



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~TOP SECRET~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SECDEF HAS SEEN

12 OCT 1970

October 10, 1970

10/12
HB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: DIA Concerns About Korea

I believe the message concerning Korean developments substantially overstates the dangers of an attack. By looking exclusively at a few military indicators, I think it provides a misleading picture of North Korea's current situation and likely policies. If the North Koreans were pointing toward a confrontation or attack on the South would they leave many of their frontline pilots deployed in Libya? Would they risk embarking on an adventure when the reliability of Soviet and/or Chinese support is questionable? When their economic problems are sufficiently acute to warrant a new effort to reschedule debts with Japan? When there is evidence of incipient contacts between the Japanese and South Korean military establishments? At a time when they appear to have embarked on an effort to refurbish more moderate international credentials (as evidenced by behavior at the Havana NAM)? At a time when they seem uncertain as to how to proceed in relationship to the US, but are actively exploring possibilities of opening contacts at the UN? When any military provocations would harden US intentions to maintain forces in Korea indefinitely? And when there are renewed indications of possible political opportunities in the South arising out of the recent ROKG actions against the Opposition?

*I agree with Mike's conclusion (above), but
nevertheless I think we should ask ourselves - whether
there are any actions we prudently should take in
case that conclusion is wrong, e.g. increased readiness,
show of force, demands to PRC, etc. This would be a
useful subject of discussion with Wickham / Flynter or
during your trip.*

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Dem.

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cf. Annex

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Sec Def Cont Nr. *X-04727A*

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12 OCT 1979

SECRET (NO) 2224

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

October 11, 1979

Memo For _____

Mr. McGiffert's note reads;

*To discuss w/ 10/12
Carmichael on the way over
HB*

I agree with Mike's conclusion (above), but nevertheless I think we should ask ourselves whether there are any actions we prudently should take in case that conclusion is wrong, e.g. increased readiness, show of force, demarche to PRC, etc. This would be a useful subject of discussion with Wickham/Slysteen in Korea during your trip.

DEM

DECLASSIFIED

BY _____

DATE _____

APA

20 Apr 2005

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5