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At his confirmation hearings on July 2, 1973, Director Colby said:

"We are not going to run the kind of intelligence service that other countries run. We are going to run one in the American society and the American constitutional structure, and I can see that there may be a requirement to expose to the American people a great deal more than might be convenient from the narrow intelligence point of view."

I feel it is time to hold Mr. Colby to his commitment, as the Congress and the American people have a right to learn what was done in our name in Chile. Much as I would prefer to see this accomplished within the channels of the Congressional process, its importance convinces me that our very system of government requires that knowledge of American activities in Chile not remain solely with a handful of officials and Members of Congress. Therefore, I urge you to promptly turn this matter to the attention of the Foreign Affairs Committee for a complete, public investigation of United States relations with Chile. I trust that you will agree that the importance of this matter and its implications for future foreign policies of the United States demands no less.

Yours sincerely,

MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON.

SEPTEMBER 11, 1974.

HON. THOMAS MORGAN,
Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2183 Rayburn House Office
Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing to reaffirm my request to you of July 18, 1974, that you initiate open hearings in connection with United States policy with respect to Chile during the Allende period.

As you know, Mr. William Colby, Director of the CIA, in recent newspaper reports, is reported as having stated that the CIA is an instrument of policy, that it does not make policy, and that in connection with the Agency's clandestine activities in Chile during the Allende period, the Agency was implementing the foreign policy of the United States. Hence, I believe that the issue rests squarely within the jurisdiction of the House Foreign Affairs Committee: who made the policy which led the Central Intelligence Agency to undertake the extensive clandestine activities designed to subvert the Allende government?

In my opinion, an accounting to the American people and the Congress is in order and we should demand that accounting from Secretary of State Kissinger who, according to Mr. Colby, was the author of the policy toward Chile.

It is no longer acceptable for the Congress to acquiesce in State Department officials' coming before Congressional committees and making statements which, if not outright lies, are at least evasions of the truth. I urge that your committee, before which State Department officials have testified on this matter, reopen its inquiry in light of what we now know, and determine whether or not transcripts of their previous testimony should be transmitted to the Department of Justice for perjury.

Yours sincerely,

MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON.

JULY 18, 1974.

HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1215 Dirksen Senate Office
Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you may know, for sometime I have been actively interested in the development of United States foreign policy toward Chile, and particularly since the overthrow of the Allende government on September 11,

1973 and my visit to that country shortly thereafter. It is my purpose in writing to discuss some of the fruits of my endeavors in that direction, which I feel pose serious questions about the manner in which our current relations with Chile evolved, how our policies there were implemented, and how Congress has exercised its oversight function. I request that you bear with me on the length of this letter, since I feel that the importance of its subject matter requires a detailed and comprehensive presentation of the evolution of my present concern.

No doubt you are familiar with numerous reports, dating from the time of Salvador Allende's election as President in 1970, alleging that the United States government played an active role in trying to influence Chilean politics. Immediately after the military coup last October, further reports appeared which indicated that the United States was involved, either directly or indirectly. At that time, I made a very brief trip to Chile which enabled me to gain a sense of the prevailing attitude there and helped add some substance to my earlier impression that the United States had engaged in political and economic destabilization efforts that eventually led to President Allende's downfall.

Since that time, I have repeatedly tried to focus attention in Congress on the origins of American policy toward the Allende government to determine its possible influence in the eventual course of events in Chile. In particular, I was concerned with the activities of the Treasury Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, the latter of which is the subject of quite limited Congressional review that is perfunctory and comes after the fact. As you can readily see from the exchange of correspondence which is attached to this letter, my efforts have not been productive of any substantial inquiries into our policies toward the Allende government. Instead, the few hearings that have been held focused largely on the internal situation in Chile and allegations of denials of civil and judicial rights. The following list of hearings and witnesses clearly documents that fact:

Sept. 20, 1973 Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs: Assistant Secretary of State Jack Kubisch

Sept. 25, 1973 Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs: Assistant Secretary of State Jack Kubisch

October 11, 1973 Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs: Central Intelligence Agency witness

October 31, 1973 Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs: Defense Intelligence Agency analysts

December 7, 1973 Subcommittees on Inter-American Affairs and International Organizations and Movements: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE—Dr. Frank Newman

May 7, 1974 Subcommittees on IAA and IOM: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE—Charles Porter, former Member of Congress, Ira Lowe, attorney

May 23, 1974 Subcommittees on IAA and IOM: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE—Dr. Covey Oliver, former United States Ambassador

June 11, 1974 Subcommittees on IAA and IOM: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE—former Attorney General Ramsey Clark; Judge William Booth

June 12, 1974 Subcommittees on IAA and IOM: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE—Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman

June 18, 1974 Subcommittees on IAA and IOM: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE—Professors Richard Fagan, John Planck, and Riordan Roett

Following the September 25, 1973 hearing, Chairman Faselc issued a statement which read: "... the Subcommittee will hold additional hearings on Chile in the near future. We intend to conduct a full scale investigation of United States policy toward Chile." The committed language of that statement has not been pursued, despite a series of conversations between my office and the Subcommittee both at the staff level and between Chairman Faselc and myself. Finally, a request made in writing by me on March 7, 1974 to Chairman Faselc that he hold hearings on U.S. activities in Chile resulted in an inconclusive exchange of letters over three months, with the end result that the Subcommittee has promised two days of hearings, possibly sometimes this summer, with non-government witnesses.

The one possible opportunity that was afforded to probe United States policies toward Chile occurred during the Subcommittee executive session testimony in October, 1973 of CIA director William Colby, who unfortunately refused to respond fully to questions of CIA activities in Chile, citing the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee. With little expectation that tangible results

would follow because of its past deference to the CIA in such matters. I turned to the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the House Armed Services Committee. In my letter of April 2, 1974 to Chairman Nedzi, a copy of which is also attached, I recounted the reluctance of CIA Director William Colby to fully testify before the Foreign Affairs Committee and requested that Chairman Nedzi's Subcommittee hold hearings to question Mr. Colby directly as to covert CIA operations in Chile.

Mr. Colby testified on April 22, 1974 and after some delay, largely due to Chairman Nedzi's desire to obtain clearance from Chairman Hébert, I was notified on or about June 1, 1974 that I would be given access to the transcript. I read the hearing transcript once on June 5 and again on June 12, and the information contained in the Colby testimony convinced me that it is of critical importance for the Congress and the American people to learn the full truth of American activities in Chile. I wish to share this information with you, in the hope that you will feel the same sense of conviction that I experienced upon learning the full details of significant U.S. activities in the affairs of another country without any prior consultation of even the committee charged with overseeing such operations. In fact, actual formal notification of that committee came seemingly as an afterthought, and only after my request was made, many months after the operations had been conducted.

While my memory must serve here as the only source for the substance of the testimony, I submit the following summary of its contents as an indication of what transpired in Chile.

The testimony was given on April 22, 1974 by Mr. Colby, who was accompanied by a Mr. Phillips, who was apparently the Latin American specialist of the CIA. Also in attendance were Chairman Nedzi and Frank Slatinshek, Chief Counsel of the House Armed Services Committee. Approximately one third of the 48 pages of testimony is devoted to exposition by Mr. Colby of a continuous Central Intelligence Agency involvement in the internal politics of Chile from 1962 through 1973. Most of the remainder of the testimony provides a description of the methods employed by the CIA in conducting such operations, focusing on the details of how activities in Chile were accomplished.

Over the 1962 to 1973 period, the Forty Committee (an interdepartmental body that reviews and authorizes all covert CIA activities and is chaired by the President's Advisor on National Security Affairs) authorized the expenditure of approximately \$11 million to help prevent the election of Allende and, in Mr. Colby's words, "destabilize" the Allende government so as to precipitate its downfall. The agency activities in Chile were viewed as a prototype, or laboratory experiment, to test the techniques of heavy financial investment in efforts to discredit and bring down a government.

Funding was provided to individuals, political parties, and media outlets in Chile, through channels in other countries in both Latin America and Europe. Mr. Colby's description of these operations was direct, though not to the point of identifying actual contacts and conduits.

A total of \$3 million was sent in 1964 to the Christian Democratic Party in Chile that was opposing Allende in the national elections. Also in 1964, unidentified American corporations suggested that the CIA serve as a conduit for corporate funds that would finance anti-Allende activities, but that idea was rejected as unworkable. Approximately \$500,000 was authorized in 1969 to fund individuals who could be nurtured to keep the anti-Allende forces active and intact.

During the 1970 election, in which Allende eventually was elected President, \$500,000 was given to opposition party personnel. An expenditure of \$350,000 was authorized to bribe the Chilean Congress, which at that time was faced with deciding a run-off election between Allende and the opposition candidate. The bribe would have been part of a scheme to overturn the results of the election in which Allende had gained a plurality, but that plan, although originally approved by the Forty Committee, was later evaluated as unworkable.

The testimony indicates that the Agency role in 1970 was viewed as that of the "spoiler," involving general attempts to politically destabilize the country and discredit Allende to improve the likelihood that an opposition candidate would win.

Following the election of Allende, \$5 million was authorized by the Forty Committee for more destabilization efforts during the period from 1971 to 1973.

An additional \$1.5 million was spent for the 1973 municipal elections. Some of these funds were used to support an unnamed but influential anti-Allende newspaper.

Although a specific request in the summer of 1973 for \$50,000 to assist the trucker's strike was turned down, the Forty Committee did authorize in August, 1973 an expenditure of \$1 million for further political destabilization activities. This final authorization came without any apparent deterrent being posed by the recently completed hearings into ITT involvement in Chile and the Senate Watergate Committee's disclosure of CIA activities related to Watergate.

The full plan authorized in August was called off when the military coup occurred less than one month later. In the aftermath of the coup, however, funds that had been committed were spent. These included \$25,000 to one individual to purchase a radio station and \$9,000 to finance a trip to other Latin American capitals to reassure them about the new military leaders.

Since learning this information, I have attempted once again to induce some Members to pursue the facts of our involvement in the Chilean situation to determine how those policies evolved and how they can be justified as being in the national interest. I have had a reasonably extended conversation with Congressman Fraser, and briefer ones with Congressman Fascell and Hamilton, in which I described what I learned from the Colby testimony. While they were indeed distressed at the details of CIA operations, nothing was forthcoming as a result of those conversations that leads me to believe that there would be further investigations or hearings into the broader policy questions that such activities pose.

I turn to you as a last resort, having despaired of the likelihood of anything productive occurring as a result of the avenues I have already pursued. It is indicative of my frustrations to note that in the five meetings this year of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, which focused on human rights in Chile, only one government witness with knowledge of U.S. activities in Chile appeared. At that hearing, Congressman Fraser and I questioned Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman on possible CIA involvement in Chile while he was stationed there as Deputy Chief of Mission from 1969 through mid-1973. His answers, a transcript of which is attached, indicated to me some knowledge on his part of CIA activities that he was unwilling to discuss before a duly-constituted Committee of the House. The inherent limitations facing Members of Congress in uncovering the facts of covert activities such as those in Chile requires, I believe, a commitment by those in a position to act beyond the existing, illusory oversight machinery.

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Yours sincerely,

MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON.

JULY 26, 1974.

Hon. MICH . AEI . J.
HARRINGTON, U.S. House of
Representatives,

WASH. DC, D.C. 20540: I apologize for the delay in responding to your letter, but have been diverted by hearings in the Committee and other related matters.