



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

Declassified Case: NW# 56093 Date
08-01-2019

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EXDIS

FOL TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM ISLAMABAD DTD 04 JUNE 1976
QTE

ISLAMABAD 5737

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PK, US, PARM
SUBJECT: BHUTTO AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ISSUE
1. MONDAY NIGHT AT DINNER BHUTTO ASKED ME ABOUT THE SYMINGTON
AMENDMENT ON NUCLEAR MATTERS. I TOLD HIM IT WAS VAGUELY WORDED,
THAT I WAS NOT CERTAIN AS YET HOW IT WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IF
ADOPTED, AND THAT I DID NOT EVEN KNOW THE PROBABILITY OF ITS
ADOPTION. WE THEN HAD A VERY FRANK AND LENGTHY TALK ON THE
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ISSUE WHICH MUST HAVE LASTED NEARLY TWO
HOURS. DURING ITS COURSE I CARRIED OUT MY INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED
IN STATE 123889 REGARDING OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SHAH. I DID SO
ONLY IN PASSING, HOWEVER, SINCE THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE WORDED IN
SUCH NARROW AND CONFINEZ LANGUAGE AS TO BE MISLEADING, IF NOT
DOWNRIGHT INSULTING. BHUTTO DID NOT ASK WHAT THE SHAH'S REACTION
HAD BEEN AND I WAS RELIEVED, AND PARTICULARLY SO BECAUSE OF
MRS. BHUTTO'S PRESENCE.

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2. IN APPROACHING THE NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE, I THOUGHT THE BEST TACTIC WOULD BE TO TRY TO PLAY THE ROLE OF A PERSONAL FRIEND IN PERSUADING HIM THAT IN MOVING TO ACQUIRE SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AT THIS TIME HE IS UNWISELY ON A HIGH RISK COURSE WHICH IS NOT WORTH THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IT COULD INVOLVE. WHAT I WAS TRYING TO DO, OF COURSE, WAS TO REINFORCE THE THINKING SPELLED OUT IN THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 19 LETTER TO BHUTTO.

3. IN THE DISCUSSION, I STRESSED THE INCREASING CONCERN IN AMERICA OVER THE PROLIFERATION ISSUE, SAYING THAT IT WENT BEYOND OUR EXECUTIVE BRANCH, OR FOR THAT MATTER EVEN OUR CONGRESS, AND WAS BECOMING MORE AND MORE OF A PUBLIC ISSUE. THERE WAS EVEN A GROWING UNEASINESS IN AMERICA OVER THE HAZARDS OF NUCLEAR POWER ITSELF. EVEN PROBLEMS LIKE DISPOSITION OF WASTE MATERIALS, PREVIOUSLY RECOGNIZED, FOR THE MOST PART ONLY BY GROUPS OF SCIENTISTS, WERE NOW UNDER INCREASING DISCUSSION. I SAID WHATEVER THE PATE OF THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT, IT MIGHT ONLY BE THE FIRST OF CONTINUED RESTRICTIVE EFFORTS BY OUR CONGRESS IN THIS GENERAL FIELD. I SAID I THOUGHT IT QUITE POSSIBLE THAT AS A RESULT AMERICAN FIRMS MIGHT END UP EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDED FROM COMPETING WITH FIRMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES IN EFFORTS TO EXPAND EXPORTS OF THEIR TECHNOLOGY.

4. BHUTTO ASKED IF I COULD FORESEE A SITUATION IN WHICH OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS, OUTSIDE OF THE NUCLEAR AREA, COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED. I TOLD HIM I GREATLY FEARED SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. HE ASKED IF IT WOULD AFFECT THE SALE OF CONVENTIONAL MILITARY WEAPONS. I TOLD HIM I FELT THAT IT COULD BECOME BROAD ENOUGH TO AFFECT NEARLY EVERYTHING WE WERE TRYING TO DO TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAKISTAN AND STRENGTHEN ITS SECURITY. BHUTTO SAID THIS IN HIS OPINION WOULD BE MOST UNFAIR. INDIA HAD ACTUALLY EXPLODED A BOMB AND SUFFERED NO CONSEQUENCES WHATSOEVER. WE HAD EVEN PUT MONEY BACK IN OUR BUDGET FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AFTER THE EXPLOSION. TO PENALIZE PAKISTAN NOW, EVEN BEFORE FACILITIES WHICH WOULD NOT GO INTO PRODUCTION FOR A PERIOD OF MANY YEARS HAD EVEN BEEN STARTED, AND DESPITE HIS OWN PLEDGE NOT TO GO FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SIMPLY DID NOT SEEM JUST. I TOLD HIM THAT WHAT INDIA HAD DONE WAS ALREADY DONE. I THOUGHT THAT INDIA HAD ACHIEVED NO WORTHWHILE GAIN TO COUNTER-BALANCE THE ALMOST UNIVERSAL DAMAGE SHE HAD SUFFERED IN HER INTERNATIONAL STANDING FROM THE EXPLOSION. ANOTHER BY-PRODUCT OF HER MAY 1974 EXPLOSION HAD OF COURSE BEEN INCREASING CONCERN AMONG MANY NATIONS, AS WELL

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AS IN AMERICAN, ABOUT THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEM, IT WAS ONLY NATURAL THAT EYES WOULD NOW BE TURNED TOWARDS PAKISTAN IN VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE REGION AND THE KNOWN IMPACT IN PAKISTAN OF THE INDIAN EXPLOSION.

5. BY THIS TIME BHUTTO WAS IN QUITE A SERIOUS MOOD AND ASKED ME WHY IN THE WORLD WE HAD NOT EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN TO HIM AT AN EARLIER DATE. HE SAID PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER HAD ARRIVED ALMOST COINCIDENTALLY WITH THE ACTUAL SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT WITH THE FRANCH. HE SAID IT UPSET HIM GREATLY BUT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER HE DID NOT SEE WHAT HE COULD DO BY THAT TIME BUT GO AHEAD. HE SAID IF IT HAD ARRIVED EARLIER BEFORE HE HAD BECOME SO PUBLICLY COMMITTED HE WOULD HAVE WANTED TO GIVE IT EVERY POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION BEFORE HE MADE UP HIS MIND. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD ME AT THE TIME THAT HIS DECISION BY THAT TIME HAD BECOME IN FACT IRREVERSIBLE. HE SAID TO BACK DOWN NOW WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR HIM AS A POLITICAL LEADER AND WOULD LEAVE HIM "PROSTRATE."

6. BHUTTO CLEARLY WANTED TO KEEP THE CONVERSATION GOING, AS HE WAS SEARCHING FOR NEW IDEAS, AND DID NOT SEEM TO MIND TRYING TO EXPLAIN THE MOTIVATION FOR HIS DECISION. HE BRUSHED ASIDE ANY SUGGESTION THAT HE SAW TACTICAL ADVANTAGE VIS-A-VIS INDIA IN LEAVING HER IN DOUBT AS TO WHAT PAKISTAN MIGHT TRY TO DO IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD. HE SAID HIS MOTIVATION LAY IN TWO GENERAL AREAS. THE LESS IMPORTANT WAS THAT HE WAS TRYING TO BUILD A MODERN DEVELOPED PAKISTAN DURING HIS TENURE OF OFFICE AS ITS LEADER. HE, THEREFORE, WANTED PAKISTAN TO KEEP ABREAST OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, BOTH FOR ITS OWN SAKE AND FOR THE CONFIDENCE AND MORALE OF HIS PEOPLE. THIS LED TO THE MORE IMPORTANT REASON, WHICH HE SAID HAD DIRECTLY TO DO WITH THE MORALE OF THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE AS A WHOLE, EVEN INCLUDING THE ILLITERATES. HE DWELT AT SOME LENGTH ON THE GENERAL FEELING OF LACK OF SECURITY THAT TROUBLED PEOPLE HERE, WHICH WAS ENHANCED OF COURSE BY THE INDIAN EXPLOSION. IT WAS PART OF LEADERSHIP TO BUILD CONFIDENCE, AND HAVING THE PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN KNOW IN THEIR SITUATION THAT THEY HAD LEADERSHIP THAT COULD ENSURE THAT IT MATCH THE TECHNOLOGY OF OTHERS WAS A COMFORTING THING. HE SAID HE GUESSED HE SAW HIS DILEMMA OF TRYING TO WALK THE FINE LINE BETWEEN GIVING HIS OWN PEOPLE CONFIDENCE WITHOUT UNDULY WORRYING OTHERS PROBABLY MORE CLEARLY THAN HE HAD BEFORE. HE PRACTICALLY ASKED IF I COULD THINK OF A WAY OUT FOR HIM. I TOLD HIM HE WAS FAR BETTER AT THAT SORT OF THING THAN I.

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WHICH IS OF COURSE WHY HE WAS A PRIME MINISTER AND I WAS ONLY AN
AMBASSADOR.

7. I SAID I COULD VISUALIZE A SOLUTION IN THE LONG TERM, BUT
GIVEN THE IMMEDIACY OF THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE GOP DECISION TO
ACQUIRE SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY THIS MIGHT NOT PROVE FEASIBLE.
I SAID A SENSIBLE WORLD OF THE FUTURE WOULD SEE TRULY MULTILATER-
ALLY OPERATED, INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED REPROCESSING FACILITIES
TO CONVERT DANGEROUS WASTE INTO USABLE FUEL. THIS WAS, OF COURSE,
SOMETHING FAR DIFFERENT THAN TWO OR MORE USER COUNTRIES AGREEING
TO JOIN TOGETHER FOR FINANCIAL REASONS IN THE OPERATION OF A
SINGLE PLANT. I DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE WORLD WAS SOPHISTICATED
ENOUGH FOR LEADERS TO ACCEPT THIS TYPE OF SUPRANATIONAL ARRANGE-
MENT, BUT I WOULD GUESS PROBABLY NOT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. HE
WANTED TO EXPLORE THIS FURTHER, BUT I TOLD HIM FRANKLY I WAS OUT
OF MY ELEMENT AND DID NOT KNOW HOW FAR WASHINGTON THINKING
ITSELF HAD ADVANCED ALONG THESE LINES.

8. I HAVE NO DOUBT BUT THAT BHUTTO WILL GIVE SERIOUS THOUGHT TO
OUR CONVERSATION. WHAT HE CAN COME UP WITH I MUST SAY I DO NOT
KNOW. KNOWING HIS POLITICAL INSTINCTS, I CAN ACCEPT THAT HIS
PRIMARY MOTIVATION WAS TO GIVE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE (AND GET VOTES)
AND ENHANCE HIS IMAGE AS A STRONG LEADER OF THE NEW PAKISTAN. I
DON'T THINK HE RECKONED THAT HIS ACTION WOULD EVOKE SUCH A STRONG
RESPONSE FROM US. AFTER ALL, HE HAD SEEN INDIA ACTUALLY EXPLODE A
NUCLEAR DEVICE WITH VERY LITTLE RESPONSE FROM US (I AM NOT SUGG-
ESTING THAT WE COULD, IN FACT, HAVE DONE MUCH ABOUT IT). WE WERE,
OF COURSE, QUITE DELINQUENT IN NOT LETTING HIM KNOW OUR VIEWS IN
A MORE TIMELY FASHION. I AM FAMILIAR WITH THE REASONS GIVEN FOR OUR
DELAY IN MOVING UNTIL JUST BEFORE THE PAKS HAD SUCCESSFULLY
CONCLUDED THEIR LONG NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FRENCH, BUT THESE CAN
HARDLY BE USED PERSUASIVELY WITH THE GOP AND IT WOULD BE FOOLISH
TO TRY. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT THERE SHOULD BE A BETTER WASHINGTON-
MISSION RELATIONSHIP ON SUCH IMPORTANT MATTERS. EVEN I DID NOT
KNOW WHAT WE WERE PALMING TO DO UNTIL TWO DAYS BEFORE WE
STATED OUR POSITION AT THE IEAE IN VIENNA ON FEBRUARY 24.

9. AS I READ THE SIGNALS FROM WASHINGTON, THE QUESTION OF MILITARY
SUPPLY HAD ALREADY BECOME COMPLETELY INTERTWINED WITH THE NON-
PROLIFERATION ISSUE, WITH THE RESULT THAT FOR SALES OF MAJOR OR
SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT WE ARE AT LEAST TEMPORARILY BACK TO WHERE

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WE WERE BEFORE THE DISCRIMINATORY ARMS EMBARGO WAS LIFTED AFTER SO MUCH ABOMINATING CONSIDERATION IN FEBRUARY 1978. I TAKE IT THAT THE EMBARGO WAS IN FACT QUIETLY BEEN REIMPOSED. THIS CERTAINLY SEEMS TO BE THE REAL MESSAGE OF STATE 132262 WHICH TOLD US OF THE DELAY IN THE DECISION ON PAKISTAN NAVY INSPECTION OF TWO GEARING CLASS DESTROYERS, WHEN ACTION AS ESSENTIALLY NON-CONTROVERSIAL AS THE SALE OF A COUPLE OF OLD WORN-OUT DESTROYERS TO A HOPELESSLY OUTCLASSED NAVY FOR A FEW HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS EACH MUST BE HELD UP BECAUSE OF "STRONG EXECUTIVE BRANCH OPPOSITION" IT IS CLEAR THAT WE ARE AT A VIRTUAL STANDSTILL IN OUR MILITARY SALES RELATIONSHIP AT LEAST UNTIL WE WORK OUT A NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY TOWARD PAKISTAN.

10. I DO NOT WISH IN ANY WAY TO QUESTION THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE, BUT I DO SUBMIT THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ALONE AND IN ISOLATION FROM OTHER FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES. I WOULD ALSO ARGUE, AS I DID IN ISLAMABAD 3497, THAT THE "NEGATIVE LINKAGE APPROACH," WHICH SEEMS FORESHADOWED BY THE PRESENT STANDSTILL ON FURTHER MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH PAKISTAN, WILL FAIL IN ITS PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF PERSUADING THE GOP TO ABANDON ITS NUCLEAR OPTION AND WILL SUCCEED ONLY IN WORSENING US/PAK RELATIONS. WE CLEARLY CANNOT NOW FORCE, REPEAT FORCE, BHUTTO INTO A PUBLIC REPUDIATION OF THE NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT, PARTICULARLY IN THIS PRE-ELECTION PERIOD HERE. THE NEGATIVE LINKAGE APPROACH MAY MAKE US LOOK GOOD IN THE EYES OF THOSE FOR WHOM WE WERE SEEKING TO CONSTRUCT A RECORD OF OPPOSITION TO PROLIFERATION, AND WILL GIVE SOME PEOPLE THE FEELING OF VIRTUOUS SATISFACTION THAT WE ARE DOING OUR PART. AT THE END OF THE EXERCISE WE WILL BE ABLE TO SAY THAT WE TRIED. WE WILL REGRETTABLY HAVE TO ADD THAT WE FAILED, AND THAT A DOWNWARD SPIRALING OF US/PAK RELATIONS TO ZILCH WAS A SIGNIFICANT BY-PRODUCT OF THE EFFORT.

11. I WOULD HOPE THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM COULD BE PLACED BEFORE THE SECRETARY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AS THINGS WILL CLEARLY GET WORSE IF WE ALLOW THEM TO DRIFT. (I DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN AFFORD TO WAIT HOPING THAT THE SHAN CAN BE A DECISIVE FACTOR. I WOULD DOUBT VERY MUCH THAT HE WOULD TRY TO PUT ANY REAL PRESSURE ON BHUTTO ON OUR BEHALF AS I REALLY DON'T SEE WHY HE SHOULD. PROBABLY, HE WILL TELL BHUTTO THAT HE IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM US BUT THAT HE WILL HARD IT OFF AS BEST HE CAN.) IT WILL NOT TAKE THE PAKS LONG TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS A NEGATIVE LINKAGE

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ALREADY IN EFFECT BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AND ALMOST EVERYTHING ELSE. I BELIEVE THAT ONCE THE GOP COMES TO THAT REALIZATION, IT WILL BE ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT TO TAKE A DECISION IN WASHINGTON WHICH CHOOSES ANY OPTION OTHER THAN NEGATIVE LINKAGE WITHOUT GIVING THE PAKS THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE FOR NO CLEAR REASON SWITCHING SIGNALS. WE MERELY GET IN DEEPER AND DEEPER AS TIME GOES BY AND THIS IS NO WAY TO RUN A BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. IF THE REVIEW I REQUEST REGRETABLELY ONLY RESULTS IN NOTHING MORE THAN A BROADENED AND BETTER UNDERSTOOD APPRECIATION OF JUST WHERE WE ARE HEADED THIS WOULD STILL JUSTIFY THE EFFORT INVOLVED.

12. I WOULD HOPE THAT THE STUDY WOULD GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE MULTILATERAL ROUTE. I THINK THAT JUDGING FROM HIS MOOD IN OUR DISCUSSION, BHUTTO WOULD BE PREPARED TO LISTEN TO WHAT WE HAD TO SAY ABOUT PROSPECTS ALONG THESE LINES, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT. HAVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IRANIANS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROCEEDED TO THE POINT WHERE WE MIGHT ENCOURAGE BHUTTO TO THINK ABOUT JOINING IN A MULTILATERAL REPROCESSING PLANT IN IRAN TO BE CONTROLLED AND OPERATED BY THE IRANIANS, THE PAKS, AND SUPPLIER COUNTRIES, PERHAPS UNDER AN RCD UMBRELLA. MIGHT WE ENCOURAGE HIM TO CONSIDER MULTILATERALIZING THE PROJECTED REPROCESSING PLANT HERE, WITHOUT IRANIAN PARTICIPATION IF THE SHAH IS NOT INTERESTED - BUT THROUGH THE SHARING OF CONTROL WITH SUPPLIER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING PERHAPS THE U.S.

13. I KNOW THAT THE DEPARTMENT WILL BE DEVELOPING MANY IDEAS WHICH MIGHT HAVE SOME PROSPECT OF HELPING INDUCE BHUTTO TO GIVE UP PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR OPTION. FOR IN DEALING WITH THIS GRAVE PROBLEM, THE ACCENT MUST IN MY VIEW BE ON THE POSITIVE AND THE INNOVATIVE, ON FINDING SOME FORMULA WHICH BHUTTO CAN ACCEPT, NOT ON FORCING SOMETHING DOWN HIS THROAT. AS I'VE SAID BEFORE, HE'S NOT LIKELY TO SWALLOW UNDER THAT APPROACH.
BYROADE UNGTE ROBINSON

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