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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7228

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NODIS

CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1,2,3  
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, TECH, FR, SF  
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH GOF ON POSSIBLE SOUTH  
AFRICAN NUCLEAR TEST

REF: (A) STATE 194977, (B) STATE 194980, (C) PARIS  
23625

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR SMITH AND I MET THIS  
MORNING, AUGUST 17, WITH QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL SOUTOU.  
EXCEPT FOR WILLIAMSON (ACDA), NO ONE ELSE WAS PRESENT.  
CONVERSATION CENTERED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON SOUTH  
AFRICAN SITUATION, THOUGH SOUTOU DID TOUCH BRIEFLY ON  
GENERAL SITUATION IN AFRICA, SOVIET MOTIVATIONS, GERMANY  
AND ON THE PAKISTANI AND BRAZILIAN NONPROLIFERATION  
QUESTIONS.

2. DURING CONVERSATIONS, SOUTOU WAS BRIEFED ON BASIS  
FOR US CONCERN AND NEED FOR URGENT ACTION TO WARN SOUTH  
AFRICANS AGAINST TESTING. SOUTOU AGREED THAT STRONG  
MEASURES WERE REQUIRED TO HEAD OFF A SOUTH AFRICAN TEST.  
HE DID NOT REITERATE INTEREST IN HAVING UK JOIN IN AN

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APPROACH TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS, AND WAS RATHER NEGATIVE  
ON A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR THE IAEA. HOWEVER, HE FELT SOME  
ACTION MIGHT BE NEEDED TO INVOLVE THE GERMANS, "IN  
LIGHT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR SUPPLY TO SOUTH  
AFRICA." END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR SMITH BEGAN DISCUSSION BY EXPRESSING  
SECRETARY'S APPRECIATION FOR THE QUICK AND FORTHCOMING  
RESPONSE OF THE GOF ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR QUES-  
TION. HE SUMMARIZED THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO US,

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Marvin Russell,  
Senior Reviewer

POINTING OUT THAT IT SEEMS TO VALIDATE THE SOVIET ALLEGATIONS, AND NOTING THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO BE MORE SPECIFIC IN REVIEWING THIS EVIDENCE FOR THE FRENCH PRESIDENT THIS AFTERNOON. EVEN PRIOR TO THIS NEW EVIDENCE, THE US HAD BEEN CONCERNED OVER SOUTH AFRICAN INTENTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD.

4. DRAWING ON REF A, HE STATED THAT THE US WAS WILLING TO DROP ITS PREVIOUS INTEREST IN HAVING CANADA PARTICIPATE IN ANY JOINT INSPECTION OF THE TEST SITE (WHICH SOUTOU WELCOMED) BUT NOTED THAT THERE WAS SOME INTEREST IN INVOLVING THE IAEA WITH OUR APPROACH. AS TO PARTICIPATION BY THE UK, AMBASSADOR SMITH EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE UK SEEMS TO BE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE RHODESIAN ISSUE. NOTING THAT THE LAGOS CONFERENCE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION COULD MAKE THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN INTENTIONS A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE URGENCY, HE OUTLINED THE PROPOSED US APPROACH CONTAINED REF B, AND PASSED SOUTOU A "NON-PAPER" CONTAINING THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED TALKING POINTS FOR USE BY AMBASSADOR BOWDLER. HE REITERATED OUR HOPE THAT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN PRETORIA COULD GIVE A SIMILAR WARNING. FINALLY,

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HE EXPRESSED A HOPE THAT IF NEEDED THE FRENCH WOULD ALSO JOIN IN A SUBSEQUENT APPROACH TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS, REQUESTING AN INSPECTION OF THE SITE IN THE KALAHARI.

5. SOUTOU REPEATED HIS MINISTER'S SUPPORT FOR THE GOF TO MAKE AN URGENT APPROACH IN PRETORIA ALONG THE GENERAL LINES OF THE US TALKING POINTS, AND THOUGHT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE A GOOD BEGINNING. HOWEVER, FRENCH WILLINGNESS TO TAKE THE FURTHER STEP OF REQUESTING A JOINT INSPECTION WOULD DEPEND ON A DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT. HE INDICATED THAT FRANCE WAS IN AGREEMENT THAT STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO AVOID A

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NUCLEAR TEST BY SOUTH AFRICA, AND "MAYBE EVEN MORE" STEPS TO RESTRAIN SOUTH AFRICA'S TEMPTATION TO USE NUCLEAR FACILITIES FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES. SOUTOU DID NOT PERSONALLY FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT UK PARTICIPATION IN A FOLLOW-ON APPROACH THOUGH HIS MINISTER HAD RAISED THE POSSIBILITY. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THE FRG SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN LIGHT OF THE "IMPORTANCE OF GERMAN SUPPLY" TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ENRICHMENT PLANT AND THE CLOSER COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS, PARTICULARLY IN COMPARISON TO THE "MODEST" SCALE OF FRENCH ASSISTANCE. HE THEN MENTIONED FRENCH-SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION, POINTING OUT THAT EXCEPT FOR URANIUM PURCHASES FROM SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE SUPPLY OF THE KOEBERG REACTORS (THE FIRST OF WHICH WOULD NOT ACHIEVE CRITICALITY UNTIL 1982), FRENCH COOPERATION WAS MINIMAL. FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY ASSISTANCE FOR THE ENRICHMENT PLANT VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTANT; THE FRENCH HAD TOLD THEIR INDUSTRY THAT NO MATERIALS OR EVEN SPARE PARTS COULD BE SHIPPED TO THAT SITE, AND HAD RECENTLY DENIED AN EXPORT LICENSE TO SOME "DUAL CAPABLE" VALVES WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN DESTINED FOR ULTIMATE USE IN THE EXPLOSIVES PROGRAM. AMBASSADOR SMITH THEN GAVE SOUTOU A BRIEF "NON-PAPER" OUTLINING US NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. HE ALSO WENT OVER THE FACTS AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM, WITH RESPECT

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TO PAST GERMAN COOPERATION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN ENRICHMENT PROGRAM, AND PROMISED TO SUPPLY ADDITIONAL DETAILS. SOUTOU WAS GENERALLY NEGATIVE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF IAEA INVOLVEMENT, PARTICULARLY AT EARLY STAGES, WHICH COULD RAISE QUESTIONS AS TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE IAEA TO TAKE ON SUCH A TASK.

6. SOUTOU, AFTER NOTING THAT FRENCH EXPERTS AGREE THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAS THE CAPABILITY NOW TO EXPLODE A DEVICE THEN DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH HIS VIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN MOTIVATIONS FROM A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE. HE DOUBTED THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD ANY MOTIVATION TO EXPLODE A DEVICE, BUT RATHER WERE SEEKING "LIKE THE

ISRAELIS" TO ACQUIRE THE DETERRENT CAPABILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHOUT THE POLITICAL COST OF ACTUALLY EXPLODING A DEVICE. AMBASSADOR SMITH DISAGREED, NOTING THAT THE SITE PREPARATIONS APPEARED TO BE TOO ADVANCED TO SUPPORT SUCH A THEORY, THAT US INTELLIGENCE SOURCES THOUGHT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE LIKELY TO CARRY THROUGH WITH THEIR PROGRAM, AND THAT SAG MILITARY COMMANDERS WOULD NOT BE HAPPY WITH DEVICES THEY COULD NOT DEMONSTRATE HAD BEEN ADEQUATELY TESTED. MOREOVER, WHILE TESTING NUCLEAR DEVICES MIGHT NOT MAKE "RATIONAL" SENSE, "RATIONAL THINKING IN THINGS ATOMIC OFTEN DOES NOT OBTAIN," AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS MIGHT WELL PROCEED, EVEN IF IT WERE CONTRARY TO THEIR POLITICAL INTERESTS.

7. SOUTOU FELT THAT SUCH A STEP BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS AT THIS TIME COULD ONLY HURT THEM IN THE ENTIRE SOUTHERN AFRICAN QUESTION, AND MAKE WESTERN COOPERATION VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE IN ALL FIELDS. HE FELT THAT PRESSURE WOULD DEVELOP FORCING THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO

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STOP EVEN ITS PRESENT ARMS RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH AFRICA -- HE MENTIONED SPARE PARTS AND DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER SHIPS ON ORDER MIGHT NOT BE DELIVERED.

8. SOUTOU EXPLAINED IN SOME DETAIL HIS VIEWS OF SOVIET MOTIVATION. THE SOVIETS ALWAYS LIKE TO LEAVE THEIR "VISITING CARD" AT TIMES WHEN THIRD WORLD MEETINGS WERE TAKING PLACE. THEY HAVE HAD A LONG HISTORY OF DISPUTE WITH CHINA WHICH ACCUSES THE SOVIET UNION OF BEING ALLIED WITH THE CAPITALIST WORLD. THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE GREAT EFFORTS TO SHOW THEY ARE PART OF AND CLOSE TO THE NONALIGNED WORLD AND ANTI-IMPERIALIST. THIS IS WHY THE STATEMENT BY TASS, AND PARTICULARLY THE WORDS USED IN THAT STATEMENT, IS SIGNIFICANT AS A MESSAGE TO AFRICA PRIOR TO THE LAGOS MEETING. HE ALSO

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THOUGHT THAT THE PARTICULAR ATTACK ON FRANCE AS BEING ONE OF THE COUNTRIES THAT SUPPLY SOUTH AFRICA WAS DESIGNED TO SHOW SOVIET UNHAPPINESS WITH RECENT FRENCH-AFRICAN POLICY, PROBABLY EVEN WITH THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER'S PRESENT TRIP. THE SOVIETS WERE SEEKING WAYS TO BOLSTER THEIR STANDING IN AFRICA OF WHICH ATTACKING SOUTH AFRICA, "NATO" SUPPLIES, ETC. WAS A USEFUL TACTIC. HOWEVER, HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE ALSO VERY CONCERNED OVER THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IMPLICATIONS OF A SOUTH AFRICAN TEST.

9. SOUTOU PHILOSOPHIZED ABOUT GERMAN ACTIVITIES. HE RECALLED A CONVERSATION WITH THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR THE PREVIOUS DAY ON BERLIN AND HIS OWN PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE ON GERMAN MATTERS TO MAKE THE POINT THAT GERMANY AS A DIVIDED COUNTRY SHOULD NOT EVER BE IN POSITION OF TAKING ON THE SOVIET UNION BY ITSELF. THUS THE THREE POWERS (US, UK, FRANCE) SHOULD CONTINUE TO ACT TOGETHER ON BERLIN.

10. AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING, SOUTOU TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE PAKISTANI AND BRAZILIAN CASES. HE PERSONALLY HAD NEVER LIKED THE PAKISTANI DEAL, BECAUSE IT SET A BAD PRECEDENT, WHICH WAS THEN FOLLOWED BY THE GERMANS IN THE CASE OF BRAZIL. HE THOUGHT THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE SHOWED THE NEED FOR

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SOME URGENCY IN DEALING WITH CASES OF THIS KIND, AND INDICATED THAT THE FRENCH WERE THINKING OF MODIFYING THE DEAL WITH PAKISTAN. THEY WOULD RAISE THIS QUESTION WITH THE PAKISTANIS DURING THE VISIT NEXT MONTH OF PAKISTANI ACTING FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAHI.

11. COMMENT: THE MEETING WENT WELL. SOUTOU APPEARED PLEASED THAT WE ARE CONSULTING CLOSELY ON THIS QUESTION, APPEARED GENUINELY CONCERNED OVER ITS IMPLICATIONS, AND WISHED TO BE HELPFUL. SOUTOU WAS IN AN EXPANSIVE MOOD, AND IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION GAVE A NUMBER OF INSIGHTS INTO QUAI THINKING, NOT ONLY ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR QUESTION, BUT ALSO ON A NUMBER OF OTHER ISSUES. SOUTOU AGAIN

DISPLAYED HIS STRONG ANTIPATHY TO THE FRG-BRAZIL DEAL,  
AND SOME DISTRUST OF GERMAN MOTIVES AND ACTIONS IN BOTH  
BRAZIL AND SOUTH AFRICA. END COMMENT.

12. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO EMBASSY PRETORIA AND  
OTHER POSTS AS APPROPRIATE.  
HARTMAN

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