



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority AND 6617

Department of State

20310  
INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

SECRET NG0837

PAGE 01 LONDON 02788 01 OF 03 111223Z  
ACTION NODS-00

COPY 6 OF 15 COPIES

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

-----004542 111226Z /21

O 111151Z FEB 79  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4506  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 AMEMBASSY LONDON 02788

STADIS //////////////////////////////////////

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

TOKYO FOR ASST SECY PICKERING AND DEP ASST SECY NOSENZO

EO 12065: RDS-1 2/17/2009 (GUHIN, MICHAEL) DES/NET/NEP  
TAGS: TECH, MNUC, ENRG, PK, FRG, US  
SUBJ: (S) US-FRG BILATERAL ON PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

1. (S ENTIRE TEXT) SUMMARY: AFTER DETAILED PRESEN-  
TATION ALONG LINES USED IN THE HAGUE, FRG RECEIVED US  
APPROACH ON SPECIFIC GERMAN COMPANIES INVOLVED IN  
PAKISTANI ENRICHMENT PROGRAM AND PROMISED TO FOLLOW-  
UP AND REPORT RESULTS. MEETING MARKED BY USEFUL  
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON EXPORT CONTROL PROBLEMS,  
WITH BOTH SIDES ANTICIPATING CONTINUED CONSULTATIONS ON  
PAK PROBLEM AND JOINT REVIEW OF CRITICAL ITEMS FOR  
CONTROL OF GAS CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY, AS WELL AS  
GENERAL "GREY AREA" ISSUE. FRG SIDE GENERALLY SYMPA-  
THETIC TO US INITIATIVE AND NEED TO DO WHAT POSSIBLE  
TO CONTROL SUPPLY TO PAK PROGRAMS. ALSO ROUGET WAS  
APPRECIATIVE OF INFORMATION ON US DEMARCHE IN ISLAMABAD,  
WHICH WAS PASSED TO HIM IN PRIVATE, WITH PROMISE OF

SECRET

D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 66817

Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDGN 02788 01 OF 03 111223Z

CONTINUED CONSULTATIONS. END SUMMARY

2. US TEAM (GUHIN, POWERS, GALUCCI), ACCOMPANIED BY SCICOUNS V N DER WEYDEN, MET WITH ROUGET AND MEHRENBURG (MFA), CZYGAN AND GRUBER (BMFT), AND MEIN (MFA). AFTER PRESENTATION OF PROBLEM AND US APPROACH AND CONTROLS BY GUHIN, ROUGET SET TONE OF MEETING FROM MFA PERSPECTIVE BY NOTING THAT GOVERNMENT NEEDED "AMMUNITION" TO CONVINCE INDUSTRY (AND BY IMPLICATION MEA) OF NEED TO IMPROVE NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROL, INCLUDING INFORMAL APPROACHES TO INDUSTRY ON SPECIAL CASES SUCH AS PAKISTAN WHERE ITEMS NOT FORMALLY CONTROLLED. (AS ADVISED BY EMBASSY BEFORE MEETING, THERE WAS SOME VARIANCE OF VIEW BETWEEN MEA AND MFA ON MATTER.) ROUGET CITED RECENT EXPORT CASE OF WATER PUMPS FOR RESEARCH REACTOR AS EXAMPLE OF RESPONSIBLE FRG EXPORT POLICY. ALTHOUGH FRG DID NOT CONSIDER FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS A COMMENSURATE REQUIREMENT FOR PUMPS, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH US (NOSENZO), FRG DECIDED TO REQUIRE APPLICATION OF

PUMPS. ROUGET WENT ON TO OUTLINE GERMAN EXPORT PHILOSOPHY AS FAVORING "FREE EXPORT" GUIDED BY REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL INTEREST, WHICH IN TURN IS ASSESSED BY REFERENCE TO (A) NPT OBLIGATIONS, (B) STABILITY OF RECIPIENT COUNTRY AND REGION, (C) VIEWS OF ALLIES SUCH AS US AND (D) OTHER KEY SUPPLIER COUNTRIES. TO BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH SITUATION WHERE RECIPIENT PURCHASED INDIVIDUAL ITEMS WHICH ARE NOT CONTROLLED BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL DUAL- OR MULTI-USES, BUT WHICH STILL MAY BE ASSEMBLED INTO SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITY, ROUGET NOTED THAT FRG MAY MOVE TOWARD CONSIDERATION OF END-USE OF ITEMS AS PART OF DETERMINATION IN EXPORT DECISIONS. GUHIN OBSERVED THAT US HAD FOUND END-USE CRITERIA AND

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority AND 66817



*Department of State*

**INCOMING  
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03      LONDGN 02768 01 OF 03 111223Z  
PART 810 USEFUL AND REITERATED THRUST OF THESE CONTROLS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DIS-  
DIS-  
DIS-  
DIS-



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 66817

20329

Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

SECRET NOB359

PAGE 01 LONDON 02788 02 OF 03 111233Z  
ACTION NOUS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISD-00 /001 W

-----004581 111235Z /21

C 111151Z FEB 79  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4507  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 03 AMEMBASSY LONDON 02788

STADIS //////////////////////////////////////  
EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS  
AND INFORMAL MECHANISMS IN "GREY CASES."

3. AS IN OTHER CAPITALS GUMIN DESCRIBED NEED TO SHARE  
INFORMATION ON PAK SHOPPING EFFORT TO GET CLEARER  
PICTURE OF WHERE THEY ARE IN THE PROGRAM, WHERE THEY  
MIGHT BE GOING NEXT, PARTICULARLY IN OUTSIDE SUPPLY, AND  
TO ENSURE AGAINST OUTSIDE HELP TO PROGRAM, WHILE NOTING  
USEFULNESS OF FRG CENTRIFUGE EXPERIENCE IN COOPERATIVE  
EFFORT TO CONTROL SUOOLV TO PAKS. POWERS THEN DESCRIBED  
PROBABLE NATURE OF PAK CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM BASED ON  
SHOPPING EFFORT AND LISTED ITEMS US BELIEVES ARE  
CRITICAL TO THIS PROGRAM. FRG CENTRIFUGE EXPERT  
CZYGAN RESPONDED THAT PAK MACHINES SEEMED SIMILAR TO  
"EARLY VINTAGE" (1960'S) URENCO DESIGN AND THAT URENCO  
WAS NOW MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED. CZYGAN AGREED  
WITH POWERS POINT, HOWEVER, THAT TECHNOLOGY LEVEL  
INVOLVED IN "EARLY URENCO" IS ADEQUATE FOR PAKS TO  
PROVIDE HIGH-ENRICHED PRODUCT FOR AN EXPLOSIVES  
CAPABILITY. CZYGAN ALSO STATED THAT CRUDE PAK DESIGN  
MAY COMPLICATE EXPORT CONTROL SINCE SOME RELEVANT  
ITEMS MAY BE DUAL-USE AND NOT COME UNDER FORMAL EXPORT  
CONTROLS. ROUGET SAID THAT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES NEED

SECRET

DIS  
DIS  
DIS  
DIS  
DIS





DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 66817

Department of State

COMING  
TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 LONDON 02788 02 OF 03 111233Z

OF KIND NOW UNDERTAKEN IF PROBLEM, INCLUDING THAT OF RECIPIENT PURCHASE BY "DUMMY COMPANIES" THROUGH INTER-MEDIARIES, WAS TO BE DEALT WITH EFFECTIVELY. ROUGET SUMMED UP DISCUSSION ON TEAM INDUSTRIES WITH VIEW THAT EVEN WHEN EXPORT COULD NOT BE PROHIBITED BY LICENSING REQUIREMENT, GOVERNMENT KNOWLEDGE OF PROPOSED EXPORT COULD LEAD TO RESTRAINT THROUGH INFORMAL CONTACTS AND WOULD AT LEAST INCREASE SUPPLIER AWARENESS OF NASCENT SENSITIVE PROGRAMS. COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT ACTION CAN NOW BE EXPECTED BY FRG IN TEAM INDUSTRIES CASE. IF NO RESPONSE IS FORTHCOMING, FOLLOW-UP ALONG LINES OF ABOVE TWO QUESTIONS WOULD SEEM APPROPRIATE. END COMMENT.

5. IN CONTRAST TO TEAM INDUSTRIES CHARACTERIZATION, FRG NOTED THAT LEYBOLD-HEREAUS WAS WELL RESPECTED FIRM, WITH SOME INVOLVEMENT IN URENCO CONTRACTS, AND HAD CAPABILITY OF SUPPLYING ITEMS WHICH COULD HELP PAK CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM (E.G., VACUUM AND OTHER EQUIPMENT) ALTHOUGH THESE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE "ESPECIALLY PREPARED" FOR GAS CENTRIFUGE AND THEREFORE UNDER CONTROL SYSTEM. ROUGET NOTED THAT GOVERNMENT WOULD APPROACH LEYBOLD-HEREAUS AND OBSERVED THAT, AS IT WAS A LARGE PRESTIGIOUS COMPANY WITH SOME GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IT WOULD LIKELY BE RESPONSIVE TO APPROACH FROM GOVERNMENT BASED ON NATIONAL INTEREST. ROUGET SAID HE WOULD TELL US OF RESULTS OF APPROACH TO LEYBOLD-HEREAUS, ADDING THAT HE SHARED OUR VIEW ON CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON EXPORT CONTROL PROBLEMS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DISSEMINATION





Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 02788 03 OF 03 111229Z

NECTION BETWEEN SUPPLIER COOPERATION OF THE KIND US SOUGHT, AND WHICH HE ENDORSED, TO COMING INTENSIFICATION OF NPT ARTICLE IV COMPLAINTS BY RECIPIENT COUNTRIES. ON ONE HAND, HE FEARED SUPPLIERS RISKED UNRAVELLING OF NPT AT REVIEW CONFERENCE IF THEY DID NOT PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY; ON THE OTHER HAND, HE RECOGNIZED NEED TO CONTROL EXPORTS FOR SENSITIVE APPLICATIONS. HE CONCLUDED THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR SUPPLIERS TO EXPAND CONSENSUS ON WHAT IS LEGITIMATE RESTRAINT IN NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY.

8. ROUGET ALSO INQUIRED AS TO HOW US APPROACH ON THIS MATTER WAS BEING RECEIVED BY OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH HAD FIRMS CAPABLE OF SUPPLYING ITEMS FOR PAK SENSITIVE PROGRAMS. GUHIN NOTED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES APPROACHED WERE RECEPTIVE TO US APPROACH AND NEED TO DO WHAT POSSIBLE (IN INFORMAL WAYS IF FORMAL MECHANISMS DID NOT COVER ITEMS) TO CONTROL SUPPLY TO PAK SENSITIVE PROGRAMS. AS PRESENTED IN OTHER CAPITALS, GUHIN UNDERLINED THAT WHILE CURRENT INFORMATION FOCUSED ON PAK CENTRIFUGE EFFORT, WE NEEDED TO KEEP WATCH AND CONTROL OVER SUPPLY TO OTHER PAK EFFORTS IN SENSITIVE AREAS, AND WE DESIRED TWO-WAY INFORMATION SHARING SO THAT WE COULD BENEFIT FROM FRG PERSPECTIVE AND ANY RELATED INFORMATION IT DEVELOPED (INCLUDING BUT ALSO GOING BEYOND TWO COMPANIES MENTIONED).

9. FOLLOWING THE MEETING GUHIN AND VAN DER WEYDEN MET PRIVATELY WITH ROUGET TO INFORM HIM OF US DEMARCHE IN ISLAMABAD ALONG SAME LINES AS JACOMET WAS INFORMED AND OUR INTENTION TO KEEP FRG APPRISED AS MATTERS DEVELOP. ROUGET APPRECIATED US KEEPING FRG INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS ON PAKISTAN NUCLEAR SITUATION, AND STRESSED

SECRET

DIS-  
NON-  
DIS-  
NON-  
DIS-





*Department of State*

**INCOMING  
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 LONDON 02788 03 OF 03 111229Z

VALUE OF CONTINUED COOPERATION IN THIS MATTER.  
BREWSTER

SECRET

S  
-  
S  
-  
N  
-  
D  
-  
D  
-  
I  
-  
S  
-  
N  
-  
D  
-  
D  
-  
I  
-  
S