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
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
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# CRYPTOLOG

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~~THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

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~~Classified by DIRNSA/CNCS/NSA/CSSM 133-21~~  
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# K1- "S.C.A. FIELD MANAGEMENT AND EVALUATION"

P. J. Earnest, K1

While performing some in-house liaison work the other day, I met someone I worked with a few years back. During the exchange and updating of trivia, the inevitable question of where each was now working came up. I responded with "K1" and the reaction was, "Oh, yes, you're involved [redacted] I said, "Wrong! K1 is the office in DDF that serves as the interface between the SCA field stations and NSA/CSS." When I returned to my desk, the thought occurred to me that perhaps there are others at NSA/CSS who are also a little off-base regarding the mission and responsibilities of K1 and I decided that maybe a little advertising was in order.

As a starter, under DDF (Deputy Director for Field Management and Evaluation), K1 is the office that is responsible for evaluating the overall effectiveness and utilization of resources at SCA (Service Cryptologic Agency) field stations. Hence K1's organizational name: "SCA Field Management and Evaluation."

## K1's Organizational Structure and Mission

Within K1, Staff Officers (or Desk Officers) are assigned to monitor, or oversee the activities of, one or more SCA stations. Staff Officers in other Agency elements might respond to this statement by asking, "So what's new? -- we have the same structure in our organization." Well, the unique aspect of the K1 staff is that the responsibilities cut across the entire Agency structure, from logistics and engineering support to operations. Consequently, there is very little, if any, correspondence that impacts on the SCA stations that the K1 Staff Officer does not have the opportunity to see. This, of course, places him in a rather exclusive position from a standpoint of knowing what's going on. Currently, there are ten Staff Officers assigned to K1 whose field and NSA/CSS experience averages about 22 years. This kind of experience provides for an extensive view of the SIGINT system. The staff members have had wide practical experience in previous assignments as commanding officers of field stations, operations officers, traffic analysts, cryptanalysts, linguists, intercept operators, SSOs (special security officers), on ship and airborne platforms, and previous staff assignments in the SCA commands and at NSA/CSS. This kind of varied experience provides for a cadre of experts who can identify a myriad of problems as they arise, and then search out the answers to them.

Briefly stated, K1's mission is to provide staff assistance to DDF. Accordingly, K1 is responsible for identifying weaknesses and problems in the SIGINT system, as applicable to the SCA field stations, and for submitting recommendations for improvement and ensuring that corrective action is taken as quickly as possible. K1 has also been called upon to serve as the focal point for special Agency programs and projects such as the Turkey, Thailand, Philippines, and Taiwan base closures.

There are two principal ways in which K1 satisfies its mission objectives:

- by maintaining staff cognizance and responding to NSA/CSS and SCA daily generated correspondence and performing in-house and SCA liaison; and
- by conducting visits to the field stations under the provisions of the SIGINT Field Performance and Evaluation Review Program (USSID 520), or, as it is more commonly known, the Field Visitation Program (FVP).

## Field Visitation Program

The purpose of the FVP is defined as follows in USSID 520:

"In order to ensure the SIGINT mission of the United States is accomplished in the most efficient and effective manner, DIRNSA/CHCSS, in conjunction with the Commanders of the Service Cryptologic Agencies (SCA), conducts a SIGINT Field Performance and Evaluation Program."

The concept of the FVP is to send teams of SIGINT professionals, from within NSA/CSS and the SCAs, to the field stations annually or as the need may arise. These teams consist of a K1 Desk Officer (Team Chief), SCA representatives, and representatives of appropriate NSA/CSS elements. The visits center around agenda items submitted by the SCAs; previsit discussions with all elements in NSA/CSS that are in any way involved with the field station, and the actual on-site visit. Every aspect of the station's operational mission, from collection to reporting, is reviewed and a report of the findings is prepared and disseminated to the SCA commanders, the NSA/CSS Key Component chiefs, the NSA/CSS elements involved, and the field station visited. Quantitative productivity studies plus the previsit and on-site discussions are the basis for the report. Any issue identified as a

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problem that cannot be resolved via verbal guidance is written up in the report, and appropriate recommendations for resolution are made. The program is conducted free of the aura of inspection, and actions resulting from the visits are resolved at the lowest appropriate organizational level. If matters cannot be resolved at the lowest element of primary concern, they are referred upward within the respective organizations for resolution.


To document the FVP achievements would be impractical. However, general areas which have resulted in significant improvements are:

- "Adjustments in Tasking and Manning";
- "Reconfiguration of Positions";
- "Amendments to USSIDs";
- "Implementation of New Managerial Procedures On-Station";
- "Enhancement of Rapport Between NSA/CSS and the Field";
- "Resolution of Technical Problems";

- "Identification of Antenna Deficiencies";
- "Improved Training Concepts";
- "Improvement in Feedback, Both Technical and Congratulatory";

and a host of other areas. In addition to these tangible achievements, the program also provides the SCA field stations, as well as the NSA/CSS elements, an opportunity to express their candid appraisal of the system to a team of people who view the system from an objective position and whose only purpose is to correct a deficiency and to make recommendations for improvement wherever appropriate.

In summary, the daily functions of the Desk Officers and the Field Visitation Program result in an impartial assessment of field station productivity and the effectiveness of NSA's operational support to the field. Therefore, if you're concerned about a station's productivity, or need information on key station personnel, position types, and orientation of antennas, photographs, correspondence, or whatever matter concerning an SCA field station, try the KI Desk Officer -- he can probably help.



| KI Desk Officers, and areas of responsibility: |  |
|--|--|
| [Redacted]                                     | USN-23, USA-36, USN-49, USA-50, USA-62, USA-65                     |
| [Redacted]                                     | USN-5, USN-44, USA-53, USA-70                                      |
| Mr. Lynn Taylor                                | USN-15, USN-24, USA-51   |
| [Redacted]                                     | USN-20, USN-835, USN-837, USN-844                                  |
| [Redacted]                                     | USN-6, USN-19, USA-71, USA-71J, USN-76, USJ-783, USN-838, USN-838J |
| [Redacted]                                     | To be assigned   |
| Mr. Eddie G. Crawford, USA                     | USA-38; USN-39, USN-45   |
| [Redacted]                                     | USA-31, USN-86, USN-847  |
| Mr. Donald W. Mustard                          | USN-3, USN-25, USA-68  |
| Mr. P. J. Earnest                              | USN-11, USN-13, USN-14, USA-34, USA-57, USN-848                    |

All KI Desk Officers can be reached on x3871s, 3872s, 3873s.

# Letter

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To Honorable Editor, CRYPTOLOG:

I see by the [redacted]

[redacted] Cute typo, but it will never last. One misspelling that does have excellent staying power at NSA is "omission" (instead of "omission"), as printed in the bottom line -- the symbols legend -- of all AG-22 Standard Intercept Traffic Page Prints. The word has appeared that way in all AG-22 page prints for several years now, which must come to several million "occurences" (to use another common NSA misspelling). And it looks as though it will always appear that way in those page prints, now that it's so well established. Does this constitute a "sin of comission"?

32 AAA= IMI SA<sup>o</sup> Constant Reader

LL B OMISSION = START M<sup>o</sup>

(C-000)