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[The President met with Luis Echeverría Alvarez, Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and translator Donald F. Barnes]

[Seating arrangements, press photos, introductions, small talk]

Nixon: Well I want to say that we – I think it's very appropriate that the first meeting that we have after I returned from Moscow is with the President of Mexico.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: I think it's very important that we establish the proposition that our two countries consult very closely, and this demonstrates it to the world.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: Dr. Kissinger, as you know Mr. President, is going to China. He's leaving tonight – he's leaving about ... this afternoon.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: If you like, after he returns some time later in the summer I would like to have him come to Mexico City and give you a first-hand report on his trip as he did earlier when he used to go to Acapulco.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: We can't – we don't do this with very many heads of government because there are too many governments, but with Mexico and, like, Japan and the European countries and Canada, we try to have that kind of communication.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: [Unintelligible] that would suit your convenience.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: In the meantime, I know that we have a number of subjects that you'd like to touch and it seemed to me, Mr. President, in the bilateral area the most pressing, urgent

problem from the discussions that I've had with my staff who have talked to your staff is the salinity problem.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: And I want to – because we are good friends, even though we've only met once before – I thought that if you would like that we might tackle that problem right away. I'd like to hear your views and then I will try to see what I can do on the problem.

Translator: *Bueno, quiero—*

Nixon: And then go to other subjects in which of course we would be mutually interested in.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: But if you would prefer another procedure or agenda, you tell me . . .

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *No. Digale que le voy a tratar el asunto en dos partes brevemente.*

Translator: I will review [unintelligible] the problem, Mr. President, in two parts and very briefly.

Echeverría: *Que la primera es una síntesis de este problema, y la segunda ... aquí viene una nota que redactó el Secretario de Relaciones de México después de haber hablado con el doctor Kissinger anoche.*

Translator: Now first to the summary of the problem, Mr. President, and second is a note drafted by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico after his conversation with Dr. Kissinger last night.

Nixon: I have a note from Kissinger too.

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *Que nunca el presidente de México había ido al valle de Mexicali, había tratado, había observado y tratado el problema desde lejos sobretodo a través de ingenieros que son los que distribuyen el agua.*

Translator: In the past, the President of Mexico has never gone to the Mexicali valley, which is the affected area, and always studied this problem from a distance and usually reviewing the reports of engineers who were the ones responsible for distributing the water.

Echeverría: *Que en el último mes acabo de estar dos veces recorriendo todo el valle, estando en muchos rincones y hablando con muchos campesinos.*

Translator: Within the course of the last month, Mr. President, I have visited this valley twice and I've gone to many far and remote corners of the valley and talked to a great many agricultural people in the valley.

Echeverría: *Que el hecho concreto es que en California y Arizona se utiliza agua mucho mejor que un poco adelante en México.*

Translator: The fact of the matter is [unintelligible], Mr. President, is that people in California and Arizona use water that is considerably better than what is used by their counterparts in Mexico just a little [unintelligible] away.

Echeverría: *Que el tratado de 1944, y en él intervino el gobernador Rockefeller y colaboradores míos, nos dijo hace poco: "nunca pensamos que el agua pudiera ser distinta..."*

Translator: And referring back now to the 1944 treaty, Mr. President, one of the authors of that treaty, one of the ones who worked on it on the American side is now Governor Rockefeller and he told some of my assistants recently that they never dreamed that this matter – that the water would not be other than pure.

Echeverría: *Él era coordinador de asuntos interamericanos e intervino... ¿verdad?*

Translator: He was coordinator of Inter-American Affairs at that time, he participated in the [unintelligible] treaty.

Echeverría: *Entonces un... un 10 por ciento de esta agua se comenzó a arrojar al río, de unos pozos, con un agua que nunca se utilizó para riego, de unos fósiles que han tenido ahí muchos siglos.*

Translator: So it came about that ten percent of their water of the river has come from wells – water from a very, very ancient, fossilized wells – and was discarded. This water is centuries old and has been discarded in the river.

Echeverría: *Otro 17 por ciento es agua un poco menos mala que si se tomo del Colorado y después de regar por medio de drenes vuelve al río y también se nos envía.*

Translator: Another 17 percent is not as bad as this first category. It is Colorado River water that is used for irrigation and it rains back into the river itself.

Echeverría: *Entonces, de acuerdo con la plática que tuvo el Secretario de Relaciones con el Señor Kissinger anoche, yo creo que pudiera salir de esa plática sin problema inmediato del señor Presidente Nixon ni con California ni con Arizona, una declaración*

que sería un extraordinario testimonio para México y para América Latina porque están muy pendientes en este [unintelligible].

Translator: And so accordingly and as a result of the conversation held last night between our foreign secretary and Dr. Kissinger, I believe that out of this meeting could come – without creating any immediate problem for you, Mr. President, either in California or in Arizona – but out of our meeting could come a statement that would be a very strong testimony and witness for Mexico and for Latin America that is [unintelligible].

Echeverría: *Es decir, si nosotros expresamos que los agricultores mexicanos deben de regar con agua semejante a la que emplean los agricultores americanos sin reducirles el agua, es decir México transitoriamente puede prescindir aunque sea contabilizada, de esa agua [unintelligible. . .] a reserva de que quede una declaración de tipo general que a él comprometa, yo estoy consciente de los actuales momentos, ¿no? con nadie en Arizona y en California y nosotros haremos el sacrificio transitorio sobretodo en la parte más mala del agua, aunque nos la tomen en cuenta como contabilizada; porque siendo mejor agua pues sirve para regar aún siendo menor cantidad, en igual forma que el agua que lleva esa parte mala.. ¿Me explico? con menor cantidad buena...*

Translator: And so for example in this, Mr. President, I think if we said something in a general way that Mexican farmers should enjoy water of a quality equal to that enjoyed by American farmers, without reducing the amount of water given to Mexico, I think this is something that would be a positive step. We would be willing to have a discarding of the bad water that is going in to this area, even if it's counted toward the amount that is provided according to the treaty [unintelligible. . .] But if we have a general statement of this kind and it would not be used in any way, wouldn't create any problems – I realize what year this is [unintelligible] is facing . . . we would not want to create any problems for you in Arizona or California – we would be willing to temporarily sacrifice the total amount of water we would receive, as I said, even if the amount that is discarded is taken away from our account. Because we believe that a better quality of water, even in a reduced amount, would be better than the larger amount that we have now that is not as good.

Echeverría: *Dígale que el Secretario de Relaciones después de hablar con el Sr. Kissinger redactó esta nota que me acaba de entregar hoy en la mañana si usted se la quiere traducir...*

Translator: This is what the foreign minister drafted after being with Dr. Kissinger and it was given to the President this morning.

Echeverría: *Que... que yo supongo que está redactada en una forma muy equilibrada... ¿usted quiere traducírsela al señor, eh?*

Translator: I have a transcript for you [unintelligible]. It's a very balanced note . . . [unintelligible].

[Translator reads draft note on salinity issue in English to President Nixon. President Echeverría asks the translator to read an additional, new section of the draft note, which he does.]

Echeverría: *Dígale al señor Presidente que claro que yo pienso una cosa técnica, él no puede comprometerla sin un estudio minucioso.*

Translator: We of course understand, Mr. President, that in a technical matter such as this you cannot commit yourself without a very careful study.

Echeverría: *Que sé que hay intereses de agricultores en Arizona y en California que están pendientes de esto.*

Translator: And I know that there are interested farmers in Arizona and in California that are watching this very closely.

Echeverría: *Pero que por otro lado, hay en México gran interés, hay mucha tensión en América Latina, y hay un problema real que es serio, ¿verdad?*

Translator: But on the other hand, there is a great deal of interest in this in Mexico, there is a great deal of tension all over Latin America and we are faced with a real and serious problem.

Echeverría: *Entonces podría haber una declaración muy equilibrada más o menos como el del doctor Kissinger y mi Secretario de Relaciones se pusieron de acuerdo.*

Translator: And then I think that we might come out with perhaps a balanced statement, more or less along the lines of what Dr. Kissinger and our foreign secretary put [unintelligible].

Echeverría: *...Algo que aunque sea en términos generales, entonces yo puedo en México disponer qué tanto, sin hacer ningún daño en lo que reciben de agua los agricultores de Arizona y California, puede ser que esa agua que es notoriamente mala no se use y empezar un testimonio común de un estudio más a fondo al problema.*

Translator: Well even if this is in general terms, I could then go back to Mexico and take that there, so that without impairing or hurting the farmers that use the water in Arizona or in California, that we not use the very and particularly bad water coming to us and then we could have a very [unintelligible] and serious technical study to the problem

Echeverría: *Que es la síntesis de lo que yo pienso.*

Translator: This is a synthesis of some of my thoughts, Mr. President.

Nixon: Well, Mr. President, there is the problem that you have alluded to: our Congress, the congressman in Arizona and California, who represent the interests of the farmers there.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: I realize this is a very, very sensitive issue for your people, but as you know, farmers on either side of the border always want something for themselves.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: And of course, if I were to take some action at the executive level which Congress would not approve, this would be a very unfortunate development.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: So what I would like to suggest is that we have a – you and I—

[Interruption when someone enters to warn the gentlemen about the time and President Echeverría's schedule.]

Nixon: The second point is, Mr. President, that – let me talk very pragmatically to you. As you know, I've just returned from a discussion with Mr. Brezhnev.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: Now here we were dealing with – basically, uh – not on a basis of personal friendship with Brezhnev, and not personal belligerence but, basically the United States and the Soviet Union have very great differences.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: But the reason that our conversation succeeded was that he and I talked directly, as you and I are talking now. And when I could do something I said so, or when he – and he took exactly the same line, or if I couldn't do it, I said so.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: Now, I did not want to make a statement on the water that the Congress would reject, because that could be misleading you and misleading your people, your farmers. . . [unintelligible].

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *Lo entiendo perfectamente.*

Nixon: You understand. Right.

Nixon: Let me say, Mr. President – what I would like to do with you is make a personal commitment . . . to do something before the end – to work this out before the end of the year.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: [Unintelligible.]

Echeverría: *Si, claro entiendo, pero... una expresión de carácter general, de la que ahorita todo México está pendiente y todos los norteamericanos de origen mexicano, quizás en el sentido de que viendo los problemas técnicos, estudiándolos a fondo se encontrara una solución. Es decir bueno, quizás tengamos que encontrar el camino, el camino técnico para que los campesinos mexicanos reciban un agua semejante a los campesinos norteamericanos porque es un sentimiento muy vivo.*

Translator: You know, Mr. President, really I think that an expression of a general nature would be useful because all of Mexico is waiting for something like this and I'm sure that this is in the thoughts of all the Mexican-American citizens that live in the United States. And I think that if we could express something in the sense that a deep technical study must be made in order to we find a solution to this problem – that it is a technical problem, we will have to take a technical and [unintelligible] solution so that the Mexican *campesinos* can in the future count on having the same quality of water as American farmers do, because this is something that is felt very, very deeply and bitterly in Mexico.

Nixon: No, I didn't mean to rule out a statement at the end of our meetings. There should be a general statement. But what I wanted to tell the President directly is what I think we can accomplish by the end of the year.

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *Sí.*

Nixon: For example, when I met with your predecessor Díaz Ordaz [unintelligible], we discussed salinity down at the Amistad Dam, we discussed salinity again when I was in Puerto Vallarta, we discussed again when he came in to San Diego. And each time we left it to the State Department to work out the matter. And I thought it was being settled. And now I have decided that it has to be taken to the presidential level, and that I, with you, must work this thing out.

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *Yo entiendo los problemas del señor Presidente Nixon claramente... ¿no? es decir no haría una proposición que fuera forzada para él.*

Translator: Mr. President, I understand very, very clearly what you are talking about and I have no intention of making any proposal that might be awkward for you.

Echeverría: *Pero, cuando tenemos que multiplicar todos los vínculos en un plan de comprensión; si mañana por ejemplo, ya que hayamos realizado una segunda plática, él tiene una expresión de interés por los agricultores mexicanos, que han estado recibiendo un agua muy distinta a los agricultores norteamericanos, pero también para tranquilizar a los norteamericanos, habla de estudios técnicos para [unintelligible] del año, esto será sin duda muy positive. Esta nota se puede ver un poco más despacio en el sentido, meditarla en el curso del día de hoy para ver qué expresión sale mañana.*

Translator: Yes, Mr. President, we have to multiply the ties in the spirit of understanding that surrounds our two peoples and our two governments, and for example tomorrow after we will have held our second meeting perhaps we could just say that you expressed an interest in the lot of Mexican farmers, that they should receive water as good as that received by their American counterparts, but at the same time to allay the fears on the part of the American side to speak of a technical study in depth that will have to be made in the course of the year on this problem. I think that this will be a very positive contribution. And I think that if you will read this note a little bit more carefully perhaps and think about it today, we can see whatever more thoughts you might have . . .

Nixon: What I would suggest if it agrees with the President is that Dr. Kissinger this afternoon and General Haig talk again with the foreign secretary and work out some language to be put out publicly. And his foreign secretary will submit it to you and Kissinger will give it to me.

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *Sí, me parece muy bien.*

Nixon: Now, now, Mr. President, there is a little sensitive bureaucratic problem here. The State Department has been handling this matter.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: And so when you are discussing the matter with other people, for example, Secretary Rogers and others, you should of course raise this and express your concern, but simply say in general terms that you hope that a satisfactory statement can be made in a communiqué. But just have in mind the fact that we will work on the statement here at the White House rather than at the State Department – with your secretary of state.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: Let me state in that connection that it seems to me that the problem has been – using our vernacular – been kicked around for 26 years – no, 28 years, since 1944. And I

will make you my personal commitment that I will work out a solution in cooperation with you before the end of this year.

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *Dígale que ha estado en manos de técnicos, de ingenieros, pero que el asunto está pero netamente político también ¿verdad? Porque en la frontera – dígame que Baja California es la frontera de toda América Latina con México, con Estados Unidos. Es decir, es, es el testimonio de una actitud norteamericana frente a América Latina, es el principal problema que hay precisamente en la frontera que México es la frontera de toda América Latina con los Estados Unidos. Que me parece a mí no dejar de considerar eso.*

Translator: Yes Mr. President, the problem I think has been also that for many years this issue has been left in the hands of technicians and of engineers when it is essentially a political problem. But I would like to leave one thought with you in your consideration of this: that the border of Baja California with the United States is more than a border with Mexico, it is the American border with all of Latin America. And so I think this is very important for you to remember this – that this is perhaps the most important problem coming from south of the border as far as the United States is concerned, and that as I said, the border is a border between the United States and all of Latin America.

Echeverría: *Dígale usted al señor Presidente que en el discurso que voy a tener dentro de una hora en el Congreso, yo ratifico mis tesis del tercer mundo frente a las potencias, porque si en América Latina yo no tomo la bandera nos la quita Castro Ruz. Estoy perfectamente consciente de eso.*

Translator: I would also like to say, Mr. President, that in the speech that I will deliver to the joint session of Congress within the hour, I will reiterate my principals of the Third World *vis-á-vis* the great powers of the world. Because—

Nixon: [Interrupting] The Echeverría doctrine.

Translator: *La doctrina Echeverría.*

Echeverría: *Sí.*

Translator: Because if I don't take this flag in Latin America, Castro will. This is something I am very, very conscious of.

Echeverría: *Dígale que nosotros lo sentimos en México – que yo lo sentí en Chile, que se siente en Centroamérica, que se siente entre los grupos juveniles, entre los intelectuales – que Cuba es una base soviética en todos sentidos, militar e ideológica, que la tenemos en las narices.*

Translator: Because we in Mexico feel, Mr. President . . . I sensed this also when I was in Chile and in my meetings with the Central Americans, with the young people, with intellectuals, that it is clear that Cuba is a Soviet base in every sense of the word, both militarily and ideologically, and we have this right up against our noses.

Echeverría: *Que sin duda los Estados Unidos estratégicamente, no permitirían nunca, ni en el Caribe, ni en México, ni en Centroamérica, ni en Sudamérica otra Cuba, no; que estamos conscientes de eso.*

Translator: We are also aware of the fact, Mr. President, that undoubtedly from a strategic point of view that the United States would not ever permit the [unintelligible] that has come under Cuba in the Caribbean, in Mexico, in Central or in South America.

Echeverría: *Que el Doctor Castro y Cuba son instrumentos de penetración en los propios Estados Unidos; lo quieren ser en México, y en todos los países de América Latina y que no cesan en eso en una u otra forma.*

Translator: And we are also aware of the fact that Dr. Castro and Cuba are instruments of penetration even into the United States itself, not to mention Mexico and the other countries of Latin America. They are unceasing in their efforts, using one path or another.

Echeverría: *Que evidentemente los grandes subsidios que recibe y su gran complicidad, es para proyectarse en grupos norteamericanos y grupos latinoamericanos. Y que si nosotros, concretamente México, no adopta una postura progresista dentro de la libertad, con la amistad con los Estados Unidos, esta corriente va a proliferar. Que yo lo siento en América Latina como se siente en algunos grupos de los Estados Unidos.*

Translator: And I believe, Mr. President, that it's obvious that with his very heavy subsidies and his very deep complicity, there is an attempt to project the influence into these groups within the United States and Latin America also. But if we in general, and Mexico very much in particular, do not adopt a progressive attitude within a framework of freedom and of friendship with the United States, the current at this time could proliferate. This I have felt not only in Latin America, but I think in certain groups in the United States it's the same.

Echeverría: *Que él no ha tenido ningún escrúpulo en sacrificar a su país y todas las libertades por ser un instrumento soviético, que está realizando un gran viaje en estos momentos por muchos países socialistas pequeños.*

Translator: He has not had any compunction at all in sacrificing his own country and eliminating all freedoms there just to be a tool of Soviets. And we see now that he is making a grand tour of some of the smaller socialist countries in Eastern Europe.

Echeverría: *Y que el gran problema para toda América Latina es en este momento el crecimiento de la población, el desempleo y las tensiones sociales que el comunismo internacional provoca. Que por tanto es muy importante, yo creo, para mi es una cosa*

de gran preocupación personal, que le quitemos la bandera con testimonios reales de cooperación a nivel oficial y con la iniciativa privada y con la tecnología.

Translator: And this is a very serious problem strengthened in Latin America at the present time by population growth, unemployment and social tensions that are aggravated by provocation by international communism. And therefore I believe it is very important – and this is something that I feel very deeply myself – that we must take their flags away from them by taking positive steps of cooperation, by using not only government but private enterprise and technical approaches as well.

Echeverría: Que el sábado próximo, pasado mañana en la noche, yo voy a cenar con el presidente de la Anaconda, de la General Motors, y de la Kimberly creo... y 40 más. Que nos invitó el gobernador Rockefeller, que les voy a decir exactamente lo mismo; es decir crear una política oficial del gobierno de los Estados Unidos y una política de la inversión privada. Pero con mucha comprensión de lo que está pasando, que este no es el mundo de hace 15 años.

Translator: Saturday evening, Mr. President, I will have dinner with the president of Anaconda, of General Motors, of Kimberly and about 40 other leading Americans executives in the home of Governor Rockefeller. And I'm going to tell them the very same thing: that there should be an official policy on the part of the United States government and on the part of American private enterprise investment structures that they should have a full understanding of what is going on. The world that we've got today is not the world of fifteen years ago.

Echeverría: Dígame que México tiene que contribuir más que ningún país latinoamericano a quitarle una bandera de progreso a Castro Ruz, que no es cosa de rivalidad personal, sino es que tenemos que, que preservar valores y provocar fuentes de trabajo con tesis distintas de lo que Castro Ruz significa como un incentivo en América Latina.

Translator: And therefore I believe that we must find other ways of – Mexico, rather, has a greater responsibility perhaps than any other Latin America country in taking the... and in planting these flags of progress – preventative action – from Castro. And there's no element of personal rivalry in this at all, it's just that it will allow for the fact that I think that we have to preserve certain vital values and in doing this provide a source of work for the people of Latin America because if not a different approach – we are using a different approach than that used by Dr. Castro.

Echeverría: Que le voy a decir a los inversionistas que necesitamos hacer inversiones privadas y mixtas. Que necesitamos alentar a los empresarios privados latinoamericanos y llevar tecnología, crear empleo.

Translator: I will tell these American investors on Saturday night that we need to have the confidence of mixed, joint investments and we must encourage the growth of the Latin

American businessman class and we must receive technology and therefore create more jobs.

Echeverría: *Que le acabo de presentar a los jefes de la iniciativa privada mexicana, de los empresarios, de los comerciantes, de los banqueros que vienen conmigo, junto con los líderes obreros y campesinos, y que están conscientes de esas tesis para el desarrollo económico.*

Translator: I just presented to you in the receiving line, Mr. President, some of the beacons of Mexican private enterprise; there are even businessmen and bankers that I brought with me, together with the leaders of our labor and our peasant movement. And they're all very well aware of the fact of the need to develop this new approach for economic development in our –

Echeverría: [Interrupts] *Y que a estos dirigentes de negocios americanos, yo les voy a repetir: “queremos y podemos ser socios, y no empleados; vamos a buscar mercados juntos en el mundo.”*

Translator: And what I will tell these American business leaders when I speak with them, and I will repeat, that we want to be and can be partners with you but not employed there. Together we can seek other world markets for our [unintelligible].

Echeverría: *Porque con la excepción de Brasil, que ha resuelto el problema, en todo América Latina existe el dilema e incentivos para los grupos de estudiantes, de obreros. Pensamos que las soluciones soviéticas no son las acertadas, que es lo que se esta debatiendo en este momento.*

Translator: Because all over Latin America, with the exception of Brazil that has solved the problem in its own way, in all of Latin America this dilemma is being debated by those students and workers: is perhaps the Soviet solution the best one for this problem, is it the wisest one? And this is what is being debated at the present time.

Echeverría: *Y que a todos los países del tercer mundo donde hay subempleo y hay pobreza, observamos soluciones capitalistas de tipo mixto preservando nuestras libertades o el otro va a avanzar.*

Translator: And throughout the countries of the Third World where underemployment is rising and poverty, either capitalism or mixed – or close to capitalism will provide a solution and within a framework of a situation of freedom or the other ideology is going make progress.

Nixon: What is the President's view with regard to the problem of expropriation? When he talks to these leaders of American business in New York, I think that's the question they will ask. The American business leaders that he refers to have a very different attitude than the American capitalists that came to Mexico, for example 50 years ago, or even 25 years ago. But on the other hand, if they think there is a substantial risk for

expropriation, then the amount that they will invest and the partnership that they will participate in will be substantially reduced.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: For example, Mr. President, I was talking to an American businessman – a very big businessman in this country – recently about the problems in the hemisphere. And he said very honestly to me, he said there are only two countries, major countries, he would invest in: Mexico and Brazil. And the reason is that each of these countries, each in its different way, provides stability – stability without the fear of violent takeover or expropriation.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: I'm not suggesting that the answer is dictatorship to the right. But what I am suggesting is that in the hemisphere if we could get more countries to follow the example of Mexico – which has freedom of speech, as we saw with all these reporters, freedom of the press, and elections, a mixed economy – this would help enormously in attracting the private capital into Latin America, which is potentially much greater than the government capital in these economies. Because private capital is expansive while government capital is limited by budgets and aid programs and so forth.

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *Dígale, que, yo veo en síntesis un porvenir de inversiones mixtas norteamericanas y locales de cada país para la creación del empleo y la producción o bien muchas convulsiones sociales.*

Translator: I see the future, Mr. President, in the sense that this is my synthesis of the future, of either – on the one hand American capital invested in a mixed economy with [unintelligible] capital and personnel for the creation of jobs and an increase of production or, on the other hand, a great deal of social disorder.

Nixon: Or [unintelligible].

Translator: [Unintelligible].

Echeverría: *Claro. [Inaudible] solución social. Pero eso de América Latina se refleja dentro de los Estados Unidos, en las minorías raciales, en las gentes de origen mexicano, de origen puertorriqueño, en distintos grupos norteamericanos, porque ganan terreno – o hay soluciones económicas equilibradas o ganan terreno en América Latina y eso se refleja en los Estados Unidos.*

Translator: And another phenomenon, Mr. President, is that these events that take place in Latin America – when solutions are not found – are reflected within American society itself in Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans and other minority groups, such as other

racial minority groups, and therefore either we find the balanced economic solution to the problems of our neighbors to the south or there will be events in these countries that will have repercussions within your own borders here.

Echeverría: *Que claro hay un gran éxito en las conferencias del Sr. Presidente Nixon en China y en Rusia, pero todo lo que China y Rusia puedan hacer por causar problemas lo van a hacer. Que en América Latina lo sentimos. Yo lo observé en México, lo he observado en México lo vi en Chile directamente, y en cada país latinoamericano en una u otra forma.*

Translator: And of course, Mr. President, the great success of your meetings in China and Russia – but in spite of the great success of these meetings [unintelligible] they will do whatever they can to create problems in the United States in one way or another. But in Latin America we feel that there are other events can take place – I sense it in my own country, in Mexico, I saw it in Chile more directly and in each Latin American country in one way or another I have seen the seeds of popular – of this problem.

Nixon: Well I think that the, ah – first, the President's analysis is very perceptive about the problems of the hemisphere. And second, I appreciate the fact that he is taking the lead – speaking up not only for his own country, which of course is his first responsibility, not to [inaudible] but to the people – but he's taking the lead in speaking up for the whole hemisphere. Because Mexico, as he said earlier, provides not only the U.S. border with Mexico but the U.S. border with all of Latin America. And Mexico also, you could say, is the bridge – the bridge between the United States and the rest of Latin America. I think for the President of Mexico to take a leading role in speaking about the problems of the hemisphere is very constructive. That's one of the reasons why I welcome this opportunity to get the President's views on not only his own country, but also settle problems of salinity with Kissinger and Haig and the foreign minister. Also, to get his views on these very profound problems that shape the whole hemisphere.

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *Dígale que ahora que yo venía para acá, grupos de mexicanos se comunicaron conmigo de Angela Davis. Que están enterados del propósito que había de una organización que está manejando Ángela Davis ahora, de hacerle una manifestación en San Antonio para protestar por la existencia de presos políticos en México, que son grupos muy comentados, quizá comentados por Chile, quizá comentados por Cuba, o algunos grupos de los llamados chicanos, que están en la universidad de California en una íntima relación.*

Translator: When I was about to leave from Mexico for this trip, Mr. President, I was informed by my various people that groups of Mexicans had been in touch with friends of Angela Davis in this country. And that we were aware of their purpose of the organization that Angela Davis is connected with in this country of working to mount a key demonstration in San Antonio protesting the existence of political prisoners in Mexico. All of this is related with people in Chile, with people in Cuba, with the so-

called “Chicano” groups in the United States, with certain groups in Berkeley, California – they’re all working closely together.

Echeverría: *Dígale que, que tan luego como hubo la idea de que ella fuera a San Antonio a una manifestación a protestar por cosas internas de México dentro una tesis de: “fuera todos los presos políticos en todos los países,” nosotros los vimos en México.*

Translator: As soon as this idea was [unintelligible] that a group going to San Antonio to actually interfere in the internal Mexicans affairs with this idea they had of saying that all political prisoners in all other countries should be released, we were immediately informed about this.

Echeverría: *Que están en una intensa actividad, y que esos fenómenos de América Latina se reflejan aquí en los Estados Unidos.*

Translator: They are working very actively – and again, these events that take place in Latin America have repercussions within the borders of the United States.

Echeverría: *Entonces, tenemos que ofrecer soluciones en América Latina apartándonos paulatinamente en donde se puede en los países con dictaduras.*

Translator: And therefore we must offer solutions in Latin America, following a course there that will enable us to, ah, sort of move away whenever possible from those countries in which dictatorships have [inaudible].

Echeverría: *Ya esos señores de los grandes negocios americanos les voy a decir, para la propia prosperidad de los Estados Unidos piensen que el continente es uno y que ustedes son los que deben de ofrecer negocios con capital y tecnología pero asociados, compartiendo responsabilidades.*

Translator: And this is what I am going to tell these American business leaders when I meet with them later in the week, that they should look at the entire continent as a single unit and therefore it is incumbent upon them themselves to offer the capital and technology to work as partners, sharing the responsibility as partners in the continent.

Echeverría: *Si no verá que el tiempo pasa el comunismo se va vender más como un incentivo, como una solución.*

Translator: Because if not, if time goes on and solutions aren’t found, communism will [unintelligible] as a possible alternative.

Echeverría: *Y eso se refleja aquí.*

Translator: And that will be reflected in the United States, too.

Echeverría: *Que cuando las medidas económicas del quince de agosto, del Sr. Presidente Nixon, que unas dos semanas después me visitó el presidente de la Anaconda en México. Estábamos en un proceso desde meses antes para que México comprara acciones de la Anaconda... en una gran mina que tenemos en Cananea, Sonora, del cobre... y alguien le preguntaba si había sido una represalia de México por la sobretasa del 10% y no por las medidas de defensa económicas del presidente Nixon del 15 de agosto, y el primer defensor fue el presidente de la Anaconda.*

Translator: I'd like to give you an analysis that illustrates some of the things that have been going on out here. When in Europe you made your announcement of August 15 of economic measures that would be taken by the United States, Mr. President, a couple of weeks later the president of the Anaconda Copper Company was visiting in Mexico. And we had been for months working on a formula by which Mexico would buy shares in the Anaconda Company with respect to the operations of a very large copper mine we have in the state of Sonora. And so the president of that company was asked if America was doing a reprisal for the ten percent surcharge and these other economic defense measures that you announced on August 15, and the first person to defend Mexico's conduct on that occasion was this American businessman, the president of Anaconda.

Echeverría: *Quiero decir en América Latina no hay capitales suficientes ni hay tecnología ni investigación científica suficiente y está creciendo la población.*

Translator: And so we have this problem in Latin America, there is insufficient capital, there is insufficient technology, there is insufficient scientific research on the one hand, and an increase in the populations on the other.

Echeverría: *Entonces toda la propaganda soviética y china es que allá si se resuelven los problemas y que el sistema capitalista y las libertades tradicionales no lo resuelven.*

Translator: And so the line taken by Soviet and Chinese propaganda is that in respect to these countries they do solve these problems, whereas the capitalist system with all its traditional freedoms does not solve these problems.

Echeverría: *Quiero decir que tenemos que fomentar inversiones equilibradas con responsabilidades compartidas con la preservación y el fortalecimiento de las libertades.*

Translator: Which means that we must produce of system of intelligent investments and shared responsibilities within a framework of increased and strengthened union.

Echeverría: *Dígale que al presidente Allende, pues lo apoyan el partido comunista y el partido socialista y otros tres o cuatro. Y yo le decía que cual va a ser el camino para fomentar que haya inversiones industriales y comerciales en nivel medio y nivel pequeño porque las ha ahuyentado del todo y es la gran carencia de cosas en Chile.*

Translator: While I was talking to President Allende, who as you know was supported by the Communist Party and the Socialist Party and three or four other parties, and I asked

him, what is the practice you are going to take to promote industrial and commercial investment in your country on the medium and small degree? Because after all there is a great scarcity of articles, of product material.

Echeverría: *Y que independientemente de una política nacionalizadora, nacionalizadora de recursos básicos, no encuentro en el camino para estimular la inversión en muchas industrias y en muchos negocios donde es necesario hacerlo.*

Translator: And leading to what is already a policy of – a nationalistic policy, a policy of nationalization of the base resources of the country, they have not been able to find a way or a path to stimulate investment in industry and businesses which they need very much.

Echeverría: *Que sólo en la dictadura socialista es posible prescindir de la inversión privada, porque toda la inversión que hay que hacer trata de hacerla el Estado.*

Translator: Because only in a socialist dictatorship can you do away with private enterprise because all investments at least are attempted by the state itself.

Echeverría: *Y que por los problemas económicos, el dilema que se plantea para los próximos 5, 10 ó 15 años es la solución castrista de dictadura como entrega a una potencia socialista y como una base anti norteamericana ideológica y militar.*

Translator: And so we see that as far as the economic problems or dilemma faced by the countries of Latin America in the next five, ten or fifteen years is on the one hand you have the Castro solution of dictatorship with its accompanying surrender to a socialist power, serving as an anti-American base both from an ideological and military point of view.

Echeverría: *Y que tenemos que pensar en el próximo año pero también en los 10 ó 15 próximos años. Entonces la propaganda es ... con los Estados Unidos ustedes no van a resolver ningún problema, la solución está en el que ha hecho Castro.*

Translator: And so we must think not only about what we do next year but what we do affecting the next ten or fifteen years because we are faced propaganda from abroad that the United States cannot solve our problems – the solution comes from Fidel Castro.

Echeverría: *Entonces está utilizando la Unión Soviética al régimen cubano, ocultando con la propaganda las grandes fallas que hay y divulgando algunos progresos que han tenido, reales por supuesto.*

Translator: And so the Soviet Union is using the crutch of the Cuban regime, and with the campaign of propaganda that [unintelligible] the great failures that they have met, but trying to [unintelligible] some progress has been made whether it be real, more or less.

Echeverría: *Y no obstante la prosperidad de los Estados Unidos hay muchos grupos de estudiantes universitarios en magníficas condiciones de alimentación y de posibilidades de estudiar que han estado yendo desde hace unos 8 ó 10 años a Cuba.*

Translator: And in spite of the great prosperity of the United States, and in spite of the fact that American students are living in a society that permits them to be very well-fed and to study under optimum conditions, for the last 8 or 10 years they have been happily going to Cuba.

Echeverría: *Entonces urge un replanteamiento de la política norteamericana frente a toda América Latina.*

Translator: And so, sir, [unintelligible] I am urging you for a whole new shaping or recasting of American policy vis-à-vis Latin America.

Echeverría: *Porque lo que pasa en América Latina se va a reflejar forzosamente en los Estados Unidos.*

Translator: Because as I say whatever happens in Latin America inevitably has repercussions in the United States.

Echeverría: *Somos una unidad indisoluble.*

Nixon: Yes, I see what you're saying, and I think the President should emphasize this in his talk to the business leaders: that they cannot look at Latin America as a divisible entity, but they must look at the whole hemisphere. And if poison afflicts one part of the body, it eventually is going to affect the other. If the poison of communist dictatorship spreads through Latin America, or the poison of unrest and [unintelligible] revolution spreads through Latin America, it inevitably will infect the United States. You cannot separate one part of the body from the rest.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: The problem that the President will run into with the businessmen – which he will not run into with regard to his own country, but with regard to the other countries of Latin America, except possibly for ... the big country is Brazil – is this: which comes first, the chicken or the egg? The big American businesses, I think, are now ready to make major investments on a partnership basis, on a basis in which the nationals of the countries involved will – as is the case of American partnerships in business there in Mexico – will participate in management and stockholding [unintelligible]. But the difficulty is they now are afraid many times to invest – afraid because of the fear of instability in certain countries, and of expropriation.

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *Si ellos se ligan con intereses locales en una proporción razonable no habrá el problema.*

Translator: If they tie in with local interests in these various countries in a reasonable degree of sharing, this problem would not exist.

Echeverría: *Porque los intereses locales en nuestros países, que son mucho más pequeños que los Estados Unidos tienen relación con el gobierno con las organizaciones de trabajadores con los políticos en el Congreso, etcétera.*

Translator: Because our local interests in our various countries – which are smaller in themselves than the United States – have a great deal of bearing on what is done by the government, by the labor organizations, by politicians, and by our [unintelligible] groups.

Echeverría: *Porque el dilema es o hay inversión con tecnología moderna o hay un creciente desempleo.*

Translator: So the dilemma we face is, either we have on the hand investments which are accompanied by modern technology, or an increase in unemployment.

Echeverría: *Y el desempleo es el mejor caldo de cultivo para propagar el comunísimo.*

Translator: And unemployment is the best breeding ground for communist propaganda.

Echeverría: *Porque en América Latina no hay ayuda económica como aquí para el desempleo.*

Translator: Because in Latin America there is no way that we can help unemployed people there using the systems you have for instance in the United States.

Nixon: I think one thing that would be very helpful for the President to emphasize in his statements in Latin America would be the fact that there is a responsibility to provide stability in government, and some guarantee for the protection of the right kind of private enterprise, such as is the case in his country. Now this is a very delicate matter. I do know this: nobody in the United States can say that because then it looks as if *we* are interfering in Latin America and trying to tell *them* what kind of government they should have. On the other hand, I think if the President of Mexico speaks out on this subject – without of course trying to say that the Mexican system is the one that everybody ought to have in Peru – but if he could simply say that, emphasize that after he returns from his trip (if he believes this to be the case) that he finds a readiness, a willingness of American private enterprise to come in on a partnership basis to Latin America. But there must be on the other side responsibility in governments in the Latin American countries to provide stability for that kind of investment.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: For example, the President has been to Santiago. I do not know President Allende, and I do not judge him, I don't know what his plans for Chile may be in the future. But on the other hand, as the President well knows, at the present time *all* foreign capital is fleeing Chile, trying to get out. And no new capital is coming in. Now that's their choice. But if the Chilean experiment is repeated in varying degrees in other Latin American countries, there's no chance that the big corporations that the President will be speaking to at Governor Rockefeller's residence will put their money there. Because there are other parts of the world – for example, countries like Indonesia, Thailand, in Asia and countries in Africa, even, where they think there's a better chance for their investments to survive. What I am saying to the President is not directed to his country. I'm using his country as an example – if more countries in Latin America could follow the example of Mexico, I think you'd see a tremendous boom in investment from the United States and from Europe and Japan. But I think the problem is that this instability in government, the fear of revolution, of expropriation now makes [inaudible].

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: But I want to tell the President that on my part, and he can count on me and he can tell the investors in New York, like [inaudible], that he can count on me to urge the American business community to invest in Latin America. I think it's vitally important for the United States that we not allow the Cuban tragedy to infect the rest of the Caribbean and eventually the rest of Latin America. And frankly, to be quite candid, I think it would be very detrimental to all of us to have the Chilean experiment spread through the rest of the continent. It will be a very unhealthy hemisphere if that will be an element - the wave of the future.

[Translation into Spanish]

Nixon: I would also like to say one other thing to the President, without treading on any of Mexico's traditional attitude toward maintaining an independent policy. I think it's very helpful that Mexico take a greater leadership role in the OAS in matters like this. I am not thinking now that Mexico should take this role as any agent of the United States. But I think that Mexico is in an ideal position to do so. And otherwise the leadership role will be taken by other leaders in the continent who cannot speak as effectively as can the President of Mexico.

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *Dígale que yo pienso que así es en realidad.*

Translator: I agree with that approach.

Nixon: In other words, let the voice of Echeverría rather than the voice of Castro be the voice of Latin America.

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *Dígale que no son razones personales, pero que estoy sintiendo que así es en este momento en América Latina.*

Translator: This is not for personal reasons, but I do feel this to be the case very much in Latin America at the present time.

Echeverría: *Queyo no sé que vayan a opinar los señores senadores y los señores representantes dentro de unos momentos del Congreso, pero que mi discurso está un poco bravo.*

Translator: I don't what the [break in tape, inaudible].

Echeverría: *¿Si? Es decir, que no es un discurso diplomático, que son verdades muy llanas y un llamado a una más profunda comprensión entre los dos medios mundos de América.*

Translator: This is not a diplomatic speech, I speak some very flat truths and I make an appeal for a greater understanding of these two half worlds that we have in the hemisphere.

Echeverría: *Quesí él no tiene inconveniente, cuando yo me refiera a nuestras relaciones y al problema de la salinidad sin comprometer al presidente Nixon, puedo decir que ya comenzaron pláticas en las que habrá una profunda comprensión para nuestros problemas, un paso adelante.*

Translator: If you have no objections, Mr. President, when I refer to the bilateral relations between the two countries, I would like to say that without making any agreement whatsoever that in the problem of salinity that we have begun to talk about it and that I found deep understanding on your part—

Nixon: Good.

Translator: —of the problem and this is a first step forward.

[National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger enters the room]

Kissinger: Hello, Mr. President.

Echeverría: *¿Cómo le va doctor? Mucho gusto.*

Nixon: [To Echeverría] He's been briefing some members of Congress and he just got rid of them so he could come down and hear you

[Translation in Spanish]

Echeverría: *Sí.* [Chuckling] *Sí.*

Nixon: We had one thing we agreed upon, Henry – sit down, Al – the President and I agreed that if you and the foreign minister, if you have a chance this afternoon, could work out a statement on the salinity problem. We've discussed it at some length – if you could work out a statement that we could make publicly. And then of course I would say at the same time that you would indicate a private commitment to the President that I will make with regard to settling it by the end of the year, appointing somebody, a top presidential emissary or expert to give me advice, et cetera. But we need something for the communiqué. We cannot sit here and just say we discussed it. And I agreed with the President that you and his foreign minister would work a communiqué this afternoon.

[Translation in Spanish]

Echeverría: *Sí como no. Sí, eso se puede pensar en el curso en el día de hoy ¿verdad? para no* [unintelligible].

Translator: This you can think of or be thinking about during the course of the day today what actually we will be going to say on this subject.

Kissinger: I have, Mr. President—

Nixon: The foreign minister made a memorandum of conversation which he submitted to us, he submitted to me. So I think now we should get together again to see what we say publicly and what we say privately.

[Translation in Spanish]

Echeverría: *Yo creo que sí. Que sin ningún compromiso categórico del presidente Nixon, yo creo que sí podemos hablar de un avance que a mí me permita tomar allá algunas disposiciones que signifiquen esperanza para los campesinos; y algunos cambios en el uso del agua sin demérito de los agricultores de Arizona y California; pero que sí sean tangibles para los campesinos de Baja California.*

Translator: It's something – without making any clear commitment on your part, Mr. President – that we can speak of progress, having gained [unintelligible] and then for me to go back home and take certain measures which will instill some hope in the hearts of the farm workers of that area. And without creating any problems for the farmers of Arizona and California but also offering some hope to the farmers of Baja California.

Echeverría: *Ahora, si esto lo que yo puedo agregar ahora en mi discurso en el Congreso como consecuencia de esta conversación, aunque sea en términos generales, el problema de los espaldas mojadas, de los trabajadores emigrantes que se emigran a los Estados Unidos.*

Translator: And I can also add in my words to the Congress in a few minutes that as a result of our conversation, that we can speak in general – we have spoken in general terms about the problem of wetbacks, that is the Mexican illegal aliens to the United States.

Nixon: Yes, yes. Because we will get – I just worked in a little more time tomorrow with the President, because we started a little late. You should indicate that we have discussed that problem and we'll go into it more tomorrow. [Unintelligible]

[Translation in Spanish]

Nixon: I think it might do very well for the President, if he desires, to indicate that we discussed the problems of the hemisphere.

[Translation in Spanish]

Echeverría: *Sí.*

Nixon: Whatever you think.

[Translation in Spanish]

Echeverría: *Sí. Sin una idea concreta pero decirles que hay un ambiente de recíproca comprensión, ¿verdad?*

Translator: Without going into the specifics, but saying there is an atmosphere of reciprocal understanding.

Echeverría: *Dígale que en este asunto de los trabajadores mexicanos, y siendo que es un problema complejo, eso para el gobierno sería conveniente la integración de una comisión que estudie más a fondo el problema y las circunstancias en que ellos trabajan.*

Translator: And as far as the wetbacks, the illegal Mexican immigrants, Mr. President, this of course is a very complex problem that I will touch upon tomorrow, but I think that we might think about the possibility of establishing a commission to study the working conditions that these people are working under at the present time.

Echeverría: *Y que no se puede hablar de un convenio porque la presión de los trabajadores norteamericanos organizados en sindicatos no lo permite, lo sabemos*

Translator: We can't speak, of course, in terms of an agreement, because we know what the pressure of American organized labor in that has.

Echeverría: [Unintelligible] *Pero que el hecho es que quizás haya... nos hablan de 700 u 800 mil trabajadores mexicanos que están ilegalmente en los Estados Unidos.*

Translator: But the fact is that we are being told that there may be as many as seven or 800,000 illegal Mexican workers in the United States.

Echeverría: *Y los propios granjeros norteamericanos son cómplices de la situación porque quieren mano de obra más barata.*

Translator: And American farmers are accomplices in this situation because they get cheaper labor.

Nixon: That's right.

Echeverría: *Entonces pasan la frontera, la frontera es muy grande, y trabajan en varios estados de la Unión Americana, en condiciones también frecuentemente duras para ellos.*

Translator: And so we have a very long border, Mr. President, and these people cross over and find work under conditions that sometimes are exceedingly harsh.

Nixon: And then many of them move to the cities, which makes it even worse for them.

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *Y ya están bastante al norte de los Estados Unidos, no es cosa de California y Texas, sino están en el centro de los Estados Unidos y en Chicago.*

Translator: They've gotten – they've moved quite a way north, they are no longer concentrated exclusively in California and Texas, they've gone [unintelligible] and in Chicago.

Echeverría: *Porque tienen parientes y amigos que los ayudan* [unintelligible].

Translator: [Unintelligible] they have relatives and friends and then they give them some cover.

Echeverría: *Y la actitud de los grupos chicanos radicales de California o de Texas, ya está cambiando respecto a esos trabajadores emigrantes, ya los están ayudando.*

Translator: And the attitude of the radical Chicano groups in California and Texas has been changing as far as these illegal immigrants are concerned. They're starting to help them now.

Echeverría: *¿Sí? Es decir primero había una tendencia de ellos a no verlos con simpatía porque venían a disputarles sitios de trabajo, pero ahora está cambiando la cosa en un sentido político.*

Translator: If at first these Chicano groups did not like to see these illegals coming in because they were in competition for jobs, well now they are changing their attitude all with a very definite political direction.

Echeverría: *Y es un problema de una minoría que va creciendo en Estados Unidos.*

Translator: So you have your problem of a minority that is growing in the United States.

Echeverría: *Lo mejor es afrontar el problema y estudiarlo.*

Translator: So the better thing would be to take the problem and study it.

Echeverría: *Sin llegando a molestar a los sindicatos, pero [unintelligible] los sindicatos... es un problema que todos los norteamericanos estamos teniendo.*

Translator: Without ruffling the feathers of the unions, of course, but to study what their conditions are because it is something that I think affects all of us.

Nixon: I agree, I agree. We agreed, incidentally Henry, that after your return from Peking – some time later this summer or maybe after we get the treaties through the Congress which will be around September 1st – that you would go to Mexico. I wish you'd take off a few days in Acapulco and call on the President and brief him. I told him that we could only do this with some of the European countries, and with Japan and Mexico and Canada.

[Translation into Spanish]

Echeverría: *Sí como no. Dígale que estamos informados en México de pues las avances de las relaciones con China y como la URSS.*

Translator: We are kept up to date in Mexico, Mr. President, of the progress made in relations with China and with the USSR.

Echeverría: *Pero el hecho concreto es que sentimos que lo que pueden hacer en Chile y en Argentina y en México y en todas partes en una u otra forma, China o la URSS es totalmente anti norteamericano.*

Translator: But there's another part, Mr. President, we feel very deeply whatever China and the Soviets can do in Chile, in Argentina, in Mexico and anywhere else, one way or another it's going to be against the United States.

Nixon: Right.

Echeverría: *Que ellos saben que un – la creación de problemas en América Latina, problemas creados por ellos, será un éxito de ellos y aspectos inconvenientes de las relaciones norteamericanas con América Latina.*

Translator: And as you know Mr. President, any problems that they can create in Latin America *vis-à-vis* the United States that may affect American relations with Latin America would be considered a success on their part.

Echeverría: *Que si pudieran crear otra Cuba en algún país latinoamericano estarían felices.*

Translator: If they could set up another Cuba somewhere else in Latin America, they would be very happy.

Echeverría: *Que donde hay dictaduras militares están muy contentos también, donde hay dictaduras militares en América Latina.*

Translator: And wherever they see military dictatorships in Latin America, they're very happy also.

Echeverría: *Porque fomentan, es decir, la clandestinidad de muchos problemas.*

Translator: Because they're able to foster a great many problems under them.

Echeverría: *Que donde no hay dictadura, subversionan grupos juveniles y revistas que son claramente sobretodo pro soviéticas.*

Translator: And wherever there are no dictatorships, they subsidize our youth groups, for examples, and magazines that are clearly pro-soviet in their line.

Echeverría: *Pero, que es mas fácil contrarrestarlos, con regímenes políticos que tengan soluciones sociales y económicas a los problemas sociales.*

Translator: So you see, sir, it's easier to counteract whatever they are trying to do when you have a political system that provides social and economic solutions to economic and social problems.

Echeverría: *Que en algunos países latinoamericanos nos dicen sus presidentes aquí nos estorbaron mucho los diputados, los representantes, los senadores y ya los quitamos.*

Translator: We are told in certain [unintelligible] – by certain Latin American leaders, well, we used to have a lot of problems with our members of Congress and our senators, so we got rid of them!

Echeverría: [Hearty laugh] *Y ahora trabajamos mejor!*

Translator: And now we are working better.

Echeverría: *Pero que en la clandestinidad están haciendo muchas cosas.*

Translator: But underground they can do a lot, still.

Nixon: Well, the President must leave for his date with the Congress if he is not going to keep them waiting. So we will meet again tonight, at dinner. We will continue our talks tomorrow.

[Insignificant chat as they leave the room.]

-end-