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EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS **DECAPTIONED**

MOSCOW FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY PICKERING

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 (2/6/2009 (GUHIN, MICHAEL) OES/NET/NEP
TAGS: TECH, MNUC, ENRG, PK, NL
SUBJ: (S) US-DUTCH BILATERAL ON PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

REF: STATE 27834 (NOTAL)

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. GUHIN REVIEWED PAST APPROACHES TO GON ON PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, SUMMARIZED URGENCY AND SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION, CHARACTERIZED RELEVANT US EXPORT CONTROL PROCEDURES, AND PASS US INTELLIGENCE ON DUTCH COMPANY INVOLVEMENT. GON OFFICIALS HAD NO INFORMATION ABOUT COMPANY NAMED, BUT PROMISED FOLLOW-UP. DUTCH OFFICIALS PROVIDED NEW INFORMATION ON EARLIER PAK SHOPPING EFFORT AND PROMISED TO PROVIDE MORE DETAIL. VISIT TRIGGERED DUTCH TO AGREE TO UNDERTAKE MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF LIKELY ITEMS WHICH PAKS MAY SEEK FOR CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM. GUHIN AGREED TO PROVIDE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION OF US EXPORT CONTROL
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PROCEDURES. GENERIC GREY AREA PROBLEM WAS DISCUSSED WITH CONCLUSION THAT THIS WOULD NEED TO BE LOOKED AT FURTHER IN ITS OWN RIGHT.
END SUMMARY.

3. MICHAEL GUHIN (OES/NET/NEP, LESLIE POWERS (OAK RIDGE) AND ROBERT GALLUCCI (INR/STA) ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY POL COUNSELOR JOHN CRUMPT MET WITH GON OFFICIALS F.J. A. TERWISSCHA VAN SCHELTINGA, DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, J. J. M. BRUYNS, OFFICE OF DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, A. J. VAN GALEN

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Geoffrey Chapman, Senior Reviewer

LAST, ATOMIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (ALL OF MFA), AND C. F. BOUVY, ELECTRICITY AND NUCLEAR ENERGY DIRECTORATE, AND F. WEISS AND A.J. NIEWLAND OF GENERAL IMPORT AND EXPORT AFFAIRS, (ALL OF MEA). GUHIN BEGAN BY REVIEWING PAST US AND UK APPROACHES, NOTING THAT THE CONTINUING AND ACTIVE PAK SHOPPING EFFORT HAS LED THE US TO UNDERTAKE THE CURRENT APPROACH. HE OBSERVED THAT THE TEAM WOULD ALSO BE VISITING OTHER CAPITALS WHERE US HAD REASON TO BELIEVE GOVERNMENTS NEEDED TO BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO PAK ACTIVITIES, AND THAT THE USG WAS TAKING APPROPRIATE STEPS DOMESTICALLY WHERE US COMPANIES MAY BE INVOLVED. HE SUMMARIZED US EXPORT CONTROL AUTHORITY BASED ON THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT, DOE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, AND NRC NOTING PARTICULARLY US RESPONSE TO THE UK INVERTER DEMARACHE. GUHIN ACKNOWLEDGED DUTCH EXPERTISE IN GAS CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY INDICATING THAT US WOULD APPRECIATE APPLICATION OF THEIR EXPERIENCE TO SUPPLIER EFFORT TO SHUT OFF PAKISTANI SHOPPING. IN PASSING THE INFORMATION ON THE DUTCH COMPANY IBIS KUNSTSTOFFEN BY HE ASKED THAT THE GON PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION THEY HAD OR COULD DEVELOP ABOUT THE PRODUCT OR SERVICES THE COMPANY COULD PROVIDE TO THE PAKS, AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT CONTACTS BETWEEN THE COMPANY (OR OTHERS) AND PAK REPRESENTATIVE S.

POWERES THEN GAVE GENERAL TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF KIND OF SECRET

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MACHINES WE BELIEVE PAKS TO BE BUILDING, HIGHLIGHTING AREAS WE HAVE IDENTIFIED AS POSSIBLY DEPENDENT UPON FOREIGN SUPPLY, AND WELCOMING A SIMILAR ANALYSIS BY DUTCH EXPERTS.

4. TERWISSCHA RESPONDED BY SAYING GON SHARED US CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE PAK NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE PROGRAM, AND THEY HAD RESPONDED TO PAS US-UK DEMARCHES BY COORDINATING WITH MEA TO INSURE THAT DUTCH COMPANIES WERE NOT INVOLVED. HE THEN ASKED MEA REPS PRESENT IF THEY KNEW OF IBIS KUNSTSTOFFEN AND THEY INDICATED THAT THEY DID NOT. TERWISSCHA NEXT SAID THIS RAISED THE BROADER QUESTION OF HOW SUPPLIERS WOULD DEAL WITH GREY AREA

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PROBLEM. HE RECALLED UK AND FRENCH APPROACH ABOUT WHAT OUGHT TO BE CONTROLLED AND LATER MEETING WITH BORIGHT (OES/NET) IN WHICH GON HAD INQUIRED ABOUT US VIEWS. HE SAID GON HAD NOT YET THOUGHT THIS THROUGH AND WOULD STILL BE INTERESTED IN DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH US. IN LATER DISCUSSION GUHIN SAID THAT AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE GENERIC PROBLEM OF GREY AREAS COULD BE HELPFUL, BUT THAT US BELIEVED IT CRITICAL TO DEAL WITH INDIVIDUAL CASES SUCH AS PAKISTAN AS THEY AROSE.

5. GON OFFICIAL WEISS SUMMARIZED DUTCH EXPORT CONTROL AS FOLLOWING COCOM LIST. ANY ITEM ON COCOM REQUIRES AN EXPORT LICENSE, AND LICENSES ARE ISSUED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE POLITICAL CONTEXT. HE SAID THAT MEA HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF INVERTERS OR COCOM LISTED ITEMS GOING TO PAKISTAN, OR OF PAK EFFORTS TO OBTAIN SUCH ITEMS (SEE PARA 6). MEA IS SATISFIED THAT ITEMS OF CONCERN ARE COVERED BY EXISTING REGULATIONS, NOTING THAT ONLY A VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF FIRMS IN THE NETHERLANDS DEAL WITH SUCH ITEMS AND THEIR INVOLVEMENT
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IN GOVERNMENT EFFORTS, MAKES POLICING AND WARNING RELATIVELY EASY FOR GON. AFTER OFFERING THESE ASSURANCES, HOWEVER, MEA OFFICIALS ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE GREY AREAS. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION OF WHETHER DUTCH REGULATIONS PROVIDED FOR CONTROL OF ENGINEERING CONSULTING SERVICES IN CASE WHERE "END USE" OF A PROJECT WAS KNOWN TO BE SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITY, MEA SAID CONSULTING SERVICES/TECHNOLOGY COULD NOT BE CONTROLLED UNLESS IT FELL UNDER THEIR CLASSIFICATION GUIDES OR INVOLVED A FIRM CONNECTED WITH THE DUTCH CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM.

6. GON OFFICIALS (VAN GALEN, LAST AND BRUYNS) THEN OFFERED THAT IN LATE 1976 AND EARLY 1977 DUTCH FIRMS HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY PAKISTANI INTERESTS SEEKING TO PURCHASE ROTOER DISCS, END PIECES, VACUUM VALVES AND PUMPS, AN AUTOMATIC PRODUCTION UNIT FOR ETCHING BALL BEARINGS, AND MULTIPHASE ROTORS, AS WELL AS A SINGLE GAS CENTRIFUGE ASSEMBLY FOR LAB OPERATIONS. COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT GON OFFICIAL (BRUYNS), WHO MENTIONED

"BALL BEARINGS," INTENDED EXACTLY THAT BOTH BECAUSE OF HIS DIFFICULTY IN TRANSLATING THE PHRASE INTO ENGLISH AND IN LIGHT OF INFORMATION THAT THE PAKS ULTIMATELY OBTAINED NEGATIVES FOR ETCHING CENTRIFUGAL BEARINGS FROM A SWISS COMPANY. END COMMENT. VAN GALEN LAST SAID THAT GON WAS AWARE OF THESE EFFORTS AND THAT NO ASSISTANCE OR MATERIAL WAS PROVIDED. THEY ALSO INDICATED THAT FRG FIRMS HAD BEEN CONTACTED WITHOUT SUCCESS. BRUYNS THEN SUGGESTED US MIGHT WISH TO APPROACH

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BELGIUM ON THIS MATTER. VAN GALEN LAST NOTED THAT DR. A. Q. KHAN HAD RETURNED TO EUROPE FOR TIME AFTER LEAVING THE NETHERLANDS AND HAD BEEN BASED IN ANTWERP. HE THEN ASKED IF USG BELIEVED THAT PAKS HAD ALL THE TECHNOLOGY AND BLUEPRINTS NECESSARY FOR A GAS CENTRIFUGE FACILITY. GALLUCCI RESPONDED THAT, ON THE BASIS OF PAK SHOPPING EXPEDITIONS FOR CENTRIFUGE COMPONENTS, IT APPEARED THAT THEY HAD ACCESS TO THE NECESSARY TECHNOLOGY. HE NOTED THAT THE DEPTH OF PAK TECHNOLOGY WAS UNCLEAR, HOWEVER, SO THAT THEIR ABILITY TO INNOVATE AND RESPOND TO INTERRUPTIONS IN FOREIGN SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT OR MATERIAL WAS QUESTIONABLE.

7. GUHIN SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT THE USG HOPED KEY SUPPLIERS WOULD MOVE ON TWO TRACKS, LOOKING INTERNALLY TO CONTROLLING DOMESTIC COMPANIES EXPORT ACTIVITY AND WORKING WITH EACH OTHER TO IMPROVE ANALYSIS AND SHARE RELEVANT INFORMATION ON THE PAKISTANI EFFORTS. TERWISSCHA RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THEY APPRECIATED

CONSULTATION AND US TEAM VISIT WOULD TRIGGER AN ANALYSIS BY
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DUTCH CENTRIFUGE EXPERTS AS NOTED IN SUMMARY. HE ALSO NOTED IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING COOPERATION ON THIS AREA (INCLUDING INFORMATION SHARING). BEFORE THE MEETING CLOSED, GON OFFICIALS ASKED IF USG BELIEVED THAT PAKS HAD A DEDICATED WEAPONS PROGRAM AND WHETHER THE PRC MIGHT ASSIST THE PAKS. GUHIN ANSWERED THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE THAT THE PAKISTANIS INTENDED TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY AND THAT WE BELIEVED THAT THE PRC DID NOT HAVE AN INTEREST IN OR INTENTION OF ASSISTING THE PAKS TO ACQUIRE SUCH A CAPABILITY.
JOSEPH

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