

37

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

06793

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Info:

EXDIS

49

Retain class'n  Change/classify to

With concurrence of

DEC 14 5 26 PM '64

Declassify  In part and excise as shown

EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (5)

FPC/HDR by AK 2/2/94

AE (8-9)

EMBTEL 660 - AE 11-2 Jan  
At earliest opportunity you should inform Eshkol President

gratified at GOI agreement schedule Dimona visit.

USG naturally unhappy at Israeli postponement to January 30, but can accept this date so long as it thoroughly understood that inspection can be effectively comprehensive to meet our needs.

Since Dimona now operating over 12 months inspection requirements more complex than last time. At minimum must include following:

1. Visiting ~~XXX~~ team will require whatever time necessary (minimum estimate two days) complete observations at site with full access to reactor and all other facilities in order verify nature all such facilities, their production capacity and their present utilization.

2. Team should have opportunity review operating records reactor and any facilities either at site or elsewhere in which irradiated or unirradiated reactor fuel is stored, fabricated or processed, perform physical inventory and make independent

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NW 64112  
By DM/ST, NARA, Date 3/3/2008

AE 11-2 JSR

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:HERussell:rvc: 12/11/64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - John D. Jernegan

Cleared by:

NE - Mr. Davies SCI - Mr. Thomas INR - Mr. Brown  
AEC - Mr. Kratzer AEC - Mr. Reichard CIA - Mr. Devlin CIA Miss Cooney  
~~XXX~~ S/S - Mr. Hilliker White House Mr. Komer

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Classification



~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

measurements as may be necessary to verify production of reactor since previous visit. This more detailed inspection necessary to account for production.

3. Team also should have opportunity verify location and use any plutonium or other fissionable material produced in reactor.

4....

SECRET

*Classification*



~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

4. ~~In view of long lapse of time since last visit to AEC and intelligence community consider~~ Thorough inspection outlined above which corresponds to US bilateral and IAEA requirements minimum necessary permit President at later date reassure others on peaceful nature Israel's nuclear activities.

FYI: Visits to date have fallen considerably short normal safeguard requirements and at best accomplished only determination nature facilities at site and productive capacity at time of visit. AEC and intelligence community agree above more thorough inspection imperative.

We regret earlier date for inspection not set. Embassy's excellent reporting of developments on Israel's domestic scene has helped explain Eshkol's attitude. We appreciate difficulties and distractions he faces, but do not believe secret Dimona inspection would significantly affect his party's election prospects. Decision permit six-monthly Dimona inspections originally taken by Ben-Gurion and reconfirmed by Eshkol, presumably after full Cabinet discussion. Deputy Defense Minister Peres also involved in decision. Thus, ~~XX~~ difficult believe "hard liners" in cabinet could oppose Eshkol on decision in which they and Ben-Gurion participated.

Embassy's reporting suggests that with approach elections domestic pressures likely increase rather than lessen. Thus, inspection earlier than January 30 would appear decrease risk adverse domestic political repercussions.

Our....

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*



~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

Our inability fathom Eshkol's arguments for delay naturally heightens our security fears. Eshkol's remark that "we cannot build nuclear weapon in two months" not reassuring in light estimate US experts that if Israel decided to produce weapon following January 1964 inspection, it could produce enough plutonium for one or two nuclear devices by the end of 1965.

USG of course would not presume to suggest to Eshkol best timing of inspection politically. We hope however he will not invoke domestic political problems as pretext for further delays. Given other indications suggesting that Israel may be engaged in development weapon, further efforts delay inspection would bring into question Israel's good faith. END FYI.

GP-3

END

ACTING

BALL.

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY

EXDIS

Embtel 660

At earliest opportunity you should inform Eshkol President gratified at GOI agreement schedule Dimona visit, ~~week-end January 30.~~ Since Dimona now operating over 12 months inspection requirements more complex than last time. At minimum must include following:

1. Visiting team will require whatever time necessary (minimum estimate two days) complete observations at site with full access to reactor and all other facilities in order verify nature all such facilities, their production capacity and their present utilization.
2. Team should have opportunity review operating records reactor and any facilities either at site or elsewhere in which irradiated or unirradiated reactor fuel is stored, fabricated or processed, perform physical inventory and make independent measurements as may be necessary to verify production of reactor since previous visit. This more detailed inspection necessary to account for production.
3. Team also should have opportunity verify location and use any plutonium or other fissionable material produced in reactor.

4....

Drafted by: *[Signature]*      Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - John D. Jernegan *[Signature]*

NEA:NE:HERussell:rvc:12/11/54

Clearances: NE - Mr. Davies *[Signature]*    SCI - Mr. Thomas *[Signature]*    ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~    INR - Mr. Brown *[Signature]*  
 AEC - Mr. Kratzer *[Signature]*    AEC - Mr. Reichardt *[Signature]*    CIA - Mr. Devlin *[Signature]*    CIA - Miss Cooney *[Signature]*  
 S/S -      White House -

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~  
Classification



# EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION (EXDIS)

NO. COPIES RECEIVED:	SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION BY: B. C. Tueller	BR  RD  GH
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	
S ✓ 4 <del>10</del>	POST TEL AVIV	
U ✓ 5-19	INCOMING	
M ✓ 6	OUTGOING 492	
S S Chron. File - No's 8 and 9 ✓ 16-17-18	DATE Dec. 14, 1964	
S SO ✓ -10	CONTROL 06793	
O A	SUBJECT	
G ✓ 7		
G PM		
S AL	WHITE HOUSE ✓✓ 2+3	
S MF	EXCOM	
ACDA	CIA ✓ -14	
E	SEC'Y DEFENSE	
H	AID	
INR - HUGHES ✓ 11	USIA	
INR	VICE PRESIDENT	
IO	TREASURY	
L	OTHER AEC - Mr. Seaborg ✓ -15	
P		
SCI ✓ 12	CONFERENCE FILE:	
S P	DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE FILE:	
AF	Microfilmed: 18	
ARA	CLASSIFIED SITE:	
EUR	COPIES DESTROYED: 17, 10, 4, 6, 18, 7	
BTF		
FE	PK 8+9 16	
NEA ✓✓ 1+13, 21	<b>EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION</b>	
O CPR 5	<b>(EXDIS)</b>	



This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, [nsarchiv@gwu.edu](mailto:nsarchiv@gwu.edu)

[Read related article:](#)

**Duplicity, Deception, and Self-Deception: Israel, the United States, and the Dimona Inspections, 1964-65**

2020-11-03