

EO 12958 1.4(b)<25Yrs

EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs

EO 12958 1.4(d)<25Yrs

EO 12958 1.4(e)<25Yrs

EO 12958 3.5(c)

EO 12958 6.2(c)

~~SECRET~~

TOT: 011920Z AUG 97

TO: NIMA NAVY YARD WASHINGTON DC, DIRNSA,
SECSTATE WASHDC//INR/DSITA/SCT//, DIA WASHINGTON DC,
DA WASHINGTON DC, CNO WASHINGTON DC, CMC WASHINGTON DC,
CSAF WASHINGTON DC, TREASURY DEPT, SECRET SERVICE//ID//,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH DC//OIPR//, DEA WASHDC//OI//,
DOEHQ//IN//, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, FAA NATIONAL HQ,
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION//S-60//,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, US CUSTOMS SERVICE W.


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
25-April-2012

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[REDACTED] PLAN TO ESTABLISH AN IRAQI
ELEMENT IN BIN LADIN'S ISLAMIC ARMY. WHICH WOULD BE
ANTI-((SADDAM)) HUSAYN [REDACTED]


SUDANESE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT (NIF), HOWEVER, LEARNED OF THIS
AND REQUESTED THAT BIN LADIN REFRAIN FROM ESTABLISHING SUCH A
GROUP, BECAUSE THE NIF SUPPORTED SADDAM. THE NIF WAS CONCERNED
THAT SADDAM WOULD LEARN ABOUT THE ISLAMIC ARMY IRAQI ISLAMISTS AND
THAT THIS WOULD DAMAGE NIF-IRAQI RELATIONS. BIN LADIN AGREED [REDACTED]

BIN LADIN PROVIDED SOME ASSISTANCE TO THE KURDS. HOWEVER, [REDACTED]



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