


TOP SECRET



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET SATELLITES
IN EASTERN EUROPE

TOP SECRET

- APPENDIX TO' NSC 5608/1

July 18, 1956

TOP SECRET



by the President this late, the enclosed statement of policy, supplied entary to the statement of policy, supplied entary to the statement of policy contained in NSC 5606/1, is circulated herewith for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

This Appendix to NSC 5608/1 is being given a special limited distribution, and the contents hereof should be subject to special security precautions with access limited to those individuals having a strict "need to know" in the performance of their official duties.

JAMES 3. LAY, JR. Executive Secretary

The Attorney General
The Appecial Assistant to the
President for Disarmament
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

MONITOR AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority /V/V 0952 97

NARA Date 2/29/2

1,

TOP SHORET

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF POLICY by the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ON U. S. PULICY TOWARD THE SOVIET SATELLITES IN EASTERN EUROPE

- when the probable reprisals or other results would yield a net loss in terms of U. S. objectives. In general, however, do not discourage, by public utterances or otherwise, spentaneous manifestations of discontent and opposition to the Communist regime, despite risks to individuals, when their net results will exert pressures for release from Soviet domination. Operations which might involve or lead to local violence will be authorized only by the Secretary of State with the approval of the President on the basis of feasibility, minimum risk, and maximum contribution to the basic U. S. objectives in NSC 5608/1.
- 2. As a means of encouraging the eventual establishment of freely elected governments in the satellites as a disruptive device and not as an end in itself, be prepared on a case-by-case basis generally covertly and under appropriate policy guidance to assist nationalism in any form where conducive to independence from soviet domination and where U.S. and free world cohesion would not be jeopardized thereby.