



Technology Service Providers for Banks

Surveys suggest that convenience is the primary reason why consumers select a bank or credit union. Features such as mobile and online banking have become an important contributor to consumer satisfaction. As more banking transactions are conducted digitally, financial institutions that lack in-house expertise are increasingly relying upon third-party vendors, specifically technology service providers (TSPs). TSPs develop the software and customer interfaces for customer account and payment services as well as maintain the digital technology.

As reliance on TSPs grows, regulators are scrutinizing how banks manage their *operational risks*, the risk of loss having to do with failed internal controls, people, and systems, or from external events (as defined by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision). Rising operational risks, specifically in the form of cyber risks (e.g., unauthorized access to customer data), have compelled regulators to scrutinize security programs aimed at mitigating operational risk. Cyber-related disruptions can potentially weaken public trust and confidence in the financial system, thus increasing the potential of a systemic risk panic (i.e., run on bank) event. Consequently, managing cyber-related risks (relative to other types of financial risks) and the associated costs have grown in importance.

Regulatory Background

Banking regulators have a broad set of authorities to supervise vendors, such as TSPs, that have contractual relationships with banks. In addition, using vendors does not reduce an institution's responsibility to ensure that actions are performed in a safe and sound manner. Activities conducted through a TSP must meet the same regulatory requirements as if they were performed by the supervised depository institution itself.

Two laws are of interest: the Bank Service Company Act (BSCA; P.L.87-856) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA; P.L. 106-102). The BSCA provides federal depository institution regulators with authority to examine and regulate TSPs that provide services to banks, including check and deposit sorting and posting, preparation of statements, notices, bookkeeping, and accounting. Section 501 of GLBA requires federal depository regulatory agencies (as well as the Federal Trade Commission) to establish appropriate standards for financial institutions to ensure the security and confidentiality of customer information. In 2001, the prudential depository regulators issued interagency guidelines requiring banks to establish information security programs that, among other things, regularly assess the risks to consumer information (in paper, electronic, or other form) and implement appropriate policies, procedures, testing, and training to mitigate risks that could cause substantial harm and inconvenience to customers. The guidance requires banks to provide

continuous oversight of vendors to ensure that appropriate security measures are maintained.

The regulators periodically update guidance pertaining to vendors. For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC) emphasized in a 2008 Financial Institutions Letter (*Guidance for Managing Third-Party Risk*) that a financial institution's management is ultimately responsible for risks arising when activities are conducted through third-party relationships. In October 2012, the Federal Financial Institutions Council (FFIEC) issued a revised *Supervision of Technology Service Providers* booklet; the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency concurrently issued new *Administrative Guidelines for the Implementation of the Interagency Program for the Supervision of Technology Service Providers*. In April 2014, the FDIC re-issued suggested guidelines for bank directors to consider when outsourcing essential banking functions to TSPs. The National Credit Administration (NCUA), the primary regulator for the credit union system, shares similar concerns. (See "Additional Resources" below.)

Concerns Related to TSP Relationships

The Office of Inspector General at the FDIC (OIG-FDIC) frequently audits the FDIC's oversight process for identifying and monitoring TSPs used by FDIC-supervised institutions and for prioritizing examination coverage. In the 2017 audit, the OIG-FDIC reviewed 48 contracts negotiated between TSPs and 19 banking firms and underscored the following concerns.

- Some contracts lacked provisions that would contractually require TSPs to implement appropriate measures to meet objectives stated in the Interagency Guidelines (e.g., protecting against unauthorized access to or use of sensitive nonpublic personal information).
- Some contracts lacked provisions that would establish business continuity plans, or provisions specifying how quickly operating systems would be restored after a cyber-related disruption. Some contracts had limited information and assurance that TSPs would have sufficient recovery capabilities if their systems were compromised.
- Some contracts lacked provisions that would require TSPs to provide incident response reports after an adverse incident. OIG-FDIC stated that banks should be notified when incidents, such as unauthorized access or misuse of customer information stored in a TSP's data system, occur; the actions taken; the response times; and controls taken to prevent further adverse incidents.

- The TSPs drafted most of the contracts reviewed by the OIG-FDIC. As a result, some contracts' terms may not have been clearly defined, making it difficult to understand the rights and responsibilities of both parties. Although contracts negotiated between larger banks and TSPs typically contain more detailed provisions, the OIG-FDIC still noted inconsistencies in operational risk-mitigation procedures and expectations.
- The OIG-FDIC noted that 41 of the 48 contracts it reviewed allowed TSPs to use subcontractors, further increasing compliance, operational, and reputational risks. In June 2008, however, the FDIC stated that contracts should prohibit TSPs from subcontracting unless the same due diligence standards used to select the TSP are met by subcontractors. The OIG-FDIC did not find sufficient evidence that comprehensive due diligence was performed by some banking firms.

Coordination Among Regulators

Collaboration among financial regulators may facilitate detection of potential financial risks. Federal, state, and self-regulatory organizations have entered into information-sharing agreements to facilitate oversight responsibilities and coordinate compliance challenges. U.S. federal financial regulators on the Financial Stability Oversight Council share information to detect systemic risks to the U.S. financial system. H.R. 241, the Bank Service Company Examination Coordination Act of 2019, would clarify the authority of state regulators to examine certain TSPs in coordination with federal regulators. The bill would also provide for information sharing between state and federal regulators with respect to TSPs in an attempt to facilitate the detection of operational risks related to cyber disruptions.

Challenges for Financial Institutions

While regulators continue to express concerns that banks may face operational risks as a result of their relationships with TSPs, enhanced compliance standards may pose challenges for banks, particularly for community banks and small credit unions.

- It may be costly for institutions to conduct appropriate diligence when selecting TSPs or to structure contracts that adequately protect against possible TSP risks. Smaller banks may also lack the resources to monitor contract compliance to insure that the TSPs are adhering to GLBA and other regulatory requirements.
- Although the industry consists of many TSPs, only a few large TSPs currently provide the majority of digital products to the financial industry. The market power of the large TSP firms potentially could lead to high prices for TSP services, which small institutions may be less able to pay than larger institutions.
- Given lower transaction volumes and costly digital services, some industry observers report that community banks have adopted digital processing technology at slower rates relative to larger banking and fintech firms, possibly inhibiting their ability to compete in various niche product markets. Additional requirements placed

on TSP contracts will likely increase the costs for some of the small depository institutions to close existing technology gaps.

Additional Resources

Office of Inspector General—FDIC, *Technology Service Provider Contracts with FDIC-Supervised Institutions*, Office of Audits and Evaluations, Report No. EVAL-17-004, February 2017.

Office of Inspector General—NCUA, *Audit of the NCUA Information Technology Examination Program's Oversight of Credit Union Cybersecurity Programs*, Report No. OIG-17-08, September 28, 2017.

Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 12 C.F.R. Part 364, February 2001, at https://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/resources/3530/occ-12cfr30_ap_b_inter_guid_estab_stand_safe_info.pdf.

Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, Federal Reserve System Examiner Guidance, at <https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2001/sr0115a1.pdf>.

International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework Comprehensive Version, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, June 2006, at <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf>.

FDIC, *Guidance for Managing Third-Party Risk*, FIL-44-2008, June 6, 2008.

FDIC, *Technology Outsourcing: Informational Tools for Community Bankers*, FIL-13-2014, April 7, 2014.

Government Accountability Office, *Better Information Sharing Among Financial Services Regulators Could Improve Protections for Consumers*, GAO-04-882R, June 29, 2004, at <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-882R>.

Government Accountability Office, *Financial Technology: Additional Steps by Regulators Could Better Protect Consumers and Aid Regulatory Oversight*, GAO-18-254, March 2018, at <https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/691290.pdf>.

NCUA, *Evaluating Third Party Relationships*, Letter No.: 07-CU-13, December 2007.

Penny Crosman, "Can Big Four Core Banking Vendors Oligopoly Be Broken?" *American Banker*, October 7, 2013.

Andy Peters, "Why Fewer Consumers Are Switching Banks," *American Banker*, April 25, 2019, at <https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-fewer-consumers-are-switching-banks>.

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