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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Minister of Defense of Italy, Mr. Andreotti,
Secretary McNamara and Assistant Secretary Nitze

TIME: Afternoon, December 13, 1962

PLACE: NATO Building, Paris, France

Mr. McNamara began the discussion by referring to M-113 personnel carriers. He said that we would be happy to help Italy produce them in Italy. Mr. Andreotti said that he understood Mr. Gilpatrick had overruled the difficulties which seemed to stand in the way. They are having the costs analyzed and will see whether it is better to start new production or to rely solely on procurement in the United States. Mr. McNamara pointed out that they could perhaps begin assembly in Italy from parts shipped from the U.S. Mr. Andreotti said they had a team in California working with the FMC Corporation and would make a decision based upon the analysis of that team.

Mr. Andreotti then asked whether Mr. McNamara had seen a letter that he had sent requesting technical assistance in their work on atomic submarines. Mr. McNamara said that it had not arrived when he left Washington but that he would look into the matter on his return.

Mr. McNamara said he wanted to raise a point which had arisen during the Cuban crisis. When we were considering plans to attack the Soviet missiles in Cuba, we were concerned about the danger of a Soviet response against the Jupiters in Turkey and in Italy. The danger to Turkey seemed to us to be the greater but we were concerned about Italy as well. It seemed to us that it would be wise to substitute something more responsive and less vulnerable to sabotage or to direct attack before a serious discussion or crisis might arise with respect to Berlin which might be as early as next April.

Mr. Andreotti said Italy would not itself raise this question because of the potential effect on the Alliance. He asked whether it was possible that one could use a naval deployment. Mr. McNamara said we could assign Polaris missiles to SACBUR and have Italy participate in the targeting. Mr. Andreotti said that it was important that the initiative come from

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the U.S. He thought it was also important that action be taken prior to the spring elections in Italy. Their main concern was that there be no impression of weakness on Italy's part. Mr. Nitze suggested that we would want to coordinate any arrangement with SACMUR before it was announced.

Mr. McNamara said that we had also been thinking about SETAF. We had earlier thought that this responsibility should be taken over by Italy. We believe, however, that the Corporals are obsolete and should be replaced by Sergeants. Furthermore, we would be prepared for at least an interim period to continue the U.S. responsibility for SETAF as at present. He said it might be possible to link together the replacement of Jupiters and the Corporals. Mr. McNamara asked Mr. Andreotti whether he thought this could be worked out within sixty days after we made a proposal.

Mr. Andreotti said if Mr. McNamara could send them a proposal, they could let us know within three days. He suggested Mr. McNamara send him a personal letter. He repeated that he hoped the transaction could be completed before the elections, even though he hoped still to be a member of the new administration which would follow the elections.

Mr. Andreotti then referred to a concern that the 104Gs would not be effective as all-weather fighters. Mr. McNamara said he would have to prepare himself on the question and would talk to Mr. Andreotti about it later.

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