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Authority NAID 931542
By RJA NARA Date 4-25-95

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Memorandum

TO : EUR/WE - Mr. Meloy

DATE January 18, 1963

FROM : GTI - John W. Bowling

375.75611
12-1962

SUBJECT: Jupiter Negotiations - Ankara

Reference: Ankara's telegram No. 792, January 18, 1963.

I have the action copy of this telegram, but we assume that any reply, of course, will be prepared and approved through "the group".

I must admit that I agree with Ambassador Hare and his description of the Turkish position as grotesque. It was just possible that the Turks are being super-clever, but I believe they are utterly confused, suspicious, and worried about domestic political repercussions. I would suggest that the following points be covered in a reply:

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(1) As has been repeatedly and publicly indicated, the US looks forward to a true multilaterally-manned and controlled NATO nuclear force. The substitution of Polaris for Jupiters, however, does not represent the establishment of the force we envisage, but is rather only a small step in that direction. There can therefore at this stage be no possibility of placing U.S. Polaris submarines under the command of foreign nationals. Following a long period of future negotiations on the nature of a multilateral NATO force, we look forward to NATO agreement on manning, controls, command, and financing of such a force. Attempts at this time to make ad hoc ~~multilateral~~ bilateral agreements would distort and prejudice the ultimate success of the complicated NATO negotiating process which Under Secretary Ball recently initiated in Paris.

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(2) In view of the above, the Turks should understand that the training of full Turkish crews is neither timely or practical. We do contemplate the presence of Turkish observers on the Mediterranean force Polaris vessels from time to time, and we also contemplate a carefully phased program of training in the US, beginning with general familiarization training on the Polaris weapons system.

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(3) From information presently available to me, I would think we should inform the Turks that the advancement of delivery dates on F-104gs to the time now indicated has been the result of an all-out expediting action and that it is literally impossible to increase the number of

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number of F-104g's in the first squadron. This is not a question of will or of priorities on the part of the US. It is a question of physical resources available.

(4) I don't know anything about a training program for F-104g pilots, but I imagine that the DOD can provide us with an outline of the training program they contemplate and that it may satisfy the Turks.

(5) I believe we should tell the Turks that there are too many changeable factors for us to guarantee second squadron F-104g delivery at any one time. We can say that we are quite certain that it will occur during 1964. Any specific date set at the present moment might very well have to be revised forward or backward in view of unforeseeable developments in the world military and political situation.

(6) I think ~~the~~ Group should push hard on DOD/ISA to see what they can come up with in the way of a little icing for the Turkish Navy in the form of materiel.

(7) I believe the key to the negotiations in Turkey at the present moment is the exact situation with regard to our negotiations in Italy. If these are going satisfactorily, I would suggest that Hare be given a summary of the situation and be authorized to convey it to the Turks in his discretion. *Perhaps using Italian Ambassador Unbale*

I am not pessimistic, and I think it quite possible we could end up with a satisfactory solution in ten days or so. I stand ready to cooperate in any way that I can.

cc: G/PM - Mr. Kitchen

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