

*From the [redacted]*

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1. WHY THE POLITICAL PROGRAM SHOULD BE IN THE SPEECH

Military action by us with respect to Cuba will raise world-wide fears of a nuclear war. It will also raise questions about our full objectives. The world will be watching us closely to see whether we combine our military might and determination with political acumen. Inclusion of a political program in the initial speech will drive home the essential point: that the United States wants a political settlement, not an escalated military ~~involvement~~ involvement. In the absence of such an offer at the very outset we risk being in the world position the UK was in at the time of Suez. [ ] Should further military action be necessary after the speech we would be credited with having tried to avoid the necessity. [ ] The offer would not sound "soft" if properly worded; it would sound "wise". An offer in a subsequent speech (such as in the SC) would not create the necessary initial impact on world opinion. It might even give the appearance of a retreat, from our initial position.

2. WHAT "NEUTRALIZATION" WOULD MEAN

The political program needs a catch word which will strike imaginations as portraying a fair offer. "Neutralization" is the best that comes to mind, "demilitarization" a second best. By

"neutralization"

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"neutralization" we would mean a result along the Austrian type. The main content of the program would in fact be "demilitarization". i.e. removal of Soviet military installations, equipment, and personnel under UN observation. Such neutralization and demilitarization would immediately and drastically reduce the troublemaking capability of the Cuban regime, and would probably result in its early overthrow. In the initial proposal a tight-rope needs to be walked between asking Khrushchev directly to agree to replace the present Cuban Government with a non-communist one (which would make it almost impossible for him to talk), and any implication that we would settle for the present government. The crux of the problem is getting the USSR out militarily and putting as much "neutral," e.g. UN influence, in as possible in order to bring about consequential political change.

### 3. WHY GUANTANAMO IN AND ITALY AND TURKEY OUT

Within the scope of vigorous US military action to defend our security, an offer to exchange Guantanamo for removal of Soviet installations in Cuba would be regarded both world-wide and domestically as a gesture showing our wisdom and good faith. It is the element of concession (of little real importance) which would give a proposal for "neutralization" of

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Cuba (i.e. withdrawal of Soviet military support) "balance". The entire political context in which the offer would be made, in other words, would be different than the one now prevailing. An offer in effect to exchange Guantanamo for the Soviet sites in the absence of US military response to the Soviet moves would be weak. In conjunction with such steps it would be regarded as a far-reaching step by us to grasp peace out of the brink of war.

Turkey and <sup>Italy</sup> ~~Italy~~ should not be included in the initial offer. Their inclusion would divert attention from the Cuban threat to the general problem of foreign bases. Furthermore, Turkey and Italy should be consulted in advance. The inclusion of bases in these countries in an inspection arrangement in ~~response~~ response to the USSR's broadening of the issue would at a later stage be a powerful move.