

# ORGANIZING FOR EFFECTIVE C3 ANALYSIS (U)




PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



EO 3.3b(3)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~(S-CCO)~~ An effective analysis of a country's total Command and Control Communications (C3) could be accomplished through the establishment of an analytic organizational structure



~~(S-CCO)~~ C3 analysis attempts to define clearly and to represent graphically the communications system available to a country's National Command Authority (NCA) for the command and control of its military forces. The total C3 system is immense, since it encompasses the following:

- the communications of all active duty individual Service Arms (Ground Forces, Air Forces, Naval Forces, etc.);
- all para-military units which can be used to augment fixed communications networks;
- all civilian communications which can be adapted for military service when required; and
- all communications spectrums such as HF, VHF, UHF, SHF, etc., and all available communications modes such as cable, microwave, morse, voice, printer, etc.

~~(S-CCO)~~ The sheer size and complexity of a modern C3 system dictates that analysts involved in total C3 analysis have broad enough experience in sub-system target entities to:

- transcend arbitrary target demarcation lines;

~~SECRET~~

- understand the existing Order-Of-Battle structures of the constituent military forces;
- be knowledgeable in state-of-the-art and projected communications equipment and systems available for C3 use; and
- be familiar enough with all of the existing traffic analysis techniques to attack simultaneously all target characteristics.

[REDACTED]

The staff elements in the field are driven predominantly by concern over the station's collection and reporting performance, and normal planning and staff actions inherent to such concern, which inhibits any meaningful C3 involvement on their part.

~~(S-CCO)~~ At both NSA and the field, changes which could be made that would allow us to successfully carry out the sustained C3 analytic attack required.

~~(S-CCO)~~ First, the least costly solution at NSA would be the creation of a C3-oriented line organization staffed to maintain a continuous analytic attack. Ideally,

[REDACTED]

This C3 organization would have sufficient resources and authority to:

[REDACTED]

Under such a system, the current line organizations would continue to function in their traditional role against currently assigned targets. Such a continuation is critical to the success of the C3 organization to minimize data base maintenance requirements and maximize the availability of its time to conduct the required studies.


~~(S-CCO)~~ A second approach would require extensive reorganization to

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Such an approach would greatly enhance our ability to view the C3 system in its totality but may not be feasible at NSA because of the tremendous reorganization required. The


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
[redacted] yet retains the capability to deal with current collection, analysis and reporting responsibilities. While the earlier-mentioned reorganizations at NSA would facilitate the effective division of analysis in the field site, a couple of options are available to the field element which are not dependent on direction from NSA:

[redacted] Of necessity, the processing and collection support activities normally assigned to an analytic section must be held to a minimum to allow this C3 element sufficient time to make the required studies..



Likewise, product reporting would be substantially improved with events related to their proper perspective vis-à-vis changes and improvements in the total system.

~~(S-OO)~~ In summary, I believe that one of our most pressing problems in effecting an analysis of a target country's total C3 system is related to our organizational structure rather than to the analysis of the C3 system itself. Even without major reorganizations of our operational elements,



~~(FOUO)~~ This dynamic approach would place the SIGINT community in the forefront of reporting on organizational, doctrinal, and threat-associated changes, reporting which would be well in advance of collateral indications of such changes from other intelligence disciplines.



~~(S-OO)~~ In the field, processing, analysis and reporting assets must be imaginatively divided in