Edki Tuen

DECLASS FIED June 3, 1964 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NU 86-293

Your soft sell to Eshkol connected a lot better than we realized yesterday. Israelis came around this morning and:

- 1. Agreed to let us reassure Nasser on Dimona.
- 2. Agreed to IAEA observers in joint desalting study.
- 3. Agreed in principle to IAEA controls on any big desalting reactor.
- 4. In return for a nine month extension of present US bilateral on existing small reactor, agreed to ask for IAEA agreement within that time.

For what it's worth, I gave Israelis a hard line after your meeting yesterday, saying I knew that while you didn't want to press Israelis so hard as to spoil good atmosphere of visit, you as well as rest of us were disappointed at lack of Israeli response on any points. This may just have helped.

While all returns aren't in, this visit seems to have netted out a distinct plus. So far Arab reaction, especially from Cairo, is most restrained (your warning to Kamel took), while Israelis are highly pleased. We also managed to steer press successfully (so far) away from sensitive arms issue.

Results of Eshkol's visit analyzed. White House, 3 June 1964. U.S. Declassified Documents Online, https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349271220/USDD?u=wash74137&sid=USDD&xid=0d648a9e. Accessed 9 July 2020.



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