

**The NSC has waived their
classification equity for
information within this
White House/NSC document.**

**Your agency has been determined to be the
agency of primary interest.**

**Please review for your agency's equities
and obtain any necessary concurrences.**

*Pastor -
Personal*
9

MEMORANDUM

State Department review
completed

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

June 27, 1977

Carter Library Review
Completed, 4/7/04

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: ROBERT A. PASTOR *Rob*

SUBJECT: The Gedda Story and U.S. Policy to Chile

Having been caught in a crossfire and almost shot, let me offer three possible reasons why the two State Department officials tried to nail me. I want to spell these out in some detail not only because of the obvious effect this incident has had on me and my relationship to you, but more importantly because of the implications of this incident for the NSC and for the President's policy on human rights.

I would speculate that the document I sent for comments as a draft PRM was presumably rewritten (to refer to "alternative Chilean regimes" and addressed to the CIA) and leaked for three reasons:

- To try to get rid of me by identifying me with an unjustifiable policy of intervention and by making it appear as if I were acting on my own against your instructions.
- To try to put a stop to the NSC Staff's "interference" in the State Department's conduct of foreign policy.
- To keep U.S. policy to Chile solely the prerogative of ARA.

* * *

From my conversations with Rick and David, I know that our recollections of the circumstances preceding my LDXing a copy of the draft on Chile to State are different. Still I would like to state my impressions of what happened clearly and honestly.

I raised the issue of a PRM on Chile with you during the Frei interview, when he talked of the great need for U.S. policy consistency to Chile, and you said that we should talk about it later. Later, you said that you did not think the PRM was an appropriate instrument to do a country study, and you suggested an inter-agency study instead. About a week

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

later, when I was talking to you about a Caribbean PRM (following the President's suggestion to all of us to try again, if you believe that you are right), I said that I thought that an inter-agency study would not work because Todman would chair it, and his views on the direction U.S. policy should take to Chile did not, in my opinion, reflect the President's views on human rights policy. (Todman strongly opposed the meeting between the Vice President and Frei and argued forcefully -- (through Luers, since he was making a speech in Tampa) -- at the Christopher meeting on Friday on behalf of three AID loans to Chile.) Besides, Todman told me, as expected, that he did not think such a study was necessary. Then you asked me whether I had shown the drafts (of the Chile and Caribbean PRMs) to anyone in State for comments, and I said I had not, and you, in an offhand manner, suggested I send them for comments, "and then we'll see."

I told Luigi and Tom Thornton that you had reservations about the Chile study. If I were trying to do an end-run around you, I would never have volunteered those comments to them or anyone. Although I feel quite sure Luigi was not responsible for the leaks (he called me up to apologize for what happened, and he is about the only one in ARA whom I trust), I think he may have carelessly passed on to others the comment that you had reservations about that PRM, and that was exploited by the people who told Gedda, who wrote that Bob Pastor was acting on his own. I regret more than I can convey that it was used so successfully, and that you did not trust me enough at the beginning to see the Gedda article for what it was -- an attempt to cut my most important source of effectiveness -- my relationship with you.

Secondly, the NSC, and let me start by two stories. After the Frei interview with Mondale, a friend of mine in State overheard another official saying: "Goddamit, the White House is trying to make foreign policy." John Marcum mentioned to me that when Kissinger moved over to State in 1973, he effectively castrated all the regional NSC Staff by either making regional policy himself or going directly to the President. On defense issues, one had to use the NSC because Defense strongly asserted its interest, but in regional policy, there were no obvious counterweights to Kissinger. So the Latin American people in NSC, Defense, and Treasury hardly did anything; whenever I came to Washington during this period, I was always surprised at how much time they had.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3

I have had difficulty working with ARA for personal and policy reasons, no doubt, but mainly I believe for institutional reasons. They act as if life does not exist outside ARA except perhaps on the seventh floor. They have tried to exclude me and have kept me uninformed on what they have been doing. Hardly any information or recommendations bearing on future policy are forwarded to the NSC unless I ask for it first. (There were hardly any "action folders" sent for the 12 days I was travelling on the trip with Mrs. Carter.) They, frankly, would like to see NSC disappear. To the extent that they want to relay information to the President, they have learned to convey this information through the Secretary's memoranda to the President, which, of course, I do not see and on which I cannot offer my comments. I suggest this would not be that much of a problem if I were dealing with some "new people" in ARA, but they have not arrived, and are not likely to.

Thirdly, U.S. human rights policy to Chile. I heard on Saturday that when the Gedda story broke, Todman's reaction was: "consider that the Chile PRM is dead." U.S. policy to Chile is currently a series of uncoordinated, ad hoc decisions. To the extent that ARA makes policy, it is an attempt to improve our relations with Chile.

That approach would be all right if Chile were not the kind of symbol which it currently is in the United States. Indications of its overriding symbolic importance to the U.S. and to the President's human rights policy include the number of news articles on Chile in the last week and the number of times Jimmy Carter mentioned it in the second debate with Gerald Ford.

State is currently wrestling with two very different approach for U.S. policy to Chile. ARA's approach: begin a dialogue with Pinochet, trying to exchange economic assistance or positive statements by our Ambassador or Secretary of State for even the slightest indication of diminishing repression. As an example, Luers suggested to me the possibility of a Presidential letter of appreciation to Pinochet when he exchanged Jorge Montes, a prominent Chilean communist who was in prison since the coup, with ten Russian dissidents. The problem with this strategy is that it would risk Presidential association (either directly or indirectly) with the most regressive government in the hemisphere for "a pittance."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4

A second option is suggested by Mark Schneider, Pat Derian's very effective Deputy, to immediately and totally disassociate the U.S. from the present regime.

Presently, policy is not the result of bureaucratic pushing-and-pulling, as Graham Allison would have it, but rather the USG is presently pursuing these two options simultaneously. Sometimes, Schneider inserts himself in the process, bringing it to the attention of Christopher or Vance. Other times, ARA just communicates directly with the Chileans. There is obviously good reason to conclude that our policy to Chile has been inconsistent and ad hoc without a sense of goals or strategies. That is why I initially drafted a PRM. Given the Gedda story and ARA's strong fight for loans to Chile, I think there is even a stronger and more compelling need for a systematic attempt to formulate a consistent policy to Chile than before, but for obvious reasons, this will be the last time I will say that.

* * *

Let me raise briefly the two other cases which lead you to the conclusion, which I think is totally false and unfair, that I was either going around you to push for my own policy or that I was, to use a favorite expression, an "unguided missile."

Meat

1. If you look at the first follow-up memorandum on the Oduber conversation, which went out while I was still on the trip, and mine (Tab A), I think you will see what I was trying to get at. The first memorandum provided several options by way of questions of possible ways to implement the President's request; the most promising path, and one which was discussed with Oduber, was omitted because it was not reported in the summary memcon. All my memorandum tried to do was ask them to look at another formula for increasing Costa Rica's quota. My point is that the best way to increase Costa Rica's quota is to try to get an agreement from Australia and New Zealand to reduce theirs, and the best way to do that would be on the basis of a principle -- special and differential treatment for the LDCs -- which they have already accepted internationally. Another option is to force a single-country increase down the throats of the Australians and New Zealanders, but I do not think that would be as effective or as desirable. (They would probably claim compensation for U.S. violation of the GATT.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5

Narcotics

On the letter to Lopez Michelsen, after drafting it with Mathea Falco, she undertook to get clearances from Bourne, Luers, and Christopher, and I said that I would send the letter through you (rather than through Bourne). I do not know what she told Christopher, but I overheard her conversation with Luers, who said: "I don't think we should mention the Minister of National Defense, but that seems to have been the President's wishes."

There was some ambiguity on that direct question -- whether a name should be named in the letter, but the President was so much stronger on this issue than the rest of us (and he himself remarked, that it was curious that he should be bolder than his advisors), that Mathea and I thought we should include it, and if he had second thoughts, it would be easier for him to delete it than to rewrite it in order to add it. If you had called me to ask, I would have been glad to tell you. I would have told you when I gave you the letter, but it was finished at 10:00 p.m., and you were gone.

* * *

I guess what I found most depressing about the Gedda leak is that the "leakers" succeeded to a certain extent in achieving their three objectives.

CONFIDENTIAL