

N80-87-3

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From N. Bailey

JDU
7-0429

Form 1325.7
(6-81)

Option to 31, 14, Approved by NAFIS, June 1978

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INFO: (6 Hrs.) (3 Hrs.) (30 Mins.) (ASAP)

5. TYPE OF MESSAGE
 Single Address
 Multiple Address
 Title Address
 Book Message

FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER USE
MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
NR: 258 DTG: Z

6. FROM
LLNL
W. E. NELSON, EMERGENCY RESPONSE
LIVERMORE, CA
N. Bailey

7. *W. E. Nelson*
(Signature of authorizing official)
8. DATE 1/21/87

8. TO
MR. CARL N. HENRY, MS K497, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY,
P.O. BOX 1663, LOS ALAMOS, NM 87545
SUBJECT: "QUICK LOOK" REPORT - MIGHTY DERRINGER
During the MIGHTY DERRINGER exercise, I had the opportunity to observe at four locations: at LLNL for threat assessment; at OCONUS site during NEST advance party arrival; at NYO Home Team before main party deployment; and at Camp Atterbury CONUS location.
LLNL
1) Threat Assessment
Threat assessment of the data proceeded in an appropriate manner but was soon overrun by other parts of the NEST organization. Many did not wait for establishment of credibility before acting. - This "leaning forward in the
BE BRIEF - EUMINATE UNNECESSARY WORDS

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69
11713783
21P 8:45
69

10. ORIGINATOR (On separate lines, enter Name, Routing Symbol, & Tel. No.)
WILLIAM E. NELSON
L-389
2-8950

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foxholes" made shambles of an orderly assessment of information and establishment of information exchanges between intelligence organizations. The one-hour assessment report was issued appropriately, but there were reservations of issuing a four-hour report, since everyone was acting and making notifications as though the threat had been confirmed as real.

2. Notifications

Observation: A number of LLNL NEST team members received notification directly from NVO to go on one-hour standby status. The "old boy" network was a day or two ahead of official notification for possible deployment.

Recommendation: A number of emergency response procedure documents have been written and distributed, but they seem to be ignored when they should be used. Notifications exercises done by the book might be in order.

NVO

1. Deployment

Observation: NVO, in developing main party deployment roster struggled with the numbers/types of personnel. The list had been debated a number of times to fit expected transportation capabilities. The emphasis seemed to be on taking as many as possible (acceptable for an exercise) rather than determining minimum requirements.

Recommendation: Develop a series of different sized deployment rosters based on function and hours of operations requirements for selected scenarios.

2. Recovery Plan

Observation: During the discussions of the deployment rosters there was no mention of a recovery plan for covering a domestic problem (real or exercise).

Recommendation: Procedures call for a recovery plan before deployment. Referring to the emergency response procedure manuals during planning (checklists) and operations would prevent overlooking important considerations such as recovery. Also, running communications/procedure drills rather than relying on people to read the manual at their convenience would lead to more consistent performance.

CONUS

Bill Chambers has already listed most of the issues and concerns for the CONUS location, so I will not repeat his listing but only add some comments and a couple of additional concerns that I have.

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- Technical difficulties with the secure communications systems was mainly due to the use of "split pairs" in the telephone cable. Extra care should be taken so that all telephone lines to equipment are "paired" lines.
- The use of a radiation match surrogate source in a realistic location provided a proper situation to evaluate search procedures. Escorts for search teams should have experience in covert operations ~~to help prevent inadvertent acts that would alert terrorists.~~

(b) (1)

- Display of organizational chart with names filling the boxes was very helpful.
- A strong liaison link between Search and FBI was established and it functioned well. There was some delay in establishing this link. A higher priority by DOE to establish this link may be necessary since inexperienced FBI may not recognize the requirement.

OPERATIONS

1. Standards

Oberservation: We have written a number of procedures to guide our actions, but no standards have been devised by which to judge whether performance is an acceptable level. Procedures and standards would give a perspective to operations that allows the various groups to coordinate their work in a more efficient manner.

Recommendations: The Operations Working Group should develop a strawman of communication standards of content and time schedule between locations (NVO, Labs, HQ, field locations).

ADDITIONAL PERSPECTIVES

The exercise was of sufficient size so as to prevent any one person from knowing everything that was going on. Listed are a number of items that should be considered in the after action report. They may have been done appropriately, but I am not aware of it.

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1. Sitreps: Were sitreps sent on a timely basis to all locations? Was the content up to standard? What means was used -- CATCOMS, FAX, Voice?
2. Procedures: There are three publications, OSC Handbook, OCONUS and CONUS OPS Plans available, yet I did not see any of them being used during the exercise. Are they useful? Do they need changing? OPS WG needs feedback.
3. Adversary Takedown: Were means other than frontal attack considered to incapacitate the adversaries?

(b) (1)

- Scenario - very broad addressing difficult problem.
- Plan structured well to stress players.
- Good phase changes -- made clear expectations.
- Creditable.
- State and local involvement a plus.
- Things went so smooth that it was amazing; frustration seemed very low.
- Startup - general briefing good.

(b) (1)

- First Governor statement was good, but no questions was bad.
- Search was good - need better communication.
- Secure communications was insufficient.
- Class/Unclass - classified information group (TOC) worked well.
- Two stages in technical work - actions that stimulate device, and those that don't - were not well identified.
- Photos to searchers assisted their operations.
- Transmission of secure information needs greater capacity.
- Are there plans for cleanup? Answer - Yes.

(Roy N. Lennox)

- People knew where to go to get information.

CONTROLLERS (at CONUS)

- State/local players needed more local injects - written or voice inject for free play. A damage sheet would help.
- Functional vs TTX exercises caused some problems.
- UK precepts
 - Quick to set down, make contacts, and identify problems.
 - More functionality play would have been helpful.

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- Technical support from FEMA to state/local was needed - logistical, equipment.
- Message system within FRC us needed. FEMA did not use status boards.
- More definite time sequence for exercise - time mileposts would help keep exercise smoother.

(John LaBarre)

- First time in exercise.
- Had concern about turf issues - did not find a problem.
- FEMA is headed toward functional groups vs organizational groups.
- Felt too much free play - needed more stress from injects.
- FBI, DOE, FEMA general agreement for switch of control went well. Better than in Washington.

(Bill Chambers)

- Mixing working schedules (24 hour vs 8 hour) caused problems.
- OPSEC - mix classification problem (FBI SECRET vs DOE SECRET).
- Mix of FTX, CPX, TTX required constant attention to keep players straight.
- Communications between sites needs improvement.

HOT WASH NEST/FBI (at CONUS)

(John Simeone)

- Control interface went well, remained flexible.
- FBI internal - lack action from FBI/HQ.
- Lack guideline direction from NSC to FBI.

(Supervisor - FBI)


- Need more linkage in FBI CP with NEST and FEMA.

(Bill Blacketter - FBI liaison to NEST)

- Very positive - things worked well.
- Impressed with NEST resources and capability.

(Bill Mosiman)

- Player FBI/EOD interactions needs examination, especially during and immediately after assaults.



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(Don Schueler)

- Startup excellent.
- Problems ID went quickly.
- Transition between organizations went well.

(Gene Sasso)

- Search organization went well.
- Interchange of sitreps during operations need improvement.

(Ray Duncan)

- C&C went well.
- Transition of organizations went well.

(Bill Erwin)

- Fred Koopman liaison to DOE - went well.
- Rick Anthony liaison to FEMA - not so good.
- Advisory Board needs outline from SAC office.

(Al Davison)

- Bob Hampton impressed with NEST planning and execution.

(Tom Dahlstrom)

- Search forward TOC good.

(Dick Smale)

- Consequence phase - yield was a little small.
- Communications need improvement.

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