



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM

March 9, 1979

To: S/AS - Ambassador Smith
 From: S/AS - George Rathjens
 Subject: PRC Meeting, March 9, 1979 - 4:00 PM

The meeting opened with a lengthy discussion of the Symington Amendment problem. Turner stated that the evidence was clear that the Amendment had been triggered. There followed a lot of discussion however as to whether or not this had happened in a formal sense, and whether the Secretary of State had to make a determination to that effect. A particular issue is the question of action to be taken on two AID contracts which in the normal course of events would be signed virtually immediately. (There is a cable from Islamabad asking for authorization to sign them.) After much discussion, there seemed to be a consensus that they should be signed provided the lawyers would approve. Most of those present seemed to feel that this would be possible but Christopher kept reiterating that it could be done only in the event that the lawyers went along.

There followed a discussion of the effectiveness of efforts that are being made and could be made to cut off the flow of critical materials from the U.S. and its allies. Efforts that had been made were mentioned and Pickering pointed out that a list had been developed in consultation with the Department of Commerce which would be transmitted to others immediately. The estimate has been that it would take the Pakistanis three to five years to develop a weapon and it was suggested (by Pickering, if I remember correctly) that with very tight controls this time period might be doubled. Despres argued otherwise, pointing that

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the three to five year figure was already predicated on substantial supply restraints, and at best one might achieve an additional year's slippage in the construction of a 7,000 unit centrifuge plant. He said that the Pakistanis already had all of the equipment needed for the first 1,000 units and probably all that would be needed for the next 3,000. He believed that there would be a 1,000 unit plant operating by the end of 1980 and that sufficient material for a weapon would be available in early 1982. Deutch observed that if there were some low-enriched uranium available, the time could be cut.

The third item on the agenda (and from my point of view the critical one) was how to dissuade the Pakistanis from going ahead. There seemed to be consensus that one had to try to build on the Pakistani interest in a nuclear weapons zone and on the Indian statements about their having no interest in nuclear weapons. The upshot of all this was a consensus -- at least I read it that way -- that it was imperative to build on Indian interests. Keeny argued that the U.S. could make it easier for both Pakistan and India if we were willing to play down safeguards; and that this could safely be done, considering how good our intelligence, and that of India, appears to have been.

The question of debt rescheduling being made conditional on the Pakistanis dropping their nuclear program was raised but not pursued.

Questions were raised about Saudi support. Despres replied that there was evidence of money from Saudi Arabia but absolutely no evidence of a Saudi role or concurrence in the enrichment program.

Aaron summed up the meeting by observing that we should go ahead with the two AID contracts (with Christopher, I believe, again reiterating that that would be conditional on a legal opinion) and that we should put the Pakistanis on notice that we could undertake no new obligations if they persisted on their present

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course. We should be tough on exports even if it would have little effect on the Pakistan program, if for no other reason, because of precedent.

An interagency group will be appointed to look, on a high priority basis, at options, with it being, I believe, clearly understood that a main point of this effort should be to look at ways of getting the Indians involved constructively.

There was much skepticism in this meeting, and also in the one the night before, about any action being successful. I suppose this is in large measure justified but it does seem to me that there ought to be an overwhelming self-interest on the part of India in Pakistan's not acquiring a nuclear capability. Perhaps I am very naive, but it would seem to me that it ought to be the Indians who should be trying to persuade us to help them dissuade the Pakistanis rather than vice versa. In any event, I came out of the meeting less pessimistic, I think, than most of the others about the possibility of getting the Indians and the Pakistanis to reach some kind of an accommodation that would enable Pakistan to get off the track it is on.

I am somewhat concerned that, in looking at options, the possibility of other powers playing a very prominent role may not get as much attention as it should. I have in mind, of course, particularly China, India and perhaps Saudi Arabia, as well as the European states. Are the people at the highest political levels in these countries seized with the problem? Shouldn't we try to get them involved to try to help find a solution to the problem rather than just trying to find something we think might work and then trying to bring them along?

There was no particular discussion in today's meeting on arms for Pakistan, but there was a fair amount of it in yesterday's. I think most of those involved in this activity are aware of the pitfalls in trying to buy the Pakistanis off by a combination of aid, debt

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rescheduling and arms. It probably won't work because in fact no quantity of conventional arms that they could realistically acquire would enable them to match India's capability; and, trying to buy them off would, of course, create the worse possible precedent in any future cases. Notwithstanding this, I think there may be some effort to try this path. I think it would be wrong, and that if we are going to make concessions anywhere to try to bring about a satisfactory resolution of this problem, it will probably have to be in our dealings with India. This conclusion is predicated on my belief that there probably is no hope of turning the Pakistanis around unless their legitimate security concerns can be met, and that the key to accomplishing this is in inducing India to move in ways that the Pakistanis see as less threatening. The use of carrots with the Indians to get them to be reasonable strikes me as more promising than the use of either sticks or carrots with Pakistan.

It seems to me that you should be represented on any interagency task group that is charged with looking at this problem. If things move as rapidly as I infer that they will, and as I think they should, the effort will be well underway before I have returned from Japan. (I am stopping off at Livermore and Los Alamos on my way back and so will not be back in the office until the 22d.) I guess the finger points at Bob Kelley. He is, I believe, knowledgeable, and he has sensible and constructive views about the problem.

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- Policy Planning (Kreisinger)
is putting together today a
paper which we will see Tuesday.
It will be then circulated "interagency."
But more useful may be Wednesday
meeting with SECRET U.K.'s Parsons,
who will discuss U.K. proposal,
(see attached cable from Strator)
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