

# NODIS

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TEST. SIMILAR DEMARCHES WERE MADE TO UK, FRANCE, AND FRG.

2. SOVIETS EXPRESSED TO U.S. STRONG CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF SOUTH AFRICAN TEST. WE HAVE TOLD SOVIETS THAT WE HAVE BEEN GIVING SERIOUS ATTENTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, THAT WE FULLY SHARE THEIR CONCERN IN PREVENTING A POSSIBLE NUCLEAR TEST, AND THAT WE HAVE MADE OUR DEEP CONCERNS KNOWN TO SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT (SAG).

3. A CAREFUL REVIEW OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE DATA HAS LED US TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS IN FACT SUBSTANTIAL PROBABILITY THAT

SAG IS DEVELOPING NUCLEAR TEST SITE IN KALAHARI. AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE BUT WHEN COMBINED WITH PRIOR EVIDENCE OF AN UNSAFEGUARDED ENRICHMENT PLANT IN SOUTH AFRICA CAPABLE OF PRODUCING HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM, AND EVIDENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS-RELATED R AND D, IT NOW APPEARS LIKELY THAT SOUTH AFRICANS ARE ENGAGED IN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES PROGRAM, AND ARE FURTHER ALONG THAN WE PREVIOUSLY REALIZED. OUR INFORMATION DOES NOT SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT AN ACTUAL TEST OF ANY DEVICE IS IMMINENT.

4. SINCE SOVIET DEMARCHE, USG HAS UNDERTAKEN SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS WITH BRITISH, FRENCH, WEST GERMANS, AND ISRAELIS, IN ORDER TO ENSURE COORDINATED APPROACH TO SAG ON ISSUE AND FULLEST POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AMONG GOVERNMENTS NAMED IN TASS DISPATCHES. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES GOJ SHOULD BE AWARE OF SITUATION SINCE JAPANESE, WHILE NOT ACCUSED OF TRANSFER OF WEAPONS-RELATED NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO SOUTH AFRICA, HAVE WELL ESTABLISHED TECHNOLOGICAL AND COMMERCIAL LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND MAY BE PRIVY TO INFORMATION WHICH WOULD BE HELPFUL TO

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US IN OUR CONSULTATIONS ON ISSUE.

5. US HAS RAISED ISSUE URGENTLY WITH SAG, REITERATING OUR LONG-STANDING CONCERN THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAS NOT RATIFIED NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY NOR PERMITTED ITS PILOT URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT TO BE SUBJECTED TO INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS. ON SPECIFIC ISSUE OF POSSIBLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, WE HAVE ASKED SAG FOR SPECIFIC ASSURANCES THAT 1) SA DOES NOT HAVE OR INTEND TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES FOR ANY PURPOSE, PEACEFUL OR OTHERWISE; 2) THAT KALAHARI FACILITY IS NOT TESTING FACILITY FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES, AND 3) THAT THERE WILL BE NO NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TESTING OF ANY KIND IN SOUTH AFRICA. INTERIM PARTIAL ASSURANCES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED, AND WE ARE CONTINUING TO PURSUE THE MATTER WITH SAG.

6. APART FROM OBVIOUS LONGER-TERM GRAVITY OF ISSUE, EARLY SATISFACTORY AND FULL SAG RESPONSE CRITICAL IN VIEW OF LAGOS ANTI-APARTHEID CONFERENCE WHICH BEGINS AUGUST 22. DEPARTMENT'S VIEW IS THAT, WHILE SAG WILL IN ANY EVENT COME IN FOR SEVERE CONDEMNATION, FAILURE OF SAG TO DEFUSE NUCLEAR ISSUE BY PROVIDING FULL AND PUBLIC ASSURANCES WILL GREATLY INTENSIFY PRESSURES FOR ANTI-SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIONS AND MEASURES OF MOST EXTREME SORT, LIMIT OUR ABILITY TO FORESTALL OR MODERATE EXPECTED DEMANDS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION. END FYI.

7. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS YOU SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH APPROPRIATELY SENIOR GOJ OFFICIAL AUGUST 22 AND BRIEF ON ISSUE, DRAWING ON FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

--AS GOJ PRESUMABLY AWAKE FROM PRESS ACCOUNTS, SOVIETS HAVE ALLEGED THAT SAG IS PURSUING NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND HAS BEEN AIDED IN THIS EFFORT BY U.S. AND OTHER NATO MEMBERS AND BY ISRAEL. SOVIETS HAVE ALSO MADE ORAL DEMARCHES ON THIS SUBJECT TO U.S., UK, FRANCE,

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AND FRG.

--PREVENTING SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS ONE OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S TOP PRIORITIES AND WE WOULD VIEW WITH THE UTMOST SERIOUSNESS SOUTH AFRICA'S ACQUISITION OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY.

--DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH A CAPABILITY WOULD BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO OUR GENERAL NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS AND WOULD ALSO HAVE PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT.

--SINCE SOUTH AFRICA HAS NOT SIGNED THE NPT AND HAS FOR SOME TIME HAD AN UNSAFEGUARDED PILOT URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE SAG COULD BE IN A POSITION TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY.

--ACCORDINGLY, WE HAVE TAKEN THE MATTER UP URGENTLY WITH THE SAG TO OBTAIN ACCEPTABLE ASSURANCES THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS NOT DEVELOPING AND WILL NOT DEVELOP OR TEST NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES.

--WE HAVE ALSO INTENSIFIED OUR EFFORTS TO GET SAG TO PLACE ALL ITS NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER FULL INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND TO DECLARE PUBLICLY ITS INTENTION TO ADHERE TO THE NPT WITHOUT DELAY.

--WE HAVE HAD AN ENCOURAGING RESPONSE FROM THE SAG ON THE QUESTION OF ASSURANCES, AND ARE HOPING FOR A FULL AND DEFINITIVE RESPONSE WHICH CAN BE MADE PUBLIC IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE ARE PARTICULARLY HOPEFUL FOR SUCH A RESPONSE IN VIEW OF THE LAGOS ANTI-APARTHEID CONFERENCE WHICH BEGINS ON AUGUST 22.

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--IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONSULTATIONS WHICH THE U.S. HAS  
BEGUN WITH THE UK, FRANCE, THE FRG, AND ISRAEL, WE BELIEVE  
IT NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACTS WITH  
MAJOR ALLIES AND POTENTIAL NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AS JOINT  
EFFORTS ON THIS SERIOUS MATTER GO FORWARD. WE WISH TO  
MAKE GOJ AWARE OF THIS ISSUE AND OUR PERCEPTIONS OF IT,

AND WILL BE CONSULTING FURTHER AS EVENTS DEVELOP. WE HOPE  
THAT THE GOJ WILL SHARE WITH US ITS VIEWS AND ANY INFOR-  
MATION THAT IT MAY ACQUIRE ON THE SUBJECT AS CIRCUMSTANCES  
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