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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

June 7, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: GLOBAL ISSUES

SUBJECT: Evening Report

Daily Activities

Tuchman spent most of the day at the State-sponsored discussion on US-USSR relations and human rights. It was informative and interesting (for the first three hours or so) but disappointing in that even in this group of experts, the discussion tends to fall apart whenever it gets close to a concrete analysis of US objectives (as opposed to tactics, on which everybody has something to say). There was an interesting discussion of the fact that the real significance of the Orlov Committee (monitoring Helsinki) lies in the fact that it is the first time the various nationalities have worked together. There was complete agreement that the nationalist movements see the human rights movement as just the first step on the road to national autonomy, and that this is indeed the big threat to the Soviet government, and the hidden bombshell in the whole human rights debate with the USSR.

Tuchman prepared briefing books for tomorrow's SCC meeting on PRM-27, CW; forwarded Presidential letter of appointment for Gerard Smith; and continued to try to get a decision on the F-18L out of DOD. We will be sending forward a memorandum to you on this tomorrow in any case (we expect to have received their draft by then).

Kimmit attended a meeting of the Policy Planning Working Group of the Arms Export Control Board -- the discussion centered on PD-13 follow-on actions, especially the need for definition of certain terms contained in the directive; attended a legislative strategy session at State in preparation for Senate, and later Conference, consideration of the security assistance bill; and discussed US-USSR bilateral cooperative agreements with Ann Keatley of Frank Press' office.

State, NSA, OSD reviews completed

NLC Review Completed.

Significant Intelligence

Arms Transfers. Moscow's first comment on the new arms transfer policy appeared in the June 2 Pravda. While skeptical of our intentions, and duly

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2

25X1 noting the exceptions and loopholes, the overall effect is pretty positive in that the article cannot really find anything to criticize.



25X1 [redacted] Bhutto, speaking on the floor of the Parliament, maintained that he had never had any illusions about getting the A-7. He declared that despite Kissinger's "dangling of the A-7 before our eyes" he had known all along that Pakistan would never get the plane.

Embassy Belgrade reports further evidence of the Yugoslavian interest in Western arms, in the visit of a delegation headed by the Defense Secretary to the Paris Air Show, and in representations to the Italians and to the French urging close military cooperation.

Human Rights. State has finally moved on implementing the President's proposal on creating a UN High Commissioner for human rights, in the shape of instructions to USUN, in preparation for the UNGA. State recommends that "one possible way to generate wide support among Afro-Asian states would be to seek to associate a prominent and well-qualified African with the Concept of the High Commissioner. They suggest Skyiamah of Ghana and M'Baye of Senegal.

Marinez de Hoz' meeting with you received very heavy press coverage, most of it to the effect that progress is being made in convincing the US that Argentina's terrorist problem makes it a special case. One paper reports that you indicated interest in traveling to Argentina and in keeping open lines of communication with GOA leaders. Another report states that the US has "matured in its understanding that there are in-distinct regions and situations distinct policies" (sic).

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