

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 22, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE AND SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, NICHOLAS BURNS, RICHARD /DFJ
SCHIFTER AND DANIEL FRIED

SUBJECT: European Security Architecture, NATO Expansion and
Russia

In the wake of the Vice President's trip to Moscow and our December 21 discussion with the President, we have revised our NSC conceptual paper on how to proceed with NATO expansion. We would like to circulate this paper to a small group of senior officials at State, OSD, JCS and OVP to prepare for the Christopher-Kozyrev meeting in mid-January. The preparatory work of Dick Holbrooke's small interagency group will be reviewed and managed by regular Deputies meetings.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve our paper on European Security Architecture for senior and restricted interagency distribution.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Building Europe's New Security Architecture

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By SL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-m

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BUILDING EUROPE'S NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

We need to maintain U.S. leadership in defining the way ahead on NATO expansion and other elements of our European security agenda. We need to (a) integrate USG thinking about next steps in the NATO expansion process with our Russian and other European equities; (b) plan consultations with the Russians (especially the Christopher-Kozyrev meeting in January), Allies, CEEs and Ukrainians; and (c) based on the above, set objectives for year-end 1995 when the NATO study is due and beyond. The outline below summarizes NSC staff views on USG direction and tactics, based on interagency work (including Strobe Talbott's senior interagency process) and our own thinking following the NAC Ministerial and CSCE Summit and the Vice President's Moscow trip. Principal developments since the last iteration of this paper include the NAC communiqué and Russia's stiff reaction to it, but also hints from the Russian Government of interest in a formalized treaty relationship with NATO.

I. Policy Framework

Objectives

- An integrated and inclusive security system for Europe, including but broader than NATO expansion.
- In the medium term, an expanded NATO, including at first one or more CEEs who live up to our precepts, with the credible prospect of further expansion to those not admitted in the first tranche.
- In close parallel, an institutionalized relationship between NATO and Russia -- possibly in the form of a Treaty ("alliance with the Alliance") or Charter. It could include a commitment on consulting with Russia on NATO or NATO-led military operations as in ex-Yugoslavia, but without giving Russians a veto or right of prior consultations over NATO decisions. The Treaty/Charter could establish an institutional framework for consultations in 16+1 format (possibly modeled after the SCC) and could also include negative security assurances.
- Possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine, Baltic and southern tier States (i.e., Romania) should be maintained; we should not consign them to a gray zone or a Russian sphere of influence. This said, we should not emphasize this point in public or privately within NATO at this time, given Russian sensitivities. And looking to the near and medium term, we will need to develop a Ukraine strategy in parallel with the deepening of the NATO-Russia relationship.

- New NATO members will acquire all rights and responsibilities of current members (full Article V guarantee) and will be expected to commit to full integration in NATO's military structures. NATO military authorities to undertake detailed planning for defense of new members. *At the end of the day, there might be flexibility on operational issues (such as stationing of foreign forces, forward deployment), but we do not need to decide this now, nor should we offer assurances to the Russians in this regard prematurely.*
- Expansion needs to take place in a way that does not dilute NATO's military effectiveness for either core self-defense missions or new peacekeeping and other non-Article V missions. At the same time, expansion should not be governed primarily by technical military criteria. When they join, new members should be on a "credible path" toward making a positive contribution to the common defense.
- NATO expansion should take place in coordination with the enlargement of the EU, but should not be delayed to match the EU's likely timetable. Nor should EU membership automatically entitle NATO membership: as a general rule, there should be no full WEU members who are not also members of NATO.

Rationale, Principles

- NATO expansion intended to project stability eastward and to underpin the democratic reform process in CEE. Stability in Central Europe will be a net plus for all countries, NATO members and non-members alike.
- To ensure emerging European security architecture can include Russia, *expansion process should proceed in close parallel in substance and pace with deepening Russia-NATO partnership*, leading toward formalized relationship in tandem with a strong U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship and development of other multilateral institutions in which Russians will participate (strengthened OSCE, G-8, Contact Group).
- Expansion process to be evolutionary and transparent. Consultations with principal interested parties before announcement of decisions or major forward steps. Expansion linked to a continued, robust PFP as mechanism both for preparing new members and deepening ties with countries not seeking or likely to attain membership or not among the first group to join.
- "Insurance policy"/"strategic hedge" rationale (i.e., neo-containment of Russia) should not be emphasized in public diplomacy, with focus instead on goal of building inclusive European security architecture in which a democratic Russia will be a major partner.

- within PFP from exercises to joint peacekeeping and other operations. Implement PFP and NACC work programs for 1995-96 (broader range of field exercises, CPXes, defense planning activities, political consultations) to signify acceleration of integration process -- for future members and non-members alike (*Must decide on priorities for use of \$30 million in FY95 and the expected \$100 million in FY96 for PFP support, and to meet the President's commitment of \$10 million for the Baltic Battalion in FY95.*)
- o With CEEs: Consultations with selected CEE countries in rough parallel with Russia consultations. In 1995 consultations, keep expectations realistic -- be clear about timing; elicit their thinking about achievable next steps for 1996 to help shape our own and Allied thinking. Stress need for progress and caution against backsliding vis-à-vis precepts. Keep membership door open for all - - e.g., Ukraine, Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria (countering Allied inclinations to draw a line at the Visegrad countries) -- while stressing that all candidates must satisfy the same precepts. *Be careful not to move ahead in our thinking or rhetoric on NATO expansion beyond the CEE countries' variable and uncertain state of political maturity.*
 - o With Russia: Starting with Christopher-Kozyrev meeting, hold increasingly serious, frank dialogue about NATO expansion, enhanced NATO-Russia relationship, including possible Treaty/Charter; convey assurances about timing of NATO decisions. Elicit Russian thinking about next steps in 1996 as our own thinking evolves. Insist on end to public charges from Russians. *As long as Russians do likewise, avoid use of challenging public language (e.g., no Russian veto), but be careful not to allow Russians to confuse serious dialogue with right of joint decisions or veto.*
 - o With Allies: Generate deeper Allied consensus on expansion, working bilaterally at high levels when necessary and using the 1995 NAC study. Move beyond U.S. identification with expansion issue. Develop Allied thinking about military requirements for potential new members, including requirements for aspirant nations. Explore military options for NATO integration with first CEEs, e.g., pace of military integration, forward deployment, resources, defense planning, military doctrine, standardization, and command and force structure. Ensure progress by spring Ministerial to support interim consultations with Partners.

- o Within Quad: In addition to above, explore possible "German 2+4 solution" for CEEs (e.g. temporary and/or conditional restrictions on deployment of stationed forces on new CEE members' territory) but do not broach these with full Alliance or with Russians prematurely.
- o Within OSCE: Press our agenda, strengthening organization along lines we have suggested. Increase its role and visibility within NIS as well as CEE. In study of new "security model" for the 21st century, express openness to Russian ideas for putting OSCE on a legal basis and for further streamlining of decision-making; resist proposals that would elevate OSCE above NATO.
- o With Congress and with U.S. , West European, CEE and NIS Publics: Greatly increase Administration visibility on issue through op-ed pieces, speeches, USIS outreach, and expand information activities by NATO to match U.S. efforts. Need special, focused public information effort on NATO/PFP in Russia. Maintain consistent message before all audiences.

II. Winter/Spring Strategy

Objectives at Christopher-Kozyrev Meeting

- Affirm understanding about public discretion and private openness.
- Explore both sides' thinking: Russia-NATO Treaty/Charter, principle of parallelism between NATO expansion, Russia-NATO relationship, and robust U.S.-Russian bilateral relations.
- Reassure Russians about timing of expansion decisions (no expansion in 1995, sensitivity to Russian elections in 1995-96).
- Reject joint decision-making about NATO expansion.
- Press for early Russian decision to complete PFP implementation documents and to sign NATO-Russia memorandum of understanding.
- Make clear that development of Russia's relationship with NATO must evolve in step with expansion process and cannot get out ahead of NATO's relations with CEE countries: perceptions of a U.S.-Russia condominium would set back the progress we have made with the CEEs, and would not be in Moscow's interest either.

- Suggest willingness at proper time to discuss military aspects of expansion (e.g. understandings about stationed forces, nuclear deployments, etc.), but not at this early stage of intra-Alliance study.

Outline of discussions/public outreach

- 1) Speech by Secretary of State or higher Administration official (January). Op-ed pieces starting in January and throughout the year.
- 2) Consultations with key Allies, Quad and, subsequently, with other allies (January, prior to and after Christopher-Kozyrev meeting).
- 3) Christopher-Kozyrev meeting (mid-January), with follow-up consultations at senior official level over following months.
- 4) Discussions with selected CEEs, Ukraine, Baltics: beginning in January in Washington and capitals via Embassies, and visits in both directions. Parallel public outreach efforts with CEE/NIS.
- 5) Interagency team to Quad capitals before spring NAC Ministerial.
- 6) Reinforced NAC to prepare for spring Ministerial.

Maximum Year-end 1995 Objectives

- Deeper Allied, U.S. public/Congressional consensus on expansion on basis of our thinking and the NAC study.
- Realistic CEE, Ukrainian, Baltic expectations and greater degree of confidence in process.
- Russian understanding if not acceptance of package combining NATO expansion and parallel Russia-NATO relationship.
- More robust and visible PFP, following year of exercises.
- Enhanced U.S. bilateral military programs with partners, based on Warsaw Initiative \$100M.
- Broad consensus among Allies (and as much consensus as possible among CEEs, Russia) about 1996 next steps, e.g., implementation of study and greater differentiation among Partners.