TO: The Secretary

FROM: Jeffrey C. Kitchen

SUBJECT: Status Report on the Implementation of the Nessau Decisions

As background for your appointment with Secretary McNemara this afternoon, as well as for your participation in tomorrow's Cabinet meeting, I wish to report on the status of the implementation of the Nassau decisions.

The Steering Group as a whole has held two meetings and a third is scheduled for Thursday, at 11:00 a.m. Discussion within the meetings has been useful in clarifying some of the issues that have arisen and in approving some of the policies we have been considering.

In addition, Mr. John McNaughton and Mr. Henry Rowen of the Department of Defense, Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. David Klein of the White House, Mr. Ball, myself, and other members of the Department of State have consulted daily on problems which have arisen in order to maintain our momentum on this project.

As you know, the basic responsibility in drafting papers for consideration of the Steering Group has been assigned to the Sub-Groups. There follows a brief report by Sub-Groups on their activities.

## Sub-Group I - Legal, Financial, and Technical Agreements with the UK

Sub-Group I's paper, completed Tuesday evening January 8, U.S.-U.K. Agreement, is to be considered in the Steering Group meeting for Thursday, January 10. It is designed as a broad instrument cast in fairly general terms and has been prepared on the assumption that we are to give effect to the commitments made at Massau rather than go beyond them at this junction.

## Sub-Group II - Assignment of Forces to NATO

The fourth draft of Nassau Sub-Group #2's paper, "Assignment of Nuclear Forces to NATO," has now been forwarded to the Steering Group for consideration. The paper attempts to develop, in accordance with Nassau concepts, a plan for the assignment to NATO and control of various categories of existing and future nuclear forces. The NATO force envisaged would provide for inclusion of both national tactical

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and strategic forces, as well as multilateral strategic forces. The type of command and control arrangement proposed (a major subordinate Commander under SACEUR) is considered among 5 or 6 alternatives as the one best responding to the military needs for coordinated targeting and centralized control of nuclear units, as well as best affording greater European participation in nuclear affairs. The size and composition of the initial US and UK strategic forces to be subscribed, as well as those pre-targeted tactical nuclear weapons which could be assigned, are treated in the paper. In connection with the terms for assignment and withdrawal of the nuclear forces it is assumed that none of the national components should be withdrawn except when the supreme national interest is at stake. Finally, in providing for a multilateral component within the plan an attempt was made to ensure that command and control arrangements, as well as the terms of assignment and withdrawal, would encourage the development of this multilateral component in order not only to ensure the participation of non-nuclear powers, particularly the Germans, but also over the long term to promote the absorption of the national components.

The paper still requires extensive revision and several issues are still unresolved. The TAB's to this draft have not yet been collated with the paper. A revised section on terms of withdrawal is needed. Defense and State have differing views on the assignment of ACE fighter bombers to the NATO Nuclear Force. The rationale for the preferred command set-up is not cogently argued. There is no consideration given to the assignment of the present Polaris submarines now earmarked for SAGLANT. In addition the Joint Staff representative has reserved on most major proposals for changing existing arrangements.

# Sub-Group III - Negotiations with the French and NATO Members

Sub-Group III has not yet produced a draft paper but expects to by Monday, January 14. It is awaiting three special papers:

- 1) from INR Wednesday, January 9, a paper analyzing French policy divergences from the Alliance's policy in the military, economic and political fields;
  - from AEC Friday, January 11, a paper commenting on legal and Congressional problems involved with the French in the nuclear field;
  - 3) from Defense next week an analysis of material needed to bring the French up to the UK level in the nuclear field.

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After these papers are presented and after we obtain a reaction to Under Secretary Ball's NAC presentation, Sub-Group III will draft a scope paper on our approach to the French.

Sub-Group IV - Multilateral Force Planning (Priority Attention to Germany)

Mr. Owen reports there is unanimity within the Sub-Group on the substance of his paper <u>Multilateral Force Planning</u>. Defense and State are ironing out changes in presentation of the substance before presenting the final draft to the Steering Group.

### Sub-Group V - Concept Paper

Mr. Rostow's paper, Post Massau Strategy, was issued last week. We are awaiting a written comment from Defense on the paper.

### Sub-Group VI - USSR Reactions to Nessau and Subsequent Agreements

Mr. Garthoff's research paper, <u>Developments</u>, is in your book. It does not foresee any new developments in future Soviet reaction. The Soviets will wish to exploit any potential divergence in the Alliance (i.e., the clandestine Soviet radio broadcast on Jupiter removal) and will be alert to note changes in our non-proliferation policy.

# Sub-Group Jupiters

Fresidential approval of our plan of action on the replacement of the Jupiters was received on Saturday, January 5. Letters from Secretary of Defense McNemara to the Ministers of Defense of Italy and Turkey were dispatched on that date and instructions to Ambassadors Reinhardt and Hare followed on January 8 and 9. Reinhardt is in Rome and has seen Andreotti. Hare will arrive in Ankara on the 10th.

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