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Heading:

STATE 219498 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NODIS ROUTINE

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S NOVEMBER 7 MEETING WITH UK NATO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE, DAVID MANNING

2000

(U) Classified by the Deputy Secretary, reason 1.5 (b) and (d).

RELEASE IN FULL

1. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: THE BULK OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S NOVEMBER 7 MEETING WITH THE NEW UK AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE TO NATO, DAVID MANNING, WAS DEVOTED TO RUSSIA. RECENT CONTACTS WITH RUSSIAN LEADERS HAVE LEFT MANNING CONCERNED THAT OLD THINK REMAINS TOO PREVALENT AND THAT PUTIN HIMSELF MAY DELAY ENGAGING WITH THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND COMING TO TERMS WITH OUTSTANDING ISSUES, LIKE NMD. MANNING INDICATED RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER SERGEYEV WILL VISIT LONDON NEXT MONTH. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ECHOED MANNING'S DISAPPOINTMENT IN PUTIN'S PERFORMANCE TO DATE, POINTED OUT THE USEFULNESS OF THE PJC FOR ACCULTURATING RUSSIANS TO THE WAYS OF THE WEST, AND CHIDED THE EU FOR NOT PRESSING PUTIN MORE STRONGLY ON CHECHNYA AT THE OCTOBER EU-RUSSIA SUMMIT. ON NMD, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN U.S./NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS BUT THE QUESTION OF

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A VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT TO PYONGYANG REMAINS OPEN. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) ON NOVEMBER 7 THE DEPUTY SECRETARY HOSTED A 40-MINUTE MEETING IN HIS OFFICE WITH DAVID MANNING, THE UK'S NATO AMBASSADOR- DESIGNATE (MANNING WILL TAKE UP HIS NEW DUTIES IN JANUARY). ACCOMPANYING MANNING WERE BRITISH AMBASSADOR SIR CHRISTOPHER MEYER AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR PETER GOODERHAM. EUR/RPM DEPUTY DIRECTOR SKINNER, D STAFF AND EUR/UBI NOTETAKER ALSO ATTENDED.

RUSSIA
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3. ~~(C)~~ MANNING RECOUNTED IMPRESSIONS FROM HIS TRIP TO MOSCOW THREE WEEKS EARLIER AND FROM THE PREVIOUS WEEK'S VISIT BY RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY SERGEI IVANOV TO LONDON. MANNING VOICED CONCERN THAT PUTIN MIGHT NOT ENGAGE QUICKLY WITH THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND CONTINUE TO "STRING THINGS OUT" INTO NEXT YEAR WITHOUT DECIDING WHAT HE REALLY WANTS. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS HE SPOKE WITH IN MOSCOW HAD USED LANGUAGE FROM 10 YEARS EARLIER, WHILE NO ONE HAD TALKED ABOUT PARTNERSHIP. MANNING SAID HE HOPED THE RUSSIANS WOULD REALIZE THAT DEALING CONSTRUCTIVELY ON NMD AND NATO ENLARGEMENT WAS IN THEIR INTEREST. HE HELD OUT SOME HOPE FOR WORKING WITH SERGEI IVANOV, WHO HE SAID CAME ACROSS AS FAIRLY FLEXIBLE, INTELLIGENT, AND REALISTIC.

4. ~~(C)~~ THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SUGGESTED THE WEST MIGHT NOW BE PAYING THE PRICE FOR SEVEN YEARS OF SUCCESSFULLY TURNING YELTSIN'S BIG "NYET'S" INTO GRUDGING OK'S. MUCH HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED ON MANY FRONTS - ON MISSILE SALES TO INDIA AND IRAQ, IFOR/SFOR, AND NATO ENLARGEMENT, AMONG OTHER ISSUES. BUT PUTIN HAD SET HIMSELF UP AS A DEPARTURE FROM YELTSIN AND SO IS MORE WARY OF SAYING YES TO THE WEST. ALL THE SAME, AMONG SOME RUSSIAN OFFICIALS THERE REMAINS A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN TAKING A BENEFICIAL,

PRAGMATIC APPROACH. WHILE PEOPLE LIKE RUSSIA'S NATO AMBASSADOR SERGEY KISLYAK MIGHT BE "PROBLEM CHILDREN," PUTIN HIMSELF MIGHT STILL BE BROUGHT AROUND TO THIS PRACTICAL LINE THOUGH PRESSURE FROM THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER BLAIR.

5. ~~(C)~~ THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SUGGESTED THE NEXT ROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT MIGHT BE EASIER UNDER PUTIN THAN IT HAD BEEN UNDER YELTSIN. WHILE THE FORMER RUSSIAN PRESIDENT

SAW NATO IN SYMBOLIC, EVEN EMOTIONAL TERMS, THE CURRENT PRESIDENT APPEARS TO THINK MORE IN TERMS OF A HARD-HEADED STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF RUSSIA'S PRINCIPAL THREATS, NAMELY ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND THE CHINESE. HE ALSO POINTED TO PUTIN'S RECENT POSITIVE STATEMENT ON EU ENLARGEMENT. ACCORDING TO MANNING, THE UKG HAS NOT YET FORMED ITS VIEWS ON THE NEXT ROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT; HE SPECULATED THAT LONDON WOULD PROBABLY AGREE TO TWO NEW MEMBERS BUT THEN MIGHT BE PUT UNDER PRESSURE TO AGREE TO TWO MORE, PERHAPS A "NORTHERN" AND A "SOUTHERN" COUNTRY. MANNING THOUGHT THE U.S. CONGRESS WAS UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO ONLY TWO NEW MEMBERS (HE MENTIONED SLOVENIA AND SLOVAKIA AS THE LIKELIEST CANDIDATES), BUT HE WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO STOP AT JUST THREE.

6. ~~(C)~~ IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM MANNING, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY UNDERScoreD THE POTENTIAL USEFULNESS OF THE PJC. HE DESCRIBED IT AS A CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF THE WEST'S INTEGRATIVE STRATEGY FOR RUSSIA AND AS A MEANS OF EXPANDING RUSSIANS' PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS AND OF OTHERWISE ACCULTURATING THEM TO "HOW THINGS ARE DONE."

7. ~~(C)~~ ON THE SUBJECT OF RUSSIA MORE BROADLY, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT PUTIN GOT OFF SO LIGHTLY ON CHECHNYA AT THE OCTOBER EU-RUSSIA SUMMIT. HE SAID THE LACK OF CONSISTENCY WAS REGRETTABLE AND THAT IT WAS UNWISE TO ALLOW PUTIN TO BELIEVE HE CAN PUSH THE ISSUE "BELOW THE RADAR SCREEN." RATHER THAN SIMPLY ASK QUESTIONS, IT IS IMPORTANT, HE SAID, TO PRESS THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT ON THIS AND EMPHASIZE THAT CHECHNYA CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS.

8. ~~(C)~~ ON THE STATE OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY, MANNING NOTED HIS IMPRESSION FROM HIS RECENT VISIT IN MOSCOW THAT THINGS WERE NO LONGER "BUMPING ON THE BOTTOM," BUT HE QUESTIONED WHETHER PUTIN WAS USING THE BREATHING SPACE TO DO THE HARD THINGS NECESSARY OR JUST TO AVOID DOING THEM. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT OFFICIALS AT THE U.S. TREASURY ARE SOMEWHAT UPBEAT ON PREMIER KASYANOV AND HIS TEAM. THE KASYANOV TEAM, FOR EXAMPLE, LOOKS ON CONDITIONALITY FOR LOANS AS A USEFUL MEANS OF ENFORCING DISCIPLINE INTERNALLY. MANNING SPECULATED THAT THOSE IN CHARGE IN MOSCOW MAY SEE STRENGTHENING THE ECONOMY AS A STEP TOWARD REASSERTING RUSSIAN POWER.

9. ~~(C)~~ MANNING NOTED DEFENSE MINISTER SERGEYEV'S PLANNED DECEMBER TRIP TO LONDON. HE WONDERED WHETHER SERGEYEV WOULD STILL BE IN HIS POSITION BY THAT TIME.

NMD
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10. ~~(C)~~ IN RESPONSE TO ANOTHER QUERY FROM MANNING, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID HE COULD NOT HAVE PREDICTED THAT THE SITUATION WITH NORTH KOREA WOULD HAVE CHANGED AS SIGNIFICANTLY AS IT HAS. THE QUESTION OF A PRESIDENTIAL TRIP, HOWEVER, REMAINS OPEN SINCE IT IS STILL UNCLEAR

WHETHER THE NORTH KOREANS ARE PREPARED TO MAKE THE KIND OF MISSILE DEAL NEEDED. HE CAUTIONED THAT, EVEN IF THE U.S. AND NORTH KOREA REACH AGREEMENT, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT NOT TO BE MISLED INTO DISCOUNTING THE CONTINUING THREAT. PICKERING

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