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VE CATCOMS-III
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Message # 81 By LLL

Event Open
Sent 09:02:24 15-Jan-86

From : LLNL/F. Jessen
To : NVO/G. Allen & W. Adams

Subject : Mighty Derringer Critique

Info Copy : LAX/R. Young & D. Stillman; LSL/M. Lucas;
PLC/M. Miron; YAR/J. Krofcheck;
ZDV/W. Nelson & D. Eddy; FOR/R. O'Brien

MIGHTY DERRINGER CRITIQUE

F. Jessen
16 DEC 86
REV 13 JAN 87

OVERVIEW

The revised NEST Command Structure worked far better than most people anticipated.

The separation of the NEST CP and TOC functions worked well, but only because the two activities were located within the same building and within short walking distance of each other.

For the first time the Assessment and Intelligence functions/personnel worked in concert with each other.

For once the on-site phone system worked.

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Too many experienced NEST personnel were used as controllers, thereby leaving the player side either understaffed or saddled with too many inexperienced "first time" participants.

Classified communications were very deficient; they simply went from bad to worse or were non-existent in many cases.

Established notification procedures were ignored by NVO from the start; likewise, clear identification of personnel assigned to the various NEST command functions was never accomplished - as a result confusion and indecision ran rampant during the predeployment phase.

Playing out the logistics of deployment vs prepositioning of players needs to be reconsidered, particularly if the players miss playing during a significant portion of the player "time window".

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The threat scenario was not well thought out, and on many occasions the controller injects were either poorly timed, inconsistent with the information already in play, or simply non-existent.

Given the magnitude of this "national exercise", it is unfortunate, if not inexcusable, that many of the participating agencies were not serious players; they either stopped playing too early or did not fully participate right from the start.

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/ PREDEPLOYMENT

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DOE/OTA served as an effective focal point for submitting questions to the Intelligence Community; however, there are improvements which they need to incorporate into their procedures to be better prepared to accomplish this important function.

The LLNL Intel personnel were very helpful in expediting retransmission of classified information via the DYFAX system.

The LANL Technical and Operational assessments were "off base" in that their Teams did not grasp the fact that the information to be assessed related to intelligence reports of a nuclear terrorist threat detected in it's initial stage of activity, rather than the conventional threat message used by an adversary to communicate their threats and demands.

The use of fictitious names for people, places and country capabilities caused a major disruption, and the lack of prompt controller injects simulating normally known, explicit background information was very unrealistic.

The controllers provided bad guidance on the use of existing proliferant country data; ultimately this added a great deal of confusion to an already confused situation, and may have compromised some information to personnel who did not have a "need to know".

Secure CATCOMS was needed.

Closing down the DOE/Germantown communications center at COB (EST) stops all SACNET classified communications and should not happen even during exercises - a SOP needs to be established at the DOE/EOC (Forrestal) for emergency operations on a 24 hour basis; likewise, switching to the special NEST NET crypto key is of questionable value and should be reconsidered as an SOP.

There are no procedures for extended work day / 24 hour operation of the Z Division DYFAX system during emergencies.

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The Director of A&I cannot meet his A&I responsibilities, and also in addition as the LLNL/SSA charged with coordination and preparation of LLNL based personnel and equipment required for deployment; in this exercise, the A&I activities suffered at the expense of LLNL deployment planning.

The LLNL/SSA's listed on the ALERT Roster are not properly trained or informed of their responsibilities in a NEST incident.

There was little or no coordination by NVO with the LABS concerning the requirements for and make-up of the Advanced Party.

The requirement to cut back on the OCONUS, main party deployment was poorly orchestrated and revealed a genuine lack of understanding on the part of NVO management as to the manning requirements to properly meet assigned tasks; there is little sense in attempting to do a job with insufficient resources - if a foreign government won't allow a large enough NEST contingent into their country to get the job done, then NEST should NOT be deployed.

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A&I DEPLOYMENT

CONUS / OCONUS

The Deputy Director for A&I (Wayne Adams / NVO) was picked to accompany the Advanced Party, this turned out to be a wise move and he was very effective at establishing initial contacts with the three other Intel Centers already functioning at the OCONUS site; this resulted in a quick start-up of the A&I intel function once the main party arrived.

Limited, but adequate space was provided for the A&I function in the CP and the NVO support personnel were very accommodating in helping A&I set-up their work space (two rooms, 20*15 and 8*15); equipment set-up went smoothly as did the arrangement of tables, files, etc.

Two 12 hour shifts were established (noon-midnight & midnight-noon) using the predeployment shift assignments; shift change briefings were conducted religiously through out the exercise, and a written A&I summary plus an AIMS update were issued at the end of each shift these measures expedited the shift changes and provided good continuity from shift to shift.

The Director (and Deputy) for A&I maintained a focused activity through out the exercise; requests for providing staff support to the OSC for non-A&I functions were properly, but diplomatically, rejected.

Information flow between A&I (CP) and the TOC went well, mainly because of the efforts of the A&I team with the Intel section members carrying the brunt of the load; the scientific teams located at the TOC need to be more disciplined in relaying information they either generate or obtain back to A&I for analysis.

Information / Data management functions were properly anticipated and functioned smoothly. All incoming information and outgoing assessments & field documents must be processed & logged by the A&I Coordinator before any further distribution, and an adequate sized AIMS staff is required on both shifts. The procedure of using A&I team members to score information reports and assessments for entry into AIMS worked well and should be used on future operations.

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composed and distributed.



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There are not enough A&I Team members to properly staff two separate incident sites; additionally, assessors, NSU members and AIMS/CATCOMS operators are in short supply. This situation was known prior to the exercise; but recommendations to locate all assessors at one site with direct classified communication links to the second site were rejected out-of-hand by the Chief of Staff and On-Scene Commander - as a result, the support at the second site was inadequate.

There is only one stand alone AIMS System; again, the second site suffered.

A faster Xeroxing capability is needed for reproducing multiple copies (typically 12 to 14) of the Assessment Reports, A&I Field Documents, and AIMS Reports.

Recipients of the A&I publications did not establish some sort of simple filing system or clip board method for maintaining their copies of these publications; as a result, some (many?) NEST personnel did not have an opportunity to review all of the A&I published information.

The information contained in the AIMS Reports is organized in a straight forward manner; however, most NEST personnel have not bothered to invest 15 to 30 minutes of their time to learn the reporting format.

Most NEST personnel are still communicating crucial information verbally, which results in much wasted time.

Intel team members were assigned to the TOC to insure a good flow of information between A&I (CP) and the TOC; however, there still seems to be either a misunderstanding or a real lack of interest on the part of most NEST personnel assigned to the TOC - information flow between the TOC and CP must be in both directions, and NEST personnel stationed at the TOC must recognize that they have a responsibility to inform A&I of critical information originating at the TOC or reported to the TOC from the Working Point as soon as



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The Intel function was also disrupted by tracking down faulty controller injects and repeatedly requesting information that was either non-existent or not yet scheduled for release by the controllers; again, this was very bad planning on the part of the exercise planners. Some mix ups are to be expected in any exercise, but Mighty Derringer is noteworthy for the excessive number of these

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disruptions.

The procedures for certifying that Intel Team members from both LLNL/Z-Div and LANL/IT-Div have special waivers for access to "No Contractor" caveated information were non-existent; as a result, LLNL & LANL personnel were barred from entry into the tactical intelligence centers operating on-site.

The Intel Lead Tracking IBM/PC was not set up to be connected to the AIMS computer; as a result, pertinent information could not be electronically transferred back and forth between machines.

The Intel Section needed a word processing capability that could operate in parallel with the Lead Tracking program, or they need to be a user on the Assessment Section's word processor.

Requests for Intelligence information were not coordinated between the field elements of A&I and their respective home teams before the requests were transmitted to DOE/OTA for follow up; this led to some confusion and extra work by the parties concerned.

The end of the OCONUS exercise play was not well managed; proper forensic evaluation of the disabled device was precluded by the rush to close down the Working Point - ultimately this impacted the appropriateness of the disablement recommendations made to the CONUS site.

10 / CONUS

At the CONUS site, the understaffed A&I Team tried hard to make the

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✓/ CONUS

At the CONUS site, the A&I Director was distracted from his primary responsibilities of directing the A&I activities and advising the NEST OSC because of the shortage of A&I personnel; given the situation, the A&I Director should have focused more on providing team leadership and less on functioning as a team member.

At the CONUS site, the NSU had to be divided between two separate

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hostage-barricade locations; again, there were insufficient personnel to cover both sites properly, and certainly not enough personnel to support both locations on a 24 hour basis.

At the CONUS site, the CP was relocated ("notionally") to a safe location; the NSU personnel at the two hostage/barricade locations were never notified of this change, and the CP apparently did not address the risk to the negotiators at their original locations - this blatant lack of concern for the safety of NEST personnel assigned to forward working sites is inexcusable.

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OPER COMMENTS / OCONUS

Living "on-site" is an efficient mode of operation; sleeping accommodations and provisions for a 24 hour cafeteria were good.

Special Intelligence considerations were identified during the course of the exercise, briefed to the NEST OSC, but not actually implemented due to the lack of personnel; in this type of scenario, these Intelligence considerations might very well override many of the standard NEST operations, and impose stringent, additional OPSEC conditions upon NEST.

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