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United States Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

INR Report:
India-Pakistan Relations:
A Difficult Balance

July 1989



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Cover Photo: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto hold joint press conference after the December 1988 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit in Islamabad.

India Today, January 31, 1989.

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India-Pakistan Relations: A Delicate Balance

Scope *This INR Report traces the history of the antagonism between India and Pakistan, explains why improvement in relations at best will be incremental, and analyzes ongoing normalization efforts. It assumes that Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi will remain in power at least through 1989. It also assumes that the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan will be replaced by a government reasonably friendly to Pakistan.*

Key Judgments

1. Neither India nor Pakistan wants to fight a fourth war, but mutual hostility and fear are so deeply ingrained that any major effort by Prime Ministers Gandhi and Bhutto to improve relations would encounter serious resistance in both countries.

2. The two leaders have established a measure of personal rapport, but are hampered by political weakness and the need to pander to popular prejudices in order to be reelected. Bhutto is inexperienced, as are most of her political appointees, and she and her party have a long way to go before they can hope to make needed electoral gains. Gandhi probably can survive national elections (which must be held before December 4, 1989), but faces the probability of a much smaller majority in parliament and perhaps even the need to take another party into coalition.

3. Neither government, therefore, is strong enough domestically to go much beyond expressions of bilateral good will. To neutralize politically motivated attacks, leaders and spokesmen from time to time will need to reiterate standard statements of concern over perceived threats to national security from the other country.

4. The most serious bilateral problems—the two nuclear programs, rival claims to Kashmir, and alleged assistance by each country to separatist groups in the other—are not amenable to easy solutions and probably will persist for years, perhaps decades.

5. Although India already has overwhelming military superiority over Pakistan, it presses ahead with an unrelenting conventional military

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buildup aimed at attaining global semi-superpower status. In doing so it ignores the effect on Pakistan (and the other South Asian countries) of avowed Indian military ambitions.

6. Pakistan closely tracks India's ever-expanding ability to project military power. The more threatened Islamabad feels, the more it will seek to purchase advanced military weapons systems and cling to its covert nuclear weapons capability, despite US nonproliferation pressures.

7. Although publicly denied by government officials, Pakistan's nuclear weapons program has widespread public popularity in Pakistan. No national leader, especially one like Bhutto who is still on trial, can afford to be seen as weakening Pakistan's defenses by seriously curtailing or abandoning it.

8. In India there are strong pro-bomb pressures on Gandhi, urging him to offset the Pakistani weapons program by one of his own. India has considerable technological capability in this area, may already have made a low-key start, and could easily and quickly outstrip the Pakistani effort. A Pakistani bomb test or official announcement of possession or near-possession of a nuclear weapon almost certainly would cause India to abandon restraint and launch its own program.

9. There is only a slight chance of war between the two countries, as neither has much to gain from such an event. Hostilities might break out by accident, or—an even more unlikely possibility—be triggered by New Delhi's efforts to take out all of Pakistan's nuclear weapons facilities in coordinated surgical strikes.

10. Some slight progress has been made recently toward stemming regional nuclear proliferation. Ongoing efforts to increase bilateral cooperation in antiterrorism programs or narcotics control will continue but will only slowly improve the general relationship.

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
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Near East/South Asian region, including disputed borders between Pakistan, India, and China.

Historic Antagonism

Religious and Historic Differences

Hindu India and the Muslim Conquerors. The 1947 partition of the United Kingdom's Indian colony into India and Pakistan arose out of the political, religious, and social division of Indian society between the Hindu majority and a large Muslim minority. The Hindu religion and way of life are direct descendants of India's prehistoric culture and largely determine the present-day mores of the Indian masses. Hinduism has been able to adapt to successive waves of conquerors and colonizers who over the centuries introduced all of the world's great religions to the subcontinent.

The last successful military invasion of the plains of north India began in the eighth century A.D. It brought Islam as the religion and culture of the conquerors. Muslim rulers gradually extended their control over Indian territory and the Hindu masses, establishing centers of power from the west—Peshawar and Lahore in what is now Pakistan—through New Delhi, and as far east as Dhaka, now capital of Bangladesh.

British Times. The British maintained fragile control of their huge, populous colony by a policy of "divide and rule." They deliberately protected and cultivated minority groups as a counterweight to the Hindu majority. The Muslims were favored with particular trust by the British administrators and were especially valued for their loyalty and valiant service in the colonial armed forces.

The Fateful Bequest—Partition. These British practices perpetuated and may have intensified the existing, natural divisions between Muslims and Hindus. When independence was imminent, Muslim leaders became fearful and reluctant to risk their fate under the control of the Hindu majority. They instead demanded of the British that they be given their own country. Without due consideration, the British agreed.

The Massacres of 1947. The result was a bloodbath. As millions of Hindus and Muslims hurriedly left their homes to join coreligionists in another region, an

estimated 10 million lost their lives in fratricidal slaughter. The violence—and deep well of bitter prejudice that it revealed between the two communities—shocked British, Hindu, and Muslim alike.

The Present. Strengthened by living memories of the 1947 killings, mutual fear and hatred persist, though usually beneath the surface. India and Pakistan have fought three wars, over Kashmir in both 1947-48 and 1965 and over East Pakistan in 1971.

The Kashmir Dispute

40-Year Stalemate. The most longstanding, deep-seated, and intractable dispute between India and Pakistan centers on their rival claims to the state of Kashmir. In 1948 the dispute was referred to the United Nations, which ruled that a plebiscite should be held to determine the wishes of the population. Pakistan, aware that the majority of Kashmiris are Muslim, agreed. India, probably for the same reason, refused to allow the referendum to take place. The two countries hold the same positions today as they did more than 40 years ago.

A Line on the Ground. Kashmir remains divided into Indian and Pakistani portions by the 1948 cease-fire line. Standing Indian and Pakistani armies permanently face one another across it and regularly exchange shots in minor skirmishes. The cease-fire line, now called Line of Actual Control, is monitored by the oldest established UN observer team—the UN Monitoring Group to India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

Domestic Political Constraints. The Kashmir dispute has become so entrenched in the popular mind in both countries that compromise solutions are virtually ruled out. In neither country would a leader long survive in power if he or she as much as publicly acknowledged the status quo, let alone settled for anything less than the full state of Kashmir.

Points of Friction

The Siachen Glacier. The Kashmir problem has spawned a simmering border conflict on the Siachen Glacier in northeastern Kashmir, not far from the Karakoram Pass into China. (*See map, p. 6.*) In 1948

no one thought that these barren Himalayan ranges might become objects of dispute. Preoccupied with other problems, South Asian leaders put off decisions about the undemarcated northern portion of the Indo-Pakistani cease-fire line, along with plans to settle the rival claims to Kashmir.

Now the glacier is seen as the determinant for drawing the line dividing Kashmir northward from the end point of the Line of Actual Control; it has become the highest and bleakest battlefield in the world. Since 1984 India and Pakistan have maintained troops along facing ridges. These forces engage in occasional skirmishes in summer months in efforts to extend their areas of control.

A tentative Siachen Glacier disengagement agreement was reached in June 1989 when the two Defense Secretaries decided to have military experts discuss possible troop withdrawals to positions held in 1972 (the year the Simla Agreement was signed). Unfortunately, little is known about positions at that time, and the expert-level discussions could drag on for months, if not years.

Mutual Charges of Interference. The Kashmir dispute in all its ramifications is a low-key source of friction compared with the emotionally charged suspicions concerning aid to separatist extremists and terrorists.

All circles of society in each country hold the fixed conviction that native separatist groups challenging the central government are provided haven, training, arms, and material assistance by the other country. Indians believe Pakistan is to blame for continuing Sikh extremist killings in the Indian state of Punjab. Pakistanis blame Indian agents for the recurring outbreaks of Sindhi separatist violence (most recently, the systematic gunning down of almost 300 people in Hyderabad in September 1988).

What Are the Facts? Little hard evidence exists to substantiate the more extreme charges, although officials on both sides from time to time have come up with compilations of material purporting to prove their respective accusations. There is some evidence that Pakistani military intelligence has at least facilitated the transit of Sikh militants into India and the transfer of funds to them. Indians provided similar assistance to the anti-Zia terrorist group Al Zulfikar in the mid-1980s. The situation is complicated by the widespread smuggling that occurs all along the Indo-Pakistani border and by spies who easily move in and out, seeking information about military strength and movements.

Normalization Efforts

The Simla Agreement. India openly supported East Pakistan's independence movement in 1971. In retaliation, Pakistan launched the third Indo-Pakistani war, suffering a humiliating defeat in the attempt and hastening the independence of its eastern half, now Bangladesh.

In 1972, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto signed the Simla Agreement, which laid the basis for future relations. This agreement called for the peaceful resolu-



Indian troops at West Pakistan border, December 1971. (Photo is CONFIDENTIAL.)

tion on a bilateral basis of all disputes between the two countries.

Bilateralism. India views the Simla Agreement as the keystone of its relationship with Pakistan. For New Delhi, the agreement enshrines the cardinal tenet of Indian regional policy—bilateralism. India prefers to settle disputes with other South Asian countries strictly one-on-one and resents as interference in regional relations any significant participation by third parties or multilateral organizations.

Pakistan Disagrees. Islamabad reserves for itself the right to refer bilateral disputes to the UN or some other multilateral organization. It persists in calling for the UN referendum mandated in 1948 to determine which nation has valid claim to Kashmir.

Each time a Pakistani diplomat or political leader mentions the unsolved Kashmir question in the UN or elsewhere, a chorus of objections rises from New Delhi. Indian policymakers complain, often bitterly, that in ignoring the principle of bilateralism the Pakistanis are not keeping their word under the Simla Agreement.

Beyond Simla. The history of open conflict between India and Pakistan makes them aware of the danger of allowing hostility to increase to dangerous levels. In recent years they have cooperated on normalization efforts, up to a point, in order to keep tension levels manageable.

No-War Pact, Treaty of Friendship. The impetus for a recent round of attempted improvement in relations was provided by former Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq's self-styled "peace offensive," launched in 1982. Zia took advantage of a brief stopover in New Delhi in October of that year to meet with Indira Gandhi and talk normalization.

Zia put the Indian Government on the spot by urging publicly that it sign a no-war pact with Pakistan. Not to be outdone, New Delhi proposed in turn a more comprehensive Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, claiming that a simple no-war pact was redundant because the Simla Agreement served the same purpose.

By his initiative, Zia made Pakistan look good internationally, but little real progress followed. The two countries tried to produce a composite draft pact/treaty, only to reach a stalemate when two important points of difference emerged, on bilateralism and the provision of bases to foreign powers:

- India demanded that Pakistan forswear referring any dispute outside bilateral channels; Pakistan refused.
- India wanted Pakistan to promise not to give basing rights or access to Pakistani military bases to any extraregional nation; Pakistan claimed this option as a sovereign privilege.

Bilateral Commission. Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has shelved the pact idea, agreeing with the Indians that Simla makes it redundant. But while the pact/treaty was under consideration, some marginal improvements in bilateral relations did take place. A Joint Indo-Pakistani Commission was formed, chaired by the Foreign Ministers. The Commission meets once or twice a year to discuss possible cooperation on a variety of fronts; and specialized subcommissions get together as needed to consider trade, culture, travel, border control, communications, etc.

As a result, the list of items that the Pakistani private sector can buy from India has grown; a slight loosening of respective visa regulations has occurred; an improvement in telephone links between Islamabad and New Delhi is in the works; and there is some, very limited, exchange of information between border officials in an effort to control the movement of illegal narcotics.

Political Will. For any significant advance to occur on the normalization front, however, high-level leadership resolve is essential; it is not enough to talk over separate issues at middle-rank or technical levels. The breakthrough of 1972, which produced the Simla Agreement, came about because both Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi wanted it. They worked out the basic understanding even as their diplomats wrangled fruitlessly in another room.

Current Situation

Domestic Political Factors

Pakistan—A Newly Elected, Civilian Government... Benazir Bhutto became Pakistan's Prime Minister on December 2, 1988, inaugurating yet another era of democratic experimentation in the country's troubled political history. Her claim to leadership and legitimacy stems from her electoral victory and proven popular following. Bhutto has boldly loosened press controls, released political prisoners, and allowed the untrammled operation of a strong and vocal political opposition.

But at the same time, Bhutto faces serious economic problems and must deal with political challenges in Baluchistan and in Punjab, Pakistan's majority province. Both Baluchistan and Punjab are controlled by opposition parties, not Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP). She will find it very difficult to counteract these weaknesses and maintain law and order, yet keep her promise to the military not to neglect the nation's defenses or cut the military's huge share of the national budget (approximately 40 percent in Pakistan fiscal year 1989-90).

...A Still Stronger Mandate Needed. The economic constraints Bhutto must contend with are likely to force on her an unpleasant choice—either fail to deliver on the social development spending she has promised her supporters, or renege on her pledge to the military. Unwilling to antagonize the military, Bhutto probably will look more and more hopefully to midterm elections to strengthen her hand (her mandate runs until October 1993). She will want to win big in Punjab Province and increase her party's seats in the National Assembly to a majority, rather than the plurality she now holds there. Only then could she feel confident of carrying out economic reforms and retaining her social programs.

Until new elections are held, Bhutto probably will resort to keeping up the appearance of increased government aid to the poor, while maintaining high defense spending. She is aware that the Pakistani military might move to declare martial law and oust her if it felt directly and seriously threatened. In conversations with US officials, Bhutto consistently has em-

phasized the needs of her armed forces and has asserted that national funds for additional modern weapons (such as the 60 new F-16s Pakistan wants) will be found.

In addition, as a preparation for the next elections, Bhutto will seek popular but cost-free issues on which to take a stand and build her reputation. One position that would solidify and expand her base of popularity is unflinching, determined opposition to India. This would be a particularly attractive position for her as a means of building her following in Pakistan's heartland—Punjab Province—now controlled by the opposition party.

India—Gandhi Faces an Uphill Election Struggle. Rajiv Gandhi's domestic weakness precludes the likelihood that he can make significant concessions to Pakistan until after national elections, which must be held by December 4, 1989. Even then his options will be limited. The tide of sympathy votes that swept him to power on December 4, 1984 (in the immediate wake of Indira Gandhi's assassination) has long since ebbed, and his next parliamentary majority is likely at best to be a slim one.

Gandhi's Congress (I) party has done badly in important state elections—most recently in the January 1989 Tamil Nadu polls—and will need to concentrate on making election gains in north and central India to avoid a loss at the national level. Furthermore, Gandhi now must contend with an opposition which is attempting to unify, and which could win in the somewhat unlikely event that its unification efforts succeed.

Should Gandhi's position begin to seem precarious, he will be tempted in electioneering to strike anti-Pakistani poses to show how well he can protect India's security. As a last resort, he might again repeat familiar charges about alleged Pakistani aid to Sikh extremists in India's Punjab, as a way of rallying the Hindu majority behind him (and as an explanation for his failure to end Sikh terrorism).

Pakistani Perceptions

Indian "Hegemonism." Pakistan shares with China and the South Asian countries around India a conviction that New Delhi is bent on dominating the South Asian region. These states fear that to achieve

this end India would foment separatism and internal unrest in its neighbors to create a pretext for sending in troops. Indian assistance to Sri Lankan Tamil separatists from 1983 to 1986, the Indian Peacekeeping Force operating in Sri Lanka since mid-1987, and the use of Indian troops to abort the Maldives coup in December 1988 all reinforce the view that India's overwhelming military capabilities stand behind an expansionist foreign policy.

The Bitter Legacy. For Pakistan the lessons of history are particularly vivid. It lost one-half of its territory in 1971—when India trained, supported, and encouraged the Bangladesh freedom fighters—and the trauma of defeat remains very much alive. On October 26, 1988, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, in a speech to his troops, noted that with the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan all Pakistani forces could once again be stationed on the eastern front, facing India.

In fact, throughout the decade of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, the bulk of Pakistani forces has remained in the east and military construction in that area has continued. Many of Pakistan's proposed or actual military acquisitions during this period—antitank helicopter gunships, the M-60 tank, and the Harpoon naval missile, for example—have clearly been directed against the Indian, not the Afghan-Soviet, threat.

An Uncertain Future. With Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Islamabad anticipates increasing Indian attempts to cultivate the next regime in Kabul. It will make every effort to counteract these Indian advances. It is determined to assure the security of Pakistan's western flank by preventing as far as possible any improvement of relations between Afghanistan and India.

In the short term, Indian influence on the successor regime in Kabul will be severely limited because of New Delhi's support for the USSR and the Afghan communist regime throughout the Afghan war. As time passes, however, and inevitable frictions arise between Kabul and Islamabad, India and Pakistan no doubt will once again contend actively in Afghanistan, with Iran, China, and the USSR participating from the sidelines.

Indian Point of View

Pakistani Adventurism. Indians regularly hark back to Pakistani military conflicts with India, beginning with Pakistan's rash attempt to seize Kashmir in 1947. Although well-intentioned toward Bhutto herself, Gandhi shares the popular Indian assumption that Pakistan might launch a sudden, suicidal attack if India were ever to let down its guard.

New Delhi claims to be somewhat less suspicious of Pakistani motives and intentions now that a democratically elected government holds office in Islamabad. Nevertheless, India is well aware of the dominant role still played behind the scenes by the Pakistani military. It will take several years of civilian government in Islamabad, and clear signs that the Pakistani military allows major security decisions to be made by the political leadership, before suspicions may begin to fade.

Pakistani Aid to Sikh Extremists. Many Indians believe that the seemingly unending killings in India's Punjab State might be ended if only Pakistan would stop helping Sikh extremists. Gandhi voiced this concern to Bhutto when the two held private talks during the December 29-31, 1988, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit. He added that he believed the movement of illicit arms and funds from Pakistan to Sikh terrorists in the Indian Punjab could be blamed at least in part on the widespread availability of illicit drug money and the smuggling of drugs between Pakistan and India.

Despite top-level Pakistani denials, most recently from Bhutto herself, Indians remain convinced that at some level of the Pakistani Government (perhaps in the military intelligence agency) limited assistance is provided to Sikh extremists. Many Sikhs do move freely in and out of Pakistan, ostensibly to visit Sikh religious shrines there, and cross-border smuggling routes between India and Pakistan are many and well used.

Pakistan has refused visas to individual Sikhs at Indian request, but New Delhi believes Pakistan could do much more. Islamabad's failure to prevent overseas Sikhs (residents of Canada or the United Kingdom, for instance) from bringing money and arms into



India Today, January 31, 1989.

The leaders of the seven-nation South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) at their fourth annual summit, held December 1988 in Islamabad. From left to right: King Birendra, Nepal; ex-President J. R. Jayewardene, Sri Lanka; King Wangchuk, Bhutan; Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan; President Maumoom Abdul Gayoom, Maldives; President Hussein Mohammad Ershad, Bangladesh; Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, India.

Pakistan, intended for further shipment to India's Punjab, is seen in New Delhi as a lack of will, not means.

Two Can Play the Same Game. Also behind the Indian conviction of Pakistani guilt is the knowledge of India's own facilitative role in helping the Bangladesh and Sri Lankan Tamil insurgencies survive and, in the Bangladesh case, prevail. Indians are convinced that at least some in the Pakistani leadership, especially in the military, would be delighted to turn the tables on India if they could.

A Changing International Environment: The Soviet Factor

Rethinking Relationships. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from South Asia and Moscow's more conciliatory global foreign policy have forced both India

and Pakistan to rethink their relationships with the USSR and each other:

- New Delhi is anxious about changes in Soviet policies, but wants to retain Soviet good will and preserve the special relationship. It has widened its options by tempering its rhetoric vis-a-vis China and Pakistan.
- Islamabad hopes the Soviet Union will become more evenhanded in South Asia and believes the time has come for some improvement in bilateral relations. Pakistan knows that India will remain important to Moscow, but assumes that in the future the USSR will no longer need to condone Indian hostility toward Pakistan as a way of repaying New Delhi for its faithful support of Soviet policies in Afghanistan (and Cambodia).

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Soviets Encourage Rapprochement. Soviet leaders in recent visits to New Delhi (e.g., Gorbachev in November 1988) made clear to the Indians that in line with Moscow's moves to promote disarmament and improve relations with China, the US, and others, the USSR wants India, too, to partake of the warming trend, especially regarding such important near neighbors as Pakistan and China. Gandhi moved quickly in December 1988 by undertaking what were in effect goodwill visits to both countries.

During each visit Gandhi encouraged the impression of a definite warming in bilateral relations, but could not agree to any breakthrough on fundamental issues of difference. But the border question with China and the Kashmir problem with Pakistan are issues on which popular prejudices and conflicting national claims are in head-on collision.

Some Bilateral Improvement

The Nuclear Nonattack Pledge. Gandhi attended the late-December 1988 SAARC summit in Islamabad, the first Indian leader to visit Pakistan in more than 20 years. In bilateral exchanges between SAARC sessions, Bhutto went out of her way to emphasize her wish to improve relations with India. She was determined to prove that a democratically legitimate leader of Pakistan could succeed where the late President Zia, in her eyes little more than a military dictator, had failed.

For Gandhi, Bhutto's popular mandate and her welcome emphasis on the Simla Agreement as the cornerstone of future Indo-Pakistani relations were important factors in convincing him that he should seize the initiative from his more cautious advisers and venture beyond mere atmospherics. Three agreements were initiated as a result of the Bhutto-Gandhi talks.

The most important of the agreements is the pledge not to attack each other's nuclear facilities, which Gandhi first proposed to Zia in December 1985. All three agreements, long ready for signature, had been shelved, in large part because of Indian displeasure at what it believed was Pakistan's continued covert assistance to Sikh terrorists.

In a further conciliatory move, Gandhi agreed to withdraw longstanding Indian opposition to Pakistan's readmission to the Commonwealth Organization, thus authorizing India to become Pakistan's sponsor in this move. The return to the Commonwealth would be particularly sweet to Bhutto, representing as it would another success wherein Zia for so many years had failed. The October 1989 Commonwealth summit in Kuala Lumpur may see Bhutto's hopes realized.

A First Step? Gandhi's responsiveness to Bhutto signals a shift away from mutual suspicion and hostility, at least for the time being, but it should not be overestimated. Despite the rapport apparent between the two leaders, Gandhi's room for maneuver remains limited. In Indian eyes the three agreements and the Commonwealth decision are considerable concessions on his part to Pakistan's new leadership. They expose him to politically motivated attacks for being "soft" on Pakistan. Bhutto, too, has been criticized by her political opposition for placing too much value on the breakthrough with India.

But there is reason to hope that the nuclear agreement can be a first step. If ratified, it would improve regional security somewhat by strengthening, legitimizing, and publicizing the commitment of the political leaders on each side not to resort to preemptive strikes as a means of dealing with their neighbor's nuclear program. On the other hand, like the 1972 Simla Agreement as it affects the Kashmir dispute, the nuclear nonattack pledge may encourage further procrastination in confronting a dangerous problem.

The Conventional Arms Imbalance in South Asia

Indian and Pakistani Strategic Thinking

Reciprocal Threats. For both India and Pakistan the most likely enemy remains the other country:

- India perceives itself and its ambitions for great-power status as threatened by a Sino-Pakistani axis. It relies on Soviet support, and it worries

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about US arms supplies to Pakistan and about Pakistan's nuclear intentions.

- Pakistan views India as resentful of Pakistan's existence as a separate, Islamic nation. It is afraid New Delhi will take military action if Islamabad goes too far in challenging India's plans to project its power throughout the region and beyond (see map, p. 14).

Focused on the mistakes of the past, each military establishment remembers the three wars it fought with the other and sees its priority duty to be preparing for a possible fourth round. India aims to win; Pakistan is intent on survival. Pakistan looks fearfully at the gigantic Indian military machine and at New Delhi's steadily accelerating acquisition and upgrading of military equipment.

Indian Advantages. India has almost all the military advantages. Pakistan is a narrow country; India has strategic depth. India probably could cut Pakistan's main north-south lines of communication early in a conflict. And Indian aircraft can strike almost all the important targets in Pakistan, including population centers, whereas Pakistani aircraft can reach only a few such Indian targets.

Both sides train for a short war, but India goes further. It plans and exercises extensively to refine its operational capabilities. India's huge annual military exercises—especially Operation "Brass Tacks" in 1986-87—regularly heighten bilateral tensions and confirm Pakistani fears that India is honing an invasion capability.

India's Present Superiority

India Has More Troops and Equipment... In any military comparison Pakistan comes off as the weaker. The Indian Army is more than double the size of Pakistan's. India has special troops, such as eight mountain divisions, which would be extremely useful for special missions during wartime, while Pakistan has few such resources. India's Air Force already has a 2.5:1 advantage over Pakistan's and is far superior in quality, especially in all-weather interceptors; Pakistan's 40 F-16s are too few in number to tip the

balance against some 450 first-line aircraft in the Indian inventory. (See table, p. 15.)

India has a proven ability—exhibited most recently in Sri Lanka and the Maldives—to deploy and support troops outside its borders; Pakistan lacks the means to project significant power beyond its borders. New Delhi is concentrating on acquiring additional high-technology weapon systems or in coproducing them, while Pakistan can attempt only a relatively modest military modernization program because of fiscal limitations. In addition, India's military advantages at sea are completely beyond Pakistan's ability to counter.

...And Greater Stocks of Military Supplies. In the area of domestic arms manufacture, India is ahead as well. Furthermore, India's advantage in this sector is growing; the current imbalance will increase significantly over the next few years. Pakistan's arms industry is much more limited and would make little contribution during a conflict.

Indian war stocks are also plentiful, rated at 60 days, compared with a week or two for Pakistan. Such low war reserves limit Pakistan's military flexibility, especially the ability to exploit any Indian weaknesses.

Indian Military Buildup Projected To Increase

India continues to maintain strong ties with the Soviet Union in the military supply area. An estimated 70 percent of current Indian military equipment was procured on favorable terms from the USSR. Recently, however, India has been turning more to the West for the latest military technology, especially aircraft and related components. This trend would accelerate if the Soviet Union began to insist on less lenient credit terms and/or hard cash for its equipment.


In the next five years, India's military modernization program will increase its overall advantage in manpower and weapon systems. More and more it will be in position to overwhelm Pakistan in case of a war, unless Islamabad receives significant, early help from the outside.

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Indian Air Force Attack Parameters: Bear F and Jaguar Operating Radii From Goa and Port Blair



Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative 7677 7-88 STATE (MUR/GE)

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Pakistan's Situation Worse Than the Facts Show

The Capabilities Gap. The types of equipment each nation has in its armory further tilt the balance in India's favor. India has a much larger arsenal of modern weapons—such as Jaguars, Mirage 2000s, and MiG-23/27/29 aircraft; T-72 tanks; and aircraft carriers.

Numerical comparisons, as in the accompanying table, can be seriously misleading unless the specific capabilities of the weapons are also factored into the analysis. Pakistan's obsolete F-6s are no match for India's Mirage 2000s; the main guns on Pakistan's T-54/55 tanks probably cannot penetrate the armor of an Indian T-72 tank, and so on. Pakistan would be taking a major risk in even fielding some of these weapons—their easy defeat on the battlefield could cause a rout. And India every day is widening the gap with Pakistan in many less visible areas, such as communications, logistics, intelligence, technical ability, a well-developed officer and enlisted corps, and the day-to-day knowledge required for modern armed forces.

The China Factor. Indian military planners respond to questions about India's overwhelming superiority vis-a-vis Pakistan by noting that India faces another potential enemy—China—and that consequently many of India's forces are stationed facing north, not west. Further, they state, China could be expected to assist Pakistan in case of a conflict with India.

It is true that India faces a potential threat from China, but Indian forces are still primarily oriented toward Pakistan. And China is unlikely to give active support to Pakistan in an Indo-Pakistani war. In 1965 and 1971 China did little more than make threatening noises to assist Pakistan.

Cross-Border Military Competition

A Volatile Situation. Both India and Pakistan react quickly to increased readiness or acquisition of more and better weapons by the other. For India, the most dangerous single feature of the US-Pakistan military aid relationship, reinstated in 1981 following

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was Pakistan's acquisition of 40 F-16s, a fighter plane so advanced India could not then match it. The F-16 purchase galvanized New Delhi into seeking state-of-the-art MiG-29s from the USSR, supplementing with Jaguars from the UK which it had already acquired and Mirage 2000s from France for which it had contracted.

Contrasted Military Strengths

	India	Pakistan
Army		
Army strength	1,100,000	485,000
Divisions	35	19
Tanks	3,300	1,675
T-72	600	0
Vijayanta	1,750	0
T-54/55/59	0	1,200
Navy		
Aircraft carriers	2	0
Surface combatants	35	16
Air Force		
Fighter aircraft	1,000	300
Jaguar	98	0
Mirage 2000	49	0
F-16	0	40
MiG 23/27/29	236	0
F-6 (MiG-19)	0	170
Mirage III/5	0	55

Now that Afghanistan is no longer the focus of East-West competition, and both superpowers appear to be scaling down their commitment in the subcontinent to some extent, New Delhi incessantly urges Washington to stop providing Pakistan advanced military technology. But Pakistan, fearing it may once more be neglected by the US and acutely aware of its growing conventional arms inferiority to India, strains to retain a qualitative edge in weaponry.

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To this end, Bhutto has joined her military leaders in pressuring Washington to authorize 60 more F-16s for the Pakistani Air Force. Unfortunately, although the F-16 purchase probably would make Pakistan feel safer for a while, it could also serve as justification for another escalation of Indian military acquisitions and efforts at arms production.

Missile Competition As Well. India's well-publicized recent development of indigenous surface-to-surface missiles stimulated Pakistan to try to produce SSMs of its own. General Beg underscored the importance of the missile's potential to Pakistani military morale when, on February 5, 1989, he spoke proudly of the fledgling program to a class at the Pakistani National Defense College. Even though the Pakistani missile development effort has encountered setbacks and difficulties, Islamabad, probably with Chinese help, presses doggedly on.

The Nuclear Deterrent. As a last resort, Pakistan relies on its covert nuclear program as the ultimate defense against India. Pakistan hopes that its territorial and weaponry disadvantages can be offset by the threat of possessing a nuclear bomb. In an interview taped on February 7, 1989, for US television, then-Pakistani Ambassador to the US Jamsheed Marker explicitly acknowledged that Pakistan was a nuclear "threshold state." "We have deliberately chosen not to take the final step, to build a bomb and test it, because we don't think it is right," Marker said.

in talking about the Indian nuclear test explosion of 1974, he added, "To us, it sounded like a bomb.... We are exercising our nuclear option."

South Asian Nuclear Proliferation

India's Nuclear Program and Pakistan's Reaction


The 1974 Explosion. India's losses in the course of the 1962 border conflict with China terrified the Indian public. As a result, India's leaders vowed to remain armed and ready against any further Chinese aggression. During the 1960s, Chinese tests of nuclear weapons goaded New Delhi into pursuing its own nuclear option, culminating in India's 1974 test of a nuclear device, termed by India a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE).

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. New Delhi, offended that China was granted the status of a nuclear weapons state by the NPT while India was kept out of the club, steadfastly refuses to sign the treaty, terming it discriminatory. Instead, India demands that all nations renounce the possession of nuclear weapons before it will agree to rule them out.

The Pakistani Reaction. Pakistan appears to have embarked on nuclear weapons development right after its military defeat by India in 1971; it accel-



Times of India.



INS "Chakra," India's CHARLIE 1-Class Nuclear Attack Submarine, the first Soviet SSGN leased to a foreign country. Additional nuclear subs, to be leased by India in the mid-to-late 1990s, will contribute to power projection through sea denial and endurance for long-range operations. (Photo is UNCLASSIFIED.)

erated its development efforts in 1974, after India's nuclear test. While Islamabad officially denies that it wants to produce a nuclear weapon, the Pakistani public believes a weapons program exists and overwhelmingly supports it. Most Pakistanis insist that they need nuclear weapons as a deterrent against India, basing their arguments on the model of the East-West nuclear power balance.

Current Situation in India

At this time, the only restraints on production of nuclear weapons by either side appear to be political, not technical. Neither government has yet made the political decision to take the last step. It is likely that India has had a low-level, informal nuclear explosives development effort under way since its 1974 test. It probably could assemble and test another nuclear explosive device soon after making the decision to do so, and could produce deliverable nuclear weapons within a year.

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It is also working to build a uranium enrichment capability that could produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons or for fuel in naval reactors. (India has on lease a Soviet nuclear submarine, preparatory to acquiring or building one or more of its own. See photo, above.)

India possesses modern aircraft capable of nuclear delivery and is developing nuclear-capable short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. These could be ready by the early 1990s.

Pakistan's Program

Pakistan so far has refrained from testing a nuclear device. But it probably could do so within a few weeks of a decision to proceed.

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It possesses aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and possibly could adjust for this purpose the short-range SSM it is developing.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons program is more structured and purposeful than India's. China made a major contribution to it in the early 1980s. Since then, despite official denials after the two countries signed a treaty of peaceful nuclear cooperation in 1986, Sino-Pakistani weapons-related nuclear cooperation has continued.

Public Positions, Behind-the-Scenes Activity

In public, India and Pakistan accuse each other of having a covert weapons program, while each operates unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and procures materials and equipment for them worldwide.

India with its larger industrial base is able to manufacture much of what it needs itself, but it still must obtain some items from abroad.

Over the years, Zia made a series of antiproliferation proposals to New Delhi. One of these—the South Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone—is a regular feature of Pakistani public and international diplomacy. India regards the proposals in large measure as insincere, asserting that the Pakistanis know that India will turn them down because of Chinese nuclear weapons and New Delhi's insistence on global nonproliferation.

Largely Ineffective Nonproliferation Efforts

Pakistani Ambiguity. Pakistan's nuclear efforts over the last decade have defied effective control by the US and others. It is likely that Pakistan intends to

follow the Israeli model of "calculated ambiguity"; i.e., it would possess nuclear weapons but would not test them or publicly confirm that it had them.

Pakistan would thus hope to continue avoiding US antiproliferation penalties while keeping India guessing and therefore wary of aggressive action. Islamabad would also hope to avoid forcing New Delhi into making the decision to begin producing nuclear weapons.

Indian Hesitation. India complains, but so far has done nothing further. It now faces the prospect of a nuclear-armed Pakistan without having its own nuclear deterrent in place. There is an important body of public, civilian opinion in India which opposes a nuclear-weapons-armed India on ethical grounds. Perhaps in deference to this group, which can be extremely vocal, Gandhi has been reluctant to give the nuclear weapons program a green light.

But Gandhi faces mounting evidence that Pakistan has crossed or is about to cross the nuclear weapons threshold. If New Delhi were sure that the Pakistanis had only a few unacknowledged weapons and did not intend to test, it might have enough confidence in India's conventional superiority to refrain from launching its own nuclear weapons development program (at least until a time better to its liking). But if Pakistan demonstrates significant nuclear weapons capability, or tests a weapon, the Indians will feel compelled to ignore the enormous costs and move quickly to produce their own nuclear weapons.

A Region in Danger

One could argue that proliferation symmetry between India and Pakistan might create mutual deterrence, making conventional conflicts self-limiting. But the risk is high that if, through miscalculation or irrational response, a conventional war were to start (not a likely development) it might turn into a nuclear exchange. If this occurred, the US and the USSR could be drawn into the conflict.

Another frightening possibility is the off chance that nuclear weapons or weapons-grade nuclear material stored in either country—being more vul-

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nerable to thieves or saboteurs than stockpiles in the five major nuclear weapons states—could fall into the hands of international terrorist groups. South Asia has its share of indigenous terrorist organizations—e.g., the Indian Sikhs and the Sri Lankan Tamil bands—and is close to the Middle East and easily accessible along the main international air routes.

Outlook

A Possible Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia

Lasting Hostility. Relations between India and Pakistan are unlikely to improve quickly; in the near term they could become more strained. Improvement depends on the long-term influence of global advances in disarmament and on the slow buildup of bilateral trust coupled with a corresponding, gradual lessening of mutual suspicions and popular prejudices. Even under optimum conditions, basic popular hostilities probably would take at least several more decades to erode to any appreciable extent.

The suspicions and prejudices existing between Islamabad and New Delhi are particularly resistant to change because they form the bedrock of each country's world view and security policy. Especially in the military establishments, but also in influential civilian circles, there are powerful pressure groups interested in maintaining some level of mutual suspicion, in part to justify their claims to scarce resources.

The nuclear weapons programs in both countries (actual in Pakistan; mainly a potential in India) are particularly important to the two governments. Indian and Pakistani leaders see the nuclear weapons option not only as an international status symbol but also as essential to national security. They largely disregard repeated warnings that the existence of these programs could trigger the very confrontation they fear.

A Few Hopeful Signs. In both Pakistan and India there is a certain degree of support for nuclear research and development programs that stop short of full-scale nuclear weapons production or testing. Mutual confidence-building measures have been established: a "hot line" between army chiefs, and (if it

is ratified) the nuclear nonattack pledge. Finally, measures taken by the US in cooperation with other advanced countries to stem the flow of key nuclear equipment, material, and technology to India's and Pakistan's unsafeguarded facilities should continue to have a delaying effect. (Unfortunately, little progress seems likely in ongoing attempts to persuade China to cooperate in nonproliferation efforts.)

Regional Dynamics and External Factors.

Diplomatic pressure by the US and others on India and Pakistan to curtail nuclear weapons-related activities, such as high-explosive testing, and to sign the NPT have at best only slowed the pace of their unsafeguarded nuclear programs. The effectiveness of any nonproliferation efforts is blocked by a continuing pattern of interlocking regional suspicions:

- India perceives a serious threat to its security from the Chinese nuclear force and the Pakistani bomb program.
- Pakistan fears India's nuclear potential, its alliance and weapons supply relationship with the USSR, and its conventional military superiority. Islamabad's fears are greatly heightened by India's willingness to use its troops in neighboring countries, such as Sri Lanka or the Maldives.

Regional Tensions Can Increase

Bhutto and Gandhi have gone about as far as they can at the moment toward improving the climate of bilateral relations. For them to attempt more would risk damaging their respective political bases. Their good will toward each other, a definite improvement over the past, encourages the hopes of many in both nations that the situation will gradually improve.

But at the same time, more downturns must be expected. Stubborn problems remain which probably will resurface again and again, causing at least temporary rises in mutual hostility. The three main problem areas are:

- **Domestic Political Weakness.** Gandhi needs to "hang tough" on Pakistan in 1989, an election year; Bhutto must continue to prove herself as a leader until she can show in new national elec-

tions that she has solid support in all the Pakistani provinces, not only her native Sind.

- **Sikh Terrorism in the Indian Punjab.** Gandhi's efforts at a political settlement in Punjab are likely to continue to be ineffectual, making it even more tempting for him to lash out at Pakistan for helping the insurgency. Bhutto promised Gandhi an end to any official or unofficial Pakistani assistance to Sikh terrorists, but it is not certain she can deliver on her pledge.
- **Kashmir.** Gandhi is hopeful that a meeting of the two Defense Secretaries can bring about a standdown on the Siachen Glacier, saving enormous sums of money and some lives. The rival claims to all of Kashmir, however, which give the Siachen Glacier its symbolic and strategic importance, probably will never be resolved. The only hope is that as the years pass the status quo will become more and more acceptable (even if never publicly acknowledged), until finally the two armies now facing each other over the Line of Actual Control dividing Kashmir can move back and allow it to become more of an ordinary border.

US Attempts a Difficult Balance

The US has sought good relations with all South Asian countries, in order to promote regional peace, political stability, and economic development. Aware of the destructive consequences of hostility between India and Pakistan, the US has encouraged normalization at every opportunity.

These efforts encounter routine agreement in Islamabad and New Delhi, accompanied by assurances of each country's good intentions and complaints that the other is undermining the improvement of relations. Indeed, each country tries to manipulate the US to gain an advantage over the other. Pakistan seeks US backing and high-technology military equipment to defend itself against India's overwhelmingly superior forces. India, intent on maintaining itself as the predominant power in South Asia, argues against US military assistance to Pakistan (and US involvement other than economic with any country of the subcontinent).

Uncertainties in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal add a further dimension to the Indo-Pakistani problem. Pakistan hopes to encourage the emergence of a friendly, noncommunist government in Kabul, largely to bolster its own position vis-a-vis India. India, anxious not to have an Islamic coalition of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran on its western flank, probably will want to help the USSR, especially in the postwar reconstruction period, by trying to counter Pakistani influence and rebuild Indian and Soviet ties to Kabul. For the US this possible competition between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan threatens hopes of noninterference in the rebuilding of the Afghan political and social structure.

US moves to obtain Indian and Pakistani cooperation in antiterrorism efforts and narcotics control are hindered by poor Indo-Pakistani relations. Progress in any single area can be and often is held hostage to attempts by Islamabad or New Delhi to persuade Washington to refuse arms, technological assistance, or political support to the other country.

Alternate Futures

Major Changes Unlikely

Continuity characterizes the South Asian political scene. Traditional elites and dynastic politics are the rule, and shifts in policies as basic as those governing relations between India and Pakistan will be discernible only over decades, not years.

Short of a fourth Indo-Pakistani war (the most improbable of contingencies), bilateral relations probably will remain essentially the same. Each military establishment will continue to arm against the other, while political leaders and diplomats cautiously pursue measures designed to prevent actual hostilities and gradually erode the bedrock of popular hatred and suspicion.

Because elected governments in New Delhi and Islamabad must defer to popular opinion in order to be reelected, few significant compromises can be expected in the foreseeable future, especially not a solution of the Kashmir dispute. Atmospheric improvements are possible, however, facilitated by such helpful adjustments as confidence-building measures

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(the nuclear nonattack accord), expanded trade links, antinarcotics trafficking cooperation, cultural contacts, and regional programs under the auspices of SAARC.

But at the same time, warming and cooling trends will continue to alternate, in response to a wide variety of internal and external factors. National elections, for example, usually foster a downturn in relations, as do US arms sales to Pakistan, which increase Indian suspicions of Pakistan.

A Scarcity of Leaders

In neither India nor Pakistan is there a strong, obvious candidate waiting to take over from Gandhi or Bhutto. Each enjoys unique personal and family advantages and faces a weak, fragmented opposition and no political competitors with any noticeable charisma or prestige. Both are young—Bhutto is in her mid-thirties and Gandhi is in his early forties—and they can be expected to be active politically for decades to come. Even if they are voted out of office, they probably will remain in the national legislatures and could be reelected after short periods out of power.

For both leaders, assassination or fatal accident is always a danger. Sikh terrorists pose an omnipresent threat to Gandhi. In case of Gandhi's or Bhutto's demise, his/her party would select a substitute and probably call elections to take advantage of the sympathy vote. In these snap elections the opposition might lose considerable ground if tainted by real or imaginary links to an assassin, but in time it could recover and take advantage of a more evenly matched competition for power. Eventually new leaders and new political relationships would emerge on both sides, regardless of the initial lineup.

Indian Possibilities

If Gandhi were suddenly removed from the scene, the Congress (I) party would be especially hard pressed to replace him. Years of Gandhi family dominance have prevented other leaders from emerging. The various aspirants would attempt to stake their claims, and Congress (I) would survive intense infighting only with great difficulty. In the end, the new person on top could be a lackluster figure, without enemies but incapable of winning votes.

As a last resort, Congress (I) might turn to Arun Nehru. Despite currently being in the opposition, Nehru could be persuaded to rejoin Congress (I) "for the good of the nation." He has the advantage of being Rajiv's cousin and thus a bona-fide member of the Gandhi dynasty; is an ambitious, experienced politician; and would have some chance of winning.

The 1989 Elections. The only opposition force now in existence with an outside chance of unseating Gandhi and Congress (I) is the National Front (NF), a fragile coalition of seven opposition parties. While Congress (I) actively cultivates Muslim voters, the NF has yet to attract a significant Muslim voting block and in the upcoming campaign may concentrate instead on conservative Hindu voters. This could make the NF marginally more inclined to condemn Pakistan, but not to any significant degree.

Facing Pakistan Without Bhutto. Without Benazir Bhutto at the helm in Pakistan, current Indian efforts to build bilateral good will would slacken. If another martial-law government came into being in Islamabad, New Delhi would be especially wary, as it believes the Pakistani military is suicidally bent on extracting revenge for past defeats. Even under these circumstances, India still would be extremely reluctant to initiate military hostilities. However, it might contribute to heightened tensions, by more forceful protests against Pakistani "provocations" (such as fancied or real continued assistance to Sikh or Kashmiri separatists or to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program), an increase in arms purchases and production, or a beefing up of troop encampments on the Indo-Pakistani border.

Pakistan's Options

The Pakistani situation is complicated by the possibility that widespread civil unrest could erupt at any time and could trigger a resort to martial law. But even this eventuality probably would be temporary, barring a tremendous national disaster (like the loss of East Pakistan in 1971) or prolonged fighting in the region (such as the Afghanistan conflict). The Pakistani military's No. 1 priority is its commitment to internal law and order. Whether or not martial law was formally imposed, if at all possible the military would cooperate with the political leadership and the government in the holding of new elections.

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cooperate with the political leadership and the government in the holding of new elections.

Pakistani leaders, in particular the military, would be highly unlikely to risk even the appearance of an attack on India. They are acutely aware that they would quickly lose any war, that in a military conflict New Delhi would employ overwhelming force and give no quarter.

Bhutto Could Be Voted Out. Bhutto's hold on power at this time is more precarious than Gandhi's. She faces a far tougher challenge—a more disunited country, with enormous, fundamental economic and security problems.

Over the next year or two, therefore, Bhutto could be voted out if she makes enough mistakes. Every passing month is crucial. She is learning the craft of government on the job and has to compensate not only for her own inexperience but also for that of her advisers and party leaders.

To date Bhutto has few domestic successes to show for her initial efforts. She must rely on the weakness of the opposition to give her the time she needs to consolidate power and build up her party as an effective governing as well as election-winning organization.

- If she fails in these efforts, she may be forced to hold elections as late as possible (probably at the last minute, late 1993), with a poor record, a weak PPP, and a strengthened opposition. She then

would be likely to lose to an opposition coalition centered around the more traditionalist Pakistan Muslim League and probably led by now-Chief Minister of Punjab State Nawaz Sharif.

- If she is doing well and feels more confident, she probably will call early elections (in 1990 or 1991), before the opposition can unite around winning candidates who may have a chance against her and her party. Under these circumstances she could well be reelected.

No Changed Policy Toward India. Whether Bhutto holds onto power, or a non-PPP government is in office, there is little likelihood of change in Pakistan's present two-track policy toward India: maintaining and equipping a military capable of defending the country against an Indian attack, while seeking rapprochement through diplomatic channels.

This policy enjoys widespread support, from the public at large as well as from the military and civilian elites. Despite the advantages for normalization from the personal good will between Bhutto and Gandhi, as exhibited at the December 1988 SAARC summit, their presence at the top is not necessary nor is it the determining factor. Any successor government in Islamabad will see the need both to work to improve relations with India and to arm against it.

Prepared by Mary C. Shoemaker (647-8574) with contributions from Rush Holt and Randall Elliott

Approved by Richard A. Clarke

Annex: Three Indo-Pakistani War Scenarios

A fourth war between India and Pakistan is unlikely. Pakistan is aware that it would have little chance of winning and therefore will avoid moves that could set off hostilities. India could be assured of winning, but it would suffer considerable costs and severely damage its international reputation. After a war India would have to decide how to deal with a defeated Pakistan so that it would not be dangerously unstable, but also could never again be a military threat.

A war could occur, however, either through calculation or inadvertence. Under calculation, the initiating side would have to conclude that its vital national interests were at risk and could be preserved only through hostilities. India could decide, for example, that Pakistan's nuclear program was an unacceptable threat to Indian predominance in the region. (This is increasingly unlikely as a motive, because the optimum time to cripple the Pakistani program was several years ago.)

In an even more improbable scenario, Pakistan could decide that the military balance was tilting irreversibly against it; that political measures would never resolve outstanding differences, such as Kashmir; and that its only option therefore was to attack first, seize territory, and hold on for a cease-fire.

A war could occur accidentally through a minor incident that escalated, or through a misunderstanding by either side. The former could occur on the Siachen Glacier or the Kashmir frontier, where Indian and Pakistani forces exchange fire regularly. The latter would be a replay of the 1986-87 "Brass Tacks" crisis, when Pakistan overreacted to unusually large Indian military exercises.

In any case, India's overwhelming military might would lead to a quick victory. Three scenarios follow:

OPERATION GLOW, India Goes After the Nukes

OPERATION SLEDGEHAMMER, India Initiates a Conventional Attack

OPERATION SWITCHBLADE, India Responds to a Pakistani Attack

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OPERATION GLOW, India Goes After the Nukes

Phase 1: Despite having agreed not to attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities, India secretly assembles a large Air Force strike contingent, with support, at bases close to Pakistan's border. The Indian Army assumes a strategic defensive posture along the border.

Phase 2: Indian aircraft launch a surprise attack against all nuclear production and storage facilities in Pakistan. Indian interceptors engage Pakistani aircraft and prevent any from reaching Indian territory. All nuclear production, storage, and delivery capabilities are destroyed.

Phase 3: The Pakistani Army attacks several points along the border with India. Lacking air cover, and with less mobile formations, Pakistan suffers high casualties. All Pakistani formations including reserves are committed to the fighting. Indian officers perceive that the initiative on the ground has passed to them and attack. Pakistan's military is unable to respond to the Indian attack.

Phase 4: Indian forces defeat Pakistan's military—deployed in static positions close to the border and attempting to defend everywhere—and prepare to move against Pakistan's cities. Pakistani formations are constrained by limited mobility, lack of air cover, and an inability to shift reserves or coordinate operations at the corps level and higher. Indian Army units defeat Pakistani formations piecemeal.

Phase 5: Faced with a military defeat, but with cities and the general population relatively unscathed, Pakistan sues for peace on the 25th day of the war.

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- III -

OPERATION GLOW



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- IV -

OPERATION SLEDGEHAMMER, India Initiates a Conventional Attack

Phase 1: Pretending to be involved in annual fall and winter maneuvers, Indian infantry and limited mechanized forces gather along the entire border with Pakistan. Breakthrough-echelon armored and mechanized forces mass in the Bikaner area of India's Thar Desert.

Phase 2: Indian Air Force elements deploy to western airfields and begin aggressive border patrols, reconnaissance flights, and air combat maneuvers. The Indian Navy—carriers and most other auxiliaries and combatants—moves out of port.

Phase 3: Indian forces begin the attack, their primary objective being to seize the initiative and force Pakistani units back all along the border. Indian infantry formations advance 3-5 miles per day for the first week, then pause to regroup. Surrounded Pakistani units and strong points are bypassed, with reserve Indian units mopping them up. Fastest moving elements receive priority air support.

Phase 4: Once Pakistan has deployed all its forces and they are fixed along the border, Indian armored and mechanized forces attack as second-echelon forces. Their goal is to cut Pakistan in two. Indian forces attack through the one screening division south of Bahawalpur and reach the Indus River in 5-7 days. This effectively cuts north-south communications and severs Pakistan.

Phase 5: Indian armored forces then make a difficult "turning maneuver" to face north and continue attacking in that direction, while they detach screening forces to protect against weak Pakistani forces in the south. Naval action and the use of special troops keep southern Pakistani units from posing a serious threat. Pakistani forces in the north are in an extremely difficult position—being attacked from the east and south while they attempt to defend major population and industrial centers and the entire border area.

By this phase, Indian forces face a disorganized, demoralized, and defeated Pakistani military. Pakistani units are not able to hold everywhere, especially where command, communications, and logistics are insufficient. Indian troops break through at several key points and begin moving on such major targets as Islamabad.

Phase 6: Pakistan sues for a cease-fire, on the 18th day of the war.

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
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- V -

OPERATION SLEDGEHAMMER



Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative

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- VI -

OPERATION SWITCHBLADE, India Responds to a Pakistani Attack

Phase 1: Pakistan, alarmed at unusually large Indian military exercises near its border, mobilizes. India detects Pakistan's mobilization and starts preparations for hostilities.

Phase 2: Pakistan launches attacks in the northeast and southeast designed to improve its territorial position, reclaim all territory considered "lost" to India, and defeat a major portion of the Indian military. Islamabad figures this will ensure peace for at least the next five years.

Phase 3: After initial gains, Pakistani forces are checked by superior Indian formations. Some Pakistani airstrikes reach New Delhi and other major Indian cities. Indian armor and mechanized forces mass along the border opposite Islamabad.

Phase 4: India launches a massive armored drive on the capital of Pakistan, some 60 miles from India's border. Diversionary attacks are carried out against Lahore, Sukkur, and Hyderabad. The Indian Navy carries out attacks against Karachi while the Indian Air Force achieves air superiority over Pakistan. Indian units along the border pin Pakistani units. Indian breakthroughs occur almost immediately after any Pakistani unit is moved to the threatened Islamabad corridor.

Phase 5: After heavy fighting, Indian forces drive a wedge from the border to Islamabad. The Pakistani Air Force is virtually destroyed, and India absorbs heavy air losses. Daily damage to Pakistan's cities, industries, and infrastructure mounts. The Government of Pakistan flees Islamabad, which is then declared an open city.

Phase 6: Put on the defensive everywhere and unable to hold back Indian forces, encircled Pakistani Army units begin to collapse. Most of the southern half of the country is left without any effective military force. Karachi is assaulted by naval and special troops.

Phase 7: Pakistan sues for peace on the 30th day of the war, in an attempt to avoid being totally defeated.

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
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- VII -

OPERATION SWITCHBLADE



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