


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
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
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# AN EARLY N.S.A. PROPOSAL FOR SATELLITE REMOTING



*I* n August 1962 Joseph E. Horn, then in C03, submitted through channels a paper outlining a future SIGINT system.

While currently engaged in preparing a history of Project [redacted] I have received several requests for copies of Horn's paper, which is reproduced in full below.

William M. Nolte, V38

## DISPOSITION FORM

File No. C03/085/62, 19 September 1962


The attached paper is submitted, as a think piece, not a proposal. The devotion of time to considering the statements made in the inclosure was motivated by the day-to-day pressures on SIGINT activities and the feeling that NSA should have a long range plan which steps beyond the many SIGINT development plans of varying scope that are prevalent today throughout the SIGINT Community. As far as known, the idea as presented is different from any current development plans.

JOSEPH E. HORN  
C03


29 August 1962  
JOSEPH E. HORN/Ext. 3723/C03

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
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
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
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# THE CHANGING FACE OF N.S.A.


One of our constant readers (and almost as constant contributors) is also a pack rat. He has saved, for example, all the back issues of the Agency's *Quarterly Management Review*. Recently he compared the issue for the fourth quarter of FY73 and the issue for the second quarter of FY77, and came up with some interesting figures that he wants to submit without comment. Ed.

How many people are there in your COSC field today, and how has that number changed over the last 4 years? The following figures were taken from two issues (4 years apart) of the *Quarterly Management Review*. Only fields with 100 or more civilians assigned to them are shown.

## NEW AND IMPROVED AIDS FOR BOOKBREAKING

**Virginia Valaki**  
(Bookbreaking and Cryptolinguistics Coordinator, P16)





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Never mind what ever happened to Baby Jane, or even to the CAA!

Wayne Stoffel, P14 asks: **What Ever Happened to COPES?**

**C**ollection by objectives seemed like a good idea. We were facing a future of declining resources and restricted options. Wherever



There was never any real question that we were going to be cut -- in collection positions, in field stations, and in TA processing people. So why not try to be smarter about assigning collection? Have you ever seen an intercept operator sitting at his collection position for 8 hours, waiting for a target that never came up? Well, I have, and it's almost as bad as



It seemed logical to give the collector more information and bring him into the decision process about when to collect and, especially, when to *stop* collecting. Any traffic analyst knows that the way to beef up collection is to beef up the information flow to the collector -- improve the technical support. Whenever you give him more information, the collector does a better job of collecting for you. So why not tell him what you are trying to do and what you expect to get out of the intercept?

So that's what we tried to do -- decide as carefully as we could what our collection *objectives* were, and then set up our tasking so that the collector understood what the objectives were and when they were to be considered satisfied.

Well, then, what happened to COPES? We're using the system -- but it doesn't seem to be

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working. Over and over, one hears that the assignments (SCOL) don't match the target. Other cases are left in a "developmental" status for extended periods (years?), even though the targets [redacted] seem stable and "developed."

Is it a lack of understanding of COPES? Unlikely, since over 1000 people have taken the COPES course (MR-410).

I've heard it said that COPES, used properly, would cause you to lose collection resources. I think that's shortsighted, as I said above, because there was never any question about our losing cover, only *where* (and, as events turned out, we didn't have a lot of choice about that). Our real choices were in how much of our targets we *retained* while cover was reduced.


I've heard it said that, because COPES was new and people were resistant to change, it would

never fly. But that's hard to believe, too, because it's been several years now and it isn't new anymore, and NSA people are more adaptive to change than we like to think -- it's a way of life with us, having to adapt continuously to changes in the target and in our situation.

Then why haven't the "middle" people taken hold of COPES and made it their own? Did we train all the workers in COPES and neglect to teach the middle managers how to use it as a tool?

Or is there some other problem? Is the bookkeeping too involved or too extensive? Does COPES require a stronger traffic-analysis effort than we presently can manage? Or is it something else? What do *you* think?

~~(S)~~



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