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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~  
~~MEMORANDUM~~

March 14, 1979

To: S/P - Mr. Kreisberg  
From: S/AS - Gerard Smith  
Subject: Pakistan - Comments on S/P Paper

An extremely  
thought -  
provoking  
piece. Best  
thing that  
been done  
thus  
far.

OLD  
OPTION  
A

The S/P paper seems to me not comprehensive enough. For example:

-- It does not consider a "do nothing" extreme position under which we would wait to see if the Indians or some other country would ask us to do something.

-- It does not consider the possibility of UN action.\*

-- It does not consider the possibility of a long-term public information program to put heat on the Paks not to be mavericks.

same?

★ →

-- It only glancingly touches on how a CTB, which the Indians and the Paks could sign, would resolve the problem (making it more urgent that we agree on a CTB without loopholes).

-- It does not consider the possibility of some sort of nuclear guarantees to relieve the pressure on Pakistan to go for nuclear weapons.

Perhaps the whole question of security guarantees under the NPT should be reviewed. If the Paks joined NPT, would the nuclear powers be willing to earmark some

\*I have spelled out in the annex to this memo some reasons why throwing the glare of world attention on the Pakistani covert program, possibly through a Security Council meeting, should be considered.

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NARA, Date 10/18/2016

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How: by threat  
of retaliation or  
first strike?

Argues  
against  
a do  
nothing  
approach

units to neutralize any nuclear threats to Pakistan. I think that if Pakistan develops nuclear weapons it will be hard over the long run to keep Germany and Japan away from nuclear weapons, to say nothing of Libya. When that day comes, the case for an earmarked anti-Libyan deterrent force will be strong. Maybe we should bite the bullet now and start thinking in that direction. Perhaps such a device could be made more general and any non-nuclear party to the NPT could be the beneficiary of such a commitment. For example, if we and the Soviets and the British earmark one submarine for NPT guarantee purposes, it would not affect the strategic balance with the Soviets at all.

The paper hardly touches on the relationship of the Israeli problem. If a major concern here is that what starts as a Pakistan bomb would end up as a Moslem bomb, should we not be considering a nuclear free zone extending from the Middle East through South Asia? If there is to be peace in the Middle East, it's just possible that the Israelis could do without the nuclear weapons potential which they presently have and which is apparently exercising pressure on the Moslems to imitate.

We should also examine whether we should tell the Paks that if they develop nuclear weapons they are just too hot a nation for us to be associated with. You will recall that at one time the French were thinking about their weapons program as a trigger capable of forcing the United States to use nuclear weapons in the event of Soviet invasion of Western Europe -- even if we didn't want to do that.

I would like to see some discussion on whether American policy should not be--"Let the Chinese and the Soviets handle this on the basis that it's their part of the world and their security which is most directly involved."

The case for doing nothing has historical roots. Think back to the absence of international action in 1949 when the Soviets developed a nuclear weapon, to the Fifties when the British and French went into the

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Again,  
a do-  
nothing  
approach

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nuclear weapons business, to the Sixties when Israel and China followed suit and to the Seventies when India exploded a nuclear device. If none of those cases led to sharp American reactions, what is the case for "action" now? If the Indians are acquiescent in a nuclear weapons race in South Asia, why should we be more sensitive? If our fear is of a Moslem bomb, isn't that something that the Israelis should be taking the lead on?

*a new policy*

*unlikely they'll acquiesce long.*

On a more brutal plane should we not be considering the possibility/likelihood of some other country sabotaging or destroying the Pakistani plants?

*yes*

*Option B*

We might also consider convening an international planning group, to develop possible courses of action. There are precedents for this, e.g., the exercises during the Berlin crises of 1958-1961 in which experts met to develop options to counter expected Soviet moves. (Live oak)

\* \* \* \* \*

You asked whether the IAEA ought to be involved.

If the Paks proceed to develop a weapon capability claiming that they are pursuing a peaceful program, it will have large implications for the acceptability of nuclear power around the world. The IAEA, having responsibility for the promotion of nuclear power under safeguards, should have a direct interest in Pak developments. In the first instance, Director General Eklund should be advised in general terms of Pakistani developments and consulted as to what, if any, role IAEA could play -- e.g., if the matter were raised in the Board of Governors, would that lead to Pakistan leaving the agency? Keep in mind that next December the IAEA General Conference is to be held in New Delhi.

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Finally, I would stress the desirability of early consultation with the USSR. Morozov, who we work with, described our nonproliferation interests last month as "identical". J ★

Attachment:

Annex

Copy to:

D ✓

P

T - Mrs. Lucy Benson

PM - Mr. O'Donohue

NEA - Mr. Miklos, Ms. Coon, Mr. Lande

L - Mr. Michel

OES - Ambassador Pickering

INR - Mr. Gallucci

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UN Security Council Option

It was Justice Brandeis who said, "Sunlight is the best disinfectant." For the several reasons below, we should consider the option of throwing the full glare of world attention on the Pakistani covert nuclear weapons program, possibly through a special meeting of the UN Security Council, or some other world forum.

② 1. The 3 options now on the table -- ① sanctions, ③ mutual Pak-Indian renunciation, or a US-Pak security arrangement -- do not appear either feasible or likely to succeed.

2. The Pak action puts at risk the peace and security of South Asia and the world. Mobilizing the opinion of governments and publics against their action, as was done in August 1977 to South Africa, may be the best, and perhaps only, way to stop them.

3. Even if exposure alone does not work, it may galvanize those involved into the effort that will produce a solution. The underlying problem is an extremely complex mix of power rivalry, deep (and realistic) feelings of insecurity, as well as other factors. We will need time and thought to treat these. And we may need to first demonstrate the problem and convince concerned governments and opinion that there are grave dangers, before we can get them to take new steps toward a solution. The solution, as in many things, may not be available or knowable at the outset. But to let the Pakistanis go forward without exposure, will only make the eventual answer more difficult.

4. There is no way Pakistan can defend its action under a peaceful use of nuclear energy rationale. The U.S. is usually in a minority arguing against transfer of sensitive technology, particularly where the technology fits plausibly in a civil nuclear power program. In the Pakistan case, we would be able to turn the tables on the Group of 77 and others who demand the fullest flow of technology and profess to see no risk. A year before the NPT Review Conference, where we are likely to suffer severe attack for frustrating technology exchange rights, under Article IV of the NPT, we could establish the merit of our position in an indisputable way.

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