITH OVERLAPPING RESPONSIBILITIES AND BLOATED BUREAUCRACIES. WOERNER REPLIED THAT THE EC WILL SURVIVE AND, WITH IT, THE WEU. EUROPEANS WANT A SEPARATE INSTRUMENT TO USE IF AND WHEN THEY REACH THE GOAL OF A COMMON SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY. THIS INSTRUMENT WOULD BE USED IN CASES WHERE THE U.S., FOR WHATEVER REASON, CHOSE NOT TO BE INVOLVED. THE EC'S PAINFUL AND PUBLIC FAILURE IN EX-YUGOSLAVIA FOSTERED A DETERMINATION TO BE READY TO ACT IN ANY CASE IN WHICH THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT TO ENGAGE.

19. FOR THIS REASON, THERE SHOULD BE TWO PILLARS UNDER THE NATO ROOF -- THE U.S. AND THE WEU. THE WEU IS NATO'S EUROPEAN PILLAR. INSTITUTIONAL MODALITIES FOR ACTION SHOULD BE DECIDED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. BUT IN EACH CASE. THE COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR USE. WOERNER ARGUED THAT THE KEY IS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE MODALITIES OF THE NATO/WEU RELATIONSHIP AND TO AVOID CONSTRUCTING A SECOND, DUPLICATIVE, SEPARATE WEU SECURITY STRUCTURE. IN WOERNER'S VIEW THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE EASIER TO REACH WHEN FRANCE MOVES CLOSER TO KEY NATO DEFENSE BODIES.

20. WOERNER WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT NATO WOULD SURVIVE -- AS

LONG AS THE U.S. MAINTAINS ITS COMMITMENT TO EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN PILLAR IS FIRMLY IN PLACE. AFTER THE STRUCTURE IS COMPLETE, THE ALLIES CAN CONSIDER FURTHER REORGANIZATION.

21. THE SYG SAID HE PERSONALLY DOUBTED THE CSCE WOULD SURVIVE. ALTHOUGH CSCE DESERVES A CHANCE. WOERNER WORRIES THAT IT IS NOT DEVELOPING "AS A REGIONAL UN" DUE TO THE LACK OF A STEERING ORGANIZATION. HE BELIEVES THE CSCE IS A TALKING SHOP WITHOUT ENOUGH SUBSTANCE. WOERNER NOTED THIS WAS ONLY HIS PERSONAL VIEW. NATO IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN STRENGTHENING THE CSCE.

#### U.S. SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE

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22. WOERNER ASKED IF HE COULD RAISE AN ADDITIONAL SUBJECT: RENEWED U.S. SUPPORT FOR NATO INFRASTRUCTURE. HE SAID NATO WAS DOWN TO THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, AND LOWER FUNDING LEVELS WOULD THREATEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE PROGRAM, WHICH ALONG WITH THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE WAS THE BACKBONE OF NATO. THE SYG ASKED FOR A U.S. COMMITMENT OF 250 MILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR, NOTING THE GERMANS PAY ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT AND THE UK JUST A BIT LESS.

23. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT THE HILL'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN TO WOERNER'S LOBBYING THE PREVIOUS DAY ON INFRASTRUCTURE. WOERNER SAID THAT CONGRESS HAD BEEN "FRIENDLY BUT NONCOMMITTAL." THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD WOERNER'S POINT, BUT IT WAS A TIME OF COMPETING PRIORITIES, AND MANY WERE NOT YET AWARE OF NATO'S ADAPTATION AND NEW ROLE.

#### NATO BRIEFING ON THE CLINTON/YELTSIN SUMMIT

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24. IN CLOSING, THE SECRETARY MENTIONED THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING HOW THE U.S. COULD BEST BRIEF THE NAC ON THE RESULTS OF THE APRIL 4 CLINTON/YELTSIN SUMMIT. WOERNER RESPONDED THAT DEBRIEFING THE NAC WAS A GOOD TRADITION WHICH SHOULD BE CONTINUED. HE ASKED THAT A SENIOR OFFICIAL BE SENT TO NATO WHO HAD PARTICIPATED IN ALL THE SUMMIT MEETINGS. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT MODALITIES OF THE DEBRIEFING WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BEFORE HE COULD GIVE WOERNER DEFINITE INFORMATION. CHRISTOPHER

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