

**ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL SECURITY DIVISION SYDNEY
REGISTRY 2017/6606; 2017/7743**

DR CLINTON FERNANDES
Applicant

DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

**STATEMENT OF FACTS, ISSUES AND CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT IN
REPLY**

The CIA, aware that its men and activities were being closely monitored by the new Allende government, turned to its allies. In response to a formal request from the Agency, two operators from the Australian Secret Intelligence Service were stationed inside Chile; the Australians were told that outsiders were needed because of the government's close surveillance. By 1972, the Australians had agreed to monitor and control three agents on behalf of the CIA and to relay the information to Washington.¹

1. The respondent has filed affidavits by two public servants and a former public servant. They all provide anodyne and generic justification for the refusal of the respondent to release the documents sought by the applicant.
2. Anthony Sheehan is from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He deposes to his considerable experience in the public service. He deposes that release of the information would be likely to prejudice the security or international relations of the Commonwealth.
3. Peter Darby (a false name) is an ex ASIO officer. He deposes that disclosure of this information may be damaging to Australia's international relations, even where the information is historical. Presumably on that basis, information will be kept secret for ever. He expresses concern that release of the information will expose the relationships between ASIO and foreign intelligence services.
4. Many Australians would be entitled to express legitimate concern if ASIS or ASIO were exposed as having cooperated with the CIA in toppling the democratically elected government of Chile led by President Salvador Allende,

¹ Seymour Hersh, Kissinger: The Price of Power, (London: Faber & Faber, 1983), 295 Attachment A p 295.

for example by helping to create what the CIA called a “coup climate” to destroy the economy and encourage the Chilean military under General Augusto Pinochet to launch the coup. Many Australians would be entitled to express legitimate concern if ASIS or ASIO were exposed as having cooperated with United States, British or Chilean intelligence services during the time of the Pinochet regime. That is presumably the information sought to be protected from release. That cooperation has been previously exposed by the then Minister for Immigration Clyde Cameron.

5. Jack Lowe (a false name) of ASIS states that the release would be likely to prejudice Australia's security, defence and international relations. He does not make clear how events in Chile affected Australia's security or defence. On one hand, he states that it is essential that ASIS operates in secrecy to protect, amongst other things the identity of the ASIS staff members and agents, the intelligence obtained, the information shared with ASIS in confidence by liaison partners and other government agencies, as well as the details of ASIS's sensitive operations, techniques, capabilities, methods and internal administrative arrangements. On the other hand, he deposes how ASIS depends on the willingness of staff and agents to put in their lives or liberties at risk. He goes on to describe how it is necessary to minimise the damage to Australia's international reputation if it was discovered to be conducting operational activities.
6. The dichotomy is an important one. The applicant does not wish to know the names of particular agents or their sources. It accepts that they should be protected even presumably in death. Nevertheless, the second point is more difficult to follow. Lowe does not explain why it necessary to minimise the damage to Australia's international reputation if it was discovered to be conducting operational activities. There is no doubt that ASIS conducted operational activities in Chile. He does not make clear why it is necessary to prevent the discovery of this already public information.

7. There is some similarity in this case with the *Binyam Mohamed*² case where the Court of Appeal was confronted with executive arguments that the release of details as to the torture of a man called Mohamed Binyam might lead to the US government restricting its flow of intelligence to the UK. The force of that argument was somewhat undercut by the fact that the US had itself already released that information. In that case, Sir Anthony May held at [281] that:

It is, I think, over-facile to suppose that the outcome of such a review would necessarily result in an undiminished flow of intelligence from the US to the UK. Certainly it seems distinctly improbable that the US Government, left to itself, would alone take damaging umbrage because a bare summary of intelligence information about Mr Mohamed's treatment, all or most of which was regarded as publicly known, was included as being necessary in a UK court judgment. The fact that it is derived from intelligence sources ceases to be of much significance if the information is publicly known anyway.

8. In any event, there are grounds to release the material. There is a public interest in informing the public. As Lord Bingham held in *Shayler* [2002] UKHL 11, [2003] 1 AC 247 at [21]:

The business of government is not an activity about which only those professionally engaged are entitled to receive information and express opinions. It is, or should be, a participatory process. But there can be no assurance that government is carried out for the people unless the facts are made known, the issues publicly ventilated. Sometimes, inevitably, those involved in the conduct of government, as in any other walk of life, are guilty of error, incompetence, misbehaviour, dereliction of duty, even dishonesty and malpractice. Those concerned may very strongly wish that the facts relating to such matters are not made public. Publicity may reflect discredit on them or their predecessors. It may embarrass the authorities. It may impede the process of administration. Experience however shows, in this country and elsewhere, that publicity is a powerful disinfectant. Where abuses are exposed, they can be remedied. Even where abuses have already been remedied, the public may be entitled to know that they occurred.

9. Lowe does state at paragraph 7 that “some material I have decided can now be released” and “I have asked for arrangements to be made for the further

² *Mohamed v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs* [2010] EWCA Civ 65

material to be released.” The applicant does not know what is meant by these comments.

10. The documents attached to his affidavit make for interesting reading. They constitute much of the publicly available historical record provided by ASIS itself. That is a speech by Nick Warner the then Director General of ASIS. That speech describes the excessive secrecy in which ASIS was founded and which continued for decades and the need to increase public awareness of ASIS contribution to national security.

The highest levels of accountability and external oversight

11. He goes on to describe how ASIS is an agency with the highest levels of accountability and external oversight. Warner does not explain what that means. The legislative and judicial branches of government are effectively excluded from any process of oversight of Australia’s intelligence and national security policy. Section 29(3)(a) of the *Intelligence Services Act 2001* prevents the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) from “reviewing the intelligence gathering and assessment priorities” of ASIS or ASIO. Likewise, Section 29(3)(b) prevents the PJCIS from reviewing “the sources of information, other operational assistance or operational methods” available to ASIS or ASIO. Section 29(3)(c) prevents the PJCIS from “reviewing particular operations that have been, are being or are proposed to be undertaken” by ASIS or ASIO. Section 29(3)(f) prevents the PJCIS from reviewing the rules issued by the Minister to intelligence agencies concerning the privacy of Australians. There is no provision in the Act for ongoing judicial oversight of the intelligence agencies.
12. There are of course benefits to the executive in such a shielded process. Neither it, nor ASIS, is subject to accountability or external oversight. Any complicity, for example, in the crimes of the Chilean coup and the ensuing military dictatorship are hidden from Parliament and from the public. These crimes are far from trivial; in a country with a population of 10 million in 1973, there were about 4,000 cases of death or disappearance by the regime,

between 150,000 and 200,000 cases of political detention, and approximately 100,000 credible cases of torture.³

13. It appears that one of the major processes for accountability and external oversight is in fact the access to historical records such as this case and others like it where accountability and oversight in relation to the historical record are sought.
14. An example of similar executive action was examined in *Fernandes and National Archives of Australia* [2011] AATA 202. In that case, the applicant applied for access to records of the Defence Intelligence Organisation relating to Indonesia and East Timor. The respondent made many of the same objections as it makes in this case. His Honour held at [22] that:

Naturally, I have also taken into account that the events covered by the documents took place 35 years ago. I have taken into account that the policy of the Act is that, prima facie, material thirty years old, however confidential it may have been at the time it was prepared, can be taken to have lost that confidentiality. Only material of the most sensitive kind which would still impact on national security, or material given in confidence by a foreign government, should be exempt.

15. The information that was released showed that the executive had known for decades of the murder of a number of Australian journalists. That material was obviously embarrassing to the executive. Its release did not apparently cause damage to the security and to the international relations of the Commonwealth.

The passing of time

16. As the witnesses attest, these events took place 50 years ago. With every year, the need for secrecy reduces. As the respondent itself states in its own *Access Examination Manual* in the section on Records related to Australia's international relations⁴:

27. Records may contain frank and comprehensive reports from diplomats and other officials on events and personalities in other countries, and on relations with those countries. Their reports often deal with matters of considerable sensitivity and in language that may not be used diplomatically.

³ Steve Stern, *Battling for Hearts and Minds: Memory Struggles in Pinochet's Chile, 1973-1988* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006) xxi. Attachment B p xxi.

⁴ National Archives of Australia, *Access Examination Manual* 2014. Attachment C p 56.

Many such reports may not cause harm after 20 years. However, they should be exempted if they could reasonably be expected to harm Australia's relations with another country.

The foreign experience of declassification

17. The US Government itself has publicly disclosed much of what happened in Chile. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities 'Covert Action in Chile 1963 – 1973 issued a public, although slightly redacted report that stated in particular that⁵:

Despite the intelligence community's view that the US has no vital interest in Chile, the decision was made by the Executive Branch to intervene in that nation's internal political and economic affairs. Between September 14 and October 24, 1970, the CIA, at President Nixon's instruction, attempted to prevent Allende's assumption of office by promoting a military coup d'état in Chile. The wide array of US economic pressures were initiated to ensure that Allende's economic problems would persist as a major liability...

18. Further, the intelligence agencies themselves have made public large amounts of material. It is somewhat surprising that ASIS, unlike its domestic counterparts ASIO⁶ or foreign counterparts such as the CIA and MI6⁷ has provided so little information as to its activities. Indeed, the CIA has declassified vast amounts of material in relation to its activities within Chile (and elsewhere). The USA declassified some 24,000 records between June 1999 and June 2000 as part of the Clinton Administration's Chile Declassification Project. A copy of The Pinochet File by Peter Kornbluh is at Attachment E (pp ix to 160).

19. That book includes documents (sometimes redacted) that include the following details and commentary by the author:

Page xi: Beginning in the early 1960s, U.S. policy makers initiated more than a decade of efforts to control Chile's political life, culminating in a massive covert effort to "bring down," the duly elected Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende.

⁵ Attachment D p 36.

⁶ David Horner *The Spycatchers, The official History of ASIO, 1949 - 1963*, John Blaxland, *The Protest Years, The Official History of ASIO 1963 - 1975*, John Blaxland, *The Secret Cold War: The Official History of ASIO, 1975-1989. Attachment F.*

⁷ Keith Jeffery *'MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949'* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010). Attachment G.

Page xii: Chile became the catalyst for the first public hearing ever held on covert action. Senator Church's Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities—known as the Church Committee—conducted the first major Congressional investigation into clandestine operations and published the first case studies, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973*, and *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, detailing those operations abroad.

Page xiii: But only a handful of the hundreds of documents reviewed by the Senate Committee staff in the mid-1970s were actually declassified.

Page xiv: In 1999, the Clinton Administration agreed to conduct a “Chile Declassification Project” for the benefit of Chilean and American citizens.

Page xv: the Declassification Project produced 24,000 never-before-seen documents—the largest discretionary executive branch release of records on any country or foreign policy issue.

Page xv: Stamped Top Secret/Sensitive, Eyes Only, NODIS [no distribution to other agencies] NOFORN, [No Foreign Distribution], and Roger Channel [high urgency, restricted dissemination], among other classification categories, they include White House memoranda of conversation [MEMCONS] recording the private commentary of U.S. presidents and their aides; decision directives and briefing papers prepared for Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan; minutes of covert-action strategy meetings chaired by Henry Kissinger; high-level intelligence reports based on informants inside the Pinochet regime; and hundreds of heavily redacted but still revealing CIA Directorate of Operations communications with agents in its Santiago Station that detail massive covert action to change the course of Chilean history.

Page xv, xvi: They cover events such as: Project FUBELT, the CIA's covert action to block Salvador Allende from becoming president of Chile in the fall of 1970; the assassination of Chilean commander-in-chief René Schneider; U.S. strategy and operations to destabilize the Allende government; the degree of American support for the coup, etc.

Page xvi: Many of the documents name names, revealing atrocities and exposing those who perpetrated them. These records have been, and are being, used to advance judicial investigations into the human rights atrocities of Pinochet's military and to hold regime officials accountable for their crimes.

Pages 1-2: On September 15, 1970, in a fifteen-minute meeting between 3:25 and 3:40 p.m., President Richard Nixon ordered the CIA to initiate a massive covert intervention in Chile. The goal: to block Chilean President-elect Salvador Allende from taking and holding

office. His victory on September 4, in a free and fair—if narrow—election, marked the first time in the twentieth century that a “socialist parliamentarian,” as Allende referred to himself, had been democratically voted into office in the Western Hemisphere. During a White House meeting with Henry Kissinger, Attorney General John Mitchell, and CIA Director Richard Helms, Nixon issued explicit instructions to foment a coup that would prevent Allende from being inaugurated on November 4, or subsequently bring down his new administration. Handwritten notes, taken by the CIA director, recorded Nixon’s directive:

- 1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!
- worth spending
- not concerned risks involved
- no involvement of embassy
- \$10,000,000 available, more if necessary
- full-time job—best men we have
- game plan
- make economy scream
- 48 hours for plan of action

Page 2: a “Special Task Force” with two operational units—one focused exclusively on the Chilean military headed by veteran covert operative David Atlee Phillips, and the second devoted to the “political/constitutional route” to blocking Allende—was immediately established and activated. CIA headquarters had dispatched a special covert agent to Santiago to deliver secret instructions to the Station chief on the new operation, code-named Project FUBELT. [FU was the CIA’s designated cryptonym for Chile; BELT appeared to infer the political and economic strangulation operations the CIA intended to conduct to assure Allende never reached Chile’s presidential office.]

Page 8: On Kissinger’s orders, CIA, State, and Defense Department analysts conducted a major study into the implications for the United States. The intelligence assessment they produced in mid-August was called National Security Study Memorandum 97. “Regarding threats to U.S. interests,” NSSM 97 stated clearly, “we conclude that...

An Allende victory would create considerable political and psychological costs:

- a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by the challenge that an Allende government would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions that it would create in other countries. We do not see, however, any likely threat to the peace of the region.
- b. An Allende victory would represent a definite psychological setback to the U.S. and a definite psychological advance for the Marxist idea.

Page 10: The CIA Chief of Station in Santiago was Henry Hecksher, who used the code name “Felix”.

Page 12: the CIA called “Track I”—the “parliamentary solution.” Track II became the internal designation for operations in the aftermath of Nixon’s September 15 order to foment, by whatever means possible, a military coup. Track I included proposals for a contingency slush fund of \$250,000 to bribe members of the Chilean Congress.

Page 14: Track II focused on identifying any Chilean military officer, active duty or retired, willing to lead a violent putsch, and providing whatever incentive, rationale, direction, coordination, equipment, and funding necessary to provoke a successful overthrow of Chilean democracy. The Track II component of Project FUBELT was highly compartmentalized; most members of the 40 Committee were not aware of its existence. On Nixon’s orders, Ambassador Korry and his staff were excluded from knowledge and participation in this set of operations.

Page 15: At the initiation of Project FUBELT, the CIA had only two “assets”—paid agents—in the Chilean military. For that reason, the Agency recruited the services of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) military attache´ in Chile, Colonel Paul Wimert, who, according to a Task Force Report “enjoyed unusually close, frank, and confidential relationships” with potential coup plotters. ... The CIA also mobilized a small elite unit of four special agents—known as “false flaggers,” or the “illegal team.” These operatives, “chosen for their ability to assume non-U.S. nationality,” according to internal CIA summaries of Track II, operated under extreme deep cover, posing as Spanish-speaking Latin Americans; their use was intended for “those contacts with the highest risk potential, that is, those individuals whose credentials, reliability, and security quotient were unproven and unknown”—to safeguard against exposure. “Headquarters proposed establishing small staff of false-flag officers in Santiago to handle high risk target-of-opportunity activities,” records the September 28 entry in the CIA’s daily log on Track II.

Page 16: the CIA faced what Director Helms described as “the impossible” challenges of forcing President Frei to move against the democratic structures of his own nation, “neutralizing,” if necessary, Chile’s respected commander-in-chief, General Schneider, and overcoming what agency records called “the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military.” Moreover, there existed no reason, no justification, nor even a pretext for the military to move to block Allende’s Popular Unity coalition from taking office. In reality, the vast majority of Chileans were at peace with the outcome of their political process. “There is now no peg for a military move,” as the Station reported on September 29, “in face of the complete calm prevailing throughout the country.”

Page 17: the CIA, with the help of the embassy and the White House, actively set out to change tranquility into turmoil in order to foster a

“coup climate” in Chile. The objective was to instigate such socioeconomic crisis and upheaval that Frei and/or the military would be prompted to act. “We conclude that it is our task to create such a climate climaxing with a solid pretext that will force the military and the president to take some action in the desired direction,” Broe and Phillips informed the Santiago Station on September 28 in a cable that provides a covert blueprint for how the CIA intended to foment a coup in Chile. (Doc 7)

Page 19: “The key is the psych war within Chile,” CIA officials stressed. “We cannot endeavor to ignite the world if Chile itself is a placid lake. The fuel for the fire must come from within Chile. Therefore, the Station should employ every stratagem, every ploy, however bizarre, to create this internal resistance.” (Doc 7)

Page 20: In another, and far more sinister, cable dated the same day the Station was ordered to consider instigating “terrorist” activities that might provoke Allende’s followers. Almost all references to the use of terrorism have been redacted from the declassified CIA records, but they do contain enough information to show that terrorist acts were part of the effort to create a coup climate. The Task Force Daily logs show that the Agency was monitoring and providing small amounts of funding for the actions of a neofascist group, Patria y Libertad. An October 6 CIA status report noted that the Station had contacted “a representative of an anti-communist group intent on organizing terrorist activities”—a reference to a false-flagger meeting with retired General Arturo Marshall—and “this group is allegedly counting on the leadership of General Viaux.” The daily log for October 10 noted that Viaux “intends to increase the level of terrorism in Santiago over the weekend. The objective of this activity is to provoke the UP into retaliatory violence and public disorder.” (Doc 8)

Pages 20-21: Pressure from Kissinger resulted in a sharply worded Chile Task Force directive to the Station the next day. This unique cable, signed for emphasis by the DCI, Richard Helms, ordered the Station to “sponsor a military move” using “all available assets and stratagems” to create a coup climate. “Every hour counts,” the cable stated; “all other considerations are secondary.” “Contact the military and let them know the USG wants a military solution,” the instructions read, “and that we will support them now and later.” (Doc 9)

Page 21: Through a foreign intermediary, the CIA first contacted Viaux on October 5. A second, more substantive contact was then made through a member of the false-flagger team. The Track II daily log for October 9 stated that a “false flag staffer was instructed to contact General Viaux. This officer will offer Viaux moral, financial, and material (arms) support in behalf of an unidentified U.S. group.”

Two of the four-member “false-flag” team who served as a liaison with Viaux and his group can now be identified as Anthony Sforza and Bruce MacMasters. MacMasters was based out of the CIA’s Mexico City Station;

Sforza was a legendary deep cover agent who had spent twenty years operating throughout Latin America, Europe, and Asia pretending to be a Mafia-connected smuggler and using the alias Henry J. Sloman; he had also been working in Mexico City on a top-secret CIA operation against Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba known by the code name JKLANCE. MacMasters entered Chile using a false passport from Colombia. In his half-dozen contacts with Viaux and his men, according to a still classified CIA memorandum, he introduced himself as "a Colombian businessman," and told them he was "representing American business interests such as the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and other unidentified business groups." Sforza passed himself off as an Argentine with connections to Latin American business.

Page 22: to block Allende's ascension to the presidency, "General Schneider would have to be neutralized, by displacement if necessary." The commander in chief, and his "Schneider Doctrine" of non-intervention in Chilean politics, constituted "the main barrier to all plans for the military to take over the government," according to CIA reporting.

Page 23: On October 11, a member of the "illegal" team, Anthony Sforza, met with Viaux and his group several times. That evening, Sforza conferred with MacMasters in the bar of the Hotel Carrera—a meeting the CIA considered a major security breach because the false-flag agents were not supposed to be seen together.

Page 24: the Station chief passed on U.S. intelligence on the ability of Allende's supporters to resist—they "could not hold out for more than sixteen hours"

Page 28 (The Assassination of General Rene Schneider): Late the next day, the six submachine guns and ammunition arrived via the embassy's diplomatic pouch—specially wrapped and falsely labeled to disguise what they were from State Department officials. (Doc 14) It took the Station almost twenty-four hours to arrange a clandestine transfer. At 2:00 a.m. on October 22, Colonel Wimert drove to a desolate spot in Santiago to deliver the weapons to a Chilean army officer waiting in his vehicle. Only hours later, at 8:00 a.m., Schneider's chauffeur-driven car was deliberately struck and stopped by a jeep as he drove to military headquarters in Santiago. Five individuals then surrounded his car; one used a sledgehammer to break in the rear window. Schneider was shot three times at close range. Despite emergency open-heart surgery, he died on the morning of October 25.

Page 29: After briefing DCI Richard Helms, the Task Force directors Broe and Phillips sent back a cable of commendation: "The Station has done excellent job of guiding Chileans to point today where a military solution is at least an option for them. COS [and others involved] are commended for accomplishing this under extremely difficult and delicate circumstances." (Doc 15)

Page 29: Covering up the U.S. Role. On October 24, 1970, the Chilean Congress overwhelmingly ratified Salvador Allende as president. The vote count was 153, which included all seventy-four Christian Democrat Senators and Congressmen, to thirty-seven votes from the Nationalist Party delegates for runner-up Jorge Alessandri. Far from fostering a coup climate, the Schneider shooting produced an overwhelming public and political repudiation of violence and a clear reaffirmation of Chile's civil, constitutional tradition.

Page 30: Two key problems concerned the CIA: first, that Viaux "may not want to be fall guy" for the killing and could implicate the U.S. One of the false flaggers, the Station determined, had given Viaux a written message that could potentially prove a U.S. role. Second and more importantly, a Chilean military officer still had the CIA machine guns, and ammunition that Colonel Wimert had given him—apparently hidden in his house. ... This led Wimert to forcefully retrieve the weapons. "This equipment was subsequently returned to the Station," a CIA report cryptically concluded. Wimert also recalled that he was forced to pistol-whip General Valenzuela into returning the \$50,000 supplied to pay the kidnappers.⁴⁰ To dispose of the guns, as Wimert would later admit, he and Hecksher "drove seventy miles west, to the resort town of Vina del Mar, and threw the weapons into the Pacific Ocean."

Page 31: If any "points of compromise" of the CIA's secret role in the Schneider assassination surfaced in the press or through the Chilean government's investigation, headquarters warned in an October 28 cable reflecting the anxiety in Washington, "absolute denial will be the order of the day even with Ambassador and other embassy colleagues." ... The stonewall strategy succeeded for four years—until investigative reporter Seymour Hersh broke the story of Track II and CIA efforts to destabilize the Allende government on the front page of the New York Times in September 1974. The revelations created an immediate political scandal.

Page 79: Within two days of Salvador Allende's inauguration, President Nixon convened his entire National Security Council to discuss ways to "bring about his downfall." "We want to do it right and bring him down," Secretary of State William Rogers declared at the November 6, 1970, NSC meeting on Chile. The Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, agreed: "We have to do everything we can to hurt [Allende] and bring him down." The secret/sensitive memorandum of conversation of this cabinet meeting—a pivotal document withheld from the Church Committee on the grounds of "executive privilege" and kept secret for thirty years—records the unyielding White House commitment to undermine Chilean democracy, as well as the reason for it. "Our main concern in Chile is the prospect that he [Allende] can consolidate himself and the picture projected to the world will be his success," stated Nixon, providing the only candid explanation of his policy to prevent the democratic election of a socialist from becoming a model for Latin America and elsewhere. "No impression should be

permitted in Latin America that they can get away with this, that it's safe to go this way. All over the world it's too much the fashion to kick us around," the president continued. "We cannot fail to show our displeasure."

Page 83: the United States would "seek to maximize pressure on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation." (Doc 3) The measures identified in NSDM 93 reflected Washington's intent to isolate, weaken, and destabilize Chile until the country was ungovernable.

Page 112: On September 8, both the CIA and the DIA alerted Washington that a coup was imminent, and confirmed the date of September 10. A DIA intelligence summary stamped top secret umbra reported that "the three services have reportedly agreed to move against the government on 10 September, and civilian terrorist and right-wing groups will allegedly support the effort." (Doc 17)

On September 9, the Station updated its coup countdown. A member of the CIA's covert agent team in Santiago, Jack Devine, received a call from an asset who was fleeing the country. "It is going to happen on the eleventh," as Devine recalled the conversation. His report, distributed to Langley headquarters on September 10, stated: A coup attempt will be initiated on 11 September. All three branches of the Armed Forces and the Carabineros are involved in this action. A declaration will be read on Radio Agricultura at 7 a.m. on 11 September. The Carabineros have the responsibility of seizing President Salvador Allende.

According to Donald Winters, a CIA high-ranking agent in Chile at the time of the coup, "the understanding was they [the Chilean military] would do it when they were ready and at the final moment tell us it was going to happen."

Page 113: "Chile's coup d'état was close to perfect," Lt. Col. Patrick Ryan, head of the U.S. military group in Valparaiso, reported in a "Sitrep" to Washington. By 8:00 a.m. on September 11, the Chilean navy had secured the port town of Valparaiso, and announced that the Popular Unity government was being overthrown. ... the military repeatedly demanded that President Allende surrender, and made a perfunctory offer to fly him and his family out of the country. In a now famous audiotape of General Pinochet issuing instructions to his troops via radio communications on September 11, he is heard to laugh and swear "that plane will never land." Forecasting the savagery of his regime, Pinochet added: "Kill the bitch and you eliminate the litter." Salvador Allende was found dead from gunshot wounds in his inner office around 2:00 p.m.⁴⁹ At 2:30 p.m., the armed forces radio network broadcast an announcement that La Moneda had "surrendered" and that the entire country was under military control.

20. Similarly, Rory Cormac has written an article based on declassified documents that shows that⁸:

The Intelligence services of the UK:

1. bribed radio producers to buy airtime
2. meddled in trade union politics
3. influenced universities
4. built up contacts in Christian Dems + “the left wing” parties

They did so for the following reasons:

1. To signal partnership to US
2. To signal friendship to amenable factions in the hope that UK could increase trade relationship once they were victorious.
3. To make “the Latin Americans feel that they are being taken seriously”.
4. To exploit US weakness post-Bay of Pigs

Page 1: Recently declassified documents reveal that, at the start of the 1960s, the UK dramatically increased covert action in Latin America. ... In 1945, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) had ten stations in the region, but this dwindled to just three (in Mexico City, Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro) a few years later.

Page 2: British special political action involved unattributable propaganda, forgeries, and influencing opinion in the church, trade unions and political parties.

Page 5: By the end of the 1950s, SIS had a director of production (intelligence operations) for the Americas, with a deputy director overseeing stations in Latin America. By 1966, Latin America had its own production section, known as P8.

Page 6: Serrano Reyes, the personal field assistant of Leslie Boas, the Regional Information Officer in Caracas, doubled up as foreign correspondent for a number of Colombian, Ecuadorian and Brazilian newspapers. He was also a Venezuelan correspondent for a new Latin American news agency.

Page 6: The UK also relied on the radio – but ruled out covertly purchasing radio stations. Doing so would have been too expensive and difficult to keep secret. Instead, they agreed to bribe local producers and proprietors to buy airtime. One IRD officer boasted ‘that if he was given £100,000 to play with he could buy virtually all the radio commentators in the Andean region!

⁸ Rory Cormac (2020): The currency of covert action: British special political action in Latin America, 1961-64, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2020.1852937 Attachment H pp 9, 10, 18.

Pages 9-10: The biggest challenge on the horizon was Chile where a presidential election was due to be held in September 1964. According to the local ambassador and British intelligence, there was a 'strong possibility' that the socialist/communist coalition, FRAP, would win and put Salvador Allende in charge. 'Once in power the chances are that Allende would be manoeuvred by the communists, either willingly or otherwise, and that the end-product might well be a Government on the Cuban pattern.'

This left the Foreign Office with a choice between devoting all efforts to keep FRAP out of power or 'accepting the inevitability of a left-wing government, and instead trying to build up the moderate Socialist elements of the FRAP [. . .] in the hope of keeping the Government from going too far to the left.' The best course of action, many agreed, was to 'concentrate on building up a wide range of political contacts, particularly among Christian Democrats and the left wing, so that we shall have points of influence through which we might hope to make some impression on events when the election draws near.' In short, the UK preferred the Christian Democrats but prudently backed both horses. It worked through actors such as the Instituto Privado de Estudios Economicos y Sociales – 'the main SPA instrument available' to the UK – and the Chilean Committee of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an anti-communist advocacy group covertly funded by the CIA. The latter had 'organised a number of successful counter-subversive measures during the 1961 meeting of the Executive Committee of WFDY' in Santiago.

Page 15: The Foreign Office now oversaw funding (alongside the Treasury) and seconded diplomats sat full time within the special political action section of SIS in a deliberate attempt to integrate operational planning into foreign policy. SIS maintained 'continuous access to the policy considerations and requirements of the departments concerned,' including IRD.

Page 18: Meanwhile, in Santiago, the IRD tried 'to influence the Chilean government now.' It used the Chilean Committee of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which had excellent contacts in universities and among political parties. For example, the UK pressured the government to undermine a Youth Congress due to be held in Santiago in 1964. They sought to 'stiffen the Chilean Government's privately-avowed opposition', in the hope that the congress would have to move to Havana. In the background, the UK planned to 'consider briefing one or two suitable groups or individuals to attend in order to report on and/or disrupt proceedings'. Indeed, UK deniable pressuring of, and cooperation with, certain governments was a two track process. On one level, interference needed the complicity of local actors, but, beneath it, the IRD used black propaganda and disruption techniques to promote British interests. This

reveals a spectrum of covertness, from confidential training to deniable propaganda targeting those same audiences.

Special political action involved training local security services in counter-subversion, much like Britain was doing in the Middle East, again demonstrating similarities with the British approach elsewhere. Courses were geared towards enhancing the intelligence and security capabilities of local authorities, building trust in the UK, and warning them of the dangers of communism. It was particularly important given the relationship between 'guerrillas and urban terrorists and criminals'. Efficient criminal investigation could play a counter-subversion role in places like Chile, where the IRD officer had developed contacts within the police. However, it brought the UK into competition with the CIA who sought to monopolise any training that involved intelligence or counterinsurgency.

21. It is interesting that ASIO and the UK and USA intelligence agencies have declassified so much and still manage to preserve viable intelligence services. It is surprising that ASIS cannot do the same. Aside from material that discloses confidential sources, the documents should be released in a sanitised manner, redacting the identity of sources whilst revealing the intelligence product.



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