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**DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa'ida
And the Intelligence Community Response** [Redacted]

March 19, 2004

[Redacted]

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
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**DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa'ida
And the Intelligence Community Response** [REDACTED]

Scope Note

[REDACTED] This document was prepared by the CIA's Director's Review Group to assist the DCI in his review of the central issues related to the war on terrorism and the September 11, 2001 attacks. [REDACTED]

Introduction

[REDACTED] September 11 brought the fight with international terrorism home to America in the most vivid way. But, the Intelligence Community (IC), and the FBI were already fully engaged in this war many years before September 11.

- The IC did not discover terrorism suddenly on September 11, 2001.

[REDACTED] The growing terrorist threat to US citizens and facilities worldwide—including in the United States—has been at the top of the Intelligence Community's agenda for many years. This Report lays out a nearly decade-long record of Intelligence Community involvement in fighting terrorism and particularly Usama Bin Ladin and his al-Qa'ida network.

- It is a record of keen awareness of the threat, disciplined focus, and persistent efforts to track, disrupt, apprehend, and ultimately bring to justice Bin Ladin and his lieutenants and dismantle al-Qa'ida. It is also a record of consistent efforts to warn policymakers of the seriousness of the al-Qa'ida threat.

The Early Years: Terrorist Financier (1986-1996)

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin gained prominence during the Afghan war for his role in financing the recruitment, transportation, and training of ethnic Arabs who fought alongside the Afghan mujahedin against the Soviets during the 1980s. At age 22, Bin

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Ladin dropped out of school in Saudi Arabia and joined the Afghan resistance almost immediately following the Soviet invasion in December 1979. His money and his experience as a frontline fighter enhanced his reputation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin had drawn on his family's wealth and donations from sympathetic merchant families in the Persian Gulf region, to organize the Islamic Salvation Foundation, or al-Qa'ida ("The Base"). The foundation maintained recruitment centers and guesthouses in several Middle Eastern countries and organized and funded paramilitary training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

- Under al-Qa'ida's auspices, Bin Ladin also imported heavy equipment to build roads, tunnels, caves, hospitals, and storage depots in Afghanistan for use by the mujahedin and, eventually, to form part of his terrorist infrastructure.

[REDACTED] The Afghan experience was key to radicalizing Bin Ladin and cementing his dedication to Islamic extremist causes. It provided him with an opportunity to make and strengthen contacts with a wide variety of Islamic extremists of various nationalities. Many of the men who became key members of the al-Qa'ida leadership met and fought alongside him in Afghanistan against the Soviets.

- It is also at this time that Bin Ladin began perverting the teachings of Islam and the Prophet Mohammed for his own violent purposes. And it is then that he began to exploit underlying social, political, and economic discontent and widespread resentment of the West in many parts of the Muslim world.
- In a 1988 press interview, he claimed, "I felt it a sign from God to battle all opponents of Islam when a mortar shell that landed a few feet away from me did not explode." Urged on by fervent Islamic radicals, he began using his personal fortune to shelter and employ hundreds of militant, stateless "Afghan Arabs" and train them for *jihad* or holy war around the world.


[REDACTED] Although Bin Ladin returned to Saudi Arabia to work in his family's construction business after the Soviets left Afghanistan in early 1989, he continued to support militant Islamic causes and radicals who by then had begun redirecting their efforts against secular and moderate Islamic governments in the region. He began publicly criticizing the Saudi Government and harshly condemned the Gulf War and the presence of US and other Western forces in the Arabian Peninsula.

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
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- Saudi officials say they seized his passport from 1989 to 1991 for attacking the Al Saud [redacted].
[redacted] They revoked his citizenship in 1994.

[redacted] Bin Ladin came to the attention of the CIA as an emerging terrorist threat during his stay in Sudan from 1991 to 1996.



[redacted] During his five-year residence in Sudan, Bin Ladin combined business with *jihad* under the umbrella of al-Qa'ida. In association with powerful members of the ruling Sudanese National Islamic Front, he embarked on several business ventures that probably multiplied his fortune. His workforce in Sudan included militant Afghan war veterans [redacted]



[redacted] While in Sudan, Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida financed Islamic extremists who opposed secular and moderate Islamic governments and who despised the West. Following are several examples of what the Intelligence Community learned at that time regarding al-Qa'ida's activities from Sudan:

- Islamic extremists who in December 1992 bombed a hotel housing US servicemen in Aden [redacted] Bin Ladin financed their group [redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

- [redacted] Bin Ladin sent members to Somalia in 1993 to work [redacted] opposing US forces sent there in support of Operation Restore Hope. Bin Ladin later publicly claimed responsibility for this activity [redacted]

- We believe his experience in Somalia played a significant role in molding his perceptions of the United States. He has publicly said the US withdrawal from Somalia demonstrated that Americans were soft and the United States a paper tiger that could be more easily defeated than the Soviets had been in Afghanistan.

[redacted]

Qa'ida had attempted to acquire material that could be used to develop a

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chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) capability [redacted]

[redacted] CIA's assessment of Bin Ladin during the early 1990s was that he was a major terrorist financier. The IC viewed him largely as a financial supporter of other terrorist groups and individuals, not as the center of a separate organization or network focused on carrying out terrorist attacks on the United States. Moreover, he was only one of a number of potential terrorist threats and, at that time, not considered the most important. As such, the Bin Ladin-al-Qa'ida target competed for resources with other targets [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Bin Ladin's prominence grew during the latter part of his residence in Sudan in the mid-1990s

[redacted]

[redacted] 1996 our awareness of the threat represented by Bin Ladin had grown significantly.


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[redacted] establishment in late January 1996 of an "Issue Station" within the DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) to focus on the "the Sudan-based terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin

[redacted]


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


soon provided intelligence revealing a broader and more pernicious terrorist capability that reached well beyond financial activity.


[redacted] information on Bin Ladin's stay in Sudan, indications of al-Qa'ida's role in terrorism, and Bin Ladin's connections with Egyptian terrorists.




Bin Ladin's connection to the assassination attempt on President Mubarak during a visit to Ethiopia in 1995




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
[redacted] defined Bin Ladin as the head of a worldwide terrorist organization bent on attacking the United States.



Ladin's intent to target the United States on its soil and his interest in acquiring CBRN materials to produce weapons of mass destruction.


[redacted] By the time Bin Ladin left Sudan in 1996 and relocated himself and his terror network to Afghanistan, the Intelligence Community had gained a substantial appreciation of the significance of his threat and was taking strong action to try to stop him.

- CIA focused more resources on him by creating in January 1996 a Bin Ladin Issue Station in CTC




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
The Taliban Sanctuary Years: Evolving into a Strategic Threat (1996-2001)


[redacted] CIA efforts to track Bin Ladin's whereabouts continued even during the transition period of his relocation from Sudan to Afghanistan.



[redacted] At the time, there was insufficient evidence to indict him in the United States and issue a US warrant for his arrest.

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If any doubts remained about the emerging threat to the United States represented by Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida, they were gradually dispelled by a series of declarations he issued from his refuge in Afghanistan during the 1996-1998 timeframe.

- In an undated interview in Afghanistan published in July 1996 in the London daily *The Independent*, Bin Ladin declared that the killing of Americans in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in June 1996 marked the beginning of the war between Muslims and the United States.
- One month later, in August 1996, Bin Ladin, in collaboration with radical Muslim clerics associated with his group, issued a religious edict or *fatwa* in which he called "*Declaration of War*" authorizing attacks against Western military targets on the Arabian Peninsula.
- Eighteen months later, six months prior to the 1998 US Embassy bombings in East Africa, al-Qa'ida issued another *fatwa*—under the banner of the "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders"—stating that all Muslims have a religious duty "to kill Americans and their allies, both civilian and military" worldwide.
- During a subsequent media interview, Bin Ladin explained that all US citizens were legitimate targets because they pay taxes to the US Government.

By the time of the 1998 East Africa bombings, al-Qa'ida had established its intention to inflict high casualties and a modus operandi emphasizing careful planning and exhaustive field preparations, which Bin Ladin saw as a prerequisite for the type of spectacular operations he had in mind.

- For example, when asked in a November 1996 interview why his organization had not yet conducted attacks in response to its August *fatwa* statement, Bin Ladin replied, "If we wanted to carry out small operations, it would have been easy to do so after the statements, but the nature of the battle requires qualitative operations that affect the adversary, which obviously requires good preparation."

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[REDACTED] By early 1998, CIA knew that we were dealing with a sophisticated terrorist organization bent on causing large numbers of American casualties. The East Africa bombings in August 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 succeeded because of al-Qa'ida's meticulous preparation and effective security practices.

- CIA analysts looked at al-Qa'ida targeting studies and training materials captured around the time of the East Africa and USS Cole attacks. They published an in-depth intelligence study of al-Qa'ida's terrorist operations that revealed that much of the terrorists' advance planning involved careful, patient, and meticulous preparation.
- This included extensive surveillance and the preparation of casing studies that detailed the vulnerabilities of potential targets. In the case of the US Embassy in Nairobi, for example, the terrorists' casing study was prepared in 1993, five years before the attack [REDACTED]

- The analysts also pointed out in the same in-depth study of al-Qa'ida methods [REDACTED] conscious of operational security. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We were also becoming increasingly concerned—and therefore warned about—al-Qa'ida's interest in acquiring chemical and biological weapons and nuclear materials.

- In a December 1998 interview, Bin Ladin called the acquisition of these weapons a "religious duty" and noted, "How we would use them is up to us."

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[REDACTED] DCI Deutsch expressed his concern about the growing lethality, sophistication, and wide-ranging nature of the terrorist threat, and that terrorists would push this trend to its most "awful extreme by employing weapons of mass destruction." DCI Tenet made similar warnings [REDACTED] as early as 1998, when he pointed to Bin Ladin's attempts to purchase or manufacture biological and chemical weapons for an attack against US facilities.

[REDACTED] None of Bin Ladin's and al-Qa'ida's extensive terrorist plotting, planning, recruiting, and training in the late 1990s would have been possible without the Taliban sanctuary in Afghanistan.

- Although Afghanistan had served as a place of refuge for international terrorists since the 1980s, the Taliban aided Bin Ladin by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] permitting him to build and maintain terrorist camps, and refusing to cooperate with efforts by the international community to extradite him after the US indicted him in June 1998 for his call for a worldwide "holy war" against US citizens.

[REDACTED] Since the Soviet invasion and its aftermath, Afghanistan became something akin to Terrorism Incorporated, a country with a vast infrastructure of camps and facilities for the refuge, training, indoctrination, arming, and financing of tens of thousand of Islamic extremists from all over the world.

- It provided Bin Ladin an isolated and relatively safe operating environment to oversee his organization's worldwide terrorist activities.
- Militants who received training there were sent to fight in *jihads* in Kashmir, Chechnya, or Bosnia. When they returned to their homes to resume their normal lives or migrate to other countries, they constituted a ready supply of manpower for terrorist operations. Two of the 9/11 hijackers followed this pattern.

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[redacted] The al-Qa'ida-Taliban training camps formed the foundation of a worldwide network by sponsoring and encouraging Islamic extremists from diverse locations to forge longstanding ideological, logistical, and personal ties.

[redacted] received basic training in the use of small arms and guerrilla tactics [redacted] more advanced and specialized training in subjects such as explosives, poisons, and assassination techniques.

- Bin Ladin emphasized indoctrination in extremist religious ideas and included the constant repetition that the United States is evil and that the current regimes of Arab countries are not true believers in Islam and should be overthrown as a religious duty.

[redacted] In summary, what Bin Ladin created in Afghanistan was a sophisticated adversary [redacted]

The IC's Efforts to Track, Disrupt, and Bring Bin Ladin to Justice

The Strategy

[redacted] By 1998, the key elements of the CIA's strategy against Bin Ladin were emphatically offensive rather than defensive. They included:

- Hitting Bin Ladin's infrastructure;
- Working with liaison to break up cells and carry out arrests;

- Pursuing a multi-track approach to bring Bin Ladin himself to justice, including working with liaison services, developing a close relationship with [redacted]


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US federal prosecutors, increasing pressure on the Taliban, and enhancing our unilateral capability to capture him.


[redacted] go after the terrorists

offensively.





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
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
[redacted] In the spring of 1999, in response to the DCP's request for a baseline review of the CIA's operational strategy against Bin Ladin and a new strategic plan, CTC produced a new comprehensive operational plan of attack against the Bin Ladin-al-Qa'ida target inside and outside Afghanistan.



The Plan emphasized in its multifaceted program the priority of capturing and rendering to justice Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants.




program to gather the intelligence to be able to track and act against Bin Ladin




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- Another element of the strategy that emerged in 2000 and 2001 was the use of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)




[redacted] this central, Afghanistan-focused strategy was played out against the necessity for aggressive and complex efforts to disrupt planned Bin Ladin-sponsored terrorist operations on a worldwide basis, which diluted the focus on Bin Ladin himself.


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- Responding to the Millennium threat, the attack on the USS Cole, and the rash of indications of planned terrorist actions during Ramadan 2000 and the months leading to September 11 worked to shift the focus of operational effort away from internal Afghan operations.



[redacted] CIA submitted a revised strategic proposal on counterterrorism to the NSC Staff in December 2000 that would have significantly expanded our activities



- It was too late for the departing Clinton administration to take action on this strategic proposal, however.

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The Intelligence Community Role

[REDACTED] Up to this point, this paper has focused on CIA's role in developing our understanding of the al-Qa'ida threat and devising and implementing a robust and well-focused program and strategy to counter it. We now turn to a critical aspect of the overall counterterrorism effort—the broader Intelligence Community role.

[REDACTED] CTC has aggressively pursued inter-agency representation, both in line management and at the working level, since its establishment in 1986. Over the years, this emphasis has fostered both improved communications as well as begun to break down the often-cited cultural institutional barriers to creative and effective support and joint operations. By 2001, the Center had [REDACTED] representatives from more than a dozen agencies involved in the fight against terrorism—10 percent of the Center's personnel complement at that time.

[REDACTED] FBI officers were detailed there nearly at its inception in 1996, with their representation growing [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] CIA operations officers served at FBI headquarters prior to September 11. CTC [REDACTED] detailed to the FBI, and there is CIA representation [REDACTED] FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces [REDACTED] CIA also has assigned officers to work with FBI to assist them in establishing their own foreign intelligence reporting and analysis capabilities.

- From the mid 1990s on, the Center has had [REDACTED] officers detailed from NSA, while NSA—in addition to hosting working level CIA officers—had until recently a senior CIA Directorate of Operations officer serving [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As CTC ramped up its efforts against Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida, the relationships and institutional structures that developed over the years among Community agencies paid enormous dividends in the fight with the terrorists. What follows are a few of the more significant examples:

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


[redacted] Over the years, the FBI and CIA have worked hand-in-hand in combating terrorism. Indeed, CIA's counterterrorism program, particularly from 1995 forward, was affected by the strong policy emphasis on criminal investigations and prosecutions as counterterrorism tools. There have been numerous successes and some instances where cooperation could be better. The need for us to work better together has long been abundantly clear.


- When problems do occur, it is the result of different organizational cultures, different objectives, different tradecraft, and in some cases a lack of interpersonal rapport.




[redacted] FBI and CIA worked closely together in the aftermath of the first World Trade Center bombing.



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[REDACTED] FBI and CIA collaborated closely on the TWA 800 case. After the crash, CTC immediately formed a working group to assist the FBI and other agencies in the investigation.




[REDACTED] FBI and CIA cooperated closely on countering terrorist threats in 1998.

- After we received a rash of reports in 1998 threatening attacks in the United States, we worked together to provide advisories for local law enforcement agencies.
- One such episode occurred after [REDACTED] a plot in the fall of 1998 to hijack a plane on the eastern coast of the United States to attempt to free the "blind Shaykh" from prison [REDACTED]



- CIA and FBI participated with other agencies in NSC-chaired meetings of the Counterterrorism Security Group to discuss this reporting and take action on it.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] Also in 1998, FBI and CIA worked closely together in the wake of the East Africa bombings to disrupt a planned attack against our Embassy [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] CIA and FBI also worked closely and successfully to defeat the suspected Millennium plots and several other cases in 2000.


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[redacted] Since 9/11, the two agencies have made collaboration and cooperation against terrorism a key objective. [redacted]



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[Redacted] Despite this excellent record of collaboration, occasional problems continue. A major, ongoing concern is FBI's own internal dissemination system. CIA officers still often find it necessary to hand-deliver messages to the intended recipient within FBI. In addition, FBI has not perfected its FI reporting system and headquarters-field communication, so dissemination of intelligence outside of FBI still is spotty.

[Redacted]


[Redacted] In some cases, CIA and FBI could have performed better together.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The different organizational culture and goals of FBI and CIA sometimes get in the way of desired results. The FBI focuses on gathering evidence to solve crimes and CIA focuses on threat assessments and collecting and analyzing intelligence. When these two goals compete, problems have occurred.

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[REDACTED] A 2000 CIA Inspector General (IG) report on CTC concluded that many improvements had been made and that relationships between CIA and FBI had been institutionalized [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Nevertheless, the IG report also pointed to continued problems that perhaps might be impossible to overcome fully because of "the natural tension [that] exists between the two organizations, deriving from their different missions, which can be negotiated but never eliminated." Some of the most salient difficulties cited by the IG were:

- The difference in organizational mission—intelligence collection and Covert Action for the Agency and successful prosecutions of terrorists for the FBI.
- The loss of potential intelligence opportunities because of deference to law enforcement goals.
- Concerns in both organizations about access to the other's mission critical information.

[REDACTED] Nonetheless, the leadership of the two agencies have consistently worked these issues and will continue to do so as we identify them.

- For example, the assignment of top-flight personnel to significant positions at the headquarters level of the two agencies has substantially improved coordination.

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[Redacted] CIA will continue to move to correct problems and make progress in closing the gap between where we are and where we want to be. Progress in raising the level of cooperation among the Community agencies over the years has been key to warning policymakers and stopping and disrupting attacks against US interests overseas.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] without FBI input on the domestic nexus of international terrorism, CIA analysts would have been hard-pressed to provide threat warnings in early August 2001 that al-Qa'ida continued to view the US homeland as a high priority target.



Working With Foreign Liaison

[Redacted] Working closely with foreign liaison partners has been an indispensable part of CIA's counterterrorism strategy before and after September 11.

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
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Support to the Military

[REDACTED] The Intelligence Community, and CIA specifically, worked together in support of one actual and several planned cruise missile attacks against Bin Laden and the al Qa'ida leadership. The demand by policy officials for multiple, corroborative sources pinpointing the time and place where Bin Laden would be vulnerable to an attack combined with concerns about collateral damage to civilians, however, served as major constraints to the final go-ahead to launch.

- On August 20, 1998, the United States conducted multiple attacks with cruise missiles against targets in Sudan and Afghanistan in response to clear evidence of Bin Laden's responsibility for the planning and execution two weeks earlier of the bombings of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

[REDACTED] Bin Laden and his lieutenants would be present in one of several camps located near Khowst in Afghanistan. Although we believe that we damaged several of the intended targets in Afghanistan and killed or injured approximately 80 terrorists, Bin Laden escaped injury, possibly warned in advance of the attack,

- In late November 1998, military consumers [REDACTED] were increasingly interested in our tribal Afghan sources' reporting on Bin Laden's movements [REDACTED] in Qandahar for a possible cruise missile attack. The military expressed concern about our [REDACTED] reporting being reliable enough for locational data.

[REDACTED] The military also expressed concern about collateral damage given the proximity [REDACTED]

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[redacted]

ultimately policy officials decided the risks of collateral damage to a nearby mosque were too great to call in a strike.

- In February-March 1999, military contingency planning on a strike against Bin Laden focused on hunting camps used by UAE princes [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Following policy official discussions with the UAE about the presence of its military C-130s in the area in early March, the camp UBL reportedly had visited—Shaykh Ali's Camp—was dismantled.

[redacted]

- In May 1999, the military again contemplated a cruise missile strike against Bin Ladin in the Qandahar area [redacted]

[redacted] we intensely tracked and reported on Bin Ladin's whereabouts for almost a week [redacted]

[redacted] from May 13-19. Again, the military was concerned about the precision [redacted] respect to identification of particular buildings as well as potential collateral damage to surrounding facilities, resulting in policy officials not authorizing a strike.

Budget and Resources

[redacted] The IC's war with al-Qa'ida in the decade prior to September 11 did not come cheaply. In a period when overall funding for the Intelligence Community and the Agency showed little if any actual growth, CIA's CBJ requests to the Congress for counterterrorism funds [redacted] more than [redacted]

[redacted] For a number of these years the overall annual appropriation included substantial supplementals. These

[redacted]

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- While this growth pattern was clearly favorable, the fact that it rested significantly on supplemental appropriations and other emergency measures increased the difficulty in program planning.
- These figures demonstrate a steady growth in positions targeted against terrorism

[REDACTED] A review of the context in which personnel resources were allocated indicates that despite the downsizing of CIA and the IC in general during the 1990s a series of DCI's worked aggressively to provide an enhanced level of effort against this increasingly dangerous and sophisticated target.

[REDACTED] In the decade prior to the attacks on September 11, the Intelligence Community experienced a substantial decrease in personnel resources across the board. This reduction began in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union and continued well into the mid-1990s, reaching its nadir in 1999. Overall Community resources were reduced [REDACTED] resulting in a substantial decrease in case officers in the field, closing of some stations, and significant reductions of analysts and support personnel.

[REDACTED] The Intelligence Community dealt with this resource-constrained post Cold War environment by prioritizing the focus of its work through such mechanisms as PDD 35. But at the same time it continued to face new demands from the policy community for intelligence support that required new and different approaches and the

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creation of new bureaucratic entities that drew on CIA expertise and staff personnel. Indeed, CIA had to contend with the resource demands of several emerging or heightened threats and events including:

- Mounting concern over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This issue moved sharply to the forefront as concerns arose over the lack of security of former Soviet WMD stockpiles, aggressive efforts by Iraq, Iran, and North Korea to develop these weapons and their means of delivery and, at the end of the decade, the emergence of India and Pakistan's nuclear tensions.
- The Gulf War [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The reduced supply of personnel and expertise and rising demand for support to policy makers and war fighters sharply constrained our ability to shift personnel resources within the Agency to address these new and shifting priority concerns. Our flexibility was further reduced by the very substantial time it takes to recruit, train, and develop the expertise of both analysts and case officers.


[REDACTED] In this constrained environment, a series of DCI's nonetheless saw to it that the personnel resources committed to the counterterrorism effort was not only protected but actually enhanced. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the depth of the Community draw down, personnel positions within CTC grew [REDACTED] despite [REDACTED] percent reduction in personnel Agency wide.

[REDACTED] With respect to the analytic effort, in 2001 [REDACTED] across the Agency were making analytic contributions to the counterterrorist mission in a variety of ways, such as traditional analysis, targeting, and operational support. [REDACTED] dedicated to al-Qa'ida. The equivalent of [REDACTED] were working terrorism-related issues or applying specialized skills to the terrorism problem from their positions in the DI, in addition [REDACTED] CTC [REDACTED] After September 11 those numbers rose dramatically. The total analytic presence in CTC [REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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We are using all of the traditional

operational means available to accomplish this goal and are using new means of getting at this difficult target


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
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
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
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[redacted] analyzing
terror finance trends, working with the US policy and law enforcement communities, and
utilizing all source information [redacted]



- Identified al-Qa'ida's growing interest in cash couriers and trusted hawala networks as vehicles for transferring funds in the Middle East and South Asia.



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
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Integration of Collection

[redacted]
has been a key element in our ability to learn about and operate against the terrorists.
[redacted]

- In undertaking this integration effort, the ADCI for Collection convened daily meetings with analysts and collection officers from NSA, NGA, and CIA to develop a collaborative collection effort.

[redacted]

- Through focused collection, we were able to build a more complete picture of

[redacted]

- This integrated intelligence collection effort also supported military targeting operations prior to September 11, including the cruise missile attack against the al-Qa'ida training camp complex in northeastern Afghanistan in August 1998; in addition, it helped to provide baseline data for the US Central Command's target planning against al-Qa'ida facilities and infrastructure throughout Afghanistan.

[redacted] Following the September 11 attacks, the IC redoubled its efforts to collect and integrate all of the intelligence disciplines. [redacted]

[redacted] This information, [redacted] greatly facilitated our ability to locate, track, and support US military operations against al-Qa'ida and Taliban
[redacted]

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[REDACTED] Community collection officers meet daily to ensure focused and dynamic collection on Bin Ladin and residual al-Qa'ida leadership.

Warning and Analysis

[REDACTED] Our analysts assessed al-Qa'ida's modus operandi, capabilities, and intentions to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, they warned policymakers during the summer of 2001 that the threat of terrorist attacks was real and serious. Such performance was the result of significant measures by the Directorate of Intelligence to enhance our analytical capabilities assigned to this target.

[REDACTED] After the East Africa bombings in 1998, Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida were the target against which we arrayed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Each analyst was responsible for the full range of tactical and strategic work, each bearing responsibility for supporting senior policymakers, operations, long-term research, current intelligence, briefings, targeting, and more. In reality, however, most analysts were consumed by tactical work. We needed to get the right balance between strategic and tactical analytical work by giving more effort to strategic analytic issues.

- CIA therefore created a Strategic Analytic Unit in July 2001 to fix this problem [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Unit allowed us to isolate the analysts assigned to it from the grind of daily crises to focus on the bigger picture.

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- In addition, during 2000 and 2001, we engaged in a full-scale effort to push our analysis into the broadest possible circulation [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Many of these steps contributed to our analysts' warning during the summer of 2001 that Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida were engaged in intensive operational planning and preparations against US interests. We documented the increased threat in current intelligence products such as the President's Daily Brief (PDB) and the SEIB, citing plots in the Arabian Peninsula and Europe. Four current intelligence pieces particularly stand out.

- On June 29, 2001, our analysts published a piece in the SEIB entitled "Terrorism: Bin Ladin Threats Are Real" which concluded that recent indications of near-term attacks were not part of a disinformation campaign, but were consistent with other reporting and public statements by Bin Ladin.
- A June 30 SEIB article entitled "Bin Ladin Plans High Profile Attacks," [REDACTED] al-Qa'ida operatives expected their next round of attacks to have dramatic consequences.
- Another SEIB article, on July 25, noted that, although one Bin Ladin attack had been delayed for a few months, preparations for other, near-term attacks were still underway.
- A SEIB article on August 7, 2001, "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US," underscored Bin Ladin's desire to conduct terrorist attacks in the US homeland. It noted that the Millennium plot to bomb the Los Angeles airport might have been Bin Ladin's first serious attempt to strike in the United States. It pointed out that al-Qa'ida members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks.

[REDACTED] The interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, through CTC's Community Counterterrorism Board, also issued several threat advisories during the summer of 2001. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition to the analytic effort done in CTC, analysts from across CIA's Directorate of Intelligence contributed to the counterterrorism mission by doing specialized work on topics such as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the financial flows that enable terrorism [REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]**Covert Action****Authorities**

[REDACTED] By 1998, the IC knew that in Bin Ladin we were dealing with more than a "terrorist financier" and that in al-Qa'ida we were dealing with a sophisticated and determined global terrorist organization that represented a serious threat to the security of Americans at home and abroad. As such, the CIA's strategy against this threat became emphatically offensive.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Memoranda of Notification (MONs) signed by the President during the 1990s escalated over time the scope and intensity of covert activity against al-Qa'ida but also set boundaries around what the Agency could and could not do. Indeed, although these MONs provided broad authorities to render Bin Ladin, they also gave rise to persistent concerns within the Agency about the legal and

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procedural limits they placed

[redacted]

- A December 24, 1998 MON for the first time authorized the use of lethal force in offensive operations designed to capture Bin Ladin [redacted] spelled out the parameters within which lethal force would be authorized, restrictions [redacted] remained in force in all subsequent MONS [redacted]

[redacted] authorities being approved were in keeping with Executive Order 12553; and that any forceful measures did not constitute assassination but were legal under the US definition of self-defense. Their implementation also was subject to constraints regarding the risks for collateral damage [redacted]

- A MON of February [redacted] 1999 authorized the CIA to work with the Afghan Northern Alliance commander Masood against UBL [redacted]

[redacted]

- A December [redacted] 1999 MON [redacted]

[redacted]

Operations

[redacted] Armed with these specific authorities, constraints, and guidelines, the CIA between 1998 and September 11 pursued a multi-track approach to

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bring Bin Ladin to justice and destroy al-Qa'ida. It involved building up our HUMINT and technical collection capabilities, working with foreign liaison services and friendly local groups—including Northern Alliance commander Masood [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Operational planning for a capture and rendition operation of Bin Ladin [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] May 1998 an operational plan to use a friendly local tribal group in Afghanistan to capture Bin Ladin and turn him over to US officials.

- The operational proposals were discussed with the White House in May 1998. The plan also was discussed with other principals, but CIA did not formally submit the plan for approval because we assessed the chances for success as low.
- During the same general time frame, [REDACTED] Prince Turki, the Saudi Director of General Intelligence, to [REDACTED] pressure the Taliban to expel or deport Bin Ladin.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In the end, this initiative did not pan out, but given the potential loss of life involved in other plans, we chose to await its outcome.

[REDACTED] In the wake of the East Africa bombings three months later, a similar plan to use the friendly tribal group to capture Bin Ladin was forwarded to and approved by the President in the form of the August 1998 MON. Its authorities, as noted earlier, were expanded in subsequent MONs. The following actions were initiated under this authority:


- September 1998 - Afghan tribal assets initiated a search and rendition operation in their area of influence. Efforts by this group continued until 11 Sep 2001 without significant results. On 9 Aug 2000, an ambush operation was reportedly launched against a convoy in which UBL was a passenger; it was unsuccessful. We have been unable to confirm that this operation actually took place.

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED] In addition to the unilateral efforts then underway [REDACTED] also enlisted for capture and rendition operations against UBL. While [REDACTED]

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
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an exchange to develop a plan for the capture and rendition of Usama Bin Ladin. The main resource to be used in this plan was a group of Afghan tribal assets




provided several options to capture and render UBL including the ambush of a convoy in which UBL was a passenger or an assault on the compound being used by UBL near Kandahar. A MON authorizing action to capture and render UBL was signed on August 1998.



Final details for the effort were completed by September

1998.



continued to monitor his activities in an effort to launch a capture operation. This activity continued for several months with no results.

On December 24, 1998, the Afghan group was told that, under new guidelines just received, they were only authorized to use lethal force in the context of a capture operation, if the opportunity arose, contingent on a determination

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that a successful operation to capture was not feasible. Following receipt of this new directive, the group developed new plans [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had launched an ambush against a convoy of vehicles in which UBL was believed to be a passenger. The ambush was terminated when the attackers heard the voices of women and children. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We have been unable to confirm that this operation actually took place. Although the group continued monitoring the activities of UBL until the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks, they were unable to execute a successful operation to capture UBL.

[REDACTED] The principal reason for the inability to execute the capture and render operation was the absence of timely and accurate intelligence on the plans, intentions, and travel of UBL [REDACTED] throughout the operational period. UBL was absent, for extended periods of time, from the area in [REDACTED] Heavy security for UBL also had an adverse impact on efforts by the indigenous group to launch an operation throughout the operational period. Various questions on the reporting accuracy of the indigenous group also surfaced during the course of this operation. Most of the questions were never answered satisfactorily. This created major difficulties in making decisions regarding proposed operations based solely on reporting from this group.

Executing The Plan

[REDACTED] In the spring of 1999 CIA began to put in place the elements of its operational strategy, "The Plan." At the time of the Plan's creation, CIA already had made a significant impact on the al Qa'ida organization and its affiliates.

- By the spring of 1999, CIA [REDACTED] had

[REDACTED] terrorist cells in Albania, Azerbaijan and [REDACTED] stopped at least two probable attacks against US interests in Albania and in the Persian Gulf region. In addition, these operations created disruptions in the regional and international terrorist infrastructure al-Qa'ida was attempting to build in those countries and the region, and we believe created doubts in al Qa'ida's perceptions about its ability to organize and operate with impunity.

- This activity was in addition to efforts to bring the perpetrators of the East Africa embassy bombings to justice. CIA operations sent the message that the United States was not only going after al Qa'ida for crimes it had already committed but also seeking out, breaking up, and rendering to justice terrorists engaged in planning future attacks wherever we could find them.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There was an important, yet unintended, consequence of our activity against the al-Qa'ida target prior to our development of the Plan that deepened the challenge of identifying and stopping the terrorists' activities. They increased their security practices, not only for physically guarding Bin Ladin himself and his senior lieutenants, but also for compartmenting terrorist operations.

- Persistent publicity and leaks of information about our methods in the United States and abroad caused the terrorists to [REDACTED] emphasize their compartmentation, and recruit individuals for operations who had never attracted any kind of attention [REDACTED]
- Thus, paradoxically, our successes against the terrorists made it harder to break up their future operations.

[REDACTED] The Plan was thus intended to regain the initiative through a wide range of operational activities to identify, locate, and render to justice Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants [REDACTED] We understood that such an approach would require the development of the right type of officer [REDACTED]

- We knew there were insufficient case officers in CTC. [REDACTED] we started to homebase Clandestine Service Trainees in CTC. In the meantime, we moved to encourage quality officers from line divisions and other directorates to rotate to CTC Headquarters and overseas slots, directly hired officers with special [REDACTED] skills, and fully developed and cross trained CTC homebased officers in all categories.

- We augmented our training program considerably [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] understood that we needed to maintain and reinforce where necessary already-strong liaison relationships [REDACTED]

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
[redacted] Our revamped approach began to pay big dividends towards the end of 1999 and continuing on in 2000.

[redacted]

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get access to him, and tried to convince the Taliban regime that Bin Ladin was a liability to them.




[redacted]

It should be kept in mind that CIA efforts to get to Bin Ladin and his people in Afghanistan took place against a backdrop of a worldwide effort against

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al-Qa'ida. We cooperated with foreign liaison services throughout the world to break up a number of specific terrorist plots.



The Kuala Lumpur Meeting

[redacted] It was during the December 1999-January 2000 pre- and post-Millennium period that two of the September 11 hijackers—Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi—came across our screen, which has raised the question of how we were able to identify them but not uncover the plot they were part of. CIA, in fact, did some things on

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this case superbly while others revealed flaws in our approach that we subsequently addressed.

[REDACTED] Turning first to how we were able to identify al-Mindhar and al-Hazmi,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] from

[REDACTED] about the travel of possible Bin Ladin operatives to Malaysia. As a consequence [REDACTED] surveillance [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] concerned that the suspects were traveling to Malaysia to support regional terrorist plans or operations.

[REDACTED] The results of these efforts meant that we knew Khalid al-Mihdhar's true name by early January 2000 and Nawaf al-Hazmi's by early March 2000. These two dates, respectively, were our first opportunities to watch list them. We had another opportunity to do so in December 2000, when we were able to link one of the Cole bombing suspects as a participant in the Kuala Lumpur meeting. In August 2001, as a result of increasing concern about an al Qa'ida attack in the US, we reviewed our holdings and on August 23, 2001, sent [REDACTED] to the Department of State, FBI, INS, and other US Government agencies requesting that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar be entered into [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TIPOFF [REDACTED] be watch listed immediately and denied entry into the US.

[REDACTED] The fact that we did not recommend either of them for watch listing in March or December 2000 is not attributable to a single point failure. Rather, it demonstrated that a whole new system was needed, not just a fix at a single point.

Ramadan 2000 Plans Disrupted

[REDACTED] While we did not prevent the attack on the USS Cole, we were able, during the Ramadan period in the autumn of 2000, to break up terrorist cells planning other attacks against US and foreign military and civilian targets in the Persian Gulf region. These operations disrupted al-Qa'ida plans for terrorist attacks during Ramadan [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

Attempting to Capture Bin Ladin

[Redacted] Let us now turn to our specific activities in the Afghanistan sanctuary to capture and render Bin Ladin.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] None of the available potential capture units were judged to have more than a ten percent chance of capturing Bin Ladin.

- [Redacted] fehan tribal group [Redacted] was judged to be unlikely to successfully attack a heavily guarded Bin Ladin.

[Redacted]


- Masood had to be engaged to help in the attempt to capture Bin Ladin, but with the understanding that he would be his own man, never an agent or surrogate of the US Government, and would help if his interests intersected with those of the United States. Even if he agreed to do so, his chances of success against the Taliban were judged to be less than five percent.

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[REDACTED] By late 1999, CIA realized that our chances to accomplish the aims of the US Government regarding Bin Ladin by using the options described above—local Afghan tribes, Masood, and neighboring liaison services—were extremely poor.

- Consequently, we needed a new initiative.

The Predator Initiative

[REDACTED] After consulting with the Defense Department and others, the CIA began advocating the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Afghanistan for reconnaissance purposes in the spring of 2000.

- The idea of using UAVs in Afghanistan originated in April 2000 as a result of a request from the NSC's Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the CIA and the Department of Defense to come up with new ideas to go after the terrorists in Afghanistan.
- In response, the Assistant DCI for Collection, the Assistant DCI for Military Support, and the Director of Military Operations (J-3) at the Pentagon agreed that Predator UAV reconnaissance flights could be a useful source of actionable intelligence of on-the-ground terrorist activity in Afghanistan.

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[redacted]

[redacted] The decision to recommend to the NSC that CIA and the other agencies supporting the program be allowed to proceed with Predator testing and operations was made in late May 2000. The decision came only after considerable deliberations and debate at CIA about the Predator's utility as a collection platform, the manner in which the aircraft should be used, and the risks involved.

[redacted]

mid-August 2000, the program was well on track and progressing rapidly.

- Testing began [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] able to conduct the first Predator mission over Afghanistan [redacted] September 7, 2000.

[redacted]

- The Taliban unsuccessfully scrambled a Mig-21 during [redacted] and some in CIA expressed concern that the aircraft was vulnerable to detection [redacted] Such concern intensified after the US Air Force notified CIA that it would have to pay for lost aircraft.

[redacted] the UAV had completed 10 missions with varying degrees of success.

[redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is important to note that at this time CIA and the policy community saw the objectives of the Predator program as two-fold: giving the United States "eyes on the target" capability and collecting intelligence [REDACTED]

- Twice in the fall of 2000, the Predator observed an individual most likely to be Bin Ladin; however, we had no way at the time to react to this information.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] Planning began for a 2001

deployment, and counterterrorism officials discussed the possibility of capitalizing on an Air Force program to weaponize the Predator by adapting it to carry and fire Hellfire missiles.

- CIA recognized that significant issues would need to be resolved to implement the program. [REDACTED]

- CIA leadership from the beginning felt it important that there was a full understanding by the President and the National Security Council of the capabilities of the armed Predator and the implications of its use.

[REDACTED] The decision to advocate arming the Predator followed considerable debate within the Agency.

- Some contended that the potential risks involved in deploying an armed aircraft exceeded the potential intelligence return or operational advantages, while others argued that the opportunity to strike at Bin Ladin, if he could be located, would outweigh the risks involved in an aircraft being shot down over Afghanistan.

[REDACTED] Another debate centered on whether reconnaissance only flights should be conducted while the weaponized capability was being engineered and policy and legal questions were being resolved.

- Some maintained that flying the Predator for reconnaissance purposes produced high-quality imagery intelligence and insights [REDACTED] that could not be obtained otherwise.
- Others posed what eventually became the Agency's position: that continued use of the UAV for reconnaissance only could reveal to al-Qa'ida and the Taliban the areas in Afghanistan in which the United States was particularly interested and possibly result in shooting one down. Either premature

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discovery or loss would reduce the chances of success if policymakers later decided to use the weaponized aircraft.

[REDACTED] Liability for lost Predators and developing a command and control arrangement also emerged as important issues.

- Neither DoD nor CIA wanted to assume the cost of lost UAVs. While we finally agreed to split the cost evenly, the question was still in negotiation [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] It is important to emphasize, however, that this issue, while contentious, did not slow down the program. We continued to work all the preparations for deployment, including resolving several technical problems with the missile, with the full expectation that the funding question would eventually be resolved.

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] September 4. As a result, CIA was authorized [REDACTED] [REDACTED] reconnaissance purposes only.

Continued Warning

[REDACTED] The leadership of the Agency repeatedly warned the policy community in the Executive Branch and the Congress of the seriousness of the threat.

- During the Millennium threat in late 1999, we told the President to expect between 5 to 15 terrorist attacks against American interests both here and overseas.
- In spring and summer of 2001, we sought every opportunity to vehemently express our concern about the high level of threat, and we launched the massive program of disruption described above.
- We placed the Bin Ladin threat prominently in every single annual testimony to the appropriate Congressional Committees on the Worldwide Threat since 1998. In the 1999 testimony, for example, the DCI stated that, "There is not the slightest doubt that Bin Ladin is planning attacks against us. He will strike

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anywhere in the world he thinks we are vulnerable...and I must tell you we are concerned [these strikes] can occur at any time." We also warned about the growing likelihood of an unconventional CBRN attack in the United States homeland and elsewhere.

[REDACTED] threat from al-Qa'ida was "an immediate and pressing concern." And that, "Despite [our] successes, there are limits to what we can do. We will generally not have specific time and place warning of terrorist attacks... The result... is that I consider it likely that over the next year or so that there will be an attempted terrorist attack against US interests."

- During the week of July 2, 2001, the DCI contacted by phone approximately 13 of his foreign liaison counterparts to urge them to redouble their efforts against al-Qa'ida. The chief of the Counterterrorist Center, the chief of Near East Division, and others made additional urgent calls. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The DCI's concern about the al-Qa'ida threat was such that he sent a memo to the top leaders of the CIA on December 4, 1998 stating the following:

- "We must now enter a new phase in our effort against Bin Ladin. Our work to date has been remarkable and in some instances heroic, yet each day we all acknowledge that retaliation is inevitable and that its scope may be far larger than we have previously experienced. We must redouble our efforts against Bin Ladin himself, his infrastructure, followers, finances, etc. with a sense of enormous urgency. We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community."

[REDACTED] Even with the intense focus on terrorism in general and Bin Ladin in particular, the Intelligence Community had to deal with several other major challenges that demanded the highest attention.

- Some issues were themselves closely linked to terrorism, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the danger that some terrorist group would acquire such weapons. In this regard, we have worked extensively—both operationally and analytically—on the danger of rogue elements [REDACTED] helping terrorists gain access to these weapons.
- Throughout the 1990s and beyond, we were intensely engaged in supporting US policy and our military forces [REDACTED]

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[redacted] High priority issues had resource consequences for collection, operations, and analysis. And some of these issues required increased tasking of collection assets that were in direct competition with our efforts on terrorism.

[redacted]

Summary of CIA's Collection Posture Against UBL's Sanctuary

[redacted] By September 2001 our intelligence collection posture in Afghanistan covered a wide array of capabilities that could help bring about CIA's strategy against Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida.

[redacted]

[redacted] Following UBL's departure from Sudan in the spring of 1996, we had intelligence operations targeting his Afghanistan presence [redacted]

[redacted]

By spring 1998 we had opened contact with the Northern Alliance's Commander Masood and the UISFA [redacted]



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[redacted] The period following the DCI's December 4, 1998 declaration of war memo saw a continued buildup [redacted]


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Our efforts against al-Qa'ida over nearly a decade, and particularly our actions to penetrate the Taliban sanctuary, laid the groundwork for our rapid response to the September 11 attacks. This, in conjunction with our close coordination with the Department of Defense, was a major factor in the US Government's ability to defeat the Taliban and drive out al-Qa'ida from its Afghan redoubts with minimal casualties.



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[REDACTED] During the IC's nearly decade-long war with Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida prior to September 11 we learned enormously about the threat—their intentions, their methods, their tactics, their determination, their strengths, and their vulnerabilities.

- We used this knowledge to improve our operations, to exploit every opportunity to collect information on the threat, and to gauge the risks and costs of what it would take to defeat the enemy.
- We also used it to provide strategic warning that al-Qa'ida was the number one threat to the security of Americans and that a major attack against US interests, possibly including even the US homeland, was coming. We succeeded in giving the policymaker a good appreciation of the increasing danger the US faced from the terrorists.

[REDACTED] Al-Qa'ida's extreme security measures, compartmentation, and sophisticated tradecraft, as well as their sanctuary in Afghanistan, prevented us from obtaining the detailed information required to provide tactical warning of the major attacks against our embassies in East Africa, of the bombing of the USS Cole, and of the tragedies of September 11.

- In each of these cases, we saw the smoke but could not see the flames directly.

[REDACTED] When we talk about results, it is natural to focus on those instances when terrorist operations succeed by making horrific headlines. Seldom do we discuss the headlines that might have been were it not for disruptions by the heroic efforts of our intelligence and law enforcement officers.

- Examples of those headlines would include: "Hundreds killed during Millennium terror attacks"

[REDACTED]
to name a few where we know plots were successfully disrupted.

[REDACTED] The IC's war with al-Qa'ida taught us a few ingredients that boost the prospects for success:

- The various INTs working together produce better results.
- Close cooperation with friendly liaison services is essential.
- Aggressively tracking down all leads increases the chances for disruption.
- Finally, good luck helps.

[REDACTED] Our success in thwarting the plot [REDACTED] US Embassy in Tirana is an excellent example [REDACTED]

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[redacted]

[redacted] Our actions during the Millennium, when, as already related, we launched a massive worldwide effort that led to the arrest of many terrorists and the breakup of cells overseas, showed the importance of close cooperation with foreign liaison friends.

[redacted]

- There were no attacks, and we probably saved thousands of lives.

[redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted] With the increase in Ramadan-related threat reporting in November-December 2000, CIA worked with [redacted] to detect and preempt attacks.

[redacted]

[redacted] In the spring and summer 2001, we launched another massive disruption effort in response to the increase in terrorist operational activity and indicators of imminent attacks. Our actions stopped several attacks and probably caused terrorists to postpone others. For example

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The IC also was at war with other terrorist groups, not just al-Qa'ida. And we scored successes on those fronts too.

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]**Impact of September 11**

[REDACTED] The tragedies of September 11 did what the Intelligence Community's loud and incessant warnings could not do. They galvanized the attention and ended the inhibitions of the US Government; they galvanized and enraged the American people into action; and they galvanized foreign governments to take strong measures against terrorism.

- We, together with our allies, used our military power to clean out the terrorist den that Afghanistan had become.
- We are spending billions of dollars in addressing lax security measures around our nation's transportation infrastructure, particularly airports.
- We are implementing vastly increased security measures around our energy and industrial infrastructure.
- We are revamping the process surrounding the administration of foreign student visas and developing the kinds of information flows to keep track of foreign visitors.

[REDACTED] We have significantly expanded the authorities and resources of the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities to target the terrorist threat.

- The USA Patriot Act of 2001, among other things, removed legal impediments to the ability of law enforcement agencies to share with CIA

- [REDACTED]
- Because of the strong support we have received from these Committees and the Congress, we have significantly increased the funding and security, logistics, technology, and communications support to our counterterrorism objectives.

- These new resources have buttressed our pre-September 11 initiatives to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] None of these authorities, resources, and measures would have been likely without the traumatic impact of September 11. There is now a whole new approach to the issue of homeland security.

- This country's infrastructure was absolutely unprotected, and we have been helping the President's Homeland Security Coordinator Tom Ridge think through how to protect it.

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- The attacks changed all the rules—perhaps forever.

The War with Terrorism: A Look Ahead

[REDACTED] The war with international terrorism continues, and the fight will be long and difficult.

- It will require the patience and diligence that the President has asked for.
- It will require resources—sustained over a multi-year period—to re-capitalize our intelligence infrastructure at a pace that matches the changing technical and operational environment we face.
- It will also require countries that have previously ignored the problem of terrorism or refused to cooperate with us to step up and choose sides.
- It will require even closer sharing of information between intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

[REDACTED] And despite all our efforts, another major terrorist attack is not just possible, but likely.

- Our effectiveness has increased since September 11, and the Intelligence Community will continue to be riveted to an offensive strategy of bringing that war to the terrorists. But, in the counterterrorism business there is no such thing as 100 percent success, and there never will be.

- [REDACTED]
- A 1.000 batting average would mean the complete absence of terrorism, which would be extraordinary and unprecedented.

[REDACTED] As we look ahead in this war with terrorism, and Congress tries to legislate effective measures against the threat, significant questions arise about security and freedom, safety and privacy, which call for extensive public debate and careful consideration by Congress. Terrorists have learned to exploit the vulnerabilities inherent in a free, open, and democratic society like ours.

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- The 19 hijackers of September 11 moved freely in this country, operating in a manner that gave our law enforcement colleagues no probable cause to pursue.

[redacted]

- They used the international banking system to freely transfer funds and finance their activities.

[redacted] The war, therefore, will need to be pursued not just abroad but also at home, and success or failure will have to be defined in terms of the overall national effort.

- As the President's National Security Advisor Dr. Rice pointed out early in 2002, one of the lessons of September 11 involves "an end to innocence about international politics and our own vulnerability," and that the terrorist attacks "underscored the idea that sound foreign policy begins at home."

Where We Are in the Fight Against Terrorism

[redacted] Over the past year we have made substantial progress in attacking the al-Qa'ida target. We have focused on the al-Qa'ida leadership and on neutralizing worldwide al-Qa'ida cells.

[redacted]

[redacted]


[redacted] While these successes have disrupted al-Qa'ida command and control, nevertheless, al-Qa'ida retains a capacity to mount destructive attacks

[redacted]

[redacted]


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


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


Counterterrorist Strategy for the Coming Year




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