



~~SECRET - NODIS~~

42/2

18787

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED
Washington, D.C. 20520
Authority NND 96900
By NARA Date

NOV 25 1969

TO: The Under Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: EUR - George S. Springsteen, Acting
SUBJECT: Further Approach on Moscow Microwave Signal (TUMS) -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

BG 13 Moscow

DISCUSSION

It seems evident that the Soviets will continue to deny the existence of any special beam of microwave radiation directed against the rear wall of our Chancery building in Moscow and that they will stand on the oral statement passed to Ambassador Beam on August 19 and discussed further with him on November 6. (Moscow telegrams 4343 and 6226, attached as TABS B and C.) The statement nevertheless proposed a joint investigation of the radiation.

In addition to considering what our next move vis-a-vis the Soviets should be, we should also take account of the possibility that the existence of the beam may become public knowledge and aired in the American press. This possibility arises because the existence of the signal has become known to some Embassy personnel now serving in Moscow or who have served tours there in the past. As you are aware, an employee who served in Moscow during the period 1960-62 filed a claim with the Bureau of Employees' Compensation, contending that the signal was responsible for the development of cancer by his wife. The employee's

XR Pol 17-6 US-USSR

XR PER 14-12 Moscow

(B)

NODIS REVIEW
Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S
Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II
Date: 12/19/69

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

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3/24/76

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-2-

wife died some months ago; and we understand that the claim, which was being processed on a classified basis, is not being pressed at the moment.

We see no way at this time of persuading the Soviets to terminate the signal. Our inability to determine the exact purpose of the beam and the absence of any conclusive evidence that the level of radiation has had harmful effects on Embassy personnel tend to weaken our case. Nevertheless, the uncertainties surrounding this issue dictate that we should not drop this matter entirely but let it be known that we reserve the right to raise the matter in the future, as circumstances may warrant.

Therefore, we propose that Ambassador Beam make a further approach to the Soviets to express our continuing concern over the directional beam and our regret that the Soviet authorities have not responded in a satisfactory manner to the facts of the radiation as presented to them. Ambassador Beam would further reserve the right to raise the issue again and note the ever-present possibility of publicity damaging to our relations.

We believe the foregoing alternative commends itself over others which we considered. For example, one option might be to drop the matter entirely and to make no further representations to the Soviets. We reject this option because we believe it important that the Soviets be informed that we reserve the right to renew representations and that their responses to date remain unsatisfactory. Another possibility considered was to pursue the dialogue by agreeing to a joint investigation. We concluded in this connection that we should not grant the Soviets access to our chancery with special instruments and that it would be a simple matter, in any event, for the Soviets to turn off the signal for the duration of any tests to which they agreed. Thirdly, thought was given to our initiating a publicity campaign with a view to pressuring the Soviets to discontinue the beam. By initiating publicity, however, we would stimulate a Soviet suspicion that we were deliberately exacerbating

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relations over what the Soviets regard as a minor issue; we also doubt that publicity could change the Soviet position. Finally, we could escalate the representations to your level or that of the Secretary. This, we believe, is probably unwarranted as long as we are unable to demonstrate that a dangerous level of radiation is present.

In the past, other options were considered and rejected for reasons with which we still agree. These additional options were: (1) to install and activate equipment which would continuously jam the signal; (2) to advise the Soviets that unless the signal ceases, some other negotiations with them will be discontinued, such as the arrangements for the construction of new embassies here and in Moscow; and (3) to illuminate the Russian Embassy in Washington with a signal similar to the Moscow signal. (A memorandum addressed to the United States Intelligence Board discusses these options in detail--TAB D.)

Following Ambassador Beam's next approach, we would, of course, continue periodic monitoring of the signal to detect any unusual or heightened activity.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached cable (TAB A) to Ambassador Beam containing instructions for another approach to the Soviets as well as suggested contingency press guidance should existence of the Moscow signal suddenly become general knowledge and aired publicly.

Approve SW 12/2

Disapprove _____

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-4-

Clearances:

O/SY - Mr. Gentile (in draft) *EW*
PER/MED - Dr. Nydel (in draft) *EW*
EUR - Mr. Swank *CCS*

Attachments:

TAB A - Draft telegram to Moscow. (NODIS)
TAB B - Telegram from Moscow 4343 (NODIS).
TAB C - Telegram from Moscow 6226 (NODIS).
TAB D - Memorandum for the U.S. Intelligence *710*
Board (TOP SECRET).

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EUR:SOV:ADubs:erk
11/25/69 x 23738

15



SECRET
Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

200910

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

2 DEC 69 22 36z

NODIS REVIEW

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW

Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II

Date: 3/24/70

STATE 200910

~~NODIS~~

FOR AMBASSADOR

REFERENCES: Moscow's 4343; Moscow's 6226

1. It appears evident from Soviet oral statement of August 19 and your conversation of November 6 with Kornienko that Soviets will continue to deny existence of any special signal of microwave radiation directed against Embassy and that they will stand pat on various aspects of position that they have maintained in past. Soviets no doubt believe that they are in fairly good position as long as radiation level in vicinity of Embassy remains far below danger level recognized by U.S. Government.

2. After having considered various alternatives as to

DRAFTED BY: *aw*
EUR:SOV:ADubs:erk

DRAFTING DATE: 11/25/69
TEL. EXT.: 23738

APPROVED BY: *[Signature]*
The Under Secretary

CLARANCES:
EUR - Mr. Swank *[Signature]*
EUR - Mr. Springsteen *[Signature]*
S/S - Mr. Brewster *[Signature]*
O/SY - Mr. Gentile (draft) *[Signature]*
PER/MED - Dr. Nydel (draft) *[Signature]*

Page 2 of telegram to MOSCOW

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Classification

how we should proceed, we concluded that most prudent course to follow would be to reiterate once more that we reserve right to return to this question in future.

3. You should, therefore, call on Kornienko following his return from Helsinki and express to him our continuing concern over the harassment being carried on in form of the directional beam and note our regret that Soviet authorities have not responded in a satisfactory manner to facts of radiation as you had presented them to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. You should state that USG reserves right to raise this issue again and note ever-present possibility of publicity which could cause unnecessary complications and damage to our relations.

4. If Kornienko asks about proposal regarding joint investigation, you ~~xxx~~ should note that investigation would make little sense as long as Soviets refuse to permit investigation of signal source, which we have clearly identified, during actual period of operation.

(FYI. We do not, of course, wish to permit Soviet access to Embassy chancery with special instruments and equipment. END FYI.)

5. In event existence of signal becomes public knowledge and Embassy or ~~x~~ Department are queried about it, we propose, with your concurrence, to reply along following lines:

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Page 3 of telegram to MOSCOW

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(a) Since mid-1950s Soviet authorities have indeed beamed microwave signal against rear wall of U.S. chancery building in Moscow. Full investigation of this signal was conducted. ~~Following availability of appropriate equipment for this purpose~~ USG was especially concerned over possibility that microwave radiation could have harmful biomedical effects on Embassy personnel who served in exposed positions in our chancery. Investigations to date have not provided ~~any conclusive~~ evidence that the radiation level, which has remained below danger levels recognized by U.S., has proved harmful to American Embassy personnel. Nevertheless, this form of harassment has led the USG to make repeated protests to the Soviet Government. Soviet authorities have denied consistently that a special beam is directed against the Embassy and have maintained that investigations by the Soviets indicated that there was no radiated signal in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy about which we need be concerned. The Soviet Government has also suggested in reply to our protests that signals which we were intercepting likely emanated from instruments in use in research laboratories or establishments in the area close to the Embassy. The Soviet Government further claims that any radiation in the vicinity of

Page 4 of telegram to MOSCOW~~SECRET - NODIS~~
~~Classification~~

the Embassy is only a tiny fraction of the danger levels established by the U.S. and well below Soviet standards.

(b) The USG continues to monitor this signal and has reserved the right to make further approaches to the Soviet Government on this matter should circumstances warrant.

GP-1

END

RICHARDSON



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Department of State TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW

STATE

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

REFERENCES: Moscow's 4343; Moscow's 6226

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2. After having considered various alternatives as to

DRAFTED BY: EUR:SOV:ADubs:erk	DRAFTING DATE 11/25/69	TEL. EXT. 23738	APPROVED BY: The Under Secretary
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CLEARANCES:
 EUR - Mr. Swanwick
 EUR - Mr. Springsteen
 S/S - Mr. Brewster
 O/SY - Mr. Gentile (draft)
 PER/MED - Dr. Nydel (draft)

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Classification



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

5
EOR

R 191512Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3691
BT
SECRET MOSCOW 4343

4 3 7 6 Q

1969 AUGUST 19 PM 1 28

~~NODIS~~

FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

SUBJECT: TUMS

NODIS REVIEW

Oct. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC

Oct. B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S

Oct. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II

Date: 8/24/76

REF: MOSCOW 2355, STATE 092764

1. CHIEF MFA AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (KORNIYENKO) ASKED ME TO CALL TODAY SINCE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETSOV STILL OUT OF TOWN. DLOSSON ACCOMPANIED ME.
2. REFERRING TO MY MEETING WITH GROMYKO ON MAY 26 ON TUMS, KORNIYENKO READ OPAL STATEMENT (TEST BELOW) WHICH HE SAID KUZENTSOV HAD WISHED TO GIVE ME. STATEMENT DENIES ANY SPECIAL BEAM IS DIRECTED AT EMBASSY; THAT, IN ANY CASE, RADIATION LEVEL SURROUNDING EMBASSY IS MUCH LOWER THAN SAFETY STANDARDS ACKNOWLEDGED IN WASHINGTON; AND AGAIN PROPOSES A JOINT INVESTIGATION, INCLUDING INSIDE THE EMBASSY.
3. I TOLD KORNIYENKO THAT OUR FINDINGS WERE DIFFERENT. I GAVE HIM DIAGRAM SHOWING HOW BEAM IS DIRECTED FROM NEARBY SOVIET APARTMENT AT THE OFFICE SECTION OF THE CHANCERY AND EXPLAINED THAT RADIO BEAM COVERS FROM THE THIRD TO THE TENTH FLOOR OF THE CHANCERY. I PASSED OVER HIS PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT INVESTIGATION, POINTING OUT WE WERE PRESENTING NEW SPECIFIC EVIDENCE.
4. KORNIYENKO AT FIRST TRIED TO DISMISS PATTERN OF BEAM AND THEN, RETURNING TO THEME THAT SOVIET SCIENTISTS MAINTAIN THERE IS NO DANGER FOR HUMANS, ASKED WHY WE WERE DISTRESSED. I REPLIED THAT THE BEAM IS A LOW-ENERGY HIGH FREQUENEY SIGNAL, AND WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN ABOUT ITS LONG-TERM EFFECTS. I POINTED OUT THAT SIMILAR ENERGY RAYS IN EXPERIMENTS ON ANIMALS HAD BROUGHT ABOUT PHYSIOLOGICAL CHANGES. I ALSO MENTIONED THAT A FORMER EMABSSY EMPLOYEE, WHOSE WIFE HAD RECENTLY DIED OF CNACER, WAS BRINGING SUIT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SOVIET SIGNAL HAD CAUSED HER ILLNESS. I REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAD TREATED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOVIET RADIO BEAM IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE BUT THAT WE COULD NOT GUARNTEE THERE WOULD BE NO PUBLICITIY BECAUSE OF NUMBER OF PERSONS RETURNING TO WASHINGTON WHO HAD KNOWLEDGE OF IT. KORIYENKO'S REJOINDER WAS SIMPLY THAT SOVIET MEDICAL SPECIALISTS HAD EXCLUDED ANY POSSIBILITY OF DANGER TO HUMANS.
5. I CONCLUDED BY ASKING THAT HIS SPECIALISTS STUDY THE DIAGRAM OF THE SIGNAL THAT I HAD GIVEN HIM.

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6. TEXT OF SOVIET ORAL STATEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RAISING ONCE AGAIN BY YOU IN A CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER A. A. GROMYKO OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING ALLEGED IRRADIATION (OBYLCHENIE) OF THE BUILDING OF THE USA EMBASSY IN MOSCOW BY RADIO WAVES, A THOROUGH VERIFICATION WAS REPEATEDLY CONDUCTED, THE RESULTS OF WHICH CONFIRMED THAT NO SPECIALLY DIRECTED RADIO IRRADIATION OF THE EMBASSY BUILDING IS CARRIED ON.

7. THE PRESENCE OF A DEFINITE LEVEL OF RADIO IRRADIATION IN THE AREA OF THE EMBASSY IS EXPLAINED BY THE WORK OF RADIO ELECTRONIC APPARATUSES OF DIFFERENT INSTITUTES AND LABORATORIES, LOCATED NEAR THE EMBASSY. THIS LEVEL DOES NOT REPRESENT, HOWEVER, ANY DANGER TO THE HEALTH OF PEOPLE. MOREOVER, IT IS MANY TIMES LESS THAN THOSE NORMS OF IRRADIATION BY RADIO WAVES, WHICH ARE ACKNOWLEDGED IN THE USA AS COMPLETELY SAFE.

8. INASMUCH AS THE EMBASSY HAS AGAIN RETURNED TO THIS QUESTION, WE RENEW OUR PROPOSAL THAT SOVIET AND AMERICANS JOINTLY CONDUCT MEASUREMENTS OF THE LEVEL OF RADIO IRRADIATION IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE EMBASSY BUILDING AND ALSO INSIDE THE BUILDING. END QUOTE.

9. COMMENT. PUBLICITY ON TUMS WILL PROBABLY BREAK EVENTUALLY AND I DO NOT SEE HOW OR WHY WE SHOULD PROTECT SOVIETS IF IT COMES. THEIR OBVIOUS DEFENSE WILL BE THAT WE ARE DECLINING THEIR OFFER OF A JOINT INVESTIGATION, WHICH OF COURSE WOULD MAKE LITTLE SENSE BECAUSE THEY CAN EASILY ARRANGE THAT THERE WILL BE NOTHING TO INVESTIGATE. I DID NOT HOWEVER CATEGORICALLY REJECT THEIR PROPOSAL AND BY SUBMITTING NEW EVIDENCE, LEFT AN OPENING TO GO BACK TO THEM AGAIN. IF THAT FAILS, IT WILL BECOME A QUESTION OF COMPARATIVE CREDIBILITY, WITH OUR RECORD BEING THE MORE CONVINCING.

10. I CAN DISCUSS MATTER PRIVATELY WITH DOBRYNIN BEFOR HIS RETURN, AS WAS DONE IN THE PAST, AND SECRETARY MAY CONSIDER TAKING IT UP WITH GROMYKO IN NEW YORK, AS SECRETARY RUSK DID IN 1967. IN MEANTIME WE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH PREPARING THE RECORD. GP-3.

BEAM

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

EWB
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

R 061530Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4945
BT
SECRET MOSCOW 6226

Control: 1269Q
Recd : 6 Nov 69
11:40 a.m.

~~NODIS~~

SUBJECT: TUMS

REF: STATE 145635 AND MOSCOW 4343.

1. THIS AFTERNOON I ASKED KORNIYENKO WHETHER SOVIET EXPERTS HAD STUDIED OUR DIAGRAM OF DIRECTIONAL BEAM AND WHAT WERE THEIR CONCLUSIONS.
2. HE SAID SOVIET SPECIALISTS HAD MADE NEW INVESTIGATION WHICH REVEALED THAT NO ELECTRONIC BEAM WAS DIRECTED AGAINST EMBASSY AND THAT RADIATION LEVEL IN THE VICINITY WAS HARMLESS.
3. I SAID I WOULD REPORT HIS ANSWER. MATTER WAS MYSTERY IN VIEW OF FIMNESS OF EVIDENCE WE HAD AND I RESERVED RIGHT TO RETURN TO IT AGAIN.
4. I DID NOT GIVE KORNIYENKO A TIME CHART OF SIGNAL WHICH OUR EXPERTS HAD PREPARED SINCE SPORADIC NATURE OF EMISSIONS APPEARED TO ME LESS CONVINCING THAT DIRECTIONAL DIAGRAM. CHART WILL BE POUCHED WASHINGTON.

GP-4 BEAM
BT

NODIS REVIEW	
Cat. A	• Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B	• Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C	• Caption and custody retained by S/S
Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II	
Date: 31 24 19 76	

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1967-69 SUBJECT-NUMERIC FILE
File: BG 13 MOSCOW