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American Embassy, The Hague

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION and in the need for su recommended that prote

PARTICIPANTS: Max van der Stoel, Foreign Minister Kingdon Gould, Jr., American Ambassador

She DATE & PLACE: July 1, 1974; Foreign Office OW WES

SUBJECT: Retrieval of Nuclear Weapons

DISTRIBUTION: Amembassy The Hague - 1 Department EUR/WE - 1 Department PM

As the final item of my conversation with van der Stoel on July 1, I took up with him privately the desire of the US to develop contingency plans in the event that a nuclear device is stolen in the Netherlands or having been stolen elsewhere is moving towards or within Netherlands territory or territorial waters. I prefaced my remarks by saying that the United States had no knowledge whatsoever that such a situation is threatened. However, given the nature of terrorism today, such a possibility was conceivable and the US felt that contingency plans should therefore be prepared.

Such plans should be negotiated between technical experts but before beginning such discussions we wanted to get the endorsement of the GON to so proceed. Accordingly, I had earlier approached Minister Vredeling as the Ministry of Defense seemed to be the logical starting ground. Mr. Vredeling, however, felt that several other Ministries might be involved, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He had also suggested that I contact the Prime Minister directly on the issue.

Since I did not want to bother the Prime Minister needlessly, I first wanted to get Minister van der Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives

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Stoel's views on how best to proceed. The matter was an extremely sensitive one and should be handled as closely as possible.

Minister van der Stoel concurred in the desirability he dague of keeping the matter held as closely as possible and in the need for such contingency planning. He recommended that protection of these devices should be increased to preclude insofar as possible any theft. The Minister said he saw no present need for me to contact the Prime Minister's office, and that in his judgment the ideal person to evaluate the overall situation from the Dutch point of view was Mr. van der Valk, head of the NATO Section of the Foreign Ministry. By coincidence, Mr. van der Valk was his next scheduled appointment, and if I concurred, he would take it up with him.

I responded that this seemed the logical next step and I asked the Minister if he would advise van der Valk to contact Mr. Tanugy who was fully approsed of the situation... develop contingency plant in the

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