

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Meeting of the National Security Council

DATE: August 5, 1990  
LOCATION: Cabinet Room  
TIME: 5:00 - 6:30 pm

P  
B1  
1.5(c)(d)

SUBJECT: Minutes of NSC Meeting on Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

State  
Secretary Baker

White House  
The President  
The Vice President  
Governor Sununu  
Brent Scowcroft  
Marlin Fitzwater

Treasury  
Secretary Brady

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 12958  
JGP, 5/9/00  
Case No. 98-00991-F

DOD  
Donald Atwood

NSC  
Richard Haass

CIA  
Director Webster

[Redacted]

1.5C

JCS  
General Powell

DOWNGRADED FROM  
TOP SECRET TO SECRET  
JGP, 6/15/99

The President: The original reason for this meeting was to discuss covert options but there are also some other things now. (S)

Director Webster: [Redacted]

1.5C

The President: Why did you make this last comment? (C)

Director Webster: [Redacted]

B1  
1.5(d)

General Powell: There is not factual disagreement between CIA and DIA but DIA leans less forward in its assessment. (S)

General Scowcroft: Are you two comparing what you see now with what we saw that week? (C)

Director Webster: [REDACTED]

1.5C

General Powell: [REDACTED]

1.5d

Secretary Baker: INR agrees with DIA about the key missing pieces of intelligence. (S)

General Powell: We would need to see more missiles, logistics, and tanks to conclude an invasion is imminent. (S)

Director Webster: [REDACTED]

1.5C

Governor Sununu: Can we reposition satellites to improve coverage? (S)

Director Webster: [REDACTED]

1.5C

General Scowcroft: Bill, would you please say a few things about [REDACTED]

1.5d

Director Webster: [REDACTED]

1.5C,d

General Scowcroft: I suggest we have a small group evaluate this. (C)

The Vice President: Were we ever able to confirm that Saddam killed 120 officers? (S)

Director Webster: [REDACTED] and Saddam is afraid [REDACTED]

1.5d

General Scowcroft: As for diplomacy, the president has been very active and gotten good support from the allies, the G-7, and Japan, [REDACTED]

1.5d

General Scowcroft: We need to talk to the Italians given their EC role. (C)

General Scowcroft: We had a major discussion with the Saudis regarding starting to move our force deployments. The [REDACTED] have accepted Cheney going over with the presumption that we are not talking about "if" but "how", "types", etc. This was a major breakthrough if we can continue. We contacted Woerner about NATO's providing support for Turkey in closing their pipeline. He is enthusiastic and will be here tomorrow, as will Mrs. Thatcher. Another major element in getting Ozal to act would be by getting Chapter 7 in the Security Council.

1.5d

Secretary Baker: The Perm 5 met this morning. The US, UK and France strongly favor. The Soviets were uninstructed. I will call Schevardnadze first thing in the morning. China is leaning forward but it is still hesitant. They claim to be impressed by King Hussein's support for Iraq. Tom Pickering will table a resolution and try to get a vote on Monday. We have a problem adding language about a multi-national force. We think this would be premature. We have the potential here for effective sanctions. I also think you should call the Yemeni President. (S)

The President: [REDACTED]

B1, 1.5(d)

Director Webster: [REDACTED]

B1  
1.5(c)

Secretary Baker: In the Security Council, Cuba and Yemen will vote against us, but the other 5 non-aligned will support us. (S)

The President: This is very important to Ozal. By the way, what goes to Iraq from Aqaba? (C)

Director Webster: [REDACTED]

1.5c

Secretary Brady: Word is coming back to us that all Iraqi accounts should be settled by using Jordan. (S)

General Scowcroft: Let's turn to military questions. (C)

General Powell: Regarding naval forces, the Independence battle group will be in position Tuesday and ready to conduct operations. The Eisenhower battle group is moving East in the Mediterranean and could be in the Red Sea in a few days. This

will require Egyptian clearance for NPW transit. Air forces are the most flexible. They can leave the US 16 hours after receiving a "go". 66 hours from "go" they can begin operations in the region. The first aircraft could actually arrive in 24 hours. Also I can land Navy planes in Saudi Arabia in one day if all we want is some presence. As for ground forces, light forces can get there in a few days. But heavy forces would take 3 weeks to a month to arrive. Depending upon what we hear from Dick Cheney we can start moving naval air and light forces right away. We can also give the Saudis the additional F-15s we are holding. (S)

Brent Scowcroft: Now is the time to get the Saudis everything we have. (S)

Secretary Baker: Absolutely. Do we want the cable to go out asking other countries permission to come in or should we wait and see? (S)

General Powell: We should wait for Dick. (U)

Secretary Baker: Do we still need other countries in the area if Saudi Arabia says yes? (S)

General Powell: Yes. We also have a request from the UAE for E2-C support. (S)

Director Webster: [REDACTED]

1.5C

Secretary Baker: I don't see what we could lose by sending this cable now. (S)

General Scowcroft: I doubt we will get an answer without the Saudis agreeing. (S)

Secretary Baker: OK. We will hold off sending the cable. (S)

General Scowcroft: The President had a good question. We need to give Arabs the information about what Iraq is up to. (S)

The President: My sense is that Iraq does not believe we will act. Saddam is riding an emotional high. Maybe if he sees it is not business as usual he will change. (S)

B1  
1.5(d)

The President: Is there any military analysis that explains Saudi reluctance? (C)

General Powell: [REDACTED]

B1, 1.5C

Secretary Baker: We need to get the intelligence out as publicly as possible. It should go to all the NATO countries, the Arabs, Israel and members of the UN Security Council. We should also make a statement about our concern over the reports that Iraq is moving significant forces. (S)

The President: Is there any evidence of Iraqi withdrawal? (C)

Secretary Baker: Nothing significant. (C)

General Powell: We need to supplement our satellites with U2 flights. (S)

Secretary Brady: Why not get someone to talk to Saddam? Possibly Mitterrand. (C)

The President: What would he say? (C)

Secretary Brady: Why don't we try to buy some time? (C)

General Scowcroft: We don't want to appear to be negotiating. (C)

Secretary Baker: We could lose any momentum with the Arabs. (S)

The President: Our solidarity would crumble if we are seen talking to Saddam. (S)

Secretary Baker: Should we ask the Soviets to weigh in? (S)

General Scowcroft: We don't want to ask the Soviets. It would send a bad signal. (S)

Governor Sununu: This could slow things down. (S)

General Scowcroft: I am not sure we want to slow things down. (S)

The President: This is a Catch 22. If he slows down, our side will slow down as well. (S)

Secretary Baker: The only thing that will influence Saddam is our deterrent. (S)

General Powell: Even after he is in Saudi Arabia we could kick him out. (S)

Secretary Brady: Are you assuming that he will invade? (S)

General Scowcroft: We want to deter him from invading and protect Saudi Arabia so when we begin to clamp down economically, Saddam has no military option. (S)

Secretary Baker: So everyone agrees we want to spread out our intelligence? (S)

The President: I am interested in the ability of our F-16s to destroy his tanks. Knocking them out would send a strong signal. Why was it so easy for Israel to clear out Syrian SAMs in Lebanon? (S)

The Vice President: They used drones. (C)

The President: Can we do this? (U)

General Powell: Yes. They were using U.S.-made equipment and we can do it too. (S)

Secretary Baker: On another question, the British propose we send our Ambassadors back to Baghdad. (S)

The President: Didn't I hear something that our people in our embassies are being threatened? Should we maybe pull out of Iraq rather than sending back our Ambassador? Saddam is irrational. (S)

Secretary Baker: We have talked about a drawdown in Kuwait. Maybe we ought to consider doing the same in Iraq. (S)

The President: These questions need more study. I'm worried if we put forces in Saudi Arabia Saddam might grab our people. (S)

General Scowcroft: I will call the congressional leadership about the Cheney trip. (U)

The President: What we have got to do is get Chapter 7 sanctions and convince Saudi Arabia and Turkey to close the pipelines while we cut off the Gulf. We also need to take a look at Aqaba. Ozal will help if he senses solidarity. I was impressed by the military briefing I heard. It is good that Cheney is on his way. Also the diplomatic strategy is going well. The Soviets seem to be on board. We are not in too bad shape

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1.59

General Powell: The problem goes beyond the embassies. We are talking about thousands of Americans. (S)

The President: We are dealing with a mad-man who has shown he will kill. (S)

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7

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Governor Sununu: Is there any plan for protecting our embassy in Iraq? (S)

General Powell: No. There is no "Desert 1" solution. (S)

The President: If they move against our people it would be so overt that it would rally everyone. (S)

Marlin Fitzwater: Do we want to issue a statement? (S)

Secretary Baker: Why don't we wait until we see the 5AM intelligence. (S)

END OF MEETING

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